

* * PROCEEDINGS * * *

"THE CONSEQUENCES AND LIMITS

0F

MILITARY INTERVENTION"

D D COLOR DE LA SERVE DESTRUCCIÓN DE LA SERVE DE LA SE

AD NO.

AD A G 397

Best Available Copy

PROCEEDINGS of the

Research Symposium

on

THE CONSEQUENCES AND LIMITS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION

Held at Chicago University, Illinois on June 17-19, 1976,

Conference Working Drafts

For Comment and Not for Quotation

Presented at the University of Chicago

June 17 - 19, 1976

MATERIAL SERVICES

Principle Investigator

SAM C. SARKESIAN

Conference Co-Ordinators

MORRIS JANOWITZ ELLEN STERN

This conference was made possible by a grant to Loyola University of Chicago from the Advanced Research Projects Agency, #170-818/10-23-75 452.

212350 BB Introduction to the Conference

OF

"The Consequences and Limits of Military Intervention"

by

Ellen Stern

It is necessary to reevaluate continuously the obvious but basic postulate that with the advent of nuclear weapons, powerful limitations condition the scope and pattern of military intervention by the United States -- whether it be a potential action or one in fact. A reassessment of the role of force and the constraints upon military interventionary activities in international relations, in the post-Vietnam conflict period, rests on the following observations. First, the explorations of the superpowers -- the United States and the Soviet Union -- for an element of military "detente" presents a complex and prolonged process, but one which will be sustained by the realities of military technology and the pressures of international relations. Second, as the United States has embarked upon an all-volunteer force system, so too have most of the nations of the NATO alliance experimented with shortened conscription periods, instituted volunteer military service systems, or explored alternative manpower patterns. However, there is no counterpart trend in the countries of the Warsaw Pact alliance. Third, there are new developments in weapons technology which, while not as dramatic, perhaps, as the introduction of nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles, have a profound potential for influencing international political and military relations. Fourth, the changing

social structure of the advanced industrialized nations is creating social issues and internal tensions which are deeply influencing the political and military definitions of international relations and altering the all-important dimension of threat perception.

Fifth, the impact of the growing participation of developing nations in the international arena is impacting not only in terms of international trade and business -- related, especially, to the issues of energy and raw materials -- but also in terms of the growing tension between these nations and their former "masters."

Policy makers and elected officials of the U.S. political process are continually making their estimates of the changing role of force in international relations; what are the utilities and disutilities of particular patterns of interventionary actions or threats of military force. These calculations involve not only the consequences of the actual application or force, but, in the nuclear context, the political impact of "forces in being." It is not strange or unexpected that two different short term assessments have come to the fore in the immediate post-Vietnam period. These assessments:are, in essence, extrapolations of presumed trends. On the one hand, it is understandable that with the end of military participation, there has been an emphasis on constraints in the scope and effectiveness of military intervention. On the other hand, alternative short term assessments have emphasized the increasing symbolic and political importance of forces in being. This emphasis has been linked to the difficulties of strategic weapon negotiations with the Soviet Union and with the

expansion of military expenditures by the Russians and, concommitantly, the Americans. It is important to note that the short term extrapolation in either direction is of limited value since there is insufficient concern with anticipation of the built-in limitations, not to mention the complex implications or turning points of longer term trends.

The approach in our conference on "The Consequences and Limits of Military Intervention" will take into consideration short trends. But it seeks to depart from oversimplifications which stress increments or strictures implemented only to appease some segment of the political body or to gain a measure of public support. The underlying approach must be, instead, one which takes into consideration the actual current role of force and the conditions under which it is, can, or may be employed. Second, it must seek to explore models which highlight the transformation of the scope and purpose, utility, and acceptability of military force in the world; this is especially true in the case of the United States, as the phasing down of American military participation in Viet Nam has brought these considerations into an operative state. The question can be posed: where do we go from here?

Our orientation focuses on organization or, if you will, "institutionalization." This implies a core concern with military technology, but also an analytic focus in the organizational context and the societal setting. The frame of reference for our analysis has led to the following focal point: theoretical and historical perspectives, questions of manpower and issues of professionalism, changing military operations and weapons technology programs, political and military operations, socio-political considerations, and intelligence procedures

and activities.

Thus, our objective is to focus on the interplay between technology, military organization, and the political-military consequences found therein. We have sought to orient the scope of these explorations toward the analysis of U.S. foreign policy objectives. This implies the following format.

One. The scope of the analysis seeks to be world-wide, since the analysis is concerned with the conceptual dimensions of the issues. The empirical range over different geographical regions depends upon the topic under consideration.

Two. The time period is contemporary, that is, postVietnam and forward-looking. There is little point in writing
specific scenarios; instead, the analysis looks to the future, with
all inherent differing conceptions available: in the language of
Harold Lasswell, it is concerned with the developmental approach.

Three. The focus is on analysis of how the various dimensions of the issue of the consequences and limitations of military intervention are currently conceptualized. In particular, how are problematic issues conceptualized by those who seek to develop theories, models, and strategies which are explicit and only relatively generalized.

four. The core objective is the assessment of the adequacy of the existing approaches plus a reformulation of them to take into account the changed patterns of international negotiations. Each of the participants has a particular expertise in dealing with specific

subject matters -- areas of military technology, organizational problems, manpower, or those related to the military or political processes. But in the final analysis, the objective of the conference is to place this expertise in the broadest social and political contexts -- which is the real task of the social scientist and of social science analysis.

SOME ANALYTICS OF INTERVENTION DECISIONS

by Richard Smoke

Conference Draft: Not for Quotation or Citation

Background

Major changes now under way in the world's climate are likelyt to lead to vast famines and wholesale starvation in the coming years, according to an analysis prepared by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Leaked on 30 April 1976 and reported in newspapers, appropriately enough, on Mayday, this disaster signal warns governments, publics and analysts that the result could well be worldwide political upheavals almost "beyond comprehension". Huge crop failures are expected periodically in India, China, the Soviet Union and elsewhere for several decades, leading very possibly to mass migrations and to desperate acts by governments, political factions within affected countries, and terrorist groups.

This analysis darkens what many observers had regarded as an already quite worrisome prospect of world political instability in the years ahead. Even given normal weather patterns the prospects would be poor that mass famines could be entirely avoided over the next several decades. And more generally, the economic gap has been continuing to widen between the few developed, Northern, mostly white nations and the many underdeveloped, Southern, mostly nonwhite ones, as GNP's and per capita incomes go on rising among the former and largely stagnate among the latter. Among the "Group of 77" nations —actually numbering over a hundred by now— the revolution of rising expectations

is becoming what one observer has termed a "revolution in rising frustrations". More and more the preconditions are in place for international conflicts generated not principally by the traditional ideological competition, but directly or indirectly by economic demands, and simply by basic economic and material needs.

Economic issues provide a medium for international conflict as well as a source of it. Only four nations possess some 80% of the world's copper ore reserves, and another four some 95% of the tin reserves. 3 (Both metals have been almost completely mined out of North America and Europe.) Though no cartels have yet formed among these countries to fix prices or exact other demands, fewer players are needed to form them than are needed to maintain OPEC, the existing oil-producer's cartel, which numbers about a dozen significant members. Reserves of other minerals essential to advanced industrial societies are also owned by slightly larger, but still comparatively small, collections of Third World nations. On the other hand North America has been the world's breadbasket for some time and may continue to be. There is at least a potential, widely noted in recent years, for this food reserve to be employed as a bargaining chip. In both directions along the North-South dimension of world politics, then, there is an economic "layer" of interactions that represent both a medium for conflict and an increasingly serious source of conflict.

Where conflict becomes acute in this layer, furthermore, it is likely to set the stage for overt politicomilitary conflict. We have already seen powerfully-argued proposals by certain American political specialists, for example, that the United States use its military power simply to seize Middle Eastern oil fields. 4

At the same time, the traditional East--West ideological competition remains also. And so do some standing territorial competitions, e.g. in the Middle East. The emerging world cannot be adequately conceptualized in bipolar terms, either East-West or North-South, nor in "tripolar" or "pentapolar" terms. Increasingly the system is <u>not</u> one in which the great majority of players orient themselves around some small number of poles and may be regarded as allied to, subordinate to, or desirable targets for, the polar powers. Rather the system is increasingly one of numerous independent and semi-independent players in varying kinds of conflict among each other. Conflict proceeds on a number of different, but interlinked, layers of the world social system (political, economic, ideological, territorial, tribal, etc.), growing sometimes less, sometimes more, acute and urgent.

What is disturbing about this emerging world constellation, apart from the profound moral and human dimension of the looming economic disaster, is that it is occurring at the same moment in mankind's history that increasingly

diverse and destructive military technology is passing into gradually more and more hands. When during the autumn of 1974 Giscard d'Estaing said of the world economy that "all the curves are leading us to catastrophe", he did not add, at least in public, that "catastrophe" in the military-technological context of the late twentieth century could not be like "catastrophe" in earlier eras. The military possibilities are both much more destructive and much more complicated.

The world's nations are now substantially more thoroughly armed than they were during the Cold War period, and there seems to be a long-term trend in the direction of evergrowing armaments. As recently as 1960 total world military expenditures, outside NATO and the Soviet bloc, were only about \$8 billion per year, and the bulk of this was accounted for by just three nations: China, India and Japan. By 1974 these expenditures had exceeded \$20 billion a year and were continuing to accelerate. In the five years 1970-74 inclusive, the total came to almost \$100 billion, and a growing number of nations spent significant sums. The sophistication and diversity of the military technology spreading outside the two traditional blocs is rising also, in tandem with its quantity. Today a number of countries possess much of the technology which was current in the United States' armory when the U.S. entered the Vietnam War. Meanwhile the "exotic" technology of the 'seventies has already spread to the Middle East --e.g. advanced electronic countermeasures, F-16's, hand-held antiaircraft missiles, and precisionguided-munitions. The most likely prospect for the 1980's is of this technology spreading to a number of middle-rank, and some other powers. Most serious of all is the very real possibility that nuclear weapons and their makings may proliferate in the years ahead to a growing number of countries, and perhaps terrorist and criminal groups. The multiplication and dispersion of reactors, the sale of fuel-processing plants, the known development of inexpensive laser isotope-separation, and the risk of theft or covert distribution of finished weapons combine to make nuclear blackmail, and warfare employing a few nuclear weapons, disturbingly unremote. 6

Terrorist and criminal groups may also be riding a trend toward more destructive weaponry, quite apart from their possible possession of atomic explosives. Twice within the last 3 years, for example, terrorists have been captured with Soviet-made STRELLA missiles (a hand-held anti-aircraft missile) in their possession. In the future such a group, armed with only a modest number of these weapons and skillful bargaining and demonstrative tactics, might be able to bring civil aviation to a halt with a nation or region, or conceivably world-wide.

In all these respects the world of the late twentieth century seeks likely to differ markedly from the world existing when most foreign policy and national security specialists took their training. Conflict is occurring, and may well occur increasingly, on multiple layers of the world social system,

which layers are interlinked in intricate ways. In at least one layer (the economic) actual and potential conflict probably is becoming more serious, while in few if any other layers is it lessening. The number of independent or semi-independent players in the system is probably unprecedented in history, and some players are not organized governments. Equally unprecedented is the number of players who are coming to possess a wide range of advanced, very destructive military capabilities, and both the number of such players and also the ranges of their capabilities seem likely to go on increasing. There may now be a really significant danger of the actual threat, or actual use, of one or more nuclear weapons within the near to medium future.

If this is a fair, if extremely terse and oversimplified, summary image of the probable emerging world constellation, it represents an essential point of departure for a fresh analysis of the problems of military intervention. For this sort of world constellation is highly intervention-prone. It is more intervention-prone, almost certainly, than an essentially bipolar (or tripolar) world system in which conflict runs mainly along one or two layers and most actions of global significance are taken by, or at the instigation of, the two polar powers. In a world of "military plenty" (comparatively speaking) and a substantial number of independent or semi-

independent actors, the probability is raised considerably that a minor conflict may seem to threaten the interests of --or present opportunities to-- regional powers who are prepared to intervene largely on their own and have the capability to do so.

In addition, the number of players, and the multiple layers of diverse interests and involvements connecting players to local situations, will usually present a rich menu of possibilities for low-level, "sub-threshold" interventions of various kinds, as well as more overt military intervention. Numerous options are likely to present themselves for economic pressure tactics, for political threats and promises, and many sorts of covert or semi-covert "political warfare" devices. In this kind of constellation opportunities often abound for playing ends against middles, for agent-provacteur-type tactics, for "psywar" and "disinformation" operations, and for "destabilizing" political processes, groupings and governments (a la the CIA "destabilization" campaign against Allende's Chile). The likely flourishing of these and similar kinds of relatively non-violent, occasionally not even entirely coercive, possibilities for "sub-threshold" interventions may give a Byzantine or medieval-Florentine flavor to many political affairs of the near future.

Finally, this kind of world constellation is intervention-prone in another sense having to do with self-feeding

processes. Increasing instabilities in local situations (perhaps partially a result of sub-threshold interventions) tend often to create conditions inviting more and larger interventions. Consider, for example, the Lebanese civil war of the spring of 1976. We may note in passing that both the predominantly Christian rightists and the predominantly Moslem leftists were beneficiaries of sub-threshold interventions from outside Lebanon, in the sense that both were evidently resupplied with ammunition, and on the rightist side apparently with light and heavy weapons as well, after the stocks were exhausted that each side had captured when the regular Lebanese Army had dissolved. The more significant point, however, concerns the self-feeding process at work. The continuation and periodic intensification of the fighting led, during one period of five days in May for example, to the offer (threat?) of French military intervention, the actuality of a sizable Syrian military intervention, and the standing threat of a major Israeli military intervention. Here is a case, then, like many others, where the consequences of an important local instability--and the consequences of sub-threshold interventions-included the fact and threat of much greater interventions.

On Some Consequences of Military Intervention

Overt military interventions, as opposed to subthreshold interventions, have an interesting characteristic

in an era of "military plenty": they generally succeed, against opposition currently in existence at the time of the time of the interventory act. Until the contemporary period, such had not been the typical case (except in interventions by the mother country in colonial affairs). Such was definitely not the case, for example, in the Soviet intervention in the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39. For several reasons the U.S.S.R. was simply unable to intervene decisively in the Spanish theater, although a very significant intervention effort was made. Soviet logistics were inadequate to sustain more than a relatively modest flow of equipment, supplies, technicians and advisors to the Republican side in Spain; a blockade by the Nationalist side interrupted the logistical link with increasing effectiveness and the Soviets lacked the naval force to escort cargo vessels through the blockade; and the Soviets proved to have insufficient quantities of the most critical goods, especially tanks and aircraft, to be able to spare enough for Spain. 8

But in many, probably most, situations in the contemporary period, an outside power intervening in an ongoing conflict will commit an intervention sufficient to turn the local tide decisively. A wide range of interventory options is likely to be available, and generally an option will be selected that will be adequate, even ample, to deal with the existing opposition. The size of the military commitment in such situations is often heavily influenced by the tradeoff between securing a rapid and

sure victory on the one hand, and minimizing costs on the other. Both considerations argue for a decisive stroke, though the latter may suggest an upper limit on the size of the interventory force as well. The original American interventions in Korea (1950) and Vietnam (1965-66), the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt (1956), the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola (1975), and the American intervention in Lebanon (1957), to name five, all had these features.

Such calculations leave a margin for minor errors and the consequences of such interventions are, indeed, quite predictable so long as the opposition is not reinforced by a counter-intervention from a 4th (or Nth) party. The Angola and Lebanon (1957) cases provide examples. The analytically more interesting and pragmatically more important situation arises, however, when such a counter-intervention does occur. In the Cold War and immediately post-Cold-War world we have witnessed a number such situations, including the other three just named; and in the world of numerous players, military plenty, and multiple layers of actual and potential conflicts that may be coming, we seem likely to witness many more. The danger of escalation clearly ranks among the most important potential consequences of intervention.

By "escalation" here, I mean something moderately specific. I am not referring to the kind of escalation that is also sometimes called "eruption" or "explosion", where the

fighting shifts very quickly to a very high order of violence. Everyone knows that deploying Cuban and Soviet elements to Angola or American Marines to Lebanon will not be answered by a fusilade of the other superpower's ICBM's, or even by a flight of tactical aircraft with nuclear bombs in theater. The "eruption" concept is relevant mainly to an outbreak of a NATO/Warsaw Pact or Soviet/Chinese battle. By "escalation" I am also not referring to minor commitments of additional troops or other forces within a local theater, or even a substantial commitment by one side if it is clear that this represents the best that it can do.

Rather, by referring to the dangers of "escalation" in this context, I am pointing to the complicated hazards that can arise in conflicts involving several players, at least some of whom dispose of major usable capabilities applicable to the situation and as yet untapped. An initial intervention may receive a "moderate" counter-intervention, reasonable on its own terms, which in turn inspires a counter by the original intervenor or another party, also reasonable on its own terms, which in turn inspires another move, and so on. A sequence of escalations back and forth may occur, in which each step makes sense in terms of its own context in the immediate situation, yet the cumulative effect is to drive the level of violence to a much higher level than anyone originally intended or perhaps even anticipated. The stakes to be won or lost

grow as each of the two (or more) sides increase their military...and political...and psychological commitments, and the point may be reached where one or all sides find that there is so much at stake that they cannot de-escalate.

To some extent this occurred in Vietnam, and in a different way it occurred in the weeks just preceding the outbreak of World War One. 9 It almost occurred in the Spanish Civil War, which at the time was widely expected to become the launching-pad for a second world war (but never quite did, substantially because it was so widely expected). 10 If the characterization sketched earlier of the likely shape of the world to come proves accurate, such escalation sequences could well be a recurrent danger in the years ahead. A web of complicated, multi-layered relationships among numerous independent players would provide a maximum of involvments and "national interests" through which nations could become involved in local and regional conflicts. And the widening range of military capabilities available to a growing number of players would present them with attractive and reasonable options --or the appearance of attractive and reasonable options-- for intervening in these conflicts with real effectiveness at acceptable cost. The emerging world constellation may turn out to be not only intervention-prone but also, in the wake of interventions, escalation-prone.

The rise and spread of precision-guided munitions could prove particularly salient in this context, because PGM's may well create among nnational decision-makers the belief that they can intervene in conflicts in precise, "surgical" ways, at a very reasonable cost. But in fact precise weapons do not necessarily make for precise consequences. The perception and evaluation of events by policy-makers in other countries involved in the conflict are by no means entirely calculable. And while precise targetting may sometimes assist in communicating one's own political intentions to them, it certainly does not guarantee that this communication will be clear, nor that those policy-makers will evaluate the "message" the way one anticipates. Their decisions about possible counter-actions depend, naturally on how they perceive and evaluate the action.

It is primarily this inability of each national decision-making group to be highly confident about the perceptions and evaluations of their counterparts abroad, and not primarily sloppy targetting in tactical operations, that makes for such great uncertainties in trying to anticipate escalation sequences.

It is one of the paradoxes of the logic of politicomilitary interaction that recognition by decision-makers in advance,
of the escalation-prone character of a local conflict, can generate
an antidote to it in the form of greater caution in policy-making.
Decision-makers' comprehension of the hazards which the political

complexity and military plenty of the coming world may create, could lead them to accept the danger as a real limitation upon the feasibility of interventory strategies --even in specific situations where the exact route by which the hazards could materialize might not be clear.

Indeed to some extent they already accept this. To know that they do, one need only compare most policy-making regarding military intervention in the contemporary era with, for instance, the blythe fashion in which British decision-makers used to dispatch Royal Navy squadrons to local hot spots. The power and diversity of modern weapon systems, the number of states that have them, and the never-entirely-forgettable nightmare that nuclear weapons could somehow become involved, have engendered a sense of caution all around. A feeling that dangerous possibilities are becoming more numerous and more dangerous, and a sense of restraint --born of caution-in contemplating intervention options, could become more pronounced as time passes. The emerging world might then turn out to be less escalation-prone, and even intervention-prone, than the preceding discussion has suggested.

The consequences of military intervention in the coming world may depend heavily, therefore, upon the degree to which policy-makers and their staffs recognize the potential complexity of politico-military interactions -- and hence the potential complexity of their decision-making problem.

Similarly and more obviously, the quality of their decision-

making will heavily determine how well or ill military interventions which <u>are</u> undertaken achieve their immediate direct objectives, and how well or ill they contribute to long-run global objectives. The remainder of this paper is concerned with certain aspects of this problem of decision.

Some Analytics of Intervention Decisions

It is useful to draw an analytic distinction between two aspects or stages of the decision process regarding a potention intervention. First there is the stage where policy-makers derive an understanding of what a local or regional situation is, and what its significance may be. Then there is the stage where they reach an action decision about what to do about the situation (which decision may include or exclude intervention).

In practice this distinction is often not very clearcut. Certain options --for instance the use of bases in a
foreign country as a staging area for intervention-- may
bring to prominence features of the situation --such as
political relations with that country-- which otherwise would
be marginally relevant or irrelevant. There is also a
tendency for policy-makers' perceptions of what the situation
and its significance may be, to be influenced by which options
for dealing with it are most convincingly served up by

their staffs and supporting bureaucracies. For instance policy-makers who believe they have immediately to hand a wide range of effective military options for counterinsurgency and low-level warfare are more likely to perceive a situation such as Vietnam in the mid-1960's in primarily military terms. Finally, there is usually some feedback between options executed and policy-makers' perceptions of the problem. If the initial action decisions do not work out as expected, decision-makers will generally try to reassess the nature of the situation as well as the limitations of the option(s) selected. In an intervention sustained over time, a process may develop of reviewing the situation and the option(s) being executed almost continuously.

Nevertheless for many analytic purposes it is desirable to consider separately what I shall term the diagnosis of a situation and its significance, and option-handling: the search for, creation of, evaluation of, choice among and implementation of options for dealing with the situation. Let's take them in order. 11

Diagnosis: on the role of information

Policy-makers faced with a sudden international crisis situation, or a more gradually developing problem situation, must come to an understanding of what that situation is, what its significance is, and what policy issues (if any)

it creates. They may do so carefully and explicitly, or they may beel that "what the problem is" is clear and pass on quickly to the stage of considering intervention options. But one way or another --explicitly or implicitly, self-consciously or unconsciously-- they must form some kind of diagnosis of the situation. They must do so before they can begin to think about options for what to do about it, and their option-handling will depend upon their diagnosis whether this is fully recognized or not. This is so both in the obvious sense that the option-handling will depend upon the content of the diagnosis, and in the slightly less obvious sense that the quality of the option-handling will be heavily dependent upon the comprehensiveness, explicitness, accuracy and perceptiveness of the diagnosis.

I suspect that both policy-makers and the community of analysts within and without the government have tended not to be as attentive to the requirements of this diagnosis stage as we might have been. Specifically I suspect that the internal "structure" of a diagnosis --its analytical elements and the logic of how these elements fit together-- as well as the importance of this internal structure, may be less widely appreciated than they deserve. Here let me suggest two aspects of the analytics of diagnosis which may merit more attention. The first concerns the limited role of factual information in developing diagnoses.

Consider, at the outset, simply the limited value of intelligence information in assessing the intentions of other players in an emerging situation. It has become a truism in intelligence circles that even their short-term intentions, to say nothing of their overall objectives, are almost never indicated unambiguously by available information. For example, data about a new force deployment by one country, and its supporting logistical operations, may demonstrate pretty clearly that that country is positioning itself to be able to activate certain military options, but will not say much about which options are most likely to be chosen. Diagnosis of the real significance of even such relatively tangible developments depends on estimates --always somewhat uncertain-about the longer-term objectives, preferred strategies, and political-behavioral style of that nation's policy-makes.

A single example will illustrate. Prior to the Nazi attack on the U.S.S.R. in 1941, ample high-quality intelligence of Hitler's military dispositions and plans was available to Stalin. The Soviet leader, however, simply did not believe that Hitler would launch a surprise attack. Stalin's image of Hitler's style encouraged him to believe that Hitler would first present demands and attempt to bargain before resorting to force. The menacing Nazi buildup on the Soviet border, Stalin believed, was intended to set the stage for serious negotiations and bargaining. There are a number of explanations

why Stalin may have miscalculated Hitler's intentions in this way, ¹² but in any case it is clear that he did so not because hard intelligence was scanty or equivocal, but because for various reasons he did not believe in the possibility that, in the end, actually emerged.

This is a case where the number of players involved and the number of possible patterns of development were both very small. In most conflict situations in the contemporary world where outside intervention is a possibility, the number of possible players and the number of potential patterns of development are much larger; and often the relevant hard intelligence is of lesser quality or quantity or both. The role of uncertain political estimates in diagnosing other players' intentions is concomitantly greater.

I suspect that we may not be as analytical as we could be about all the ingredients that go into this kind of estimating. Certainly two ingredients seem to be important which have received comparatively little attention from analysts, at least in the open literature. One is the conceptual and doctrinal component in the political perspective of policy-making groups abroad. Military intelligence analysts give great weight to the military doctrines of foreign armed forces, but it is not clear that the doctrinal assumptions of political policy-makers abroad have received equivalent attention from political specialists (beyond such relatively straightforward things as learning what Marxism-Leninism says). 13

The second ingredient concerns the personality structures of top policy-makers abroad. There is much to suggest that the temperaments and cognitive styles of decision-makers play a heavy role in their policy-making, but only recently have such factors begun to catch the eye of politico-military specialists. Lucian Pye's new study of Chairman Mao from this point of view may turn out to be a harbinger of a new interest in this approach. 14

If we turn from the comparatively specific problem of assessing other parties' fairly short-term intentions, to the more general aspects of forming high-quality diagnoses of emerging problem situations that may require or invite intervention, we find that factual information probably plays a still less central role. A proportionally greater role seems to be played by what I shall term "conceptual presuppositions", of several sorts.

One sort is the historical analogy. A generation of decision-makers tended to shy away from policies that could seem to be like "appeasement", on the analogy of Munich, and the Franco-British policy of the late '30's, which had proved so disastrous with Hitler. President Truman, for instance, was quite explicit in saying that this analogy had weighed heavily in his decision to repel the North Korean attack on South Korea with American forces. Ernest May offers a powerful argument in his recent book, 'Lessons' of the Past, 15 that a historical

analogy comparing a current situation with one from the past can have a remarkably compelling impact on policy-makers' perceptions of their problem. Of course, a rich understanding of history usually offers multiple analogies suggesting opposite policies. But particular events of the fairly recent past which decision-makers have lived through themselves apparently can have a vivid and dramatically persuasive effect. After World War Two, for instance, decision-makers in the United States coalesced fairly rapidly around a perception of Stalin as "another Hitler". As Professor May points out, the evidence available at the time (as well as more recently) supports at least as well the analogy of Stalin as another Peter the Great or Catherine the Great -- analogies which would have suggested quite different American policies from the ones pursued. But U.S. decision-makers were not familiar with Peter or Catherine. They were very familiar with Hitler, however, and their diagnosis of Stalin may have been skewed as a result.

Similar to historical analogies are generalizations or "laws" which policy-makers may believe history "proves".

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, for example, was persuaded that most of the great wars of modern times had begun because the aggressors --Hitler, Kaiser Wilhelm, and others-- had underestimated the strength of the military alliances that would ultimately be brought to bear against them. Had they not miscalculated in this way, he believed, they would never have opted for war. In short, war was generally the

result of a miscalculation of forces. Dulles's effort to construct a system of formal U.S. alliances ringing the communist world rested in part on the premise that this would make clear to Moscow and Peking the U.S. and allied defense commitment to the lands threatened by communism. This time the potential aggressors would not miscalculate the forces, because the military alliance that would be brought to bear had been constructed in advance.

The Secretary did not consider a very different, and conflicting, historical "law" -- that wars can also result from a cycle of provocative acts reciprocating back and forth between potential belligerents, and escalating. This "law" implies a rather different policy conclusion. Had both "laws" been recognized and mutually balanced, U.S. policy-makers might not have applied containment so ambitiously and so rigidly on such a global scale: for instance to the extent of interfering in the Chinese civil war even to the point of hazardously defending islands lying a couple miles off the Chinese mainland.

A third sort of "conceptual presupposition" is the fundamental, often semi-unconscious, assumption about long-term historical trends. We have heard much recently, for example, about Secretary Rissinger's alleged belief that in the long run the tide of history is running against the West, and that therefore the best statesmanship is to delay the inevitable through a succession of compromises. Another possible example may be provided by the current North-South negotiations

over economic issues. It seems likely that policy-makers among the developed countries presuppose, at least to a considerable degree, that great economic disparities between their nations and the Third World will persist for a long time. Many policy-makers among the "Group of 77" nations, however, clearly presuppose that within a couple of generations at the very most, the standard of living and per capita incomes of their peoples must roughly equal those of, say, Europe. Clearly the perceptions in various capitals of the significance of specific negotiations must differ greatly when such underlying assumptions differ so greatly.

Historical analogies, purported historical "laws", and fundamental assumptions about long-term historical patterns clearly play a central role in decision-makers diagnoses of the significance of events. (There may be other important kinds of "conceptual presuppositions" as well.) Their exact roles in specific cases may be difficult to ascertain and demonstrate unambiguously. But I suspect that in this area, too, we do not know as much as we could about the analytics of diagnoses. To the extent that we are concerned with improving the quality of policy-makers' diagnoses, as well as understanding scientifically the bases of foreign-policy behavior, more attention to these kinds of elements could prove quite useful.

Diagnosis: on the role of images of others

There is another aspect to the analytics of diagnosis which I suspect may merit some more attention from policy-makers

and analysts. It concerns what may be a tendency to accept as sufficient a somewhat oversimple image of the decision calculus of policy-makers abroad. More specifically, there may be a tendency for the apparent or imputed objectives of the policy-makers of other nations to receive the lion's share of the analysts' attention, to the comparative exclusion of those policy-makers' underlying perspectives, assumptions, and expectations relevant to the situation -- their complete "frame of reference".

Consider an example. Let us take, in fact, the example of one of the worst military and foreign-policy setbacks in American history: the decision of the fall of 1950 to permit U.S. forces in Korea, then advancing rapidly up the peninsula in the wake of the triumphant Inchon landing, to proceed all the way to the Yalu River -- the border with China. The consequence of this decision and its execution was a massive military intervention by the Peoples' Republic for which the American forces were ill-prepared, and which sent them reeling back in one of the longest and bitterest military retreats in U.S. history. After great difficulties a stable defensive line was finally established, and there followed two and a half years of a painful and costly war of attrition, before a cease-fire was finally arranged in the summer of 1953.

How did this setback occur? At the outset of the Korean engagement, President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson had clearly defined the U.S. objective as limited to pushing the North Korean aggressors back behind the 38th parallel.

Subsequently the clarity of this limitation became eroded as Genereal MacArthur, commander in Korea, and the JCS asked permission for flexibility in operations to ensure tactical defeat of the North Koreans. And during the fall, a series of directives from Washington progressively relaxed the geographical limitations on U.S. forces, finally abandoning it entirely so long as they remained within Korea. The "decision" to do so was made gradually and in stages, and never as the result of a well-defined debate in which the full weight of arguments pro and con were considered. What partly made this possible, though, and what was equally or more significant, was the comparative simplicity of the model which Washington decision-makers were using of the probable Chinese decision calculus.

President Truman, Secretary Acheson, and other high-ranking policy-makers were perfectly aware, of course, that the Peking regime would be highly sensitive about its border with Korea, and that protecting the security of that border and of nearby Chinese territory would be a major Chinese objective. This awareness was reflected in very strict orders to MacArthur not to cross the Yalu with either ground or air forces under any circumstances. It was also reflected in a declaratory campaign during the summer and fall of 1950, aimed at reassuring Peking that the U.S. harbored no designs against China. Decision-makers in Washington quite clearly believed that these and related policies should relieve Chinese security

anxieties sufficiently that Peking would have no reason to accept the costs and risks of a military intervention in the Korean conflict.

However this belief reflected an inadequate comprehension of the Chinese perspective. In Peking's eyes, U.S. policy in Asia had begun to harden and to assume an increasingly threatening posture with the outbreak of the Korean War. Chinese Communist leaders saw in Truman's "neutralization" of Formosa early in the war an ominous reversal of U.S. policy toward China. In 1949, the U.S. had acquiesced in the communist victory in the civil war, and early in 1950 had publicly excluded Formosa, as well as South Korea, from its defense perimeter in the Far East. Now in June 1950, the U.S. was suddenly intervening in what Peking saw as a Korean "civil war", and also immediately reversed its policy of tacitly allowing Nationalist-Chinese-held Formosa fall to the communists.

Peking may also have seen, in the brilliant success of MacArthur's advance up the Korean peninsula in the summer and fall, something alarmingly like the Japanese invasion of Korea many years previously which had culminated in an all-out attack on China. What might U.S. strategic intentions really be? In adopting the objective of reunifying Korea under a pro-West regime, the United States for the first time was using its enormous military power to eliminate a communist government. Might this be the beginning of a general policy of "roll-back"? Such a policy was being advocated by the Republican opposition

within the United States to the Democratic administration, and by many military officers including General MacArthur himself. Why was he being allowed to remain in command if this were not secretly the administration policy as well?

All the "facts" just mentioned were known to

American policy-makers, but with insufficient attention to

what might be the Chinese perspective on them. They miscalculated

the feasible limits of their military intervention in Korea,

because they failed adequately to comprehend the frame of

reference through which Chinese decision-makers were assessing

the significance of U.S. activities in Asia. 16

Many other case histories could be cited where similar inadequate comprehension resulted in similar grave consequences. Roberta Wohlstetter, Ole Holsti, Robert Jervis and others have all stressed the importance in successful decision-making of a clear understanding of other parties' perspectives and assumptions. The general importance of this factor is also appreciated by many officials experienced in foreign and national security policy-making. Indeed the general need to appreciate the other side's point of view is an idea that will almost always command assent among decision-makers and their staffs.

Assenting to the idea, however, is not the same thing as policy-makers initiating analytic efforts, when faced with fresh crises, to bring to light as much as possible of their adversaries' perspectives. The attention which they usually pay to the other side's immediate objectives does not

substitute for this wider conceptual understanding. And policy-makers may not be aware of the real extent of their analytic deficiency. For many reasons of governmental organization and bureaucratic politics, working-level officials who may be familiar with relevant factors in the frames of reference of foreign governments, as they operate in a particular situation, may not be adequately tapped in the policy process. In the absence of alertness to such factors on the part of high-level policy-makers themselves, decisions may be made on the basis of inadequate assumptions about the sources of other players' behavior.

I suspect that it would be useful for more analytical attention to be given to this set of problems. Organizational changes or procedural improvements may be possible. And additional intellectual effort might find analytic methods of rapidly and effectively penetrating to the appropriate level of analysis in "real time" in policy-making.

Option-handling

As policy-makers complete their diagnoyis of an emerging situation, to whatever degree of penetration and explicitness they intend to achieve, they may conclude that the situation involves important "national interests", and hence that some form of intervention into the developing situation might be desirable. But in the case of many nations, they may disdover that they lack acceptable options, or perhaps

any options, for a unilateral intervention, and must act in concert with others or not at all.

In the Soviet Union, however, and above all in the United States, decision-makers possess a great range of options for many kinds of unilateral interventions almost anywhere on earth. The number and variety of military options physically available to the United States are completely unprecedented -- significantly greater now than they were even ten years ago, and with the coming of plentiful cruise missiles and other new technology, still increasing. It is a challenging task for U.S. decision-makers to search out their options and review them in a new, specific context, perhaps to create new options by combining, subdividing, or otherwise manipulating existing capabilities, to evaluate, then, the alternatives and to choose wisely among them.

Partly because of this range and diversity of military options open to the U.S., I suspect that there may be some tendency for American decision-makers in particular to pass rather quickly from the stage of diagnosing a problem to the option-handling stage. Particularly when there is time pressure, decision-makers may limit the time devoted to diagnosing the situation and jump rapidly to the option-handling stage. Even when there is not, the exceedingly busy schedules of high-level policy-makers make it difficult to bring the subtleties of a situational diagnosis to their attention until the issue has become so "hot" that the pressure is on to find something to do about it.

The tendency of decision-makers to jump quickly to the option-handling stage may also be due to a bias toward action rather than contemplation in American culture. In part in may also be due to a prevailing feeling that to draw out the diagnosis is negative and unconstructive because it makes problems seem larger and more difficult, whereas to turn to the search for "solutions" is positive and constructive. This bias for action, however, can easily lead to what psychologists and management specialists call "premature closure" of the diagnosis stage.

"solutions" to foreign problems in fact depends very thoroughly upon the diagnosis stage not being closed prematurely. This is perhaps particularly true where policy-makers are faced with a choice between a set of military intervention options on the one hand, and other ways of exerting influence over the developing situation on the other. There are a couple of reasons for this. Military options, unlike non-military ones, run the risk of triggering escalation sequences; diagnosing the degree to which this danger may be present in particular situations requires the most dareful possible analysis time permits to reduce the inevitable uncertainties as much as possible.

Secondly, military options generally require more preconditions in place, for the options to have a reasonable chance of success at reasonable cost, than do most non-military options.

This is a point that is sometimes overlooked.

Since military intervention is, in a sense, the most "unilateral" kind of policy to undertake (since, for the U.S. at least, it demands the least cooperation from others to proceed), the fact does not always seem clear that in most circumstances there are more preconditions to be satisfied before this kind of policy is likely to promise a favorable ratio of expected benefits to expected costs.

Approaching the analysis of military intervention from the angle of ascertaining the number and kinds of preconditions for success, is a productive analytic approach that is not always emphasized. Among U.S. policy-makers, Secretary Acheson in particular is notable for having stressed it. When faced with situations where an American intervention seemed to be a possible policy, Acheson would regularly ask what where the "missing ingredients" in the situation which, if supplied by the United States, would lead to a decisively more favorable outcome. When he could not identify such "missing ingredients", or if the "missing ingredients" could not be provided by the U.S. at acceptable cost, he would recommend against intervention.

Among scholars and analysts, the most systematic attack on the intervention question, taking this approach, of which I am aware was a study undertaken several years ago by Alexander George and two associates, David Hall and (USAF) Colonel William Simons.

The researchers compared three crises where the U.S. intervened with "coercive diplomacy" --military force

and/or diplomatic threats backed with military force. The three were the Cuban Missile Crisis, assessed as essentially a success, the U.S. intervention in Laos in 1960-61, and the initial U.S. intervention in Vietnam in 1964-65, both assessed as predominantly failures.

Analysis led to the identification, among other things, of eight preconditions for a successful intervention, at least by the U.S. under that class of historical conditions. The eight are:

- 1. The strength of the U.S. motivation.
- 2. An asymmetry of motivation favoring the U.S.
- 3. The clarity of U.S. objectives.
- 4. A sense of urgency to achieve the U.S. objectiv
- 5. Adequate domestic political support.
- 6. Usable military options.
- 7. Opponents' fear of unacceptable escalation.
- 8. Clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement.

(Note, incidentally, the extent to which the assessment of several of these, in any particular situation, depends upon the assessment of the opponents' frame of reference, as discussed above.)

The analysis which led to these conclusions is too complicated to be reviewable here. The study represents, however, one attempt to examine at least a certain set of intervention situations systematically from the viewpoint of the preconditions that need to be satisfied before an intervention strategy is likely to pay off. Other studies, approaching intervention

from a similar viewpoint, might expand or modify the list.

One other, closely-related, point about the analytics of option-handling. I suspect that the opposite side of the coin just discussed —a possible tendency toward underemphasis of the analytical preconditions of intervention— may be a tendendency toward the overemphasis of what might be termed "technical" aspects of option-handling.

This has traditionally been the case, at least, in theorization about, and practice of, deterrence strategies in U.S. foreign policy. (I refer to general foreign-policy deterrence and not the special mutual deterrence by the two superpowers' strategic armories.) It is a fair test. As Janowitz ¹⁹ and others have pointed out, there is probably no concept that has received greater attention over the last couple decades from scholars and analysts of foreign policy than this one; and if we accept "containment" as a rationale for, and the equivalent of, a general strategy of deterrence, then there is nothing that has been more central to U.S. foreign policy.

In a recent study of deterrence, co-authored with Alexander George, we remarked that theory about it has had "a somewhat narrow, mechanistic and technical character. Deterrence theory to date has seemed to presume, de facto, that the scope, desirability, form and appropriateness of a deterrent relationship among the U.S., a potential aggressor, and a third nation were either not problematical or not germane issues, and has passed on to the technician's questions—by

what tactics does one become committed once the decision has been made to do so, and how then can the commitment be effectively signalled?" The same study attempts to show that this observation applies not only to theorization, but also rather systematically to the practice of U.S. deterrence strategies in the post-World War Two world.

The empirical and theoretical arguments sustaining this thesis cannot be repeated here. Suffice it to say that there is at least suggestive evidence to indicate that the theory and practice of deterrence strategies have included a tendency to over-emphasize technical aspects of option-handling to the relative under-emphasis on the analytical preconditions for attempting a deterrence strategy in the first place. If, as I suspect may be the case, the same general pattern may appear in other facets of foreign policies —involving or leading to interventory actions— this may suggest an area where further investigation by specialists could have a quite useful payoff.

Conclusions, and a Postscript

It will have become clear in the course of the preceding discussion that the various analytical issues I have tried to raise can really be taken as variants on a single theme. In each successive context, I have attempted to point to a certain kind of simplification that I suspect occurs too often, and each time it has been of the same general kind -- a simplification in the direction of policy-makers implicitly reducing the perceived significance of "conceptual" or "theoretical" elements

in the decision analytics, in favor of the perceived significance of comparatively physical, material, or "technical" factors.

To borrow a term from philosophers, there may be a tendency toward a kind of "reductionism".

The theme might be summarized in the image of a kind of "reductionistic cascade" that may operate across the whole flow of decision-making, where at each step whatever sort of reduction from the conceptual toward the strictly technical which is possible at that step, may be a little too likely to occur. In the general context of utilizing information in forming diagnoses, the reductionism appears in the form of an underestimation of the way policy-makers' "conceptual presuppositions", not always articulated, shape their understanding of the significance of otherwise objective information. In the context of utilizing models of the decision calculi of policy-makers abroad in forming diagnoses, it appears in the form of an underemphasis on the broad "frames of reference" of those policy-makers. In the somewhat narrower and more concrete context of estimating other players' short-term intentions, it appears in the form of an underestimation of the significance of doctrinal and personality attributes of decision-makers abroad, in favor of "hard" intelligence-gathering. And in the context of option-handling --which in a sense is still narrower and more concrete-- it appears in the form of an underemphasis on the analytical preconditions of activating various strategies, in favor of emphasizing "technical" aspects of carrying out options.

At each progressive level of the sequence, the tendency seems to be for the same general kind of "reduction" to occur. The reduction "cascades" downward, as it were, throughout the progressively less abstract sequence of stages in the decision process.

In each of these contexts, how much this sort of reduction occurs, and how important it is, are matters for argument, and no doubt vary substantially from case to case. But I find it suggestive that an argument can be made across several contexts for patterns which are so similar from one context to another that they can be regarded as variants on a single theme. There may be something here worth a bit more attention from analysts and decision-makers both.

A relatively new development in American military policy-making may offer a final bit of evidence for all this, perhaps a particularly clear, in a sense even extreme, bit of evidence. This is the recent emergence of "pre-programmed options": tactical plans, command-control-cmmunications arrangements, and logistical arrangements set up in advance to make a specific menu of pre-selected options easy and quick to carry out in various hypothetical scenarios. I would argue, by way of postscript to the above, that the development of preprogrammed options may turn out to be a very long step in a very wrong direction. This is not to deny that major planning attention in advance, to the range and flexibility of the

military options available in various sorts of situations is not valuable. It is. But to design actual options in advance and in detail, and program them into the force, seems likely to have the actual effect of reducing decision-makers' flexibility in the name of increasing it.

There are two reasons for this. First, as a technical matter, preprogramming certain options is likely to have the effect of making other options more difficult to carry out in a crisis. Unless done with extremely careful attention to just this issue, the tangible steps taken at various intermediate levels of the military bureaucracy to set up certain patterns of action to be quick and easy to carry out, are likely to introduce rigidities that make other patterns of action more difficult. Yet it is impossible for contingency planners to anticipate in advance the full range of considerations that may apply in a future crisis, and program the force to cover all of them. High-level policy-makers know this so well when it comes to a crisis, in fact, that it is not unusual for their first step in any new crisis to be a decision to reject all the contingency plans immediately! Exactly this was done, for instance, by the ExComm at the beginning of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Secondly, as a psychological matter, preprogramming certain options is likely to bring these options to prominence in the minds of high-ranking military officers and civilian officials familiar with them. The result could be a kind of premature "crystalization" of their perceptions of what the

possibilities are in a fresh crisis situation. Other options, other <u>kinds</u> of options, or even just creative variations on the programmed options (which might even be technically feasible in some cases) would tend not to get thought of, or at least be prematurely dismissed.

In short, preprogramming some options is very likely to "deprogram" others -- in fact to make others at least temporarily "unprogrammable". It should not need arguing at any length that the whole idea of preprogrammed options, and its apparent desirability within the bureaucracy, represents among other things the ultimate in the tendency toward emphasizing technical aspects of option-handling at the relative expense of analytical and conceptual aspects.

The additional fact that many or most of these preprogrammed options involve the use of nuclear weapons could turn out to be the cherry on a very distasteful cake. Preprogrammed nuclear options (so-called PNO's) might allow U.S. decision-makers, faced with an intense crisis in the late '70's or '80's, to believe all too readily that they could employ a small number of atomic weapons with relative safety. Functioning less well than normally under the pressure of "crisis stress", they might come to believe that the hazards of a nuclear escalation sequence had already been thought through by the "programmers" of the options. In this way, the existence of preprogrammed nuclear options could create for policy-makers an "illusion of control" in a situation where in fact the danger

of events getting out of control was very great.

If, in addition, the doctrine and technology of preprogrammed options spreads beyond the U.S., as so many other American military inventions have, then the dangers of escalation could grow even greater. At the extreme, nations could end up in a kind of high-technology equivalent of the situation existing in 1914, when European decision-makers suddenly found in an unanticipated crisis that their military mechanisms were too inflexible to deal with it without employing pre-designed options that interacted among the players...in the end to general war. If we move even part way in this direction, the world constellation of the late twentieth century might turn out to be even more dangerous than was suggested at the outset of this paper.

NOTES

- 1. New York Times, 1 May 1976, page 2.
- Goeffrey Barraclough, "A New Economic Order?", New York Review of Books, Vol. XXIII, No. 8 (13 May 1976), page 41.
- 3. <u>Ibid</u>., page 40
- 4. Seabury, Paul, Aaron Wildavsky and Edmund Friedland,

 The Great Detente Disaster (New York: Basic Books,

 1975).
 - Tucker, Robert W., "Oil--the Issue of American Intervention", Commentary, January 1975, page 21.
- 5. New York Times, 25 October 1974, page 1.
- 6. The theme of this paragraph and its supporting information are both presented at greater length in Richard Smoke, "National Security Affairs", in the Handbook of Political Science (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1975), Volume Eight, pages 255, 332-335.
- 7. Aviation Week & Space Technology, 20 January 1975, pages 7 and 29.
- 8. Cattell, David T., Soviet Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957) chapters four and five.
 - Toynbee, Arnold J., <u>Survey of International Affairs 1937</u>, Volume Two, "International Repercussions of the War in Spain (1936-37). (London: Oxford University Press by Humphrey Milford, 1938), pages 194-201.
- 9. On the pre-World War One sequence, see for instance Ole Holsti, Crisis Escalation War (Montreal, McGill-Queens University Press, 1972); and Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: MacMillan, 1962).
 - of August (New York: MacMillan, 1962).

 The events of July-August 1914 have been analyzed in depth in a series of articles published by various participants in the Stanford "Outbreak Project" led by Robert North. For a review and critique of this series of articles see Dina A. Zinnes, Contemporary Research in International Relations: A Perspective and a Critical Appraisal (New York: The Free Press, 1976).

- 10. The Spanish Civil War is analyzed from this viewpoint in Richard Smoke, <u>Controlling Escalation</u>. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1977).
- 11. "Diagnosis" and "option-handling" are discussed from another point of view in Richard SMoke, "Policy-Applicable Theory", in Alexander L. George et.al., "Towards a More Soundly Based Foreign Policy: Making Better Use of Information", Appendix D to the Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (Murphy Commission). (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975) The discussion that immediately follows draws in part from that paper.
 - The distinction employed here between "diagnosis" and "option-handling" is similar to the distinction between "conclusions" and "decisions" introduced by Prof.

 T.T. Paterson, the management theorist, in his "methectic" theory of decision-making. See Paterson,

 T.T., Decision Dynamics (forthcoming).
- 12. For a analysis of Stalin's miscalculation see Barton Whaley, Codeword Barbarossa. (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1973).
- 13. One approach to this problem is the "operational code" technique pioneered by Nathan Leites and pursued since by Alexander George and others. See Nathan Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo. (New York: Greenwood Press, reprinted 1972); and Alexander L. George, "The 'Operational Code': a Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-making". International Studies Quarterly 13: 190-222.
- 14. Pye, Lucian, Mao Tse-tung, the Man in the Leader. (New York, Basic Books, 1976).
- 15. May, Ernest, 'Lessons' of the Past. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972).
- 16. This quite summarized analysis is drawn from chapter seven of Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, <u>Deterrence in American Foreign Policy</u>: <u>Theory and Practice</u>. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).
- 17. Wohlstetter, Roberta, "Cuba and Pearl Harbor, Hindsight and Foresight", in Foreign Affairs, 43, page 707. Wohlstetter, Roberta, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962. Holsti, Ole, Crisis Escalation War, op.cit.

- Jervis, Robert, "Hypotheses on Misperception", in World Politics, 10: 454-479.
- Jervis, Robert, <u>Perception</u> and <u>Misperception in International</u> <u>Politics</u>. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976)
- 18. George, Alexander L, David K. Hall, and William R. Simons,

 The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971).
- 19. Janowitz, Morris, "Toward a Redefinition of Military Strategy", in World Politics 26: 473-508.
- 20. George, Alexander L, and Richard Smoke, <u>Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice</u> (op.cit), page 65.
- 21. The important effects on the quality of decision-making induced by stress have been emphasized by a number of authors. See in particular Ole Holsti's Crisis Escalation War (op.cit.)

Soviet Perspectives on Military Intervention by Roger Hamburg

In this study, I will seek to accomplish a number of objectives that relate to Soviet interventionary policy in the future. First, there will be a brief resume of the use of force historically by the Soviet regime. The introductory remarks will end with a summary of a major Soviet work on the subject. Then I will discuss the current Soviet build-up of military forces. I will omit a discussion of Soviet strategic force postures because while relevant to future contingencies, they are not directly involved in possible deployments. The emphasis will be on the conventional ground forces build-up and the more publicized more novel concentration of Soviet naval forces. After a brief digression into internal reasons for the build-up, the section will conclude by assessing the overall political justification and the question of economic constraints and their possible effect on Soviet plans.

I will then consider the analysis of the political-strategic justification by concentrating on the utility of the Soviet ground posture as applied to Europe and the Far East and the deployment of naval forces for foreign policy purposes. Military-diplomatic considerations analyzed in the first sections will be applied to three case studies: Vietnam, the Middle East, and the current deployment in Angela.

Finally, I will focus on Soviet perceptions of the United States, that is, current works by Soviet academic specialists dealing with American elite foreign policy attitudes and Congressional and popular perceptions and what they may portend for possible American reaction to Soviet moves.

The paper will conclude with a brief statement of Soviet - American relations and the power calculus in the future.

Basic to an understanding of Soviet views of intervention and military force is the dictum that strategy is always dictated by political objectives; the intensely political nature of Soviet thinking on these matters is a traditional foundation of Marxism-Teninism. 1 Soviet thinking on military matters reflects the view that conflict and coercion, not force, are dominant in international affairs, although force is ever available where appropriate. Marxists "do not deny the role of force in politics" but "emphasize that force comprises only part of the political process, not fulfilling it completely."2 The "objective" factors of power include a state's population, the nature of its social structure, its level of science, technology, status of raw materials and "space-geographic conditions" (size and displacement of productive forces). These, among others, comprise the moral-political and military potential of the state. But the "subjective" factor is extremely critical, the ability of a commander to choose "unexpected means, places and times of military operations for the enemy" as well as the ability to "lead the enemy into error relative to his intentions and actions and successfully realize the decision adopted. "3 /

Such statements reflect the particular nature of the Soviet regime, founded on the basis of hostility to all existing regimes and dedicated to transforming the international environment, yet constrained from acting fully on this perception by the existence of powerful adversaries from without and internal constraints from within.

Bolshevik leaders perceived themselves as insecure militarily, economically, and politically in Europe and their primary emphasis was placed

accordingly on consolidation of internal control and building of strength for future contingencies. Revolutionary rhetoric and Comintern manipulation of political forces outside the Soviet Union substituted for a forward deployment policy that was impossible under the circumstances. The emphasis, even after World War II, was to be primarily on maintaining significant deterrent and defensive power. The uneasy nuclear balance, while allowing, even encouraging, the use of political and military instruments in foreign policy made resort to major war with a nuclear power most dangerous. This did not weaken the case for military power, however, and the general rule has been that "the more military power the country has, the better."

Military aid and advisers were used after 1923 in the Middle and Far East and the Soviet Union did make major gains as part of its pact with Nazi Germany in 1939 and during and shortly after World War II as a result of combat operations. But cold war "probes" in the Berlin blockade and the Korean War were largely unsuccessful and similar operations in Northern Iran were withdrawn when faced with Western opposition. Cverall, in the immediate post-World War II period, Soviet efforts to improve its position by direct military deployments were "minimal."

Soviet leaders thus have not used military force in the "direct manner" outside the "socialist commonwealth" and will probably strive to avoid war rather than seek it, but they have used military power in the past in circumstances within their capabilities and when the risk to the territorial base of Soviet power was minimal. This is a policy of "political offensiveness" and "military defensiveness." They have used force for limited political-military purposes aside from the context of general war or close to their own hinterland where the "deck was stacked in their favor" as in the "power play" against the Japanese in the summer of 1938. In this instance, a shrewd estimate of the Japanese political-military configuration

and a combination of military force and political firmness inflicted a limited defeat on the Japanese.

The Soviet Union has shown an ability to cut losses, withdraw from exposed and declared positions, avoid wars or situations that would not be acceptable internally, but manipulate risks where suitable for Soviet objectives. They have been circumspect where a strong Western response might be expected but have supported revolutionary movements where prospective gains appeared to warrant it and the possibility of extensive direct Soviet military involvement was remote. 10 The Western powers have used force between them on more occasions than the Soviet Union has since 1945, and the Soviets have not relied on war to advance, as opposed to preserve Soviet territory except in the context of an imminent war. 11

V. M. Kulish, in a seminal monograph collectively published in Moscow in 1973 under the auspices of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., stated what may be the closest approximation to Soviet doctrine of the use of force in international relations. It reflects past Soviet experience with the use of force in conflicts and as a "presence" for Soviet diplomacy. His and his colleagues' views reflect the caution with which force has been employed, the circumstances where it might be utilized, and some indication as to constraints limiting Soviet planners.

Aulish reminds us that a state's military might is durable "only when its development is not in conflict with the national economy and when all aspects of the country's life, economic, political, social, cultural, and military. . . are being developed in a harmonious manner. States must find the proper form that will conform to the "foreign political goal of the state on one hand and with the international-political situation on the other." He cautions that war is an "extreme and dangerous political means"

and military threats can also "summon forth a definite reaction on the part of either international or domestic forces, the consequences of which are difficult and even impossible to anticipate, particularly in the case of opposition between the two world systems." 12

Even if a state has an advantage in a particular weapon or use of military force this may be neutralized by the other side which can utilize another weapon or create "a political situation somewhere in the world or region, or in the relations between the countries, that will prevent the enemy from realizing his military advantages." Political or military strategic superiority is the result of a "complicated opposition of forces" which is impossible to express in terms of simple qualitative indices, even though it may prove impossible to analyze the balance of forces in the absence of such indices. "13

The United States was said to have high strategic mobility and manipulated a broad military presence but "no direct dependency exists between the level of strategic mobility and the actual potential for employing it to acheive political goals." The military-strategic and international effectiveness of strategic mobility depends upon objective factors like the armament, strength, and development of the armed forces but also upon "many intra-political and international-political conditions, in which military power and its mobility are realized in terms of political and military-strategic effectiveness." 14

The words of the IMEMO associates may be a warning against excessive zeal and posturing by Soviet military or political figures who may be tempted to overplay the Soviet military card, take unwarranted risks, and paint an excessively optimistic picture of what can be derived by expenditures of money and/or manpower in various critical regions. This modern "dizzy with success" syndrome could easily be nurtured at a time of rising

Soviet military capabilities and what many perceive to be a corresponding relative decline of American and Western military capabilities and motivation to resist Soviet probes and Soviet assisted clients.

The current debate in Western strategic, governmental, and academic quarters concerned with Soviet affairs deals with serious and potentially afateful questions. Is traditional Soviet caution in deploying forces beyond the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe gradually being supplanted by a "forward" posture; the use of Soviet ground, air, and naval forces to support various allies and client states in a variety of contingencies with eventual incalculable consequences for world peace? A danger arises that a Soviet Union operating in an ascending curve of great power dynamism may collide with a United States disillusioned with the results of its forward deployment policies yet determined to resist Soviet moves. Alternatively is the fear that the latter may not resist gradual encroachments until some extremely dangerous Soviet move arises out of miscalculation and a nuclear war occurs. Soviet moves could lead to a major unravelling of the nexus of remaining American commitments and perhaps ultimately to undermining the physical security of the United States itself if unchecked.

What is clear is that there has been a net increase in Soviet military capabilities in gross terms under the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership, an apparent desire to "erase the image of a Soviet Union strategically inferior to its major adversary" and a parallel effort to improve the "reach" of Soviet general purpose forces. Despite the priority placed on major investment reforms and attempts to stimulate economic growth, successive annual increases in the military budget occured between 1965 - 1970 and thereafter. 15 Parenthetically, the size of the United States armed forces had fallen by 78,000 to 2,174,000 in 1974 while those of the Soviet Union were 100,000 higher at 3,525,000. American forces fell another

44,000 in 1975 and Soviet forces increased another 50,000 to 3,575,000.16

The 1968 incursion into Czechoslovakia resulted in emplacing five-six combat divisions in central Europe. There were additional divisions in Europe, with no dimunition of strength because of Soviet manpower deployments in the Far East. In the latter instance, separate but powerful mobile armed forces remain deployed in the Far East with Soviet manpower there at about a half million, with more than 10,000 tanks plus impressive tactical air capability. Generally there is greater emphasis on increased mobility, greater fire power, more use of air transport, and better logistical performance. Soviet armies in Eastern Europe have maintained existing manpower levels and improved the ratio of advanced equipment and weapons. The Soviet European commitment still consists of 75% of available Ground Forces strength and 70% of tactical air strength. 17

The more dramatic, novel changes in naval capabilities reflected in part a belief by Khrushchev's successors that the Soviet Union needed a wider range of military capabilities, particularly as a reaction to U.S. policy in Vietnam and a perceived U.S. willingness to suppress "national liberation movements" in the Third World, accelerating Soviet efforts to project a presence into the Middle East, Africa, and the Indian Ocean. Major emphasis was placed on improving the world's largest submarine fleet whose missions included launching of sea-based missiles and interdiction of seaborne supplies but there was also a renewal of surface-ship construction, already begun under Khrushchev. There was a growth in the merchant marine and significant increases in trawler and oceanographic activities. Soviet submarines ranged further into distant ocean areas within missile range of the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States. Two helicopter carriers, designed presumably to support shore based ground forces were built. 18 There was an increased naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea.

Naval units were used for political roles from 1968 in the Indian Ocean, from 1969 in the Caribbean and West Africa and 1970 in Southeast Asia, apparently in support of a decision by the 23rd Party Congress of March, 1966 that the Soviet navy was to "contest the West's unhindered use of the seas for the projection of military power and take on the guise of guardian against imperialist aggression." The Soviet navy also introduced new classes of support and landing vessels. 20

The expansion both qualitatively and quantitatively of the Soviet Navy was accompanied by statements by senior navy officials who emphasized that the Soviet navy was now a "global, ocean-going, long-range submarine and aircraft navy" which was fully capable of "great independence of operations, navigational abilities," great striking power and combat stability. Admiral Gorshkov, in a series of articles in Morskoi Sbornik that attracted considerable attention abroad, seemed to be making a case for a powerful surface unit, as opposed to a "submarine/aviation" naval mix and for a strong naval-air arm under naval control. 21

There was an improvement in airlift capabilities and the introduction of high-performance, all-weather interceptors. This was demonstrated in Prague in 1968 and perhaps more significantly in the logistical sense in the airlift supply operation after the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war to replenish Nasser's forces. Soviet interventionary capabilities were high-lighted by the appearance during the June war of a tank landing ship together with a couple of troop-landing ships with black-bereted troops of the naval infantry forces. This seemed to convey the impression that the Soviet Union would intervene with local landing parties although the height of the crisis had passed before they appeared. 22

The motivations behind these build-ups reflect traditional world power concerns, given a particular dimension by the historical experience

of the Soviet Union and the close wedding of Soviet military power to specific strategic diplomatic objectives in conditions of economic scarcity and strain. The Brezhnev leadership sought to avoid nuclear war, deter various threats to avert such a war, maintain its traditionally strong European continental military position and a credible military presence against an increasingly troublesome Peking. In addition, it sought to develop naval and maritime capabilities to support Third World interests and compete successfully on a global basis with the United States. 23 The danger, of course, was that "instead of armed forces being the instrument of foreign policy, foreign policy may become the hand-maiden of military requirements. **24*

Besides these general strategic purposes, other reasons for the buildup, partly of an internal nature must be considered. For despite the fact
that all Soviet commentators caution that the "balance of forces" is as
much a political as a military concept, there is the fact that "something
more than a refined calculus of the utilities and disutilities of military
power helps to shape the attitudes of the Soviet leadership toward its
accumulation."25 This is evident in statements by high Soviet officials.

Military power and what may be perceived at home and abroad as parity with the United States is basic to the official Soviet world view. Possession of Stratzsic right and conventional forces commands respect and the Soviet Union's voice to be heeded, its cooperation or at least acquiescence imperative on any major international issue. This was stated succinctly by Foreign Minister Gromyko when he observed that:

The Soviet Union is a great power situated on two continents, Europe and Asia, but the range of our country's international interests is not determined by its geographic position alone. . . The Soviet people do not plead with anybody to be allowed to have their say in the solution of any question concerning the maintenance of international peace, concerning the freedom and independence of the peoples and our country's extensive interests. This is our right, due to the Soviet

Union's position as a great power. During any acute situation, however far away it appears from our country, the Soviet Union's reaction is to be expected in all capitals of the world.²⁰

Why shouldn't the Soviet Union be a power equal to the United States in the strategic and conventional spheres, Georgi Arbatov, head of the U.S. Institute asks. Americans are guilty of a system of "double measures" and "double standards" when they express concern about the "mortal danger" supposedly hanging over the United States in the new strategic and conventional balance of forces in the world.

If American navies are permanently stationed thousands of kilometers away from the United States, close to the Soviet borders, Americans once again regard this as a normal state of affairs. But if Soviet warships so much as move out into the Mediterranean, which adjoins Soviet borders and is a long way from the United States, this too is assessed as an unparalleled threat and is a violation of the legitimate order of things. 27

This sense of the United States fretting over granting the Soviet
Union its "rightful" place in world affairs is closely akin to other general
sentiments <u>linking</u> the buildup of military power with detente and the
"onward rush of socialism" in the world. Gromyko, in a recent article in
the authoritative journal, <u>Kommunist</u>, declared that:

socialism is the most dynamic and influential force in the world arena. On three continents, from the Republic of Cuba to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam the new society of the peoples of socialist states thrives and is being successfully constructed. The inexhaustible resources of these countries, imposing in their economic acheivements, the power of their offensive might is placed at the service of peace and only peace. . .

darity, of the defensive might of the socialist commonwealth will remain henceforth the foremost concern of the CPSU and its Central Committee. 25

Brezhnev, delivering his report to the 25th Party Congress, linked and contrasted the build-up of Soviet military power to the general crisis of capitalism:

The development of the socialist countries, their growing might, the increased beneficial impact of their international policy -- that

is what constitutes the main direction of mankind's social progress today. The attractive force of socialism has become still greater against the background of the crisis that has broken out in the capitalist countries.

Our Party's 24th Congress emphasized that 'The attempts of capitalism to adapt itself to the new conditions do not mean its stabilization as a social system. The general crisis of capitalism continues to deepen.' Events of the past few years are convincing confirmation of this.²⁹

Soviet diplomacy has seen no inherent contradiction forcing concessions from the United States by threats and pressures and seeking limited agreements. The United States' ability to use military means has been neutralized by growing Soviet military power and has been forced to accept the logic of detente.

The change in the balance of power thoughout the world in favor of socialist countries has resulted in the establishment of a dynamic equilibrium in the military sphere or such a relationship in the strategic forces of the two world systems (primarily between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.), that the imperialist powers will be unable to use their military might with impunity in carrying out their foreign political plans.

. . . The Soviet Union, while displaying concern for the security of all countries in the Socialist Bloc and for creating favorable conditions for socialistic and communistic organizational development has at the same time been <u>forced</u> into building up its own defensive capabilities. As a result, it succeeded to a considerable degree in neutralizing American military might and, at the same time, it ensured the conditions required for peaceful co-existence between the two world systems.

The internal dimension of the military build-up is both critical and puzzling. Certainly the economic strain of acheiving and maintaining global "parity" and a global military effort in competition with an economy that has more than double the gross national product must be great. Indeed, Soviet defense expenditures can be correlated to the rise or decline in the growth rates of the Soviet economy. But the Soviet Union is not forcing itself into bankruptcy and certainly in recent years the military share of national cutput has been small enough to be "accompanied by rapid economic growth and rising living standards. In the last been a decline in the

rate of growth of factor productivity, in the "effectiveness with which the inputs have been utilized" and Soviet deficits with hard-currency nations continue to grow.31

The total Soviet "pie" does act as a constraint in the sense that what the Soviet leadership deems as necessary for a Soviet military effort will be provided but not to the extent some military quarters propose. Military leaders know that if they push demands too heavily, "they run the risk of starving the economic goose that lays golden military eggs," and this resource constraint is a factor in Soviet force deployments and their possible utilization, as will be seen below.

But while Soviet military-strategic planners and economists have not succeeded in discovering a Marxist-Leninist philosophers' stone, it would appear that competing internal considerations override whatever hard-to-quantify burden defense spending represents. One is clearly Brezhnev's own version of consensus politics, economically reassuring a Soviet military leadership naturally dubious about a "detente" that could lead to a dangerous "relaxation" of pressure abroad and a lessening of proper Soviet vigilance and discipline at home. Therefore, it is hardly surprising to hear Marshall Grechko, the late Soviet defense minister, echo the positive correlation between detente and growing Soviet might. Positive changes in international relations are largely, he contends, the "outcome of the Party and the people's great work in boosting the country's economic potential and strengthening its defense capability, the direct result of the fact that the policy of the Soviet Union combines the firm will for peace with the constant readiness to deal any aggressor a decisive rebuff." 33

Brezhnev and the political leadership share the military's concern with the dangers of Soviet military inferiority. There is a temptation to conclude that Brezhnev, who cannot carry out referas in the command economy

for fear of possible adverse political consequences, seeks to improve the capacity of the economy to produce military power. The economy is a constraint in the sense of raising the question "how much butter must be produced in order to obtain the highest rate of military growth," with military growth a desirable end, not a regrettable necessity.

There is, in addition, a sharing of values between some elements of the military and political leadership in internal discipline, suppression of dissidence and large armed forces and deployments (excluding unpopular wars) as an instrument of internal legitimation, a time-honored technique of political systems and hardly unknown today in societies lacking the resources of the Soviet Union. To illustrate this point, Brezhnev described the military as a "good school of ideological and physical tempering, discipline and organization." The army enables the Soviet male population to "graduate, so to speek, from a unique nationwide university."35

Smith, in his conversations with Soviet citizens, found that patriotic indoctrination appeals did not fall on deaf ears. Russians, he notes, have a "primeval sense of community" of "Victorial pride in power and empire."

Soviet soldiers envied the East German standard of living but felt superior to Germans "as if their affiliation with the muscle of Moscow compensated for all else." A Russian writer who was vacationing in Sochi at the time that reports of Soviet intervention in Czechoślovakia started to arrive on Western radio frequencies noted that "The people down there were really very happy with what happened. 'Finally -- our troops have gone into Czechoślovakia. We should have done that a long time ago. Now we must go on and do the same in Romania.' These people were glad to see that Russia had used its force. They respect that force very much. They like to see Russian power exarcised."36

Whether this visceral patriotism would survive a critical test of combat, especially if it were prolonged and indecisive, (as perhaps in a war with the PRC) or whether patriotic rhetoric can perpetually neutralize internal strains and poor performance in the Soviet economy is problematical. But the burden appears "tolerable" under present conditions given the perceived advantages of military power internationally and its "bonus effect" internally.

But calls for "moral" rather than material incentives and appeals to patriotic fervor cannot completely compensate for declines in agricultural production, the lowest growth rate of civilian industrial production since World War II, and an overall decline in the growth of per capita consumption observed recently. Force levels and deployments inevitably reflect these constraints but working within them are designed to have a maximum political and psychological impact in furthering the aims of Soviet foreign policy and serving as instruments of "coercive diplomacy." Military power, in the Soviet view, is, as noted, only one element in a political-moral equation, but, properly applied in the right set of circumstances, may have disproportionate influence.

There has been a great deal of speculation, for example, about the intentions of Soviet forces deployed along the Sino-Soviet border in recent years. After the hostilities at Chenpao Island on the Sino-Soviet border and Manchuria on March 2nd and 15th, 1969 and along the Sinklang border in July and August of the same year, Colonel General Tolubko was appointed Commander of the Far Eastern Military District. Commemorating the Sino-Soviet war of 1929, Tolubko had published an article in Red Star noting that after "all efforts to settle the conflict had failed" the Soviet forces struck a "sudden and decisive blow." There were reports that in August Soviet diplomats had asked East European leaders about their attitudes

toward an attack on Chinese nuclear installations and more reinforcements were sent to Soviet Asia. But apparently these and other gestures were elements of political pressure designed to force the Chinese into border talks which were arranged later in the year. Soviet force deployments since that time are designed to put pressure on China as part of fanning the anti-Chinese feeling in the Soviet Union, which hardly needs encouragement. 39 Soviet moves and statements are designed to deter a major Chinese attack (highly unlikely given the great disparities in the military strengths of the two nations), but also to preserve the possibility of a partial rapprochment with a post-Mao leadership. The Soviet leadership might respond to Chinese "provocations" but not alarm domestic or foreign opinion to foreclose the possibility of reconciliation. 40 Brezhnev. for example, after attacking "Peking's feverish attempts to wreck detente" indicated that the Soviet government was "prepared to normalize relations with China on the principles of peaceful coexistence" and if Peking returned to a policy "truly based on Marxism-Leninism" this "would find an appropriate response from our side. #11

Any Soviet attack, even in a post-Mao China would be fraught with risks, not the least of which would be a long, inconclusive war with an opponent whose ideological zeal and motivation would match or exceed that of Soviet troops. It would be difficult to envision a Chinese leadership that, having lost a Chinese province to a sudden Soviet armed assault, would be politically able to make a settlement with the Soviet Union. Also, any imminent possibility of Soviet attack might drive the Chinese closer to the very alliance with the United States the Soviet Union professes to fear. Parenthetically, Goldhamer notes that far more attention is devoted to political indoctrination against the United States and the West in Soviet political indoctrination in the armed forces. This

is in part because Soviet military people can acquire large amounts of anti-Chinese material in the civilian press and radio and in part because the "threat" of the imperialist power is needed to justify military expenditures, 42 particularly when there is the goad of "catching up with and overtaking" a technologically superior opponent.

The question of the capabilities and intentions of Soviet ground forces in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. has, of course, always been the major cause of concern for the defense planner and armed forces of the United States who, despite fighting two Asian wars, are still oriented to the European contingency. Concern with a massive Soviet attack, a sudden move toward the English channel or some other political-military contingency, the military focal point of the cold war when Soviet forces in 1947 outnumbered U.S. troops by about 2 to 1,43 appears to be reemerging in both public and official discussion.

A Soviet commentator observed that advantages of one ideology or social system "cannot be solved with the aid of nuclear arguments" but nevertheless "it is naive to suppose that nuclear missile parity predetermines the preservation of the sociopolitical status quo." This has usually been taken to apply to non-European contingencies but there are recent indications that it may apply to Europe as well, which shows signs of being susciptible to "sociopolitical change" for the first time since the early cold war years.

Soviet military planning and deployments proceed from the assumption that deterrence may fail or indeed that even successful deterrence is linked with a war-waging, i.e., war winning capability, an ability to wage a muclear or non-nuclear war in Europe and win it. Soviet forces in Europe cutnumber NATO forces by about 3:1 in armor and 2:1 in combat aircraft and even though some of these forces are deployed for "policing" duties in

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union they constitute a formidable striking force. This is part of a "rapid roll-over" technique, using Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces with a stress on their preemptive potential. The Soviet Union is also favored by geographic proximity and her theater force levels are larger than those of all the Western allies combined. 47

Soviet forces are deployed for high speed offensive operations, a "shock " power" army which "tries to create the impression of great strength, often by reliance on mobility to augment its force by velocity (and deception) for the purpose of sapping the morale of its opponent and paralyzing his command and control. will Soviet writings depict an offensive coordinated at high rates designed to seize important areas and economic centers, of "smashing the enemy with nuclear weapons," of destroying the enemy defensive line "simultaneously throughout its entire depth," even without numerical superiority over him at every point. High speed offensive operations along the entire front will "deprive the enemy of the capability to close breaches. * Enemy tactical means of nuclear attack (a major offsetting factor in NATO defense planning) are to be neutralized by "immediate destruction of nuclear means as they are discovered, and preemption in the launching of nuclear strikes, that is, destruction of nuclear means before they can be put into action. High rates of troop advance reduce the possibilities of their destruction by enemy nuclear strikes. A rapid advance deep into the enemy's rear exposes his long-range nuclear force to the threat of capture and degrives him of the "time needed for occupying launch positions and for preparing for launch, since this time is rather lengthy. "50

Experience in past wars shows that "surprise combat actions make it possible to acheive the greatest result with a minimum expenditure of forces, means, effort and time." The enemy must be hit at his most sensitive point, concentrating superior forces in the battlefield "unexpectedly (secretly and swiftly) for the enemy and place them before the battle in

as favorable a position as possible. "51

This major emphasis on initial combat power, for a short, intense war waged before American nuclear weapons could be brought into action and before ultimately superior American logistics and economic capacity might be decisive, utilizes to the fullest Soviet advantages and is designed to downplay their vulnerabilities. Soviet ground arms are more labor-intensive forces which are supported by fewer (and less complex) weapons than in the West. Mass armies emphasizing numerical superiority have always been a Russian characteristic. 52 Chly in warfare over a prolonged period would Soviet organizational advantages disappear because of their inadequate ability to supply and maintain forces. NATO is designed to fight the sustained, long term war of the World War II variety. Soviet doctrine seeks to insure that NATO will not survive organizationally to fight such a war.

Soviet steamroller tactics and organizational practices permit "a high teeth-to-tail ratio" and "higher visibility of military power" than their opponents. A Warsaw Pact assault must concentrate attacks because of the Pact's own vulnerabilities in a longer war and to avoid the possibility of key NATO industrial nations developing superior but latent military resources. Soviet emphasis on the total economic strength of a nation as a critical factor would not be as applicable to a short conventional war using peacetime forces-in-being and readily mobilizeable forces but it would be a "binding constraint" in a prolonged war. 53

Soviet writers speak less and less of all-out nuclear war in Europe and more of swift, even sustained conventional war for "without a political goal the most fierce battle, in the words of Lenin, will not be a war but simply a fight." If nuclear missile parity does not guarantee the "preservation of the sociopolitical status quo" how would or could Soviet forces be deployed in Europe to affect that status quo? The "worst case"

is the one already noted, a rapid advance across Europe with nuclear strikes before NATO could reinforce its units or else a massive conventional assault, so sudden and so rapid that NATO could not bring its nuclear forces to. bear. A sudden attack might commence at a time of cordial relations with the West as following an American withdrawal. Or European and Western capitalism might be perceived as so eroded that they might succumb quickly to a display of Soviet military prowess. 55 The vulnerability of Western economic structures to energy shortages and generally deteriorating economic conditions which would bring about a favorable "correlation of forces" within particular European countries would be pertinent here.

Brezhnev's recent emphasis on the growth of influence of Communist parties in the Western world and the need to deepen ties with "progressive non-communist parties" in Finland, Great Britain and France are instructive as well as an assessment of detente as leading to "more favorable conditions for peaceful socialist and communist construction. **56

Alternatively, classic scenarios involving rapid deployment of Soviet forces are a fait accompli incorporating Hamburg or Bornholm Island into the Soviet bloc or probing in Berlin, testing U.S. resolution and political will. Or one can visualize the possibility of a move in northern Norway, where the Soviet Union is at a great advantage on land and sea and where it might be assumed that the West would accept Soviet expansion. There is also the contingency of a Soviet military threat to southern Europe, especially the Balkans where Greek-Turkish difficulties have roiled NATO and where Tito's death could create a crisis that the Soviets might exploit by direct military action. 57

Conceivably, a crisis in Eastern Europe on the Czech model of 1968 might lead Soviet forces to pursue refugees across borders to trace the "heresy" to its foreign source. Finally, there is the utilization of the "deployed

threat" diplomatically, "psychological coercion" exercised by the "passive threat implications of Soviet forces in being." Western European nations would consider Soviet interests and adjust to them, there would be a neutrality "tilt" toward the East, Soviet pressures rendering independence conditional but not merely nominal; and de facto acceptance by outside powers of Europe as a Soviet area of special interest. The Soviets would prevail in diplomatic negotiations not by force of arguments but by perception of strength. This would be a realistic option for them and would serve as a practical application of their belief that detente has been a consequence of their enhanced military capability. 58

A military move in Europe where the Soviet Union is militarily strongest, where the traditional Russian penchant for large ground forces continues is and will remain a major, perhaps the major concern of American military policy planners. Even if the hypothetical deployments do not occur, the large Soviet military presence in Europe casts its shadow over its Western neighbors and is omnipresent in negotiations on arms reduction and European boundaries, an eternal "bargaining chip."

The Soviet naval deployment, involving a challenge in military and geographical areas where Western and especially American forces have long been predominant, is of relatively recent crigin. Its very newness and strangeness sometimes seems to strike more alarm among Americans than the Soviet military presence in Europe does to Europeans who, while concerned, may have become accustomed to living with the problem.

In this celebrated series of articles in Morskoi Sbornik (Naval Collection) Admiral Gorshkov, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, enumerated the peacetime political tasks of the navy. These include:

1. demonstrating Soviet power beyond its borders for reasons of prestige and influence; 2. increasing Soviet control over the oceans to obtain food,

industrial raw materials and energy resources; 3. using enhanced Soviet naval capabilities to surprise adversaries, intimidate them, lower their morale, and secure objectives on shore without fighting. 59

Navies permit "the acheivement of political goals without resorting to military operations by merely threatening to initiate them." The emergence of a modern Soviet Navy allows the Soviet Union to "deliver punishing retaliatory blows and to disrupt the plans of the imperialists," to defend the country "from attacks by aggression from the direction of the ocean." Official visits and business calls by the warships of the Navy are "making a significant contribution to improving mutual relations between states and peoples" and "strangthening the international influence of the Soviet Union."

Soviet naval units have served to deter attacks on client states, as they did after the June, 1967 war in the Middle East to deter Israel from attacking Alexandria and Port Said. They also served to deter a direct threat to the U.S.S.R. posed by the presence of the Sixth Fleet's aircraft carriers in the late 1950's and Polaris submarines in the 1960's. But they also played a more discreet, "show the flag" role in support of a particular side in a regional dispute, supporting Iraq's negotiating position in its dispute with Kuwait, for example, without pressing Kuwait. This was designed to increase Soviet influence and deny to the West any advantage detrimental to the Soviet Union's clients. 61

The Soviet deployment in the Indian Ocean must be large enough to satisfy the naval requirement of familiarity, be eye-catching enough to raise the spectre of a naval race but not create one, and deflect third world hostility to the American-British counter, not to the Soviet presence. It sought to show the flag, support an anti-Polaris and anti carrier role and serve the cause of denuclearization of the Indian Ocean. Soviet support

of third world clients in this fashion serves the goal of pushing them into a position of nonalignment. This is consistent with visits of Soviet warships but not permanent bases for them. 62

In the Indo-Pakistani crisis of December, 1971, Soviet naval moves in the Indian Ocean were apparently designed to counter-demonstrate against "imperialist provocations" (U.S. Naval Task Force 74) and win favor with India. (The Russian Ambassador to India, Pegov, was quoted as saying that the U.S. would not intervene in the area and that the Soviet fleet would not "allow" U.S. naval intervention. Whether this was the actual basis of Soviet policy is uncertain.) It was an attempt to maintain solidarity with and control the actions of clients. Each side sought to maintain the "right" to intervene and to deter intervention. A superpower can support a friend who is on the strategic defensive, avert defeat, and restore the balance. (Soviet moves in support of Nasser and U.S. moves in mining Haiphong harbor during the Vietnam war), but not assist the client to victory of a conclusive sort. Soviet naval deployment policy seems to follow these "rules." It has supported with force or demonstrated on behalf of governments having internal difficulties (Yemen, 1967, Somalia, 1970, Sierra Leone, 1971) and of course on behalf of Egypt. Basically Soviet initiatives have been strategically defensive and they have not sought to interfere with Western initiatives. Soviet moves in the Indo-Fakistani crisis were apparently designed to restrict the "scope of U.S. intervention and confine it to defensive ends. * Formal Soviet naval equality, however, does not in fact mask a still substantial U.S. advantage and the interests at stake and will of the respective superpowers are ultimately conclusive. 63

The "new" Soviet naval role is significantly different from the past as it seeks to protect Soviet state interests and clients worldwide, but this

has not evolved as yet to any design to directly challenge vital Western interests nor has it evidenced a serious intention to fight limited wars at sea with the United States or other Western navies, as some believe.

While there is a growing Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, even at the end of the October War in the Middle East, when the Soviet role was quite extensive the Russians had more ships at sea but were inferior in firepower and military effectiveness.

The Soviet navy has weaknesses in logistic support and totally lacks transamphibicus capability. It has some "seadenial" capability but it is questionable whether this can be maintained without some mobile seaborne air support. It still must depend on facilities in foreign countries and these are potentially vulnerable to the vagaries of Third World internal politics, as the Soviet Union discovered in Egypt. Soviet logistics ships are highly vulnerable and their amphibious forces are designed for "short duration amphibious lift near the homeland."

Mcc Gwire has observed that the Soviet navy has been given more ambitious goals than before but has not been given the means to fulfill all these new missions and there are occasional hints that the Soviet navy cannot get all it wants, especially where huge capital costs for large surface ships like aircraft carriers are involved. The Soviet navy does not seek classic "command of the sea," in the Western sense. Resource limitations would make this difficult. They do seek control over sea areas where this can be done at reasonable cost. This is a form of "command denial," in countering the West's strategic delivery capability. In operating close to their own shores, the Soviet navy practices "command by exclusion," in more distant areas they adopt "command denial" and in specific areas they may seek temporary command with a local superiority of force. This is not "command of the sea," but as in the Indian Coean, it

cannot be easily countered if it is used as a political instrument to counter the other fleet and increase its authority and importance. If it does more than this it runs the danger of becoming "a Potemkin village on a raft" in the sense that Indian Ocean based units once deployed in a critical confrontation become "hostages to fate." Should such a critical confrontation ensue in an area of minimum Soviet naval strength, it is doubtful that Soviet units could engage in serious "gunboat diplomacy" to interrupt oil shipping, for example. 68

The Soviet Union is not challenging the United States for command of the sea but it is challenging the commands Western navies formally exercised by default. A Soviet source, for example, contends that a Soviet military "presence" with adequate strategic mobility helps to oppose the "aggressive aspirations of imperialism on a global scale." But "military presence" is "first of all an economic and political problem and only thereafter does it become a military problem." In this sense, "we immediately note that the U.S.S.R. is following a policy that is basically different from the American plan. It has its own historical, economic and geographic peculiarities which, distinct from those of the U.S.A., will not allow it to or require it to maintain a military presence in remote regions of the world. "69

Soviet armed forces on land and sea seek to create an impression of great military strength. In Europe they comprise a large military force with an ability to fight a war at different levels, either nuclear or conventional, and make it quite clear that this formidable, constant military presence is recognized by other nations and throws a corresponding diplomatic shadow. It undoubtedly could have certain sudden, "shock" military uses but it is mainly intimidating, rooted in part in traditional Russian preferences and perceived needs for such a force and not likely

to become military master of the continent assuming a reasonable nuclear balance and the absence of a collapse of political will and economic capability in the Western countries. It reflects the constraints of the Soviet economy but seeks to mitigate these by shock, surprise and a gamble that in the event of combat a rapid war would not allow time for superior Western economic capabilities and technology to be ultimately decisive. The Soviet naval forces are smaller and have less fire power in relation to their chief adversary than is the case with the traditionally dominant ground forces of a continental power like the Soviet Union. They seek primarily to deny access or at minimum complicate the deployment calculations of Western military and political leaders, but they show no apparent readiness to risk any "shoot outs" or limited naval engagements with American or other Western naval forces. While extending their reach and increasingly engaging in audacious maneuvers as in the Caribbean they too, perhaps more than the ground forces because of the costs involved and the possible skepticism of the more conservative Soviet leaders, are affected by economic constraints and the extent and duration of their reach is limited.

Yet there is the danger of miscalculation, especially of being drawn into a situation beyond the point that Soviet capabilities and more prudent interests might dictate if a client state or movement is doing poorly in a crisis situation, as occured in the "Cotober war" in the Middle East. There are precedents for large quantities of Soviet weapons and some personnel being used to "support those nations fighting for their freedom against the forces of internal reaction and imperialist intervention." The Soviet Navy, by its very presence in the Mediterranean, would "restrain the imperialists and local reaction, prevent them from dealing out violence to the local populace, and eliminate a threat to world peace and security."

"Mobile and well trained and well equipped armed forces" are required for

this role. The situation may require the Soviet Union to "carry out measures aimed at restraining the aggressive acts of imperialism." The Soviet Union has already begun to resolve the task of furnishing military-technical support for its military presence in rather remote parts of the world although "foreign political support" for a Soviet military presence may "become more complicated and difficult" than economic and military technical support. 70

It is in these instances where Soviet policy has recently reflected a more forward oriented stance. They reveal, more than possible Soviet moves in Europe or naval interdictions of Western oil tankers, the acutely political nature of Soviet deployment policy, whatever its domestic underpinnings. In Soviet moves during the second Vietnam war, the October was in the Middle East, and the recent events in Angola, there was a perceived threat to "fraternal" or client states or movements, a situation demanding and inviting some form of Soviet military presence without an immediate danger of confrontation with the United States, and a correct assessment of the probable reaction of the latter.

Soviet policy in the second Vietnamese war reflected an apparent aim of avoiding a serious risk of conflict with the United States and pitting the Americans against the CPR if possible, or at least utilizing North Vietnamese friendship in the context of Soviet competition with China in Southeast Asia for the support of national liberation movements. The Soviet Union did not threaten the DRV's interests and was more remote and less capable of adversely affecting North Vietnam's fate than Peking. Only the Soviet Union could provide the North Vietnamese the sophisticated weaponry they needed to continue the war after the introduction of American combat forces in the south and the bombing in the north and only Soviet assistance could deter the United States and checkmate it from taking

advantage of its technological superiority. 71

As American combat troops were introduced into Vietnam in the spring of 1965, the Chinese had to give the Soviet Union land access to Vietnam. This enabled the Soviets to open up a secure land supply route to the north and gave them the power to raise and maintain the level of combat in Vietnam as its interests dictated. There were even indications that the United States may not have highlighted the early Soviet role in defending the north because it was perceived that a greater Soviet role would help bring the North Vietnamese to the conference table.

Late in 1964 Foreign Minister Gromyko told the North Vietnamese that they could plan for a military push in the south. In this connection Party Secretary Le Duan said to party cadres in 1965:

"The attitude of the Soviet party today regarding strengthening the socialist camp as well as regarding the national liberation movement in general and Vietnam in particular is different from that of Khrushchev before." The Soviet comrades "agree completely with our path." 73

Soviet aid then followed a circuitous path in line with multiple and often conflicting diplomatic and military objectives: aid the North Vietnamese, isolate and curtail China, yet not incur a serious risk of confrontation with the United States, but outmaneuver and ultimately outlast the latter. The Soviets sent the DEV advanced military equipment, especially in defensive weapons, convoys of Soviet freighters and Soviet technicians. 74

The 24th Party Congress in 1971 sought detente with the United States and simultaneously sought to strengthen the Soviet position around China, including Vietnam. The Chinese had spurned a negotiated settlement in Vietnam and sought a protracted war until final victory. The Soviet Union probably sought to create doubt about the Chinese formula in North

Vietnamese calculations and sought a negotiated settlement, favoring a united front of all Communist forces and relying on Soviet support and influence. The North Vietnamese wanted some diplomatic step from the Soviet Union that would make it clear that detente was impossible while the United States intervention in South Vietnam and the bombing of the north continued. Evidence suggested that the Soviets and Chinese were unwilling to reduce arms supplies to push the IRV into concessions in their negotiations with the United States but intended to reduce aid after an agreement was reached, implying a veto over any subsequent North Vietnamese offensive in the south.75

Soviet military-diplomatic steps from that point seemed to reflect a desire to strengthen the North Vietnamese hand for negotiations, including military support in the protracted military-diplomatic bargaining that was being conducted simultaneously in the battlefields in the south, in the air over the north intermittently, and at the conference table in Paris. Soviet aid efforts also seemed to rise and fall depending upon the perceived risk of major confrontation with the United States.

The Soviet Union stepped up its flow of supplies to North Vietnam in preparation for an assault in the south. Since the Chinese had cut off the land route the Soviets maximized the degree of firepower per item shipped since the sea route was the only alternative. The Soviets began shipping new and heavy weapons to the North Vietnamese including T-54 medium tanks, 130mm artillery pieces and SA-7 missiles, new items not part of earlier Soviet aid efforts and not defensive in nature. These were key elements in the North Vietnamese offensive of the spring of 1972 which began after President Nixon's return from Peking but before the Moscow summit meeting. The offensive would have strengthened the North Vietnamese hand in the negotiations and possibly led to a more pliable

government in Saigon. There was heavy use of massive artillery barrages utilizing 130mm weapons and at least 100 NVA tanks were deployed against units unversed in anti-tank warfare. In this latter instance, prisoner interrogations revealed that at least 3000 North Vietnamese tank crewmen in the offensive had graduated from the Russian armoured school at Odessa four to five months earlier. The size and scope of the North Vietnamese offensive was made possible in part because of a massive stockpiling of Soviet weapons, following President Podgorny's trip to Hanoi in October, 1971.76

President Nixon's bombing of North Vietnam, the emergencyshipment of weapons and the blockade of Haiphong Harbor followed. The Soviet Union did not react in a military manner, perhaps because of the very massiveness of the assault?? and because they wanted the Nixon summit visit with Brezhnev to take place for what appeared to be compelling reasons. 78

The peace agreement of January 1973 depended upon the forbearance of all the major powers involved to be effective. Indeed, the Soviet Union and China "significantly decreased their Supply of arms to North Vietnam" (in Ambassador Graham Martin's words) in 1973 and were "not resupplying them with massive weapons of war" in 1974. The North Vietnamese for this and other reasons practiced a policy of prudence. This included exerting limited military pressure on the South Vietnamese regime for purposes of getting the South Vietnamese to carry out some form of political compromise in the south but avoiding steps that could lead to a resumption of the U.S. bombing of the north if the conflict escalated. The political and military jockeying for position in the south, inaugurated by the Paris agreements, continued. The U.S. had sought to stabilize Thieu before the Paris agreements were signed. Following the Paris agreements the Communists

a pipeline across the 17th parallel. They sent in enough tanks, trucks, artillery, manpower and missiles to sustain themselves for a first leavy fighting or several years of low level fighting. The force in being could exert political pressure or be utilized to laure a major offensive against the South Vietnamese should the need arise.

A Soviet observer, reviewing the events of 1973 in North Vietnam, gives a revealing insight into Soviet thinking in this period; concern at Saigon's "provocations," yet calling for a prudent, low key response.

The government of the DRV, in the course of theyear came out with a number of statements, in which it resolutely condemned the numerous attempts of the Saigon administration, supported by the United States, to wreck the fulfillment of the Paris agreements and called on the Vietnamese people to intensify the struggle for the peaceful reunification of Vietnam. In particular, in a statement published in the middle of November, it noted, that in spite of the agreement, the USA continued to strengthen the Saigon administration in the capacity of an arm of neocolonialism in South Vienam, kept thousands of its military advisers there, in the guise of civilian advisers, and bought in a large quantity of weapons and military materials.

The restriction on U.S. air support, the growing military potential of the North Vietnamese forces and the combined military-political efforts of the North Vietnamese and NIF forces eroded the ARVN military position and probably suggested that the time for a renewed major military effort was at hand. The North Vietnamese offensive unfolded, at first tentatively in the spring of 1975 and the comprehensive scope, firepower deployed and equipment utilized gave evidence of Soviet assistance. Once again the liberal use of heavy artillery and especially tanks against disintegrating South Vietnamese opposition also suggested Soviet tactics. 83

The role of Soviet assistance and particularly the complex international background of the final North Vietnamese thrust are suggested by Foreign Minister Gromyko's remarks. While the victories won by the peoples of Indochina were "primarily by their own efforts . . . all around and

effective" Soviet aid was a decisive factor.

The successful development of the concluding phase of the liberation struggle on the Indochinese peninsula was facilitated by the circumstance that it took place in new conditions, in the situation, that had come about in the world under the influence of the process of the easing of international tensions, at the beginning of which was placed the active foreign policy operations of the U.S.S.R., of the entire socialist commonwealth.

In assessing the continuing Middle East conflict Soviet politicalmilitary assistance to "confrontation states" opposing Israel, chiefly
Egypt and Syria, furnishes an example of Soviet military assistance to
selected regimes or movements on a world-wide scale. Here the area involved is closer to the Soviet Union, the stakes are far greater, the
Soviet client states far weaker, and the regional adversary far stronger
than in Viet Nam. The world-wide climate of opinion and possible American
reaction are also far more unpredictable and the ensuing risks of dangerous
escalation and even physical involvement of Soviet forces in an unplanned
and unanticipated manner far greater than in Southeast Asia.

The Soviet Union pursued multiple objectives with its build up in the then UAR, especially after defeat of Arab armies in the Six Day War in June, 1967. One was to strengthen the Soviet military and political position in the Mediterranean to limit Western actions there. Another was to strengthen the UAR side in a way that would be favorable to the Soviet Union and its position in the Arab world, to build up a "base" with stable boundaries, protected by an agreed territorial frontier between the UAR and Israel. Acheiving this latter goal would promote Soviet interests in the area, especially activity in the direction of the Red Sea - Indian Ocean that would not continuously be under threat of attack on its eastern flank. 85

From the Egyptian perspective "only the Soviets could be looked on to bolster Egypt's ability to wage war against Israel, offensively or defensively, while only the Americans could help them to make peace. As the October war broke out, Soviet help and influence weighed heavily in the balance; help for a limited military operation that could set in motion a process of American diplomatic pressure on Israel. 86

The Soviet Union became increasingly involved in Egyptian defense with Soviet combat personnel, especially pilots, for reasons quite different than that which existed in North Vietnam. In the Middle Eastern case it was imperative to shore up a client state with demonstrably inferior capabilities in relation to its regional military antagonist but not make them so strong that dangerous Egyptian moves would result that might set major American counterintervention in motion. Soviet policy in the Middle East lacked the essentially long term, strategically optimistic ambience that characterized it in Southeast Asia. 87

The exact nature and extent of the Soviet role in the coordinated Egyptian-Syrian attack on the Israeli Suez position in the Cotober, 1973 war is difficult to establish. But the Soviet Union was aware of preparations for war in May-June, 1973 because Soviet media referred to alleged Israeli troop concentrations and provocations. 88 The U.S.S.R. would not back an effort to eliminate Israel as a state: "The U.S.S.R., because of its world responsibilities could not support us in this because such support would mean it would have to be prepared for war with the United States." But Soviet military support was available for "eliminating the consequences of the 1967 aggression" because the United States would not unconditionally guarantee Israel's post 1967 boundaries. 89

The Soviets were cautious and when pressed to supply surface-tosurface missiles or MIG-25s to Cairo delayed and obfuscated. Sadat indicated, for example, that "They say, yes, yes, yes, to make things easy for us, but then we are caught in a whirlwind." The prudent. opportunistic nature of pre-October Soviet policy was revealed by Heykal (Sadat's close advisor) who contended that the Soviets could tolerate the state of neither war nor peace better than the Egyptians but that didn't mean the Russians wanted it to continue. They wanted it to end, a peaceful end if possible but one that didn't involve it with the United States.

As for the alternative, the Soviet Union does not prevent anyone from pursuing it nor does it push anyone towards it.90

Sadat apparently gave the Soviets advance warning which would explain the departure of Soviet dependents before the war started. Soviet officers and troops were distributed among Syrian field forces as advisory teams and preparations could not have been hidden from them. Both Egypt and Syria needed Soviet weapons and ammunition and Sadat knew either from prior consultation or assumed the Soviet Union would supply him what he needed to avert defeat. These arms invluded several weapons, including advanced anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles not previously supplied outside the Warsaw Pact countries. A limited number of "offensive" longer range surface to surface missiles were also supplied as well as light and medium bomber aircraft. This meant that the Soviets were willing to risk the capture of many secrets of military technology to test the efficiency of their technical doctrine and material more widely than in Indochina. Soviet military authorities could assume that a limited offensive against Israel could succeed. Soviet media had previously endorsed "all forms of struggle" by the Arabs and agreed that, given Israel's unwillingness to reach a political settlement the Arabs were justified in using other methods to regain their land. 91

Sadat's troops, in crossing the canal were protected by a Soviet missile screen and unlimited quantities of arms and equipment. In addition the use of surprise and deception as a means of disorganizing the

adversary seems to have been taken "from the Soviet Union's doctrinal book" by the Egyptian forces in the October war. 92

The fact noted above that Washington had never endorsed Israel's post-1967 boundaries may have encouraged the Soviet belief that a limited offensive would not invite an American response. Kissinger may have nurtured this assessment by withholding major arms deliveries to Israel as long as the Russians practiced restraint and Sadat would accept a cease fire. The war would be an instrument of diplomacy and pressure was exerted by the United States on Israel as the Israelis sought subsequently to destroy the Egyptian Third Army. The war ended with neither losers nor winners and it was after the war ended that Sadat, by waging war, was able to acheive a partial Israeli withdrawal through Washington pressure. 93

A Soviet assessment of the October War sheds some light on Soviet calculations and E. Primakov, of the Institute for World Economics and International Relations, makes some interesting observations. Israeli "hawks" in his view under Moshe Dayan sought to annex permanently (assimilate) Arab lands seized during the "six-day-war" in 1967. The Israelis in their military actions ("clinical strikes") sought to liquidate the capacity of the Arab countries and the Palestinians to oppose them. The Israelis would not settle the conflict in the Middle East but "sought to guarantee the preservation and stabilization of the results of the 1967 aggression" in spite of international public opinion and U.N. resolutions to the contrary. The Israelis believed, in Primakov's view, that preservation of the "heigher war nor peace" situation would cause a move to the right in the Arab world, and "weaken revolutionary decocratic regimes" as well as "facilitate the possibility of maneuvering" by "openly reactionary and pro-Islamist Arab countries."

The Israelis sustained great losses in the Cotober war and although Arab losses were greater, the Israelis were especially sonsitive because of the disparity in human resources between themselves and the Arab countries. Kissinger said that in his opinion, Israel must "avail itself" of the possibilities of negotiations for a settlement, for it could not withstand such losses indefinitely. The Israeli military-political positions aimed at "perpetuating the results of the 1967 aggression" failed and the road to a peace conference on a political settlement was opened.

The combination of the resolute measures of the Soviet Union in support of the struggle of the Arab countries for the liquidation of the consequences of the Israeli aggression with the constructive course, directed at the development of the process of the easing of international tension, exerted a definite influence on Washington's position. Under the influence of Soviet policy and also considering those changes which appeared in the military situation in the Near East and the political situation in other areas of the world, the U.S. was forced to introduce a number of corrections in its policy.

There was no question of "Washington's retreat from aid to Israel" and the United States demonstrated its full support for the Israelis with a "continuous flow of American weapons and military equipment and the shifting of the 6th U.S. fleet, strengthened with aircraft carriers, to the eastern part of the Mediterranean." But at the same time, "the United States was forced to change a number of emphases in its policy, that was established at the time of the contact of the Soviet Union with the United States on problems of settling the Near East conflict."

Foreign Minister Gromyko warned that the "Israeli aggression" was doomed to failure as the "historical experience and recent events in Indochina" illustrate. As long as Israeli aggression and expansion continue "there will be no peace in the Middle East, just as there will be no security for Israel." Israeli government circles must understand that "while they are guided by aggressive ambitions, the very existence of the

state of Israel cannot be reliably guaranteed. "96

In the last of the case studies of Soviet military assistance, the most current example is Angola and continuing black-white confrontation in Africa. Of the three areas examined, Angola seems to offer the Russians and Cubans the clearest immediate advantages at the least cost and risk, although speculation on an ability to turn it into a permanent "foothold" is another matter.

In Angola the United States was concerned that the MFLA, the faction backed by the Soviet Union over a number of years had gained a military advantage over its two rivals in a struggle for ultimate control as the Portuguese were departing. Fearful of a Vietnam type involvement but concerned about Soviet influence in Africa, the United States apparently increased covert support for one of the two rivals, the FNLA. The Soviet Union apparently interpreted this as a Washington challenge and began smuggling in AK-7 rifles, machine guns, bazookas and rockets and from March to July 1975 fighting and Soviet arms shipments increased. Fart of this was a response to what was apparently perceived as a raising of the stakes by Washington, part of a desire to compete successfully with the Chinese, who were also active in supporting one of the factions. The United States responded with additional military assistance through neighboring black African states. According to Secretary Kissinger, preventive diplomacy with the Soviet Union was practiced only much later in 1975. 97

The United States, then, through its early aid policies seemed to challenge the Soviets through theirsense of perceived threat to their client, the MPLA but such aid would be ineffectual; too little and too of greater involvement late given the general fear A especially in Congress and among the public. As one black African leader phrased it, "The declarations of Ford and Kissinger even do us harm. Whenever they bang their fists on the table."

against our enemies, the Russians take them seriously and increase military aid to the MPIA. The Americans don't match this by aid to us." The Soviets were also helped by the fact that South Africa marched north into Angola near its border with Namibia (Southwest Africa) in October. This development made a common American-African diplomatic front against Soviet and Cuban intervention at least temporarily impossible to acheive.

The Soviets soon supplied twice as much aid in a single month as it supplied to the MPIA in an entire year during its guerrilla war against the Portuguese government. This assistance included tanks, rocket launchers, MIG-21 fighters, small arms, and clothing for up to 30,000 troops. This along with the presence of up to 12,000 Cuban troops rapidly swung the balance and the conventional war soon ended with an MPIA victory.99

The size and rapidity of the Soviet arms buildup and the rapidly augmented Cuban presence reinforced Congressional and popular dubiousness (some State Department quarters had been skeptical from the very beginning) about the Angolan affair and Congress voted to cut off economic aid in December 1975. By that time "it was quite impossible for us to offset 6,000 Cuban troops, 200 million dollars in Soviet equipment, and 400 Russian advisers with such funds." By mid-December the United States would "either get out or get much, much, much more deeply involved. A decision to get involved effectively would have required not just more money, but troops and advisers. Or it would have required much closer collaboration on our part with South Africa.*100

Uniquely among the three cases examined, the Soviet Union intervened swiftly and decisively. It was able to be on the side of the angels largely because of the improvised South African move to support the two other Angelan factions. The Soviets freely admitted giving "moral and

material support to the patriotic forces of Angola and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in their struggle against colonialism. Such a course of action was "fully in accord with the well known decision on decolonization, adopted by the United Nations as well as by the Organization of African Unity."

Subsequent Soviet commentary stressed that the MPIA was recognized "as the vanguard of the Angolan people." Kissinger's accusation of Soviet intervention was "not in harmony with the facts." "Real" intervention was carried out by the South African armed forces in contradistinction to Soviet assistance which was given to the "legal government at its request in order to suppress foreign aggression against the new African state." It was the opposing Angelan factions, the Soviet commentary alleged, inspired from outside which prevented the possibility of a peaceful settlement and Mopened the path for foreign armed intervention. The Soviet Union would continue to render moral, political, diplomatic and other aid. " Given the overwhelming military preponderance of its faction the Soviet statement could remonstrate that they were "far from seeing the possibility of settling the Angolan problem only by the military path and don't speak against a political solution of the Angolan problem. M102 This kept the door slightly ajar for a compromise and may have been intended to calm concern in the United States.

The Angolan esisode occured during the beginnings of the quadrennial American presidential campaign and that fact added weight to increasing American domestic suspicion of Soviet motives and modus operandi in applying its version of detente. American foreign policy toward the U.S.S.R. hardened in various ways, largely in atmospherics but these manifestations, at first treated as so much campaign oratory by Soviet analysts, began to cause concern. 103

Common to all three case studies of Soviet diplomatic-military moves has been increasing evidence that detente does not bar extensive military aid to client states and factions that the Soviet Union favors according to its interests of the moment. But in all these cases reactions by the United States, either political or military, were considered and weighed because by all visible signs the Soviet Union still seeks detente for economic reasons and to remove the serious possibility of a military clash with the United States. Therefore, the Soviet assessment of American foreign policy and the assumptions on which it is based, as well as the congressional and popular milieu in which it is constructed are clearly vital in assessing future Soviet actions.

What connection do "assessments" or "perceptions" have with policy?
This question inevitably arises when depicting and analyzing writings by
Soviet specialists professionally concerned with areas of the world critical
for Soviet foreign policy. Of course it is difficult to trace the
intellectual source of any decision or group of decisions for policy
makers in any political system. But there are certain characteristics
of Soviet foreign policy formulation that make the problem appear less
intractable than might otherwise be the case.

The burden of office and the fact that most Polithuro members are more familiar with internal and administrative matters than foreign policy questions often oblige them to turn to foreign policy specialists in the Foreign Ministry and Academy of Sciences. But neither the Foreign Ministry nor departments of the Central Committee dealing with foreign affairs conduct foreign area studies in any systematic way; only limited research is done in country desks or regional offices. When new problems arise or old ones require new information, officials search for experts with scholarly expertise, an expertise provided by specialized research

institutes under the Section of Social Sciences or Academy of Sciences. 104

One of the sections is the Division of Economics which supervises, among other agencies, the institutes of World Economics and International Relations (IMEMO) and United States Studies (now United States and Canada). Research programmes of all institutes must be approved by appropriate Divisions and Sections and ultimately by the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences, which works with appropriate organs of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU. This centrallized administration enables research to be closely directed and coordinated and facilitates more efficient utilization of talent. Further coordination is provided by the Editorial Publishing Council of the Academy of Sciences, which approves publication programs. 105

The centrallized bias of the Soviet system is shown by occasional warnings to Soviet scholars generally to avoid adopting Western concepts "uncritically," especially Western empirical techniques and to avoid adopting the pose of the "disinterested researchen" This is less of a problem, however, in research dealing with the external world where "disinterested research" is more of an imperative, with appropriate bows to orthodoxy as a proper base for Soviet foreign policy decisions. Brezhnev himself indicated the need for such information in his remarks to the 24th Farty Congress.

I have already spoken of our scientists' tasks in the field of scientific and technical progress and the introduction of the acheivements of science in production. No less important tasks confront the social sciences. In the period under review, the CPSU Central Committee adopted a special comprehensive resolution of the problem. The tasks of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism and the Academy of Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee have been expanded and clarified. In the past few years, a number of new humanities institutes have been set up in the system of the Academy of Sciences, and this has made it possible to intensify the study of problems of the social and economic development of the U.S.S.R. and foreign countries and of the world revolutionary process and to improve scientific information. What we need is an increasingly resolute turn by the social sciences toward the elaboration of problems that are urgent for the present and future. 10?

Added to the official linkage is the fact that administrators of policy-oriented institutes maintain close working relations with the appropriate office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the International Department of the Central Committee. When the latter requet it, "emergency studies" are launched in the institutes, other programs are deferred, and the priority of party and government needs is paramount. The link between institutes and ministries is further consolidated by having prominent officials serve on the Scientific Councils of the institutes and they often take part in their deliberations. In addition scholars are oppointed to high Central Committee and Government positions. N. N. Inozemstev, director of IMEMO, is a member of the Central Committee and G. A. Arbatov, director of the Institute for the Study of the U.S.A. and Canada is a member of the Central Auditing Commission. Arbatov was also included in the official party which accompanied Brezhnev on his 1973 visit to the United States. Politburo members also informally consult with academic experts in the field of their concerns.

While the bureaucrats, as in other systems, have the final say, the prestigious social status, income, and job security of social scientists mean that they do have a growing role in the high councils of decision making in the Soviet foreign policy and government bureaucracies. 108

Soviet assessments of American presidential administrations contend that the United States as early as the Eisenhower administration realized it was not omnipotent. Only in the Kennedy administration, however, was it recognized that the "new correlation of forces in the world arena," the "process of changes in the correlation of economic, military, and political forces between the two systems" was developing unfavorably for the United States. But the Kennedy administration, although it understood the suicidal "nature" of nuclear weapons rattling for the United States sought

not to prevent conflicts but to work out rules for war in conflict itself. 109

There was flexibility in creating a broad spectrum of U.S. military forces
but military commitments taken on by the United States itself were inflexible.

Soviet analysts no longer depicted a "united bourgeoise elite" in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. There were new "realists" who sought to normalize relations with the U.S.S.R. and coexist peacefully and "wildmen" who advanced a policy of militarism, blackmail and intervention. Soviet analysts disagreed on the relative strength of the two groups. But the undisciplined character of the Kennedy foreign policy machinery, in the Soviet view was paralleled by fluctuations in moods and policies. There was and is no powerful left wing whose political leader could counterbalance the influence of the right. The "center" in the political process could still be pushed to the right in foreign and domestic policy and while occasionally "realistically thinking American politicians" correct this tendency, the "rightward list" soon recurs. 110

Only in the Nixon administration, in the Soviet view, did policy decisions reflect the new "realism," a "pragmatic conservative reaction to changes occurring in the world" which would adjust U.S. capabilities to international realities. Rigid foreign policy commitments adopted in the past would be abandoned to avoid dissipating resources in secondary directions. But the new policy of "selective" intervention was "inconsistent" and "contradictory," producing the "illusion" that relaxation would allow certain elements of the "policy of strength" to remain untouched. 112

The intellectual bases and assumptions of American foreign policy planning are of keen interest to Soviet analysts. One such study traced the U.S. policy of creating a favorable equilibrium of forces to the beginnings of the 20th century when Wilson vowed that the United States must be

the arbiter of a peace settlement after World War I. Later, the United States, according to some advisers must stay out of a Russo-Japanese War, settling it without victory so that the balance between the Soviet Union "not be disturbed." American foreign analysts in the 1940's, like Nicholas Spaikman, advocated a policy of creating equilibrium between the Soviet Union and "outlying states" where the United States could exert a decisive influence. Kennan and Kissinger sought to "split the states of the old world into hostile groups," the material base of the "balance of forces," and strengthen England, Japan, and Germany against the Soviet Union, "utilizing the contradictions" between them. 113

Naturally, Soviet writers are concerned with the most current example of the policy of equilibrium, the exploitation of Sino-Soviet antagonism. The United States would choose between strict neutrality or strengthening China, the weakest of the two competitors. China policy would be a part of an attempt to encircle the Soviet Union, a modified version of the old containment policy which had become militarily and economically prohibitive. Soviet specialists alternatingly downgraded the significance of Chinese-American ties and Chinese diplomatic or economic capabilities or warned the United States that China would be a military threat in the future. 114

The Chinese policy, like all other American policies of "balance of forces" "bore an anti-socialist, anti-communist character" and were aimed at "world rule" by the United States. All American military doctrines, like containment, limited war, graduated response, etc. were also integral parts of the balance of power doctrine but the diplomatic aspects of the latter became dominant. This was particularly true because the United States broke the "rules" of the balance of power by using its own forces in Vietnam and failing to prevail militarily.

The United States, confronting increasing military parity with the U.S.S.R., sought to change containment to "more convenient means" for acheiving its objectives, chiefly of the economic and scientific variety. American doctrines of "flexible response," "limited war" and "crisis diplomacy" showed their unreliability in Vietnam. U.S. "hegemonic aims" on Berlin, the Caribbean, Indochina and elsewhere were not acheived. Recognition of these factors, growing frustrations domestically and the growing strength of the socialist countries, headed by the Soviet Union, contributed to the realism of the 1970's. This realism, "in all its contradictory character, expresses positive changes in the minds of American ideologues, but these changes are engendered not by their good intentions and altruism, but are acknowledgment of stern truths, the change of the relationship of forces in favor of socialism." Despite the fact that American foreign policy had not really changed, that there is no new foreign policy course but only a "more flaxible policy more in agreement with the real possibilities," the "moderate realists" should be encouraged and their "liberalism" should not be underestimated. 115

Such "moderate realists" recognized that the Soviet Union had counterbalanced U.S. strategic forces with its own and had changed the role of the military factor in international relations. The Soviets would soon counterbalance U.S. conventional forces in the "not-too-distant future," especially naval forces which would restrict political-military actions of the United States in different parts of the world. Faced with these and other realities, American foreign policy in the 1970's could take several forms. One would involve a mobilization of resources and their utilization in the traditional plane of military force. Another would mark a gradual transition to neoisolationism, "a retreat from participation in international politics at least beyond the boundaries of the

Western hemisphere. A third would involve a "flexible and long term accommodation to changing conditions, oriented to a certain preservation of basic U.S. positions in the world." Domestic and foreign social and economic difficulties were such that "it can be said confidently that no American government could carry out at the beginning of the 1970's the mobilization of resources for foreign policy on such a scale and military-political character as at the beginning of the last decade."

But the second or "meoisolationist" alternative was "unacceptable" for U.S. "ruling circles." U.S. dependence on the outside world would not only not decrease but grow in succeeding years and the interests of the U.S. ruling class "objectively demanded" U.S. presence in world politics. The third alternative was the only one available and the new political strategy involved a realistic assessment of the relation of forces between the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., especially parity in the military-political sphere. 117

American political leaders recognized that they stood in the fact of mirreversible deep social-economic changes in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and no longer declared that the Soviet Union was the minstigator of mglobal conspiracy which the United States must oppose everywhere by military means. The United States must give less direct aid to developing countries, and use more economic levers in foreign policy. It would seek to replace its policies of military intervention against the socialist countries with one of fostering their economic dependence through the forging of scientific-technical links with them. But the Soviet Union had been able to attract specialists and utilize the technical acheivements of capitalist countries without changing the character of the country and would do so again. The American policy of balancing, of using mpower centers possessing nuclear missiles, especially the FRC, would not be an

alternative policy, despite Secretary Kissinger's statements. Instead, the Soviet author predicted, it would adhere to a "less risky direction" in international relations like those outlined above. 118

Soviet assessments of U.S. foreign policy directions and philosophies reveal the same ambivalence that the subject itself affords. The United States has been chastened by the Vietnam experience and the traditional military and political doctrines that led it there are discredited. But it cannot and will not withdraw from the world because it is unable to do so and it has no new foreign doctrines or directions to utilize. "Moderate realist circles" in American foreign policy should be encouraged but what is the best or proper way to do that, a Soviet forward posture to chasten American "wildness" still further and strengthen the moderates, with the risk of a sharp American turn to the right? Or a less militant posture could be adopted that might risk foregoing opportunities offered by the "change in the correlation of forces" that Soviet military strength and a forward posture had purportedly helped to bring to fruition. The analyses suggest no definitive answers which await other forums and other situations. The lingering concern with an American-Chinese link is evident but there too no specific policy emerges. Too strong an emphasis on Soviet military power in a number of situations of mutual concern to the two countries would risk driving the two closer together. Any lessening of military pressure and deployed strength, however, might erode Soviet bargaining power and reveal weakness and vacillation before foreigners, a trait traditionally despised by Soviet leaders as well as carry unacceptable domestic costs and risks.

Soviet assessments of the internal political climate in the United

States and especially the post-Watergate relationship between the President
and Congress give evidence of the same uncertainty and ambivalence.

These may even be accentuated because of the great imponderables involved and Soviet inability to understand a phenomenon that has no exact counterpart in the U.S.S.R. One Soviet work on U.S. policy making concluded that in the domestic struggle surrounding the "Watergate affair" even the most vocal critics of the government found no argument against its foreign policy course. Indeed, the Nixon administration used its foreign policy actions in its defense. Nixon administration policies aimed at easing international tensions "found and finds a positive response from the American people and other countries as well" and the attempts of the Ford administration to strengthen that foreign policy course, to institutionalize it, are "logical and natural." 119

One Soviet Americanist, assessing the results of the 1974 Congressional elections approved the losses suffered by conservatives and the "presence in the United States of a stable opposition to militarism and anti-Sovietism, which became a constant factor in the fight for the detente policy. **120* Another noted that "eminent U.S. congressmen" had positively approved President Ford's trip to the Soviet Far East (Vladivostock) and the continuation of improving relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. **121* Googress' role was now more independent and stable than before and while still secondary in foreign policy matters was important.

But the doubts and hesitations of Soviet Americanists persisted.

There were always the Soviet betes noir, the Zionists, the George Meanys, the Henry Jacksons, whose influence at any particular time was hard to assess. The views of many U.S. political figures, especially liberals, revealed a definite "ebb" or "flow" "depending upon which direction the political winds are blowing." Anti-Vietnam liberals especially who were not opposed to detente talked about "human rights" and stressed the

provisions in the Helsinki Declaration concerning the exchange of people and ideas, a form of intervention in Soviet internal affairs. There were still signs of anti communism in U.S. domestic policy and pro-Zionist and pro-Israeli organizations exerted influence, even though they were not supported by "the majority of Americans." Soviet commentators expressed concern about the influence of Jackson and Wallace, who stressed the Soviet threat and nervously observed that "the most important problems of international relations, problems of war and peace, affecting the fate of people are all the more objects in the U.S. of shameful pre-election speculation and politics." 122

Congress was especially unpredictable, especially in the event that a populist backlash over foreign policy were to envelop it. While Congress could exert a notable influence on political circles formulating U.S. policy and was an important element of the state mechanism "on all important questions (especially foreign policy), Congress, as a rule, does not oppose the President." The significance of that for Soviet foreign policy would depend upon the nature and policies of the two branches. Nevertheless, Soviet specialists recalled that Congress without any prolonged debate and delay confirmed legislation for additional funds for the Vietnam war. They also noted that up to the election of 1968 only a very few members criticized the conduct of the war and demanded its cessation. The majority of the same Congress "approved every step of the U.S. government and American military figures in expending the aggression in Vietnam." After the signing of the Vietnam cease fire in January 1973, Congress "undertook a number of steps to reestablish its position, which forced the president to step back somewhat. #123

A Soviet Americanist adopted an uncharacteristic emphasis on "subjective factors" in determining the direction of government policy. The choice of political line "depends greatly on persons found at a given instance in leading state posts, of their capability of realizing the true interests of the country and selecting the most realistic line." While the Soviet author cites President Nixon's detente policy as a positive example of the personal factor there is nothing in Soviet analysis which would suggest that a return to a hard anti-Soviet line in American foreign policy, either because of external-internal pressures or a deliberate presidential tactic is precluded.

In assessing the future course of Soviet intervention, I was struck by Adam Ulam's view that "the main difficulty with American-Soviet relations has been that for the most part the policies of the two countries moved at different levels and reflected different understandings of the realities of international life." Inevitably, each country "betrayed the other's expectations of its prospective role in international affairs." 125

Soviet specialists saw anti-Soviet designs in American circles in 1930's, looking at the period in retrospect and a duality after the war began; a lack of confidence in Soviet military prowess. Part of the current Soviet military emphasis today may be designed to compensate for past weaknesses and discourage such critics. Another commentator looking at post-World War II relations saw a U.S. attempt to bludgeon the Soviet Union with the atomic bomb, atomic blackmail and economic blockade. 126

Soviet specialists could understand a firm American diplomatic stance with the Soviet Union with military power in the background as is understood. But they have attacked Washington's military emphases either divorced from or supplanting diplomacy. One Soviet writer professed to be puzzled by the "extreme reaction" which attended the Yalta decisions after they were reached. The United States, in his view could not have prevented these events in Eastern Europe and was physically incapable of

attacking the Soviets. Having been bested diplomatically and strategically, the United States sought to attack the original agreements. As Maxim Litvinov observed in June, 1945, Why did you Americans wait till right now to begin opposing us in the Balkans and Eastern Europe?" "You should have done this three years ago. Now it's too late and your complaints only arouse suspicion here." Litvinov admitted that his country's seaking power and influence beyond its security requirements was the cause of conflict but the West's failure to resist this early enough was an important secondary one. 127

Interestingly, one Soviet commentator lauded U.S. diplomacy of the 1970's, which was more "businesslike" in comparison with the "narrowly propagandistic approach" which had characterized many diplomatic "feats" of U.S. foreign policy in the past, especially in relation to the socialist countries. 128 In this connection, Nikita Khrushchev gave President Kennedy's conduct in the latter stages of the Cuban missile crisis the highest praise a Soviet political figure can offer.

I'll always remember the late President with deep respect because, in the final analysis, he showed himself to be soberminded and determined to avoid war. He didn't let himself become frightened, nor did he become reckless. He didn't overestimate America's might, and he left himself a way out of the crisis. He showed real wisdom and statesmanship when he turned his back on right-wing forces in the United States who were trying to goad him into taking military action against Cuba.

The Soviet Union is in an assertive mood at the present time, roughly coterminous with the end of the American assertive period in 1968. The Soviet Union sees its mounting military power as forcing an acceptance of Soviet positions and influence in areas where it was previously absent or not without challenge. But economically the Soviet Union is still not a global power and its military might lacks the global character of U.S. military forces, which some Soviet specialists admit. Soviet analysts

express concern about the emerging, but still inchoate American-Chinese-Soviet triangular relationship. In addition, third world conditions would hardly allow the Soviet Union to exercise the kind of preponderant influence the United States once enjoyed. The Soviet Union can, working in harmony with these conditions, deny the United States certain advantages but it has not found any major way of converting this denial capability into assets of its own. The Middle East is a case in point and while Vietnam in one sense was a victory and vindication of Soviet arms the circumstances of that case were highly local in origin and the ultimate extent of Soviet influence in the area highly problematical.

The United States still has great appeal because of its social and technological innovation and its enormous residual strength, both economic and moral. Soviet diplomatic and military postures are designed in part to cover Soviet weaknesses, both those cited in this paper and those of morale and discipline, which are not always as high as the regime's deliberate attempts at "military legitimation" for domestic reasons would suggest. There is no reason why U.S. diplomacy cannot utilize American strengths in the future, nor downgrade the residual assets of American military and economic power after the reappraisals of recent years run their course.

A posture will have to be struck that does not seek or appear to seek to intimidate the Soviets. They will not passively accept intimidation and will react to it in exactly the opposite way intended. Such a posture should communicate to them firmly and confidently through preventive diplomacy, what American purposes and intentions are. Military power will always be a necessary accompaniment to such dealings for the United States must never be put in the position of "negotiating from fear" or "fearing to negotiate."

FOOTNOTES

1 For a discussion of Soviet views on war and related matters with appropriate citations from Marx, Engels and Lenin, see P. H. Vizor, The Soviet View of War, Peace and Neutrality (Boston: Routledge and Kegal Paul, 1975), esp. 44.

²A. Karenin, <u>Filosofia Politicheskovo NASILIA</u> (The Philosophy of Political Fogre) (Moscow: International Relations Publishing House, 1971), 27.

3 I. A. Grudinin, <u>Dialektika i Sovremennoe Voennoe Delo</u> (The Dialectic and Contemporary Military Affairs) (Moscow: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the U.S.S.R., 1971), 25.

On the subject of risk-taking, dictated by the image of the external adversary along with caution, dictated by external constraints, see Hannes Adomeit, Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior: From Controntation to Coexistence? Adelphi Papers Number Cne Hundred and Cne (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn, 1973), 34-35.

5Ken Booth, The Military Instrument in Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1972 (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, 1973), 10, 11, 13, 18, 20.

6<u>Toid.</u>, 35, 39, 40.

7 Ibid., 41-42.

8Martin Blumenson, "The Soviet Power Play at Changkufeng," World Politics, XII, No. 2 (January, 1960), 249, 263. The Soviets manipulated the Japanese to their advantage by determining the limits of military conflict (p. 257).

Ohristopher D. Jones, "Just Wars and Limited Wars: Restraints on the Use of the Soviet Armed Forces," World Politics, XXVIII, No. 1 (October, 1975), 51, 59, 60-61, 68. Both, op. cit., 45.

10 Toid., 47. The issue of major Soviet deployments to Communist or client states will be discussed later in this essay. For a general discussion of Soviet sponsorship of revolutionary violence see the two essays by Brian Crozier, "The Soviet involvement in violence," Soviet Analyst, I, No. 10 (July 6, 1972), 5-7 and "The Soviet involvement in violence, II," Soviet Analyst, I, No. 11 (July 20, 1972), 3-5.

113ooth, op. cit., 60.

12v. M. Kulish, director, Military Force and International Relations, JPRS 58947 (Arlington, Virginia: Joint Publications Research Service, May 8, 1973), 25. This is a multi-author work and Kulish wrote the section quoted here.

- 13 Tbid., 14, 15, 23, 24, 23.
- 14A. M. Dudin, Yu. N. Listvinov in Toid., 98 (my italics).
- 15Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970) (paperback edition), 441, 428-429.
- 16 The Military Balance, 1974-75 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies), 4. The Military Balance, 1975-76, 4.
- 17John Erickson, "The Soviet Military, Soviet Policy and Soviet Politics," A Lecture at the U.S. Army War College, Strategic Review, I, Fall, 1973, 27-28.
 - 18 rolfe, op. cit., 428, 444, 443, 445.
- 19 Michael Mcc Gwire, "Soviet Naval Programmes," Survival, XV, No. 5 (September-Cotober, 1973), 225.
 - 20 The Military Balance 1975-1976, op. cit., 4.
- 21 John Erickson, Soviet Military Power (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, 1971), 52. Erickson, "The Soviet Military, Soviet Folicy and Seviet Politics," op. cit., 27.
 - 22 Wolfe, op. cit., 448, 444.
 - 23 Toid., 428.
 - 243ooth, oo. cit., 62.
- 25Thomas W. Wolfe, <u>Military Power and Soviet Policy</u>, RAND-5388, March, 1975, 11-12.
- 26Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Speech before the Supreme Soviet, June, 1968, quoted in Herbert Block, "Value and Burden of Soviet Defence," in Joint Economic Committee, Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 27, 1973), 201 (my italics).
- 27G. A. Arbatov, "Soviet-American Relations in the 1970's," <u>U.S.A:</u>
 Economics, Politics, Ideology, No. 5 (May, 1974), translated in JPRS 62191 (6 June 1974), 21.
- 28A. Gromyko, "Programma Mira v Deistvii" (The programme of peace in action), <u>Kommunist</u>, No. 14 (September, 1975), 7 (my italics).
- ²⁹Brezhnev's Report to the Congress. The 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: "The Report to the CPSU Central Committee and the Party's Immediate Tasks in the Fields of Domestic and Foreign Policy," Delivered by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on Feb. 24, 1976 (Pravda and Izvestia, Feb. 25) in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press (hereafter abbreviated as CDSF), XXVIII, No. 8 (March 24, 1976), 12.

30 Dudin and Listvinov in Kulish, on. cit., 86, 97 (my italics). On Khrushchev's policy of forcing concessions and seeking limited accomodations, see Robert M. Slusser, "America, China and the Hydra-Headed Opposition: The Dynamics of Soviet Foreign Policy," in Peter H. Juviler and Henry W. Morton, eds., Soviet Policy Making. Studies of Communism in Transition (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967) (paperback edition), esp. 196.

31 Adomeit, op. cit., 33. Erickson, "The Soviet Military, Soviet Policy and Soviet Politics," op. cit., 31. Statement of Holland Hunter, Professor of Economics, Haverford College, in The Military Budget and National Economic Priorities. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Ninety-First Congress, First Session, Part 3, The Economic Basis of the Russian Military Challenge to the United States, June 23, 1969, 917, 913. Mr. Keith Bush, "Soviet Economic Growth: Past, Present and Projected" in "The Soviet Union in the Era of Negotiation and Compromise" in U.S. Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies, 8th Annual Soviet Affairs Symposium 1973/1974, 15, 17.

32 William E. Odom, "Who Controls Whom in Moscow," Foreign Policy, No. 19 (Summer, 1975), 13.

33 Marshall Grechko, "The Danger of War Remains a Grim Reality,"

Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), June 5, 1974, quoted in Peter Kruzhin,
"Grechko: The Danger of War Remains a Grim Reality," Radio Liberty Dispatch,
RL-200/74, July 8, 1974, 1. For a stimulating article describing
Brezhnev's attempts to deal with assorted economic ills, pursue detente
and appears critics in the military and security branches, see Grey
Hodnett, "Succession Contingencies in the Soviet Union," Problems of
Communism, XXIV, No. 2 (March-April, 1975), 9-11.

William E. Cdom, "The Party Connection," Problems of Communism, XXII, No. 5 (September/October, 1973), 25 and Cdom, oo. cit., 122, 113.

35Secretary Brezhnev at the Twenty-fourth Party Congress, Pravda, July 22, 1973, quoted in Herbert Goldhamer, The Soviet Soldier. Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, 1975), 235. Goldhamer's study indicates the depth of military involvement in the Soviet civil sector; civil defense preparations, pre-induction military training and other activities.

36Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York: Quandrangle/ The New York Times Book Co., 1976), 313, 314.

37Hodnett, op. cit., 10 and his footnote 38, 11.

38 Tolubko in <u>Krasnaia Zvezda</u> (Red Star), Moscow, August 6, 1964, quoted in Dr. Jurgen Domes, "Chinese Communist Strategy in the Sino-Soviet Conflict," in U.S. Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies, "Agenda for the Politburo: Critical Issues of Soviet National Security Policy," 6th Annual Soviet Affairs Symposium 1971/1972, Garmisch, Germany, 82.

39Goldhamer, op. cit., 229-234, discusses political indoctrination against the Chinese.

40 Toid., 234. Domes indicates that Soviet China specialists he had talked to did not anticipate a major Chinese military attack on the Soviet Union for the "next one or two decades." Domes, op. cit., 83.

41Brezhnev's Report to the Congress, The 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, op. cit., 7.

42Goldhamer, op. cit., 233.

43 Wolfe gives the figures as a minimum estimate of 2.8 million in the Soviet armed forces in 1947 (Khruschev's figure) as opposed to 1.4 million in U.S. forces in that year. He also indicates that the Soviet reserve system would have permitted rapid mobilization of Soviet forces to World War II levels. This manpower disparity may have been, as Wolfe argues, a deliberate move which aside from Soviet internal reasons was designed to create the impression that Europe was a hostage to Soviet arms and not a harbinger of an intention to invade (p. 26). The fear of the latter has remained, however, for many years.

Charles Scribners Sons, 1975), esp. chs. 5, 8, 9, and 10 and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's remarks about the capabilities of Soviet tactical aviation in support of ground troops. "Of particular concern for the future is the mascent but increasing capability to execute effective conventional deep strike ground attacks against NATO tactical air and nuclear reserve resources, and to do so through sudden attacks without prior deployment." Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Annual Defense Department Report FY1977 to the Congress, January 27, 1976, 127 (my italics).

45A. Bovin, "Facets of Detente," Izvestiya, February 5, 1975 translated in <u>Soviet Press, Selected Translations</u>, No. 75-3, March, 1975. Translated and Distributed by the Directorate of Threat Applications, AF/IN, HQ USAF, 4.

46 John Erickson, "Soviet Military Policy. Priorities and Perspectives," Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, October, 1974, 373.

47 Ibid., 375. Erickson, "Soviet Military Capabilities in Europe," RUSI Defense Journal, March, 1975, 67. Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Military Capabilities and Intentions in Europe, RAND P-5188, March, 1974, 7.

48 Jeffrey Record, Sizing Up the Soviet Army (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1975), 14. Steven L. Camby, NATO Military Policy: Obtaining Conventional Camparability with the Warsaw Fact, RAND 5-1088 ARPA, June, 1973, 10. Italics in Camby.

⁴⁹A. A. Sidorenko, <u>The Offensive (A Soviet View)</u>, Moscow, 1970. Translated and Published under the auspices of the United States Air Force, 1970, 3, 57, 59, 134 (my italics).

50 V. Ye Savkin, The Basic Principles of Coerational Art and Tactics-A Soviet View, Moscow, 1971. Translated and Published under the auspices of the United States Air Force, 1972, 173.

51 Tbid., 232, 31. On surprise, see Colonel A. Krasnov, "Faktor Vnezapnosti" (The factor of surprise), <u>Krasnaia Zvezda</u> (Red Star), February 3, 1974.

52Record, on. cit., 24. Record concludes that Soviet airlift capability indicates less of a desire to project Soviet forces abroad than the need to supply client states in the Middle East (p. 30). My case studies deal with this question.

53Canby, op. cit., 23, 38, 82. Goldhamer (op. cit.) contends that the Soviet emphasis on thrift of resources in training and the great stress placed on psychological conditioning and motivation in training is in part an attempt to substitute moral for material motivation and to overcome a technologically superior opponent by a high level of indoctrination as well as the shock use of firepower emphasized in Soviet military works. The Soviets keep the costs of their conscript army very low and while this provides extra resources for a modern military machine its morale effects are uncertain.

Savkin, op. cit., 75. Jacobsen notes that Moscow "no longer dismisses the possibility of more strictly limited conventional wars in Europe, especially given the "constricted conventional potential" of the allies and depicts a growing Soviet doctrine of "flexible response." (G. Jacobsen, "The Emergence of a Soviet Doctrine of Flexible Response?" The Atlantic Quarterly, 12, No. 2 (Summer, 1974), 236 and Jacobsen, "Deterrence or War Fighting? The Soviet Case; Soviet Military Posture and its Relevance to Soviet Concepts of Strategy," Canadian-American Slavic Studies, IX, 1, (Spring, 1975), esp. 21.

55R. J. Vincent, Military Power and Political Influence: The Soviet Union and Western Europe, Adelphi Papers One hundred and nineteen (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), 13.

56Richard E. Foster, John C. Scharfen, Study of Possible Soviet Strategy of Controlled Conflict, Vol I (Stanford, California: Stanford Research Institute, June, 1975), 76 and Brezhnev's Report to the Congress, The 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, op. cit., 13, 14. For a discussion of alleged Soviet organization of a subversive apparatus in some West European Armed Forces, "sleepers" who in a crisis could be activated by the MB to paralyze Western military operations, see Armaud de Borchgrave, "'Sleepers' in NATO," Newsweek, 81, No. 10 (March 8, 1976), 42.

57 Vincent, oo. cit., 13. See also Rowland Evans, Robert Novak, "Arms for Yugoslavia -- a message for Moscow," Chicago Sun-Times, April 16, 1976.

58 Vincent, op. cit., 16, 17. Benjamin Lambeth, Selective Nuclear Operations and Soviet Strategy, RAND, P-5506, September, 1975, 11-12.

⁵⁹Franklym Griffiths, "The Tactical Uses of Naval Arms Control," in Michael Mcc Gwire, Ken Booth, John Mc Donnell, eds. <u>Soviet Naval Policy Cojectives and Constraints</u> (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Special Studies, 1975), 643.

60 Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, Sergei G. Gorshkov, "Navies as Instruments of Peacetime Imperialism," in Red Star Rising at Sea, Translated by Theodore A. Neely, Jr. (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1974), 115, 119.

61 George S. Dragnich, "The Soviet Union's Quest for Access to Naval Facilities in Egypt Prior to the June War of 1967," in Mcc Gwire, et al, Qp. cit., 267, 268.

62Geoffrey Jukes, The Indian Coean in Soviet Naval Policy, Adelphi Fapers Number Eighty Seven (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, May, 1972), 11, 22, 20.

63 James M. Mc Connell, Anne M. Kelly, Superpower Naval Diplomacy in the Indo-Pakistani Crisis, Professional Faper No. 108 (Arlington, Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses, February, 1973), 7, 8, 10. Mc Connell and Kelly cite an exception to their depiction of the Soviet defensive stance, the West African patrol against Portuguese Guinea (Bissau) since 1970. It deterred sea raids on Guinea, prevented the overthrow of the Toure government, but offensively it resulted in Guinea's being able to mount an offensive against the Portuguese colonial regime. IDid., footnote 47, 13. Pegov's remarks are quoted from a Jack Anderson story in the January 10, 1972 Daily Telegraph, IDid., footnote 44, 12.

64See Desmond P. Wilson, Cdr. Nicholas Brown, U.S.N., Warfare at Sea: Threat of the Seventies, Professional Paper No. 79 (Arlington, Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses, 4 November 1971).

65victor Zorza, "Soviets' great debate: cost of building up Navy," The Christian Science Monitor, December 13, 1973.

66Erickson, Soviet Military Power, op. cit., 60. Michael Mcc Gwire, "Current Soviet Warship Construction and Naval Weapons Development," in Mcc Gwire et al., op. cit., 1444. Rumsfeld, op. cit., 129.

67 Mcc Gwire, "Current Soviet Warship Construction and Naval Weapons Deployment," in Mcc Gwire et al, op. cit., 44. "Russ, Too, Put Pinch on Navy," The South Bend Tribune, March 28, 1973.

68Mcc Gwire, "Command of the Sea in Soviet Naval Strategy," in Mcc Gwire et al, oo. cit., 634. J. Bowyer Bell, "Strategic Implications of the Soviet Presence in Somalia," Crbis, XIV, No. 2 (Summer, 1975), 408.

69Mcc Gwire, "Command of the Sea...," op. cit., 634. Dudin and Listvinov in Kulish, op. cit., 99. Before this passage, the interesting accusation that the United States was "trying to force the Socialist Bloc countries into further distributing their forces among many centers of resistance and thus weaken their direct resistance to the U.S.A."

Toid. (my italics).

70 Tbid., 102, 104. Soviet sources often explain this as a policy of restraining and halting local wars because the "probality of the outbreak of local wars and military conflicts caused by imperialist policy remains a real one." General of the Army I. Shavrov, "Local Wars and Their Place in

the Global Strategy of Imperialism," Military Historical Journal, April 1, 1975 in Soviet Press, Selected Translations, No. 75-3, September, 1975, Translated and Distributed by the Directorate of Threat Applications, AF/IN, HQ USAF, 15.

71 Paul F. Langer, "North Korea and North Vietnam," in Adam Bromke and Teresa Rajowski-Harmstone, eds., <u>The Communist States in Disarray</u>, 1965-1971 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972) (paperback edition), 273, 275.

72Richard C. Thornton, "Soviet Strategy and the Vietnam War," Asian Affairs, An American Review, No. 4 (March/April, 1974), 217.

73Le Duan, "Ne Will Certainly Win. The Enemy Will Certainly Be Defeated" (Nha Xuat Ban Tien Phong, 1966), 7, quoted in Gareth Porter, A Peace Denied. The United States, Vietnam, and the Paris Agreement (Eleomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), 24.

74 Langer, op. cit., 277-278, gives some figures on the magnitude and commodity composition of the aid.

75 Porter, op. cit., 113, 114, 188.

76Thornton, oc. cit., 227. Ian Ward, "North Vietnam's Blitzkrieg. Why Giap did it: report from Saigon"and Brian Crozier, "Revolutionary war: fact versus theory," in North Vietnam's Blitzkrieg -- An interim assessment. Conflict Studies, No. 27 (October, 1972), 3, 5, 14. Crozier reveals that captured documents of COSVN (Central Office for South Vietnam) mentioned Podgorny's visit in terms that support the assumption Moscow knew of preparations for the offensive in advance (p. 16).

77A Soviet analyst observed that the Nixon administration practiced "great severity in using military force, if the United States decides to apply it after all." G. A. Trofimenko, "Voenno-Strategicheskie Aspekty 'Doktrina Niksona'" (Military-strategic aspects of the Nixon Doctrine) in "Doktrina Niksona" (The Nixon Doctrine) (Moscow: Main Publishing House of Eastern Literature, 1972), 68.

78 John Osborne, "The Nixon Watch. The Pressure of Fear," The New Recublic, 166, No. 23 (June 3, 1972), 14. Osborne indicates that the Soviet leaders would be inviting "unmanageable domestic trouble for themselves" if they cancelled the summit. One Soviet journalist said "Do you believe that our leaders are totally divorced from public sentiment? If you do, you are foolish."

79 Porter, op. cit., 188.

80Stanley Karnow, "Avoiding Bloodshed in Saigon. Hanoi's Design," The New Republic, 172, No. 17 (April 26, 1975), 11, 12.

81E. Glazunov, "Demokraticheskaia Respublika Vietnam: Novy Etap Razvitia" (The Democratic Republic of Vietnam. New Stage of Development), Mezhdunarodny Ezherodnik 1974. Politika i Ekonomika (International Annual 1974. Politics and Economics), Academy of Sciences U.S.S.R., Institute of World Economics and International Relations (Moscow: Publishing House of Political Literature, 1974), 69. Earlier, Glazunov had indicated that the North had sought to reconstruct its economy but systematic violations by

the Saigon regime of the Paris agreement caused the DRV "constant concern for strengthening its defense capability." (p. 67)

82 Porter, op. cit., 272.

83Guy Halverson, "Hanoi military impresses Pentagon. U.S. analysts surprised by speed of thrust and power of Red units," The Christian Science Monitor, March 28, 1975.

84A. Gromyko, "Programma Mira v Deistvii" (The program of peace in action), oo. cit., 8, 9.

85Malcolm Mackintosh, "The U.S.S.R. and the Near East" in U.S. Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies, "The Present Stage of Soviet Global Expansion: Sources, Goals and Prospects," 5th Annual Soviet Affairs Symposium 20-22 April 1971, Garmisch, Germany, 44-45.

86 Malcolm H. Kerr, Soviet Influence in Egypt, 1967-1973, unpublished manuscript, 29, 6.

87For a discussion of evidence in the Soviet press of a split between "hawkish" Soviet military leader and a more cautious Soviet leadership on the extent of Soviet military and diplomatic engagement in the Middle East, see Ilana Dimant-Kass, "The Soviet Military and Soviet Policy in the Middle East 1970-73," Soviet Studies, XXVI, No. 4 (Cctober, 1974), esp. 508.

88Galia Golan, The Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli War of October, 1973 (Jerusalem: The Leonard Davis Institute of International Relations, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, June, 1974), 11.

89 Heykal in Al-Ahram, December 3, 1970 quoted in Abraham S. Becker, The Superpowers in the Arab Israeli Conflict, 1970-1973, RAND P-5167, December, 1973, 37.

90 Sadat, in his report to the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union on the expulsion of the Soviets on July 24, New York Times, July 25, 1972, quoted in <u>Toid.</u>, 38. H. Heykal, "Soviet Arms and Egypt," Al Ahram 30 June 1972, as broadcast by "Voice of the Arabs," 30 June 1972, <u>Survival</u>, XIV (September-Cotober, 1972), 235 (my italics).

91 Elizabeth Monroe and A. H. Farrar-Hockley, The Arab-Israeli War, Cotober 1973. Background and Events, Adelphi Papers Number One Hundred and Eleven (London: The international Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), 32. Foy. D. Kohler, Leon Gouré, Mose L. Harvey, The Soviet Union and the October 1973 Middle East War. The Implications for Detente (Coral Gables: The University of Miami Center for International Studies, 1974), 39, 43.

92 Jon Kimche, "Fall, 1973: The Soviet-Arab-Scenario," Midstream, 19, No. 10 (December, 1973), 15. Wolfe, Soviet Military Capabilities and Intentions in Europe, op. cit., 24.

93 Edward R. F. Sheenan, "How Kissinger Did It. Step by Step in the Middle East," Foreign Policy, No. 22 (Spring, 1976), 13, 14, 15.

942. Primakov, "Blizhnevostochny Krizis v 1973" (The Near East Crisis in 1973), in Mezhdunarodny Ezhegodnik 1974. Politika i Ekonomika, op. cit., 220, 223, 225, 226, 229 (my italics).

95 Tbid., 230.

96 A. Gromyko, "Programma Mira v Deistvii," 60. cit., 9 (my italics).

97 This account is taken from John A. Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," Foreign Affairs, 54, No. 3 (April, 1976), 414, 415, 416, 418.

98 Henry Kamm, "Angolan Premier Sees U.S. Harming His Side's Efforts," The New York Times, January 25, 1976.

99Robin Wright, "Huge Soviet aid tips Angola balance," The Christian Science Monitor, January 23, 1976. On the Cuban role in Angola see James Nelson Goodsell, "More than one tenth of Cuban army in Angola," The Christian Science Monitor, January 22, 1976.

100 MAbandon Angola to Russia? M "Soviets Are Not Apt to Gain a Tremendous Amount." Interview with Senator Dick Clark, Democrat of Iowa, U.S. News and World Report, LXXX, No. 8 (February 23, 1976), 35.

101Cbserver, "On the Events in Angola and Around It," <u>Pravda</u>,
January 3, 1976 in <u>Soviet Press. Selected Translations</u>, No. 76-2, February
1976. Translated and Distributed by the Directorate of Threat Applications,
AF/IN HQ ISAF, 11.

102 Observer, "K. Polozheniiu v Angole" (on the situation in Angola), Pravda, February 11, 1976.

103 mMoscow Plays Down U.S. Tough Talk, Soviet World Cutlook, I, No. 4 (April 15, 1976), 1, 9, 10.

104 Morton Schwartz, The Foreign Policy of the U.S.S.R. Domestic Factors
(Encino, California: Dickenson Publishing Company, 1975), 175. Vladimir
Petrov, Soviet Foreign Policy Formulation: Formal and Informal Inputs,

XR/RESS-6 (Washington: Department of State, MARCH 30, 1973),

20-21 105<u>Told.</u>, 21.

106 Terry Mc Neill, Ideological Trends and Fortends: A Review of Some Recent Developments, Radio Liberty Dispatch RL 332/74, October 4, 1974, 3.

107The Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Congress of Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Report by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee, on March 30, 1972, Pravda, Izvestia, March 31 in CDSP, XXIII, No. 14 (May 14, 1971), 7.

108 Petrov, op. cit., 22-24, Rubinstein, op. cit., 171, 175.

109G. A. Trofimenko, "U.S.S.R.-U.S.A. Peaceful Coexistence is the Norm," U.S.A. Economics. Politics, Ideology, No. 2 (February, 1974), JRS 61346, 28 February 1974, 7 (my italics).

- 110 See various Soviet sources cited on page 32 and 33 of Roger Hamburg, "Soviet Perceptions of Detente and Analysis of the American Political Process," Naval War College Review, May-June, 1975. Robert Hansen, Soviet Images of American Foreign Policy: 1960-1972, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Princeton University, 1975, 211. Anatoli Andreyevich Gromyko, Through Russian Eyes. President Kennedy's 1036 Days, translated by Philip A. Garar (Washington: International Library, Inc., 1973), 225.
- 111See Soviet sources cited in Hamburg, op. cit., 33 and footnote 44, 40.
- 112 V. Z. Zhurkin, "Foreign Policy Debates. From 'Globalism' to 'Selectiveness,'" U.S.A: Economics. Politics. Ideology, No. 6 (June, 1974), JFRS 62492, 17 July 1974, 32.
 - 113A. Karenin, oc. cit., 124, 128, 154-155.
- 114 Thid., 166, 169. On conflicting themes in US-RC relations from the Soviet viewpoint see V. P. Lukin, "Sino-American Relations: Conceptions and Realities," U.S.A: Economics, Politics, Ideology, No. 2 (February, 1973), JRS 58418, 8 March 1973, esp. 17-20. Some Aspects of American-Chinese Relations (article by B. N. Zanegin. Certain aspects of U.S. Chinese Relations) U.S.A: Economics, Politics, Ideology, No. 2 (February, 1975), JRS 64252, 6 March 1975, esp. 43-47.
- 115V. F. Petrovsky, "Novye Tendentsii v Amerikanskikh Burzhuaznykh Kontsepsiakh Mezhdunarodnykh Ctnoshenii" (New tendencies in American bourgeoise concepts of international relations), Novaia i Noveishaia Istoria (Modern and Contemporary History), Ng. 1 (January-February, 1975), 80, 81. V. V. Zhurkin, "Evoliutsia 'Krizisnoi Politiki' i'Krizisnoi Diplomatii' SShA" (The evolution of U.S. 'crisis policy' and 'crisis diplomacy'), Yoprosy Istorii (Problems of History), No. 4 (April, 1975), 83, 89. Karenin, op. cit., 275, 286.
- 116A. A. Kokoshin, Prognozirovanie i Politika. Metodologia, Crganizatsia i Ispol'zovanie Prognozirovanie Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii vo Vneshnei Politike SShA (Forecasting and Politics. Methodology, Crganization and Utilization of Forecasting International Relations in U.S. Foreign Policy) Academy of Sciences U.S.S.R. Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada (Moscow: International Relations Publishing House, 1975), 139, 151, 152 (my italics).
 - 117 Ibid., 153.
 - 118 Told., 153, 155, 157, 161, 167.
- 1195. B. Chetverikov, Kto i Kak Delaet Politiku SShA (Who Makes U.S. Policy and How It is Made) (Moscow: International Relations Publishing House, 1974), 220.
- 120Ye I. Popova, "The Senate and Strategic Arms Limitation," U.S.A.: Economics, Politics, Ideology, No. 4 (April, 1975), JPRS 64720, 8 May 1975, 24.
- 121A. D. Turkatenko, "An Important Stage in the Development of Soviet-American Relations," U.S.A: Economics, Politics, Ideology, No. 1

(January, 1975), JRS 64129, 20 Feb. 1975, 14.

122V. A. Shimanovsky, "Liberaly i Razriadka Napriazhennosti" (Liberals and the easing of tensions), SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologia, No. 1 (January, 1976), 42, 45, 48. M. V. Valeriani, "SSSR-SShA. Itovi, Trudnosti, Perspektivy" (The U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. Results, Difficulties, Prospects), Ibid., 6.

123Boris Dmitriev, SShA. Politiki. Generaly. Diplomaty (U.S.A. Politics. Generals. Diplomats) (Moscow: International Relations Publishing House, 1971), 237. S. B. Chetverikov, op.cit., 65 (my italics).

124 Tbid., 178.

125Adam Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence. Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-73. Second edition. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1974) (paperback edition), 410-411.

126 Ernst Henry, "Against Historical Truth," U.S.A.: Economics, Politics, Ideology, No. 5 (May, 1975), JRRS 64956, 10 June 1975, 25.

V. M. Berezhkov, "The Potsdam Decisions and After," U.S.A.: Economics, Politics, Ideology, No. 7 (July, 1975), JRRS 65458, 14 August 1975, 60.

127 Ye. V. Ponomareva, "Yalta; 30 Years Later," U.S.A.: Economics, Politics, Ideology, No. 2 (February 1975), JFRS 64262, 6 March 1975, 68. Vojtech Mastny, "Reconsiderations. The Cassandra in the Foreign Commissariat. Maxim Litvinov and the Cold War," Foreign Affairs, 54, No. 2 (January, 1976), 373.

128 Kokoshin, oo. cit., 155.

129 Edward Crankshaw, Mhrushchev Remembers, translated and edited by Strove Talbott (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), 555.

130 Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Competitive Relationship," in Charles Gati, ed., Caging the Bear. Containment and the Cold War (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1974) (paperback edition), 188, 191-192.

131professor John Erickson, "Soviet Military Performance. Some Manpower and Managerial Constraints" in U.S. Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies. "The Soviet Union in 1972-1973," 7th Annual Soviet Affairs Symposium 1973, Garmisch, Germany, 16, 22, 24.

Beyond Deterrence:

Alternative Conceptual Dimensions

by Morris Janowitz

In assessing the changing role of force in international relations, it is appropriate to raise the question whether the existing conceptual categories derived from scholarship on international relations are appropriate and clarifying. In particular, the analytical relevance of the key term "deterrence" needs to be called into question. Deterrence is the key concept for linking military strategy and operations to the manifold policies and practices of the United States in its international relations. In reassessing the precision and implications of the term "deterrence," there is no implicit of explicit judgment of its value—theoretical and operational—in the period 1945 to 1975. Social scientists must strive to make use of timeless categories, but at the same time, and especially in the context of international relations, they must take into consideration the changing historical context. The reassessment involves not only analytical questions, but the central issue of the changed historical context as well.

The central assumption of this analysis is that the classical categories for analyzing military organization and strategy must be reconceptualized in the era of muclear weapons and the decline of colonial rule. The idea of "stabilizing" and "destabilizing" military systems is offered as an alternative to the classical language-balance of power, offensive-defensive, and strategic-tactical military structures.

It is no simple matter to define and give concrete content to the terms "stabilizing" and "destabilizing" military structures, but their essential elements can be identified. These concepts supply a basis for reassessing international relations during the years since 1945, and for examining alternative approaches to the search for military detente. They also help to give meaning to the oft-repeated observation that, from the point of view of Western nations with multiparty political systems, the role of violence in international relations has undergone fundamental changes.²

^{*} This paper is an explication and reformulation of a congeptual framework presented in "Toward a Redefinition of Military Strategy," World Politics 26 (July 1974): 473-508.

First, the concepts are based on the recognition that total war, as prepared for and practised by the nations of Europe and the United States and Japan during World Wars I and II, is no longer viewed as an instrument for achieving national goals. To the extent that rationality operates, the outbreak of "major" war between industrialized nations is no longer defined as inevitable. A military force based on conventional mobilization for total war gives way to a force in being, which is designed to achieve deterrence.

Second, the overseas colonial empires of advanced industrial nations have, in the main, come to an end through voluntary withdrawal or political agitation, or, in a limited number of cases, as the result of military engagements. Colonial rule has given way to varieties of assistance for the building of military and paramilitary institutions in the so-called developing nations, and to support for armed conflict either between or within these nations.

As a result, the legitimacy and utility of every specific military preparation and operation have been judged in terms of new criteria which, in a kind of shorthand, have come to be called deterrence. Deterrence is equated with a reduction of the chances and avoidance of the outbreak of major war between the advanced industrial powers, and with the inhibition of peripheral and limited war. But the term has limitations -- and not only because it has been overused and misused. It deals mainly with military affairs and military goals and does not adequately encompass the range of processes and objectives required for an international order that seeks to avoid war. In short, deterrence as a concept has been mainly negative -- and therefore of limited import for analyzing the organizational goals of military institutions. However, to speak of stabilized military systems and the search for stabilization is, first, to indicate the multiple goals of military institutions of avoiding general war and reducing or inhibiting limited war. But, second, an emphasis on stabilized military systems encompasses the goals of a controlled level of military expenditures and expanding arms control, as well as a reduction in mass personal insecurity generated by the arms race. Given the dangers of accidental nuclear war. miscalculations leading to escalation of international tensions, and the sheer organizational complexity of managing nuclear military systems, new

forms of communication and negotiation are required between "adversaries" if one is to speak of stabilized military systems. In these terms, the management of military institutions involves the creation of an international arena which would improve economic intercourse and enhance the opportunity for political solutions to international tensions and imbalances. There is no assumption that the internal sociopolitical structure of "adversaries" needs to change or converge for steps to be taken in the political and military sphere.

Since, for industrialized nations, military intervention operates under marked limitations—and limitations which tend to increase—the notion of stabilizing versus destabilizing military systems is designed to explore these limitations and to assess the full range of impact that the military function has in the international arena. It is designed to explore these limitations and to assess the full range of impact that the military function has in the international arena. It is designed to avoid utopian thinking during a period of redefinition of national interests, since it assumes that stabilized military systems are required if positive goals in international relations are to be established.

The conception of stabilizing versus destabilizing military systems rests on an interdisciplinary or general social science perspective. Military technology supplies the point of departure and starts conventionally with economic elements and uses political elements as coordinating mechanisms. In recent years, there have also been efforts to incorporate psychological elements. With the declining legitimacy of military force-because of the utter destructiveness of military technology and because of the internal sociopolitical tensions of an advanced industrial society-the social dimensions of international relations come into prominence. The notion of legitimacy and the crisis of legitimacy in military force is one formulation of the sociological dimension of international relations. It is dangerous to develop a sociological model of international relations, since it can quickly reduce itself to issues of manpower and morale or questions of ethics divorced from political reality. But basically, the changing function of the military is in part a reflection of these issues of norms and legitimacy. ⁹ The analysis of international relations can therefore be enriched by the appropriate infusion of the sociological analysis of institutions, social structures, and institution building.

Two interrelated assumptions about the nature of advanced industrial societies and the impact of the industrial order offer a point of departure. They are relevant for linking the transformation of the internal social structure of an advanced industrial nation with trends in the international arena.

First, under conditions of advanced industrialism, there is a profound diffusion or dispersion of power and of authority within the nation-state and in the linkages between advanced industrialized states and the rest of the world community. There is, of course, a striking paradox: elements of diffusion and dispersion are compatible with elements of persistent and increased concentration of power and authority. We cannot assume that we are dealing with a closed system; however, the contemporary process of transformation of authority is difficult to comprehend.

Sociologists have spoken of functional interdependence to describe the process by which the division of labor in institutions becomes more complex and specialized. Mannheim has offered the notion of "fundamental democratization" to point to the normative and political implications of this development in the social order. 10 There is some merit in this formulation, although there is also a possibility of confusion, since he does not use "democracy" in the parliamentary sense. He is oriented to the residual power that emerges as formerly excluded groups increasingly enter the mainstream of society. In the United States, the trend toward fundamental democratization first became noticeable during the mobilization efforts of World War I, but its full implication developed and became more manifest during the Second Indochina War.

Since 1945, the most striking development in the internal social structure of Western parliamentary democracies has been the residual power that accrues to formerly excluded or low-status groups--minorities, unskilled workers, youth, old people, or women. The complexity of the division of labor and of functional interdependency plus new normative trends are key elements. Often the power of these groups is more negative than positive, but that is the implication of residual power. The new trends do not negate the persistence of extensive disparity and inequality in resources and privileges. This observation merely seeks to place the residual power in the context of the social structure of an advanced industrial society;

its result is an increase in political tension and an undermining of political legitimacy. The difficulties of making effective political decisions become central. There is persistent tension between elite groups and pervasive veto groups. Political systems can operate on the basis of a gap between aspiration and actual practise, but the strains from the pressure of fundamental democratization are profound on the domestic scene. They result in chronic social conflict or national political stagnation, rather than in new revolutionary circumstances.

At the international level, the same diffusion of power and authority can be noted. It reflects internal domestic changes and changes in the structure of international relations. 12 The phrase, "the shift from a bipolar to a multipolar world community," fails to capture adequately the complexity and content of this transformation. The diffusion of power involves the linkages between major nation-states; and simultaneously, within each region, a related process occurs among the smaller nationstates. The dispersion of residual power is striking, despite the enormous concentration of resources among the advanced industrial nations. As in the case of patterns of internal domestic authority, the increase in functional interdependence is operative; normative and ideological values have enlarged impact. Some writers believed that this fundamental democratization between nations, especially in the context of nuclear weapons systems, should result in invigorated competition between nations with attendant international stability, in an analog to the competitive process of the marketplace. However, the actual process of dispersion of power and authority produces no inherent increase in stability. As in the case of the impact of fundamental democratization on domestic social structure, the effect on international relations is persistent tension and great difficulty in achieving accommodation and effective political decisions.

Second, under advanced industrialism, both internally and internationally, the interplay of force and persuasion undergoes a transformation. An admixture of persuasion and force has traditionally been the central element in diplomacy. The calculus of force and persuasion has been modified so that there is good reason to speak of an increase and intensification in the fusion or articulation of persuasion and force, including the threat of force. In the period of mass armies and traditional warfare among industrialized nations up through World War I, there seems to have

been a phasing or periodicity in the use of persuasion and coercion. 13
There was more of a separation between normal international relations and the application of force. The breakdown of the balance of power led to the use of force, and "victory" was pursued by the means at hand.
Although there were intermittent periods of high tension, war followed peace and peace followed hostilities.

Under the technology and politics of deterrence and involvement in peripheral warfare, the threat of force and force itself are more continually invoked with concurrent efforts at persuasion. The process is one of gradually escalating and de-escalating force, of "fighting" and simultaneously "negotiating," of pursuing divergent means in different specific sectors of the international arena. In part, this process reflects the effort to avoid the use of great amounts of force; in part, it reflects the consequences of greater functional interdependence, in which the opposing powers must take into consideration the enlarged arenas of common interest. There is, at each step, a potent inhibition against using more powerful weapons. The symbolic aspects of force become more and more central. The fusion of force and persuasion partially reflects changes in the normative structure of international relations.

In Western political democracies, the same transformation in the balance of force and persuasion manifests itself internally—for example, in the efforts to control race relations, student protests, and labor relations, and even in the handling of bank robbers. The police are prepared to use personnel who specialize in negotiations with bank robbers holding hostages rather than to apply the force at their disposal. The application of force is not a periodic, all—or—nothing event: it is a continuous aspect of the social process, which must be moderated in terms of self-interest and recognition of the unanticipated consequences of the use of force.

The consequence of both (a) increased functional interdependence and "fundamental democratization" of residual power and (b) the fusion and moderation in the use of force and persuasion is a new level of complexity and fragility in international relations. It is not enough to assert that, because of nuclear weapons, there has been no major or total war between advanced industrial nations for more than a quarter of a century

although levels of tension and the scope of armed conflict have been persistent and unacceptably high. It is necessary to offer hypotheses about the increased limits of military intervention since the end of World War II.

Inequality is an outstanding aspect of the international order and the same can be said of the internal social structure of any society, including the advanced industrial societies. Over the last quarter century, inequality between nations has probably declined less than inequality within nations, especially within advanced industrialized states. There is reason to believe that inequality between the industrialized and the less developed nations has in fact increased. Within advanced industrialized states, those persons who are not members of the middle majority—the sick, the aged, elements of the unskilled, and welfare recipients—may well find themselves with enduring disabilities that exclude them from the material benefits of affluence.

In some fundamental sense, the role of military force is designed to support the inequalities between nations or at least does so in fact (as domestic police power contributes to internal social stratification). This assertion does not deny that military force contributes to the maintenance of a world "order"—no matter how unstable—in which economic, educational, and administrative processes can and do operate to reduce existing degrees of inequality.

However, the hypothesis appears relevant that, at the international level, the capacity of advanced industrialized nations to maintain their economic advantages by reliance on military force has markedly declined. The cost of a military establishment is so huge that there is much greater advantage to be gained by reducing or even limiting military expenditures than by using the threat of force to achieve economic advantage. 14 Critics of a variety of political persuasions now generally concede that military expenditures are not needed to maintain the economic vitality of a "capitalist" society in the West, and that military expenditures are a tremendous burden to the Soviet Union during its continuing press for industrial growth. 15

Nuclear weapons rule out the possibility of drastically restructuring the "zones of influence," as was done after World War II. Moreover, on the contemporary international scene, the less developed nations will not as

readily succumb to a show of the flag or a military presence. Of course, this does not rule out specific intervention to deny important resources to an opponent. To use the language of economics, the marginal utility of the military function has declined.

In addition, the psychological returns of a military force with nuclear weapons have grave limitations. "National security" and "defense of the motherland" are in part a matter of psychic security and of honor, prestige, and the positive attraction of membership in a collectivity. The phrase "world politics and personal insecurity," offered by Harold D. Lasswell, is a focal but neglected aspect of the transformation of international relations. The sheer accumulation of weapons—especially nuclear weapons—does not necessarily reduce anxiety.

The mass of the citizenry continues to support policies which are represented as essential for nuclear deterrence, although there may be extensive political debate about alternative strategies and levels of budgetary allocation. Popular support for national security is in part an expression of personal anxiety. However, the threat of mass destruction produces privatization as well as moral revulsion. There has been a long-term decline in enthusiasm for national war making. Popular support at the outbreak of World War I gave way to realistic participation during World War II, and the prospect of a third world war produces psychological numbness. Since 1945, sharp outbursts of neutralism have demonstrated these pressures. During a period of military detente such feelings will become more prominent, and, although likely to be limited to a minority of the population, "psychological" neutralism can have extensive political consequences.

The mass media, especially television in its day-to-day reporting of violence from Indochina to Northern Ireland, serve to increase the negative psychological consequences of military intervention. Military institutions have a diminished ability to contribute to psychological security: the reality and the imagery of violence produce higher levels of personal insecurity, leading to apathy and withdrawal. 17

In short, the perspective toward international relations appropriate for the application of the concept of stabilizing versus destabilizing must be multi-dimensional.

Instead of the classic concepts of strategic versus tactical, or offensive versus defensive, the alternative formulation, stabilizing versus destabilizing, is more useful for assessing the contemporary function of the military in international relations. The classic terms can be used to describe the technological dimensions of the military. But the notion of stabilizing and destabilizing is designed to reflect the politico-military processes at work in international relations. As shown above, the terms "stabilizing" and "destabilizing" compel one to consider the sociopolitical context of military systems in the search for a viable international system: the avoidance of nuclear war and the containment of peripheral military confrontations.

The central issue is to assess the stabilizing versus destabilizing consequences of alternative approaches to military detente, recognizing the asymmetrical constriction of conscripted manpower for the NATO forces in contrast to the Warsaw Pact states. A review of the years 1945 to 1968—from the first use of nuclear weapons to the active negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union about strategic arms limitations—is a precondition for assessing the trends that emerged after 1968, when the second phase in post-World War II international relations began.

To speak of stabilized systems of nuclear weapons implies the expectation that future weapons development will be economically manageable and also will not present the political specter of a perpetual, overpowering, and uncontrollable "doomsday" arms race, although some continuous change would be built in. In other words, nuclear weapons can be managed without consuming excessively large amounts of resources and producing such high levels of personal insecurity as to transform advanced industrial society into a type of garrison state in which the search for more and "better" nuclear systems becomes an omnipotent goal.

The hypothesis can be offered that between 1945 and 1968, although there was no explicit system of arms control, the development of nuclear weapons remained within tolerable limits of stabilization. The deployment of conventional forces in Scutheast Asia had a destabilizing effect on that area and, in turn, on worldwide international relations.

It was a period when deterrence operated to avoid the outbreak of nuclear war without any fundamental politico-military realignments that

could be viewed by any of the three central powers as basically threatening to the structure of the world community. However, the period 1945-1968 was only partly stabilizing at the level of nuclear weapons. Insufficient steps were taken to develop explicit systems of arms control and to anticipate a future in which more complex nuclear weapons would be deployed, and economic and political factors would require a more active search for a military detente. The destabilizing consequences of military intervention in the Second Indochina War reduced and delayed the United States ability to take the initiative in negotiating with the Soviet Union about strategic arms limitation and a restructuring of conventional forces in Western Europe, and contributed to increased destabilization throughout the world community, especially in the Middle East.

In 1945 it was clear that, while the United States had "numerical" superiority in nuclear weapons, the possibility of an outbreak of nuclear war was very remote, although effective steps had to be taken to prevent accidental warfare or miscalculation. The bulk of the strategic literature of that period, predicting or accounting for developments, can be readily dismissed. It would have been much too much to expect the United States political elite to begin realistic negotiations with the Soviet Union in 1950 on the basis of nuclear parity, which was to develop only at the end of the 1960s as a prerequisite of the SALT talks. However, there was no possibility of preventing the Soviet Union from achieving such parity if the United States was to remain a humane and democratic society.

In essence, the political leadership of the Soviet Union and the United States recognized the utter destructive capacity and unpredictability of nuclear weapons in any military confrontation between NATO and Warsaw Pact nations. The achievement of nuclear deterrence and relative stability between 1945 and 1968 is a reflection, not merely of weapons systems, but of political arrangements and normative patterns at the international level. The social structure and political posture of the United States initially ruled out a preventive attack on the Soviet Union. The NATO military system had at its disposal an adequate number of ground forces to achieve its deterrent role in the nuclear context. The ground-force structure of NATO, especially the very sizable American contingent, indicated a relatively stable political context, uninfluenced by the fears of a nuclear holocaust that could have produced excessive neutralism.

Nor, on the other hand, was there a move toward an independent European deterrent under Franco-German hegemony, which would have been highly destabilizing from the point of view of Soviet-American relations. Moreover, the military presence of the United States insured the continued division of Germany, which was essential for the postwar reconstruction of both Western and Eastern Europe and for the long-term stability of the West.

During the Eisenhower Administration, while the Soviet Union was engaged in the first steps toward nuclear parity, there was in the United States an extensive effort to develop civilian defense. These measures collapsed, initially because of public indifference and later because of congressional reluctance to allocate the required funds. After a very brief period of limited hysteria, the penetration of a "doomsday" outlook into their day-to-day life proved not to be acceptable to the citizens of the United States, who thereby served to contain the level of international tension. A massive civilian defense program would have been destabilizing at that time because it would have weakened the credibility of the United States strategic intentions of avoiding nuclear war. It would also have weakened the social fabric of the United States by further distorting the values of everyday life.

The effectiveness of nuclear deterrence in the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance was enhanced by the limited but symbolically significant efforts at international arms control. These steps produced no more than marginal technical adjustments, but underlined the intention to keep military developments within credible and acceptable limits. (The accords started with the denuclearization of Antarctica, partial test bans, prohibition of nuclear weapons in outer space and in the sea bed, and the construction of the hot line.)

In contrast to the relatively stabilized military balance—conventional and nuclear—in Western Europe, which lasted until the middle of the 1960s, the progressive deployment and utilization of military force in the Far East had a very different impact, which was essentially destabilizing. In essence, the basic source of the destabilization was the failure to develop those political arrangements with Communist China which were blocked from 1947 on by domestic American political agitation.

All available evidence indicates that, at the close of World War II and subsequently, Communist China would have been amenable to political initiatives comparable to those which were launched after 1968, and which would have taken into consideration the relations of China both with the Soviet Union and with other nation-states of the Far East and Southeast Asia. Instead, American foreign policy mechanically sought to apply the format of Western Europe without appropriate adaptation to the realities of the social structure of the Far East.

For a brief moment, the possibility of the use of "tactical" nuclear weapons to support the declining fortunes of the French in Indochina, particularly in the context of "white" military forces against Asiatic formations, proved highly destabilizing. This prospect created the specter of disaster for the world community. It was effectively avoided, but only after extensive destablizing consequences.

Deployment of conventional forces, especially ground forces, failed to take into account the process of decolonization and emergent nationalism in the Far East and in Southeast Asia. After the defeat of Japan, the reimposition of colonial systems was not militarily feasible and was sure to be politically destabilizing. Initially, United States policy was oriented toward the goal of decolonization and the emergence of independent nation-states with their own indigenous military forces. The conventional United States military presence had to conform to these politico-military requirements. In the British and Dutch colonies, this objective was basically achieved, but lack of political decisiveness in Indochina presented the crucial and fatal exception. (The political error was rooted notionly in tacit and then open support of French military intervention, but also in allocating a role to China in the initial occupation of Indochina.)

In retrospect—although there is no point in rewriting history—if the Nixon policies toward Nationalist China on Formosa which were implemented after 1968 had been initiated in 1946—1947, alternative political and military arrangements for Korea and particularly Indochina might have been possible. However, prolongation of the Second Indochina War was a major destabilizing process in the international arena after 1945. One of the causes was the limited effectiveness of U.S. military intervention, especially in its conventional strategic air attacks and the absence of adequate international political legitimacy of the effort. Later,

limitations in the North Vietnamese military effort emerged. The failure of their tank offensive in spring 1972 (which was blunted by tactical airpower and the increased accuracy of United States bombing of the North in the fall of 1972) created the military conditions for the acceptance of a "cease-fire." It was clear, however, from the early 1960s on, that a contraction of American military involvement in the Second Indochina War depended on a direct initiative by the United States to satisfy the political objectives of Communist China.

The vast amount of documentation about the outbreak of the Second Indochina War has obscured the central issue: the demise of the determined United States military opposition to deploying ground forces on the mainland of Asia, which had become especially strong after Korea. The leaders of this opposition were called members of the "never-again club." Before 1960, key U.S. military leaders had been opposed to large-scale ground involvement in Southeast Asia. Likewise, the limits of military intervention had been recognized in the military plans that were developed, calling for one million to one million two hundred thousand men as the requirement for a ground force in Vietnam. 18

It is arbitrary to take 1968 as the starting date of the second era in post-World War II politico-military development; no doubt it will be subject to reformulation in later retrospection. In that year, however, the internal political scene in the United States -- changed because of the election of President Richard M. Nixon--shifted to permit deescalation of the war in Vietnam, and to make possible new political initiatives with the Soviet Union and, later, with Communist China. President Nixon's election also permitted the political decision to start unilateral disarmament in the United States by ending the draft. In effect, 1968 was a political benchmark for response to developments which had been in progress since the early 1960s -- for example, the growing "numerical nuclear parity" of the Soviet Union, the increased complexity of nuclear weapons, the limitations on American intervention in the Second Indochina War, the increased recognition of the limitations of military assistance programs to the developing nations, the emerging tension between the Soviet Union and China, and the internal problems of advanced industrial countries, including the Soviet Union.

The initiatives toward detente sought a new stabilization, but contained actual and potential elements of destabilization. Starting in

1968, the legitimate utility of military force required new arrangements to stabilize the nuclear deterrent under conditions of nominal nuclear parity. It is of course assumed that political elites in the United States would not accept "marked" Russian nuclear superiority. A stabilized nuclear deterrent cannot be defined only in technological terms, namely, as an inhibited commitment of economic resources. Politically, it would be necessary to prevent both reactive neutralism and aggressive nationalism in Western Europe. Reactive neutralism would lead to significant pressure to opt out of nuclear defense arrangements because of distrust of American intentions as being either too "forward" or too "unreliable," and could be assisted by high levels of privatization. On the other hand, aggressive nationalism might be attended by pressure for a more forward Furopean defense posture. The political requirement of a stabilized nuclear deterrence would also involve the avoidance of an independent Western European deterrent, especially under Franco-German domination, which would be gravely destabilizing to United States-Soviet relations.

The conflicts -- technical, administrative, and political -- encountered in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks underline the enormous difficulties of institution building for military stabilization after 1968. However, the main objectives of strategic arms limitations began to emerge. The stabilizing elements of strategic arms arrangements include: negotiations as permanent mechanisms; improved unilateral and bilateral photoelectronic surveillance; further limitations on weapons testing; on-site nuclear explosion inspection; limitations on new launching complexes, including antiballistic missile systems and submarines; negotiations concerning new types of missles, such as the cruise missles; and improved hot-line procedures, including the stationing of joint military commissions in neutral territories. Moreover, the emerging patterns of strategic arms limitations face the incredibly complex task of political accommodation with Communist China. 19 This last is especially crucial since the United States would produce gravely destabilizing potentials if it were to seek to enhance its world position by a balance-of-power strategy of "playing off" the Soviet Union against Communist China. 20 These rivalries are likely to maintain themselves on their own accord, with destabilizing consequences. Negotiations with Communist China on strategic arms limitations might well begin earlier rather than later.

However, the core problem is not technical. It remains political, and is related in particular to the changed military function. The major political thrust of the period after 1968 has been to link strategic arms limitation negotiation to the issues of conventional forces in Western Europe. The stability of deterrence depends on the relevant contribution of conventional forces to the mechanics of deterrence, to internal political balance in the NATO structure, and to the political stability of each constituent nation. Paradoxically, despite the vast expenditure of the United States military, the central stabilizing element rests on the supply of an adequate number of conventional ground forces in Western Europe. The unilateral introduction of the all-volunteer force complicated this task; but with a viable professional reorientation, an adequate force with legitimate military utility can be maintained even without conscription.

There is little point at this juncture to spell out alternative scenarios or patterns of strategic force deployment. Instead, the issue rests on recognizing the goals of U.S. military forces under a foreign policy which is searching to design a new world order. It makes no difference whether one believes that the world arena should be seen as a single interacting field of forces or whether one believes that regional differentiation is operative. It is a tautology, that the absence of peace is the result of the failure to develop an international order; but it is a useful tautology since it implies that one must think about the use of military forces to create such a world order. Such a world order would not be fixed static, and without tension, but would have its conflicts, instabilities, and ambiguities as well. But the measure of a trend toward a meaningful world order would be signified by a decline in risk-taking for marginal advantage and a significant reduction in those direct confrontations seeded with dangerous elements of escalation; and even more important a decline is the imagery and reality of an unorganized world community locked into a doomsday search for a military weapons system to produce "superiority" by one or the other of the super powers.

There can be no doubt that the United States would have to be the prime agent of initiative in this search for stabilizing military systems It will not transpire by reactions to Soviet policies. There here can

be no doubt that the NATO-Warsaw Pact relations supply the central arena for such initiatives. The "drift toward the Left" in Western European governments bardly implies automatic destabilization, although it does complicate day-to-day management of the balance of politico-military forces.

It is best not to think in terms of strategic military objectives, but rather to identify a process of strategic adaptation. In the search for a stabilized foreign policy, the United States would seek to influence the Soviet Union to accept the premise that the United States desires a world order in which it would not station conventional ground forces outside Western Europe (correspondingly, the same would hold true for the Soviet Union in that its external ground force deployment would be limited to Eastern Europe). The size of these forces would be subject to negotiations under mutual-balanced-reduction in the light of military and political requirements for nuclear deterrence and the worldwide search for military detente. The United States would maintain a meaningful but delimited multiple purpose contingency force on active duty, supported by a contracted but effective ready reserve. This force would have a reinforcement potential for NATO and, at the same time, serve as a deterrent to Russian ground force deployments outside the Warsaw Pact.

These conditions alter the role of naval forces. A stabilized military balance would involve the deployment of naval forces by both sides as an element of the NATO-Warsaw Pact mutual deterrence on both the North Atlantic and the East Mediterranean flanks. It can be expected that a naval presence ranging widely over the globe, for diffuse objectives of national prestige and presumed political advantage, will continue with only marginal politico-military consequences. Greater expansion of naval power as, for example, in the Indian Ocean, presents potentials for delimited elements of destabilization, but local nationalist sentiment serves as a partial counterweight. There is also the everpresent issue of avoiding naval accidents, which is already being pursued by direct negotiation and treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States. 22

Strategic analysts will of course point to the profoundly destabilizing impact of the direct and indirect U.S./U.S.S.R. politicomilitary confrontations outside of the European theater, each of which presents a special case. Korea serves as case where U.S. ground forces are stationed outside of the European theater. The resolution or stabilization of this confrontation rests on the exploration as to whether a U.S. commit-

ment can be achieved by the presence of air and naval units in that theater. More generally, elements of destabilization operate in the which the United States and the Soviet Union have generated in the developing nations. However since 1968, a more realistic perspective has been emerging as military assistance programs have been shown to have very limited military utility. The general trend does not negate those profoundly unstabilizing focal points. The military assistance programs in connection with the unending Arab-Israeli conflict are central. However, the pattern of response during and since the outbreak of hostilities in 1973 in the Middle East indicates that the strategic process in that area is not merely the result of the overriding calculus of the super powers. Instead, client states have scope for initiatives which serves as the basis for a containment of the destabilizing components. Of continuing tentrality is the resolution of the politicomilitary tensions created by the persistence of white political supremacy in the southern portions of Africa. This struggle is particularly destabilizing because of its impact on the bilateral negotiations between the U.S./U.S.S.R. on strategic issues.

But the generalized and diffuse confrontation between the U.S and the U.S.S.R. in the so-called third world have been transformed and muted in good part by the political definition which has come to be held by the super powers and the importance of nationalist sentiment in these nations.

The ability of major powers to alter the political structure of developing nations by political manipulation, subversion, support of guerrilla groups, and other types of covert operations has no doubt been exaggerated, although there have been particularly striking cases. These attempts may well continue, even though massive efforts in Latin America, for example, have failed. Moreover, in the Western political democracies, there is growing recognition that measures of defense against internal subversion depend on viable political leadership as much as on military or paramilitary institutions. The appeals to nationalistic sentiment and reliance on indigenous political resources have demonstrated their effectiveness, so that a belief in the inevitable success of Communist-dominated coups and revolts has come to an end. This is not to overlook the destabilizing elements of direct colonial rule where it still persists. However, under conditions of nuclear deterrence, there is real danger that

military officers will seek to maintain a traditional definition of the military function by such means as a strong emphasis on various forms of "counterinsurgency." The specter of Western officers and intelligence operatives "going native" and leading indigenous forces dies hard, especially under the circumstances of continued military assistance from the Soviet Union and China to the developing nations. However, for a stabilized world balance, the less direct the intervention the better, since such a policy allows nationalism to operate as a counterpressure.

In partial summary, it can be said that narrower limits of the military function have emerged for advanced industrialized nations, especially those with parliamentary institutions. But to speak of narrower limits hardly alters the centrality of force--especially force that is legitimate in international relations and oriented toward stabilizing international relations.

Institution Building for Military Stabilization

The fusion of new concepts with the day-to-day realities of military organization has presented, and continues to present, deep problems in institution building. The behavior and perspectives of the military are influenced by the immediate realities of manning particular weapons systems as much as they are by the formulation of doctrine. These dayto-day realities maintain traditional combat philosophies. It is true that, in the parliamentary nations of the West, the terminology of deterrence has been incorporated into the language of the professional officer. There is much discussion of the phrase, "peacekeeping through a military presence." The phraseology of the deterrent force in the format of a constabulary or various alternatives is extensively debated in military circles. The formulation presented in The Professional Soldier continues to require clarification and explication. "The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force and seeks viable international relations rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military posture. 23 However, verbal pronouncements are not reliable indicators of institutional change.

It is difficult to assess the actual and potential capacity of a military organization to transform itself and to meet its changed function.

To move beyond the strategy of deterrence and consider issues of stabilization versus destabilization will be even more difficult. In the Soviet Union, the existence of a capacity to fight a conventional war in Europe, the possibility of intervention in socialist countries of Eastern Europe, and the confrontation on the Sino-Soviet border help to maintain traditional perspectives. However, the specter of nuclear weapons and their relation to conventional military operations has produced an equivalent but highly muted debate in Soviet professional circles about the nature of the military profession under nuclear arms.

Comparison with the medical profession may be appropriate. In order to develop preventive medicine, a separate structure and, in effect, a separate profession—the specialist in public health, with different training, career, and perspective—had to be brought into being. Clearly, it is not feasible to think in such terms in the case of the military. The transformation in professional capacities must take place within existing operational units. For the military profession, the overriding consideration is whether a force effectively committed to a deterrent philosophy and to peacekeeping and the concept of military presence can maintain its essential combat readiness.

To the detached outside observer, this problem hardly appears insoluble, but to the professional officer it is a central and overriding preoccupation. Does deterrence carry with it the seeds of its own destruction? Will such a strategy, especially under a parliamentary system, undermine the credibility of the military? Can a military force maintain combat readiness without any combat experience or an equivalent? Does not an inherent advantage accrue to nations under single-party political systems which accord the military a different social position and a broader range of functions—functions that presumably make it more viable? The focus is on the U.S. military establishment, since the movement toward stabilizing military systems rests on its initiatives and adequacy.

Institution building in the military-creating and maintaining a stabilized military force for deterrence--must be seen as an aspect of the long-term decline of the mass armed force based on conscription. The expansion of the military organization to fight a total war had the paradoxical consequence of "civilianizing" the military. The line between the military and the larger society weakened because of military dependence

on civilian industry and science, and because of the impact of the mobilization of large numbers of civilians for wartime service. "Total war" made both soldier and civilian objects of attack and served further to attenuate the distinction between the military and civilian sectors of society. Notions such as Lasswell's "garrison state," Mills' "power elite," and Eisenhower's "industrial-military complex" served to highlight the political problems associated with the expansion of the military and the blurring of the distinction between the military and the civilian sectors. 25

The emergence of an all-volunteer military slows the trend toward civilianization. While there is no return to a highly self-contained military establishment, the "new military" displays a strong preoccupation with maintaining its organizational boundaries and corporate identity. Top military leaders in particular struggle to maintain the distinctive features, qualities, and mystiques of military life as they see them. Although they are dependent on technical expertise, they press to select for the highest command posts those who have had combat experience; as the opportunities for combat decline, the emphasis is at least on operational experience. The military continues to recruit top leaders from those who have attended the prestigious military academies. It seeks to build housing on military bases and to maintain the separate structure of the community and its own style of life. The issues of civilian control are changed under the volunteer force structure, and focus more and more on maintaining the social integration of the military into the larger society.

In any military organization, there is a gap between the "big ideas" of military function and the immediate tasks which military personnel must continually perform. Military leaders hope that day-to-day foutine will create, or at least contribute to, a sense of military readiness and essential social solidarity. In essence, the more a unit during its normal routine is a military force in being, the more able it is to maintain the sense of military distinctiveness. There are, of course, limits to this observation—for example, when the task becomes excessively tedious or irksome.

Thus, the air force is the service most able to recruit personnel and maintain morale under voluntary manpower systems, because the routines of flying aircraft create military units in being. Even missile crews and radar units, because of the deadly character of the weapons which they

handle, feel a sense of urgency which helps them to overcome boredom. Naval units have traditionally represented a force in being and maintained a group solidarity derived from the vitality of seamanship. However, the tedium and pressure of the new naval life--for example, of the submarine at sea for months and months--has transformed some of these conditions and increased the problems of recruitment and self-conception.

The crisis of the military style of life is sharpest in the ground forces. Here the gap between preparation and training and presumed combat is the greatest. Training is only periodic and often lacks the sense of urgency, reality, or risk that routine operations in the air force and navy entail. Airborne and parachute units are closest to units in being, because of the risk and danger in training. As a result, parachute training, ranger training, and wilderness activities are emphasized, not only because of their functional importance but to maintain the professional ideology of combat readiness and military distinctiveness.

Combat readiness is a genuine problem, for there is insufficient experience to satisfy operational military officers. The pressure of this uncertainty carries the danger that the military will develop an inflexible posture likely to stand in the way of pragmatic adjustment to emerging realities. One possible response is the acceptance of doctrines which distort the utility of military force in international relations and which are excessively ideological, absolutist, and assault-oriented.

The essential issue is to restructure the organizational milieu of the military so that combat readiness is not an expression of personal aggressiveness or rigid ideological perspectives, but rather a meaningful element of organizational effectiveness.

Available data on education and socialization in the military supply no assurance that the process of transformation in the profession will be automatic or certain. In reality, the dominant impact of socialization is negative. Military socialization does not fundamentally alter the attitudes of recruits; it merely rejects those who do not conform to central norms and values. Moreover, the longer the time men spend in a military career, the more homogeneous their orientation becomes; and, all too often, the more pessimistic are their views about international relations. 27

Tough training is necessary and may make for group loyalty, but it does not necessarily guarantee the professional perspectives required for a

deterrent force. Moreover, as Marine Corps experience documents, there appears to be a modest supply of human beings, even in an advanced industrial society, who are prepared to expose themselves to the extreme rigors of Marine Corps training. But the responsibilities given to such men are limited to initial military assaults.

To adapt to the new realities of international relations, the military profession must have a conceptual clarity about its strategic purpose. The new element is that such understanding is not reserved to the top leadership. In appropriate degrees, all professional levels must be aware of the redefined aspects of the military function. In fact, professionalism is not to be delimited in terms of skill, but includes the dimension of awareness of the goals and purposes beyond deterrence. An educational system which assumes that an officer is trained for a tactical mission and subsequently educated for strategic goals as he advances through the military hierarchy has become irrelevant and outmoded.

Since men are not guided by strategic concepts alone, group cohesion and collective motives are essential. In the United States, particularly in the aftermath of the war in Vietnam, core elements in the military are deeply concerned with keeping alive their concept of the "fighter spirit." In Western Europe, the military forces acknowledge this problem but are less concerned, since they accept the validity of their training and operational format. One cannot separate self-conceptions from public reputations. In comparison with the military in Western Europe, and especially in Great Britain, it does appear that the lower prestige and social standing of the United States military contributes to its concern with "tough" military virtues.

Standards of personal behavior are a central issue. If it is to be seen as legitimate and reliable, a force which handles nuclear weapons cannot engage in the deviant practices found in civilian life. The constant screening of "human factors" becomes part of military medicine, and the personal and social controls required to deal with the difficult and tedious tasks of the "new military" will have to be different and more constrained than those in the civilian society.

In a parliamentary democracy, it has been assumed that an officer corps which is not excessively self-recruited and which is reasonably representative of the larger society would have a political orientation compatible with the larger society and would have internalized the advan-

tages of civil control. 28 There can be no explicit political criteria of recruitment into the officer corps. The professional soldier--officer or enlisted man--has the right to personal privacy and to civic involvements, provided he does not engage in partisan behavior. Moreover, it is assumed that he will remain integrated into the larger society. (In the Soviet Union, political reliability is required and enforced by police controls, and the military is isolated from the larger society in order to insure continuing loyalty to the Party.)

However, in an all-volunteer force, especially in states with a long tradition of citizen-soldiers, all of these assumptions are being tested. The strategic conceptions of deterrence and of stabilized military systems which do not produce tangible "victories" create high levels of professional tension and frustration, especially in a period of strong antimilitary sentiment. Recruitment becomes more difficult and the recruits tend to be less representative of the larger society. The potential danger is not simply that the military will become ingrown and socially isolated, although there is clearly a trend in this direction. The real danger is that the military will become both ideologically rigid and more specialized in its contacts with civilian society, and that these contacts may move it toward a more explicitly conservative and rightist orientation.

The result is hardly to produce a potential cadre for counter-revolution. Rather, the military emerges as one additional element of political controversy in a society already racked with extensive political conflict and dissensus. Unless this alternative can be avoided, the military is likely to operate as a pressure group against the realistic military policies required in the search for a new pattern of stabilization in international relations. 30

The formulations of social research are designed to clarify political and social alternatives; but they should be constructed so as to reduce the possibility of self-fulfilling prophecies. Thus it is necessary for this analysis of international relations and military institutions to return to its point of departure. The assumptions of "fundamental democratization" and the interpenetration of coercion and persuasion reflect the continuity between the internal social structure of an advanced industrial society and the transformed processes of inter-

national relations. The emergence of nuclear weapons and the decline of colonial rule have combined to decrease the relevance of traditional conceptions of military intervention that are concerned with the "defeat" of national adversaries or the drastic restructuring of the balance of power. In a very crude way, the term "deterrence" represented a partial, incomplete, and ultimately unsatisfactory advance that sought to recognize realities and to reformulate international political analysis. The intellectual limitations of the notion of deterrence are varied; basically, the term denotes the military objectives without adequately encompassing the political, social, and moral ends.

In a period of search for military detente, the increased obsolescence of the notion of deterrence rests not merely on the changed character of the threat of national adversaries, although this is a relevant dimension. The concept of stabilizing versus destabilizing military systems is an attempt to explicate more specifically the political and moral objectives of military systems. It is an intellectual orientation concerned with the potentialities and limitations of military systems in creating new rules and new norms which are designed to reduce the threat of nuclear and limited war and at the same time to enhance the process of orderly change at the international level.

In each historical period, it is essential to avoid the extrapolation of trends that characterize much of international relations analysis. Therefore, the formulation of stabilizing versus destabilizing military systems should highlight the build-in limitations in any search for military detente. Moreover, it does not de-emphasize the centrality of force in international relations. I am hopeful, however, that it does offer a sharper set of categories for estimating changes in the utility and the legitimacy of the military function.

The Impact of Strategic Air Warfare George H. Quester

Major American participation in the Vietnam War ended in almost the same way as it began, with the use of airpower to strike at targets in North Vietnam. Since 1965, and indeed since 1945, the United States has thus been type-cast as addicted to the threats and use of bomber aircraft. Does this show a peculiarly American infatuation with capital-intensive methods and technological gimmicks? Perhaps it does, but one would also have to stipulate very quickly that the United States has normally benefited from its reliance on science and technology. The methods and devices Americans have applied from one problem to another have typically not been silly dreams, but enormously effective liberators of human energy.

If there were indeed an infatuation, would it also demonstrate a parrticular callousness and brutality among Americans, whereby we harness technology to inflict suffering on the inhabitants of North Vietnamese cities, or Dresden or Hiroshima? Or have Americans instead tried to harness the technology of the bomber sirplane to what they expected to be a moral war, in which "military targets" were hit while "civilian targets" were spared?

As a most depressing composite possibility at the end, could it be that Americans have been kidding themselves, expecting to fight air wars with morality and discrimination, while actually relying on substantial brutality?

This paper will in effect thus be examining two separate questions simultaneously. What has shaped American attitudes on the effectiveness

of bombing?

Perhaps we will be able to document the charge that subjective predilections of Americans have made us again and again too optimistic about what aerial bombardment can accomplish. Perhaps not; for much of the account here will show how Americans have also been biased by culture and analytical style <u>against</u> the aerial bombardment tool, especially wherever it might be used in ways that hurt civilians.

Perhaps aerial bombardment in reality has never been effective. Yet the evidence on this "objective" point is also not a little mixed, for there are some interesting cases where bombing indeed seems to have had some truly valuable military and political effect. Even if Americans were disposed to credit bombing with impact for the wrong reasons, it would be a mistake therefore to miss whatever practical impact it had in fact had.

The Heritage of American Moral Attitudes

It is indeed remarkable that American official policy has so long disapproved of counter-civilian uses of the bomber airplane, not only for most of the years between the World Wars, but moreover well into World War II. The residue of such American moral feelings on the conduct of an air war indeed may account for some of the confusion in governmental explanations of bombing in Vietnam, and perhaps much of what seems hypocritical or irrational.

The years after World War I saw a great enthusiasm expressed in Great Britain for "knockout blows" by strategic air warfare, especially among such RAF officers as Air Marshal Trenchard who had planned to defeat Germany by a counter-city air attack by 1919, if the war had not already ended by then. 1 Nothing similar occurred in the United States. American

air officers to be sure were enthusiastic about the strategic potential of the bomber, but Air Corps field manuals were careful to stress techniques of precision-bombing which might cripple the enemy by destroying specific factories, while sparing residential areas even a few blocks away. Thus in 1926:

In the World War the Germans bombed London and Paris, while the dream of all the Allies was to bomb Berlin. Whether such bombing actually accomplishes its avowed purpose—to weaken the morale of the hostile nation and thus hasten the end of hostilities—is doubtful in some cases. The reactions may be in exactly the opposite direction.²

And in 1938:

It is possible that a moral collapse brought about by disturbances in this close-knit web may be sufficient to force an enemy to surrender but the real target is industry itself, not national morale.³

Why did the United States adopt these relatively high-minded attitudes? Perhaps it was already a technological fixation, this time with the vastly overrated "super-accurate" Norden bomb-sight. A more cynical observer might have concluded that Americans in the 1920s and 1930s felt that they had more to lose than to gain in any legitimation of brutal air attack. How else could any foreign power ever menace Piitsburgh or Denver or St. Louis, except by flying over the U.S. Navy and Army? Obviously it made sense for the U.S., like Japan, to demand that aerial bombardment in any future war be constricted to only the more explicitly military of targets.

In larger part, however, such attitudes also reflected the general holier-than-thou attitude of most Americans toward other states in the international system, a naivité already exemplified by Woodrow Wilson in his internationalist activist role and then retained by the isolationists

later. Other states were power-mad and brutal and selfish in this view;

Americans, military officers included, saw themselves instead as peaceloving and selfless, fighting wars only in self-defense when attacked,

fighting such wars only in ways which respected civilian lives.

The nature of American public attitudes here is illustrated by a Gallup opinion poll taken in April of 1938, as war had begun to seem more imminent in Europe, asking Americans to express their attitudes on the use of countervalue bombing as a weapon in any future war.

APRIL 15

BOMBING OF CIVILIANS4

Interviewing Date 4/2-7/38
Survey #117-A

Question #5a

Do you think all nations should agree not to bomb civilians in cities during wartime.

Yes	 	 91%
No	 	 9

By Sex

	res	NO
Men	89%	11%
Women	94	6

Interviewing Date 42-7/38 Survey #117-A

Question #5b

Should the United States call a conference of all mations to make such an agreement?

Yes.									•											61%
No																				39

By Sex

	Yes	NO
Men	58%	42%
Women	65	35

As World War II broke out in Europe in 1939, one of the earliest American "interventions" then came with a statement from President Franklin Roosevelt urging all the belligerents to limit their air forces to bombing strictly military targets. The British and French governments signalled their acceptance of this appeal on September 2, and the German government on September 18.5

This is not the place to discuss at any length where the subsequent blame should be directed for the escalation in bombings during World War II. Counter to the conventional recollections of the war, the war at first indeed saw a prolonged period of mutual restraint, in which the Luftwaffe and the RAF did not bomb each other's civilian targets. The conventional wisdom then normally charges Hitler with deliberately escalating to allout bombing of Britain during "the Blitz", presumably as part of an attempt to force the British to surrender. It will suffice to note that this author is convinced that the crucial sequence of escalation to population bombing produces more blame for the British side, as Winston Churchill may indeed have deliberately launched such bombing raids during the Battle of Britain as a means to baiting Hitler into wasting the potential of his Air Force. 6

If Americans generally concluded that Hitler had struck the first blow in counter-civilian air warfare, knowledgeable Americans nonetheless were not so ready to approve of the way the RAF was "retaliating." Even during the joint British-American bombing campaigns against German cities from 1942 to 1945, U.S. Army Air Force officers thus often congratulated themselves that American methods were more humane than those of the RAF. The RAF's Bomber Command consistently attacked at night, when it would lose fewer planes to Luftwaffe interceptors (and also would be able to carry larger bomb loads since less defensive machine-gun armament would be required against such interceptors). Yet precision-bombing by night was

impossible, and the RAF taeget simply became working-class residential sectors, in an "area-bombing" assault.

The USAAF by contrast flew by daylight, carrying lighter bomb loads, attempting to drop such bombs more precisely on specific factories, rail-way yards, and oil refineries. The distinction was obviously not based solely on moral terms. The low-bombload B-17 and B-24 in the U.S. arsenal had originally been designed in part to intercept and bomb enemy battle-ships out in the Atlantic, when U.S. isolationism would not have tolerated any other scenario for military planning purposes. An air force fights a war with whatever tools it has, and the presence of B-17s in the inventory may thus have dictated strategy in 1944 as much as the B-52 would in 1972. Yet, to complete the circle, the kind of U.S. bomber available reflected earlier rejections of city-bombing, on largely moral grounds.

The American endorsements of "careful counter-military bombing" in World War II thus very much resemble what we have come to see as the pre-requisites for limited war today. One must always be careful not to kill one's hostages; if the other fellow's cities and populations are hurt, he will lose his reason for sparing our cities and population.

Yet the exact motivation for American behavior in World War II departs significantly from this model, for Hitler throughout the war never could pose the threat of being able to bomb American cities in reprisal. There has indeed been much comment on the Roosevelt Administration's commitment to "total war" and "unconditional surrender," as part of what often seemed an excessive American commitment to war, once the traumatic decision has been taken to enter in. 9 By contrast, there has similarly been extensive analysis of how uncomfortable the American people seemed to be with the rules of "limited war" in Korea in 1950. The reluctance to

admit to bombing cities from 1941 to 1945 thus did not stem directly from any sophisticated understanding of the mutual-restraint model of limited war; indeed the British were much more conscious and attuned to this model than were Americans. Rather the American desire for a sense of restraint stemmed from a straightforward "respect for law" or morality, a feeling that winning wars by aiming at civilians was contrary to the traditions of civilization, and therefore wrong.

In part this distinction then accounts for the heavy emphsis on "intent" on explications of bombing policy in all the cases we are examining here. Protestant theology (and all Christian theology) has a heavy emphasis on intent, as opposed to some other religions which place more stress on the rightfulness or wrongfulness of the act committed, no matter what the intention. If one kills civilians as an accidental byproduct of having aimed at a factory or a fortress, therefore, one's conscience is thus considerably relieved, and one can even privately relish the "bonus destruction" achieved, destruction which is all the more welcome because it was not intended.

The mutual limitation of warfare is of course generally not so easy when the motives of one side are complicated in this matter. A side whose civilians were "inadvertently" suffering, as an unintended consequence of the American air raids, might feel that it no longer had real reason to hold back its own destructive bomber forces. As mentioned, the absence of serious German and Japanese retaliatory capabilities kept this peculiarity of American motivation from making much difference in World War II. Indeed, if American motives had been based on pure "limited-war" theory, there would have been no need to limit that war; limits only make amoral sense when the other side has destructive capabilities of its own.

The element of moral feeling thus in some ways prepared the U.S. for the limited-war experience of Korae and Vietnam, but in other ways it very much confused the logical preparation. We will return to the logic of the conduct of these wars later.

Bombing Effectiveness in World War II

Much has been made of the post-war findings of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, which studied the impacts of bombing campaigns in Germany and Japan, the study of Germany in 1945 commencing indeed even before the war in the Pacific was over. Many analogies to the Vietnam bombing have been drawn from the study in recent years, for example, contending that bombing has always been ineffective. The Study was an impressive piece of work, drawing in men from whom much would be heard later, for example, George Ball, John Kenneth Galbraith and Pail Nitze among the directors. Yet the volumes of the study are hardly consistent or coherent in their conclusions, which is not surprising, since the staffs of the Survey comprised hundreds of civilian analysts and hundreds of military officers. Studies of particular targets are at times difficult to reconcile with the conclusions of the summary volumes. The summary volumes for the European Theater are not really consistent with the summaries for the Pacific. It is thus quite dangerous for anyone, even a former Director of the U.S.S.B.S., to be too quick in stating so generally that "the Strategic Bombing Survey proved" this or that.

In analyzing the U.S. precision bombardment in Europe, the summary volume indeed concluded that such bombing had not been effective in crippling German military capability, but only because the correct target had been identified too late. If the offensive had shifted to oil earlier,

instead of striking at ball bearings, the volume concluded that the German Army might indeed have ground to a halt. 11 As it was, the oil offensive was begun in the Summer of 1944 so that the German Army and Air Force would have run out of gas approximately by June of 1945, presumably having been defeated by air power. They were of course defeated by ground power of the U.S., British and Russian armies before then, surrendering on May 7, 1945.

The same <u>Survey</u> volume was more generally critical of the British bombing effort, at least in "counter-capability" terms, noting that the area-bombing raids never really crimped German war production by producing demoralization or absenteeism in the labor supply. ¹² Indeed the pool of available factory labor sometimes went up a few weeks after a heavy raid on a nearby city, as the proprietors of delicatessans and bakeries which had been levelled now had to find employment.

Before belittling the counter-capability accomplishment of the Allied bombings too much, however, one must more generally stipulate that there was a great deal of slack in German war industry for much of World War II. Hitler had simply not imposed an austerity or rationalization on the German economy comparable to what Winston Churchill had imposed on Britain. 13 In part this probably reflected Hitler's fears that an austerity comparable to World War I might cause the German people to want to surrender again. In part it also reflected to corrupt accommodations which had been reached between German capitalists and the Nazi regime, which often allowed the industrialists to do things their old way.

Albert Speer is quite rightly respected as a technocrat-extraordinary, succeeding in raising German output of munitions for month after month through 1943 and 1944 despite the Allied bombings. Yet his major contribution came precisely in taking the redundancy and slack out of the German

manufacturing arrangements, without which his impressive record would not have been possible. If there had been no bombings, German war production might thus indeed have gone up far more spectacularly in 1943 and 1944. If there had been no wastage of German resources in 1940 and 1941, by contrast, the bombings would have produced an immediately more visible effect, as war production would have gone into decline.

The British "area bombing" campaign may thus simply have been intended to weaken war production by tiring out and emoralizing the labor force (it must have worked out ironically that RAF bombs tended to fall wherever Germans had voted for the Social Democrats or the Communists againt Hitler in the last German elections). Or the British planners may have hoped to inspire opposition to the war in the German people or governments by a brutal bombing policy which the RAF could not advertise altogether explicitly, but admitted to often enough.

Hitler would not surrender merely to end the Allied bombings. Since no such German popular revolt ever showed signs of materializing (how could it, with most of the Left's political leaders dead or in concentration camps), it is common to write off the entire British effort here as a misguided failure. Yet such a conclusion might indeed be premature, for officers of the German Army did, after all, attempt to assassinate Adolf Hitler; the destruction of German cities being carried forward day after day could only have furthered such officers' conviction that the Nazi regime and the war should be terminated as early as possible.

The average German front-line soldier (like the average civilian) was kept quite immobilized politically throughout the war, and indeed showed no signs of approving the attempt on Hitler's life. Yet we have evidence that the Nazi authorities devoted considerable effort to keeping detailed news of the air-raids from reaching the front lines, for fear

that this immobilization might not otherwise be maintained. 14

It is thus especially interesting to note that the U.S. Army Air Force's response to the preliminary findings of the U.S.S.B.S. from Europe was to shift its B-29 campaign against Japan to emulate the British area bombing attack. The B-29 was a bigger airplane, perhaps capable of carrying enough tonnage to make an area assault meaningful (especially if defensive armament could be stripped off as unnecessary when the missions were to be flown at night). If U.S. precision bombings had not exactly found the right industrial target over Europe, General LeMay in command of the 20th Air Force concluded that a campaign of bombing residential areas might force the Japanese government or people to surrender. 15

Americans may generally worship technology, but this shift to night bombing was clearly a step in the opposite direction. The B-29s were stripped of a defensive machine-gun system which had just been developed as an enormous improvement over that of the B-17. Precise bomb-aiming was to be abandoned for a crude blunderbuss approach. Everything expendable was stripped from these expensive brand-new airplanes to increase the bomb-load they could carry. LeMay's decision in the field thus in effect converted his bombers from 1945 to 1942 models, the equivalent of the high-payload bombers the RAF had used over Germany.

Yet American morality still had to be appeased, with the argument that many Japanese homes were housing small machine shops contributing to war production. If incendiary raids thus were to burn down entire residential neighborhoods, this could be raionalized as consistent with international law and American morality, as long as "military-industrial" objectives were always the target. Privately, U.S. Army Air Force planners in Washington now noted that a choice might have to be made between

industrial targets and the Japanese population as a target; their suggestion to LeMay's headquarters was that he press the attack on population. 16

The Twentieth Air Force had thus shifted to "area bombing" in its assault on Japan before the use of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The criticism is often advanced that the two obviously indiscriminate atomic bombings were unnecessary, since Japan may already have been on the verge of surrendering. Yet such an argument begs the question of what indeed was causing the Japanese Government to be so close to making peace. The two major factors here were the naval blockade of the home islands, and the conventional bombings already underway, bombings which on occasion had done more civilian damage than the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs.

It is interesting to note how the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey volume for Japan concludes that it had been wise to try to bomb Japan into wanting to surrender:

With the benefit of hindsight, it appears that the twin objectives of surrender without invasion and reduction of Japan's capacity and will to resist an invasion, should the first not succeed, called for basically the same type of attack. Japan had been critically wounded by military defeats, destruction of the bulk of her merchant fleet, and almost complete blockade. The proper target, after an initial attack on aircraft engine plants, either to bring overwhelming pressure on her to surrender, or to reduce her capability of resisting invasion, was the basic economic and social fabric of the country. Disruption of her railroad and transportation system by daylight attacks, coupled with destruction of her cities by night and bad weather attacks, would have applied maximum pressure in support of either aim.17

There was, of course, no way that so powerful an explosive as the A-bomb could be dropped discriminately on a city. Yet the United States, in the use of even this weapon, put forward military arguments for the target choice. Hiroshima was indeed an unusually military city, the home base for a number of army units, a city that had been virtually off-limits

to foreigners in the later 1930s. Nagasaki was an important industrial city.

One again wonders why exactly there should be this kind of rationalization at the final stage of the blood-letting. There was no "mutual restraint" bargaining underway by which Japan was supposed to see this all as still part of a limited war. Neutral opinion just as surely could no longer have been a consideration; were we worried about hostility from the Swedes, Swiss and Portuguese? The statements about "military targetting" of course relate in the end to an internal morality in the United States, a morality whose considerations were not yet to be shelved with the onset of the nuclear age.

The Projection on to H-Bomb War

If the American bombing of Japan, non-nuclear as well as nuclear, was wanton, American morality still necessitated that it be defined otherwise. This illusion about "military targets" imdeed has persisted well past 1945 even with regard to nuclear war World War III scenarios. It has only been very recently that any American spokesmen could admit publicly that H-bombs would be directed at Moscow in retaliation for a Soviet strike, merely to make the Soviet leadership regret its agression. For a long time, the Strategic Air Command was still pretending that its nuclear arsenal would be directed at Soviet industry and arsenals, thus to cripple the Red Army's advance on Paris. Millions of Soviet citizens would have been killed under either rubric, of course, so that the real purpose of deterrence was accomplished. 18 Yet the rubric had to pretend that deterrence was almost a byproduct, as the U.S. Air Force would fight by the rules of 1938.

If one were indeed to limit himself to official U.S. governmental

pronouncements, an observer might contend that there has almost never been an explicit admission that the intended purpose of U.S. nuclear targetting policy would be pure retaliatory spite, i.e. to kill civilians. While this objective has been explicated over and over again in the non-governmental strategic literature analyzing the balance of terror, the closest that any governmental pronouncement has come to this appears in the "Posture Statements" of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1966 and 1967, and in his testimony on the decisions about the ABM anti-missile defense. 19 Here we find specific tabular breakdowns of the casualties to be expected in the Soviet Union as the United States responds to a Soviet first-strike, casualties which purportedly would remain quite extensive if the USSR had equipped itself with a missile defense system.

Yet Secretary McNamara was an unusually explicit man in the Defense Office, not always the best judge of what the American public would respond to, often inclined to lean toward logically-clear abstractions rather than politically tuned propaganda. No great public notice was taken of the blatancy of the counter-civilian line propounded here, in part because the U.S. was not so much cross-examining the assumptions of the deterrent balance in these years right after the successful outcome of the Cuban missile crisis, in part because critical attention was instead being drawn more and more toward the developing "conventional war" in Vietnam, about whose bombing campaigns more will be said later.

It is nonetheless of some significance that McNamara's successors in office were not to feel as free to endorse the explicit countervalue theme of targetting strategy. It must also be noted that McNamara himself had already had a fling of proposing an explicit pure counterforce strategy (in which great care would presumably be taken to avoid doing damage to

Soviet civilian targets, in hopes that all American civilian targets would be spared), in the celebrated Ann Arbor speech of June, 1962.20

McNamara was thus indeed an abstract enough man to spell out the two pure alternatives, an explicit counterforce strategy, and an explicit countervalue strategy. Why then did he not pursue the (his earlier) counterforce "no cities" option, perhaps to avoid succumbing to (his later) reliance on countervalue "massive retaliation"? Accounts vary of the Secretary of Defense's reasoning here. Some suggest that he quickly enough came to fear that espousal of a pure counterforce option would enfranchise the military to demand ever-increasing budgets for the procurement of new strategic weapons systems; others suggest that he simply concluded that such a "limited strategic nuclear war" could never long be kept limited anyway.

Precision in the A-bombing and H-bombing of Soviet military targets (while Soviet cities presumably were being spared) might always have been an enormously demanding task. The mere radioactive fallout from all these explosions might already have imposed substantial casualties on the urban areas of both sides, not to mention the danger of "near-misses." followed by misinterpretations of intention and retaliation, etc. The American fascination with this may indeed have been spawned or enhanced by the attachment shown "precision-bombardment" options just a decade or two earlier during the bombings of World War II. Americans, perhaps more than other people, are prone to warm quickly to the idea of carefully-aimed weapons, "surgical strikes," bombs hitting soldiers while missing civilians. It appeals to our technological competitiveness, it appeals to our humane morality. It may of course be a delusion, but if the delusion is likely to recur, we must consider how to live with it.

The temptations of this apparent technological opportunity will thus fade in some decades, and return in others. Radioactive fallout has perhaps served to disabuse many commentators of the notion that a nuclear war fought out with bombers and missiles can be rigorously limited. Yet, in other decades, the opportunities of "clean bombs" and "smart bombs" may renew the interest here.

At the level of simple morality, moreover, it is hardly clear that Americans in general have become reconciled to the morality of threatening to kill great numbers of civilians. This author has now numerous times opened lectures on the subject by asking how many students were "opposed to deterrence"; in any class of forty students, perhaps five hands would go up. The next question would then be posed as follows: "How many students are opposed to a system in which the United States punishes particularly obnoxious behavior of the Soviet Politburo by killing as many Russians as possible, Russians who indeed disapproved of the conventional or nuclear offensives the Politburo had launched, Russians who indeed would most probably never even vote for the incumbents of the Politburo, if they were ever given a free-election opportunity to vote for Social Democrats as an alternative." Here the response usually converges on thirty-eight students out of forty.

There is an obvious cognitive dissonance problem here in that the second statement is more or less a description of "deterrence." What this exchange presumably shows is that most students do not think deeply about deterrence, being ready to assume that it is a good thing "as long as it works," i.e. as long as wars never happen and retaliations never have to be launched. The responses, once the nature of the retaliation is spelled out, however show how the deep-seated opposition to a counter-civilian strategy remains with us.

Several scholars in the field of arms control have brought such moral issues out into the open in the last decade. Fred C. Ikle, who shortly thereafter entered the government to become Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, published an article in Foreign Affairs in January of 1973, entitled "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?". In it, the author basically siggests that counter-population retaliation is a societally-imperfect basis for preserving peace into the twenty-first century, perhaps because there will be a major moral revulsion against such mutual-deterrence strategies once some sort of moment of truth emerges on the question.

Donald Brennan, a long-time supporter of the development of A3M antimissile defenses for cities, has similarly argued that a peace based on the mutual vulnerability of civilian populations to strategic attack is counter to the traditions of western civilization. 22 Brennan somewhat facetiously put forward the title of "mutual assured destruction" for this policy, nicely producing the acronym MAD; it is interesting that even defenders of a reliance on counter-civilian threats have adopted the MAD label.

A third author, Bruce Russett, has similarly proposed a reopening of more humane counter-military targetting options, based in part on reexaminations of the bombing campaigns of World War II, arguing that a more carefully composed targetting strategy could indeed be militarily effective even while at the same time being more moral. 23

Such discussions of "alternatives to city-busting" might have seemed interestingly academic but for the rise of another academic, James Schlesinger, to the post of Secretary of Defense. At various stages of his tenure from 1973 to 1975, Schlesinger issued statements proposing a substantial shifting of nuclear-targetting options away from civilian targets and

toward the military. Why these suggestions came forward here, in a way a repeat of the Ann Arbor suggestions, is not yet entirely clear. 24

Perhaps they simply reflect the deep thought and deep moral feelings of Mr. Schlesinger himself, someone not as inclined as most college students to tolerate cognitive dissonance on "deterrence." Another part of the explanation must stem from new options for far greater accuracy on missiles, some of them coming under the acronym of PGM (Precision Guided Missiles), which might now technologically facilitate the careful choice of targets Americans have always looked forward to. Another part of Schlesinger's proposals related simply to fears that the Soviet Union was developing similar new "counterforce" options, so that the U. S. should undertake some matching projects, at least as "bargaining chips" for the negotiations of SALT talks. Schlesinger moreover numerous times expressed himself as worried about the credibility of American nuclear escalation in the event of a Soviet conventional armored assault on Western Europe; the hypothetical option of destroying selected military bases in the USSR (as always without damaging cities or people) would thus be attractive as a plausible U. S. response, plausible because it would not so inevitably have to mean Soviet responsive attacks on New York.

Critics of Schlesinger's proposals turned quickly of course to the central issue of any counterforce capability at the strategic forces level; the ability to hit the location of enemy forces precisely may make war much more likely, even while making it less costly. Extremely accurate missiles encourage preemptive attack in a crisis, for they reward whoever has struck first. When such accuracy in particular is combined with the installation of multiple-warheads (MIRV) on single missiles, the result might well be that whoever has shot off his missiles first will have far

more left over at the end of the exchange than whoever has waited. For purposes of discouraging accidental or preemptive wars, precisely the opposite is desirable.

We thus have come back to the central advantage of Mutual Assured Destruction. The war-plans involved are blatantly immoral, discouraging the aggressions of national leaders by threatening the lives of hundreds of millions of innocent people. Yet if such war-plans are matched with the proper equipment, they very much discourage the launching of war.

"Conventional Bombing" in "Limited War"

Perhaps moral restraints will thus be meaningless or counterproductive today for any World War III fought out with H-bombs carried by missiles. Yet the distinction between military and civilian targets can still be relevant to the fighting of "conventional" limited wars, and American moral restraints here were indeed reinforced once the USSR had acquired the atomic bomb. A restraint on all-out and explicit terror bombing might now be required to keep any future war limited, to keep the Russian Air Force from being drawn in as part of an escalation to World War III. The Germans and Japanese Air Forces had retained little capacity for retaliation in 1945, but massive retaliation after 1949 could be a two-way street.

American bombing campaigns in the Korean War were thus constrained by President Truman despite pleas from his Air Force leadership that air raids should be directed to imposing costs and hardship on the Communists, with a view to reducing their willingness to fight, along with their ability. When it seemed from time to time that the Communist side had ceased to be serious about negotiating a truce, a very limited dispensation was given the Air Force to conduct counter-value raids, as with

the attack on the Suiho power plants in June of 1952, which incidentally supplied electrical power to Manchuria as well as to North Korea, or the raids on irrigation dams at Toksan and Chasan in May of 1953. Yet even such raids had always to be labellable within the rubric of attacks on military targets:

Whenever possible, attacks will be sheduled against targets of military significance so situated that their destruction will have a deleterious effect upon the morale of the civilian population actively engaged in the logistic support of the enemy forces. 26

Much of the same reasoning explains the very constrained and gradual and measured introduction of bombing raids over North Vietnam. American moral aversions to needless civilian destruction played a role, especially as anti-Communist as those in the South. Fear of public outcry in the United States or in foreign countries also played a role. But a most important consideration was that neither Communist China nor the USSR be drawn into active participation in the war, with all the risks of further escalation this would entail. It may well be that bombings mild enough to avoid such escalation would never be severe enough to force Hanoi to terminate its infiltration of the South. 27

American goals in the bombing of North Vietnam from 1965 to 1968 were often stated in terms of three objectives, for example in Secretary McNamara's testimony to the Stennis Committee on August 1967:

Our primary objective was to reduce the flow and/or to increase the cost of the continued infiltration of men and supplies from North to South Vietnam.

It was also anticipated that these air operations would raise the morale of the South Vietnamese people who, at the time the bombing started, were under severe military pressure.

Finally, we hoped to make clear to the North Vietnamese

leadership that so long as they continued their aggression against the South they would have to pay a price in the North.28

In reality, these objectives may collapse into the first and the third; unless one attaches enormous significance to any South Vietnamese morale derived from simple sadism or revenge, such morale logically would stem from the expectation that Hanoi's ability to infiltrate, or will to infiltrate, were being impaired by the air attacks.

The counter-capability theme over North Vietnam was thus typically phrased in terms of interdiction, of interfering with the movement of supplies to the south. While this was at first intended simply to mask the more brutal intention of the offensive, after a time it became a chance to inhibit advocates of more severe bombings within the American decision process. As Secretary McNamara indeed lost confidence in the counter-value aspects of the bombings, he found it very helpful that the interdiction euphemism had been employed all along; much of his lobbying in 1967 for a bombing halt north of the 20th parallel could thus be couched simply in terms of taking seriously the public statements of American policy, i.e. that the air strikes were intended to be counter-capability. 29

One should not pooh-pooh interdiction totally, for it surely somewhat hampered the movement of supplies south, even if the military returns per ton of bombs delivered could never approach the results
achieved in World War II. Since North Vietnam had so little industry, an
interdiction approach made more sense than any serious pursuit of industry
as a target. Yet a real commitment to "interdiction" as the goal would
probably have shifted the bombing further south long before Lyndon Johnson's decision not to seek reelection in 1963. The bombing campaign had

in truth been begun as a counter-value campaign, if necessarily disguised behind counter-capability "interdiction" euphemisms. When Nixon sent the bombers into the Hanoi and Haiphong areas again in 1972, it was with the same intention.

It was of course possible that a continuous bombing even at the original limited level would sooner or later have convinced North Vietnam that it should give up its goals in the south. But this goes to the logic of the contest of endurance that the entire Vietnam War has posed for both sides. If it is "American" to bomb, it also has become "American" to tolerate very explicit protest against such bombings at home. Almost from the outset, it became apparent that the Johnson Administration would have a limited tolerance for the war at home, and there was no way for Hanoi to miss this.

The bombings per se were costly for the U. S. in airplanes shot down and pilots killed or captured, as well as in resources expended to keep that air force flying. The bombings furthermore came to be attached symbolically to the level of American ground force commitment within South Vietnam; each small escalation of air activity by the U. S. had come as advance warning of an additional ground force deployment; a halt in the bombing conversely was to be seen as a hopeful sign that peace might be negotiated and the ground forces brought home. If there had been no ground force presence, the American public might have been more patiently tolerant of a protracted air assault on North Vietnam, with such patience perhaps forcing Hanoi to reassess its priorities. As it was, Hanoi had reasons for hope unavailable to the Japanese in 1945, hope that demonstrations on the campuses and city streets of the United States would keep the bombings from continuing indefinitely.

Richard Nixon was able to resume the bombing of North Vietnam in April of 1972, and again in December, and to conduct it in a considerably more brutal manner than Lyndon Johnson had. The American public may thus have tolerated this precisely because Nixon had withdrawn enough of the American ground forces from South Vietnam so that bombing now really could seem a substitute for ground commitment, rather than a sign that the ground commitment was going to increase. Nixon could renew the bombings also because he had significantly bettered U. S. relations with Communist China and the Soviet Union, in part exploiting the differences between the two Communist powers; this at least served to reassure him that a World War III would not result from the minings of Haiphong, or the B-52 bombings within previously exempted North Vietnamese cities.

The last round of U. S. air attacks on North Vietnam again had the major purpose of being painful. To avoid a total affront to the moral feelings of Americans or others, however, some pretense as always had to be made that pain was less the goal than a military incapacitation of North Vietnam. And as a result, the air attacks were still indeed less deadly and brutal than if no such obfuscation was needed. Bombs had to fall on dwellings as an unavoidable consequence of warehouses and arsenals; on dikes as a byproduct of attacks on anti-aircraft guns. Surely this has been pretense, but just as surely it has reduced the civilian casualties per ton of bombs from what they would have been if the U. S. were not constrained to make the pretense. Given that Hanoi and Haiphong are densely populated, the North Vietnamese regime's casualty figures of 1318 deaths 30 suggest that the last American B-52 bombing raids could indeed have been more wanton; in a similar bit of pretense over Japan in 1945, entire residential areas were burned to the ground allegedly as

ancillary to the destruction of small machine shops located within them, but this produced 100,000 deaths in a single night in Tokyo.

Perhaps the low casualty figures instead testify to the civil defense preparations of the Hanoi regime, without which the B-52 attacks would have appeared much more "indiscriminate." It is also possible, of course, that Hanoi has been concealing and understating the bomb casualties, to avoid suggesting a crack in its determination; if so, Hanoi and Washington are parties to a curious defacto conspiracy for concealing the U.S. Air Force's brutality.

The final set of B-52 bombings of Hanoi was launched and terminated almost too quickly for American opinion to be fairly sampled. We are very familiar in polling with the phenomenon that people often oppose a policy until the government adopts it, then back it while it remains policy, then heave a sigh of relief that the policy has been terminated, after the government again drops it. Such may thus explain some of the disapproval of the last round of bombing expressed in a poll of January 1973.

Yet the responses to various suggested statements about the bombing still tend to support a number of the themes we have been stressing here. A great majority of Americans found it important to accept their government's assurances that "places where people live in Hanoi" were not being deliberately bombed. At the same time, many were persuaded that "inhuman and immoral" damage was being inflicted.

Guerrilla War and Aerial Bombardments: The Analogies of Assessing Impact

There are indeed many analogies that could be drawn between the methods of guerrilla warfare and the methods of countervalue aerial bombardment. Each technique works entirely to disrupt normal functions and to destroy, without for the moment trying to "hold a line," a line behind

Did you approve or disapprove of the heavy bombing of North Vietnam by U.S. planes which took place at the end of this past year?

	7
Approve	37
Disapprove	51
Not sure	12

Let me read you some statements people have made about the Vietnam situation. For each, tell me if you tend to agree or disagree.

Pro-Bombing	Agree	Disagree	Not Sure
What we did in bombing Hanoi was no worse than what the Communists have done in the Vietnam war	71%	16%	137
President Nixon is experienced in dealing with the Communists and knew the bombings would bring North Vietnam back to negotiating.	53	30	17
The only language Hanoi will listen to is force, such as bombing their cities.	48	33	19
President Nixon was not taking a big risk in bombing Hanoi, because he knew Russia and China would stay out of it.	46	31	23
Anti-Bombing			
We lost many American lives and big B-52s unnecessarily in the recent bombing raids.	55	30	15
It was inhuman and immoral for the U.S. to have bombed Hanoi's civilian centers the way we did.	46	37	17
The bombings were wrong, because we lost the support and respect of allies and friends around the world.	36	_ 49	15
I believe the claims that we deliberately bombed hospitals and places where people live in Hanoi, besides military targets.	17	67	16

(The Harris Survey, January 1973. Copyright 1973, Chicago Tribune. National adult sample of 1,472.)

which one would maintain normal functions of one's own. A bomb placed on railroad tracks in South Vietnam by a Viet Cong agent serves almost identical purposes to a bomb placed on railroad tracks in North Vietnam by an airplane of the U. S. Air Force.

Each technique places a great deal of lip services, and a small amount of effort, behind its "counterforce" aspect, i.e., dynamiting troop trains. But each achieves a great deal of its purpose by more "countervalue" techniques, i.e., making life unplasant for the enemy, rather than disabling his military capability. Each then seeks in effect to "torture, not kill."

It is indeed interesting that the very first instances of aerial bombardment by Zeppelins over England produced demands that captured German aircrews be tried as "franc tirreurs," i.e., as having fought as guerrillas rather than soldiers, as having waged disruption rather than contesting possession of territory. As each side was to embark on more such bombing campaigns, such demands were speedily enough dropped.

The similarities between the two forms of warfare then extend to the analyses of impact. Just as in the case of air attacks, one can speculate about whether IRA bombings in London do not merely steel the British public and government to be even more resistant to concessions in Northern Ireland. Perhaps they enhance resolve, but perhaps they eat away at it. Just as in the case of air attack, it would be foolish for a British Prime Minister to admit the fading of resolve any earlier than he has to, for to be candid would only serve to encourage and accelerate the IRA's offensive. Some guerrilla campaigns succeed, and some fail. The same must probably be the fair-minded conclusion on air attacks.

There is one aspect, however, on which supporters of guerrilla war would be most vehement in rejecting parallels to aerial bombing campaigns.

Maoist and other theorists of guerrilla war often contend that success at such tactics proves the support of the masses of the people, the people who feed and shelter and hide the guerrillas between raids. In effect, they portray guerrilla war as a sort of plebiscite, a direct means of implementing political democracy. Critics of such theories would contend that a majority of mass support is quite often not a prerequisite to guerrilla success, that a fraction of supporters as small as 10 percent might suffice. Who for example believes that the IRA speaks for the majority in Northern Ireland, given that Protestants number more than half the total of the population?

The comparison nonetheless makes air war look a little less legitimate, for no popular support at all is required for such attackes to be conducted. When U. S. air attacks against North Vietnam were thus launched as explicit reprisals for the Hanoi-supported guerrilla operations in South Vietnam, at least a few outside viewers were to be troubled by the apparent asymmetry. The Viet Cong had at least proved something by operating successfully in the south (reasonable men might differ about what). By contrast, the precedent of U. S. air attacks might be extended anywhere, to Bulgaria after an insurrection in Greece, etc., etc.

Does aerial bombardment thus never serve the purposes of the country using it? Would that it were so, for then air raids might rarely if ever happen. Liberals like to have their goods and bads going together. If one disapproves of bombing per se on moral grounds, it would also be gratifying to discover that enemy capabilities are never thusly crippled, that an enemy's will to fight is never impaired.

It is dangerous to contend that capabilities have never been crippled.

The bombings of the two Axis countries in World War II did hamper weapons

production, and did reduce the enemy's ability to fight the war.

It is much easier to criticize any projection from Germany or Japan to North Vietnam as an industrial target. There simply has not been that much of fragile industry or fragile supplies in Vietnam to attack; even when the bomb tonnages dropped on the North became some multiple of what was dropped on Germany, far less "crippling" of Hanoi's military capability could have been produced. Much of the necessary manufactured goods for the North Vietnamese Army was at all times being produced in China or the USSR, which of course remained exempt from bombing.

Yet all'of this may not be as relevant as critics of the war have continually assumed, for the American bombings of North Vietnam should be charged with the same duplicity as the 1945 raids against Japan, officially explained as stressing counter-capability, while actually often being conducted largely as counter-value. If this betrays a great deal of deceit, it should nonetheless prove less stupidity in U. S. policy decisions than if one took the statements of American planners at face value.

McNamara's critics may thus have been taken in by his propaganda, propaganda phrased to satisfy the American morality of 1926 and 1938 on bombing. But do we know that McNamara and his associates were not themselves taken in by such propaganda, leading them to take interdiction and specific military targetting seriously, rather than merely using it as a cover for brutality? Perhaps Americans through the history of air war have been destined all along to overrate the precision of technology, as well as the possibility of wartime morality. When the JCS proposed more painful air raids, the civilian leadership in the Pentagon and White House proposed interdiction, rather than no air raids at all. Was this merely a necessary tactical ploy within the U. S. decision process, or

does it illustrate some fixation with the bomber that all Americans may share? 32

Yet if the most honest intention of the bombing was normally to impose hardship on Hanoi, and thus to deter any further support for the insurgency in the south, this is still where the bulk of any evaluation and criticism of American decisions and American syndromes would have to be directed. And here the critics may have less than an airtight case.

Is it really so, historically, that noone can ever be bombed into surrender, i.e., into terminating military operations even when its forces are capable of fighting on? The Japanese surrender in World War II (far more of a surrender than Hanoi has ever been asked to make) was indeed most probably produced by air attack, very possibly already by the conventional B-29 attacks on Japanese cities, or if not, more certainly by the final atomic bomb attacks. There is similarly reason to believe that the Italian Army's coup against Mussolini and subsequent switching of sides in World War II was prodded by fear of Allied air attacks on Italian cities. Hitler himself would never have surrendered to spare German cities from bombardment, but he would have made many more minor concessions in exchange for a bombing halt. The army officers who tried to kill Hitler, moreover, would most certainly have offered an armistice and withdrawal in trade for an end to the air raids.

Being bombed is decidedly unpleasant, and even the most ruthless dictators must have some sympathy for the populations that must undergo this; even dictators prefer buildings to rubble. Perhaps such leaders have had little reason to fear that the population will rebel. The secret police of Hamburg or Haiphong surely could keep such rebellion under control by timely arrests of potential ringleaders or the most vocal

grumblers; no wonder then that the experience of being bombed only "stiffened the resistance" of such city-dwellers. Yet the political leader in question must at least reckon with the unhappiness of his military officers, or of the remainder of the political elite, as with the Italian Army coup or the July 20th bomb plot against Hitler. If any part of the Communist Party leadership in Hanoi has had a particular aversion to being bombed, Pham Van Dong cannot ignore this totally.

materials and analysis on the issue of whether bombing had ever achieved any political effect in the past, with a view to whether it could be expected to have achieved such effect in Vietnam. 33 May's empirical conclusion was quite interesting, that bombing could not be expected to weaken the resolve of an incumbent in office (and indeed might steel such resolve), but that bombing could sometimes embolden others to drive the incumbent from office, and thus bring in a new team which genuinely feared further bombing and was ready to make concessions to avoid them.

Even if May's rule proved to be quite powerful here, it would not of course have ruled out some success for the United States air campaigns against Hanoi; our knowledge of the leadership succession patterns in North Vietnam, or indeed in many of the Communist countries, is hardly so perfect that we could rule the chances of a palace coup. May's distinction between incumbents and non-incumbents may stretch political reality a little too much, moreover, for many political coups consist of some of the leadership conspiring to cust the rest. Italy's response to bombing thus consisted of the ouster of Mussolini, engineered however in important part by some who already held a great deal of power. Japan's response to being bombed in 1944 was to oust Tojo, but few would deny that some very powerful

elements of the incumbent establishment remained just as powerful after the Tojo ouster.

Even incumbents, therefore, would sometimes seem to be weakened in their resolve by the prospect of seeing their cities destroyed and their people hurt. If they are clever, and most incumbents only get to be incumbents by being politically clever, they will hide the weakening of their resolve as long as they can. But it may not be concealable indefinitely.

A large fraction of the American public was certainly not unaware of this kind of logic as the bombing campaigns against North Vietnam were running their course. A set of poll questions from February 1968 (when American enthusiasm for the war was indeed in marked decline) shows fairly clearly that many Americans saw themselves to be in a contest of resolve with the North Vietnamese, and that the disutility imposed on Hanoi by the bombings was thought related to achieving a more favorable outcome in that contest of resolve: 34

Interviewing Date 2/1-6/68 Survey 757-1

Question #16

Index #33

Some people say that a halt in bombing will improve our chances in Vietnam for meaningful peace talks. Others say that our chances are better if the bombing is continued. With which group are you more inclined to agree?

Interviewing Date 2/1-6/68 Survey 757-1

Question #17

Index #33

How do you think the war in Vietnam will end—in an all out victory for the United States and the South Vietnamese, in a compromise peace settlement, or in a defeat for the United States and the South Vietnamese?

 Victory
 ...
 20%

 Compromise
 ...
 61

 Defeat
 ...
 5

 No Opinion
 ...
 14

On Establishing the "Lesson of Vietnam"

Is it thus really true that Hanoi's willingness to fight on went up day by day as the F-4 and B-52 raids continued, or was unaffected by such raids? If North Vietnamese spokesmen claim so, could such claims be taken at anything like face value? One thing is certain; if the Hanoi leadership has contemplated giving up its southern goals in 1968 or 1972 to escape bombing in the north, it would have been very foolish to let hints of this leak out until it had made its decision to surrender. The strategic psychology of a bombing campaign is very parallel to that of a labor dispute. If the employer is thinking of capitulating to labor's demands to end a strike, he might still want to wait a week or two to see if the union doesn't give up first; during that time, it would be very foolhardy for the employer even to hint that he is thinking of giving in.

In retrospect, we know that the 1965-68 bombings amounted to a limited and constrained venture in bombing for the sake of pain-infliction, a venture that failed in these terms. By contrast, the 1972-73 bombings were significantly less constrained, and very possibly had some tangible impact on the Hanoi regime's intentions. The 1945 bombings of Japan were hardly constrained at all, and were quite effective in persuading the Japanese leadership to surrender. The bombings of North Korea in 1952 were a more limited venture in terror bombing, whose impact is hard to evaluate. In the Korean War, and in the first round of Vietnam bombings, the U. S. Air Froce and Joint Chiefs of Staff indeed had advocated a more extensive bombing campaign to impose greater hardships on the Communist leadership; these recommendations were rejected, because of the threats of escalation, not because bombing "merely stiffens a people's resistance."

Those who doubt that Hanoi was in any way intimidated by the bombings will, of course, persist in their indictment that American bombing had been foolish in all respects, in terms of real motives as well as pretended. This leads us into what may be a prolonged debate as to who gave up the most in the 1973 Vietnam truce. Did Hanoi make significant concessions in October of 1972, as compared to its demands in 1969 or 1971? Did Hanoi confirm such concessions in January of 1973, after the next round of bombings of the north, when it might have been trying to back out of the October concessions? If the truce in the end indeed reflects any such major surrenders of position by the Communist leadership, an aversion to being bombed is all too probably a part of the explanation. There is no iron law in history that populations and governments always stiffen their resistance as their residences and public buildings are being reduced to rubble. Again, would that it were so.

South Vietnam fell to the forces commanded from Hanoi in spring of 1975. At the end, the offensive involved a substantial use of tanks and artillery, producing campaigns much more reminiscent of the Korean War in 1950 than the prolonged guerrilla campaigns of the Vietnamese War.

Would such an open campaign have been launched if the U. S. Administration had not been specifically forbidden, by Congressional Act, from reintroducing any form of American military force into the battle, including the B-52s which had bombed the north? Would such a ban have been imposed if Congress had not been emboldened by the domestic crisis evolving after the opening of the Watergate Case?

This author suspects that the answer should be negative on both counts. Some part of the resistance to future U. S. air operations against North Vietnam stemmed from the widely-stated assumptions that these operations

could not have any meaningful effect; yet the fact remains that Hanoi never dared commit itself to so open a southern assault until the risk of the air raids had been removed. Some other Americans may have had fewer doubts about the effectiveness of the air threat for maintaining the stalemate, but had developed a major ambivalence or moral concern about whether the stalemate in South Vietnam (in which great numbers of people were still losing their lives each week) was something that should be maintained. However few welcomed the Communist victory in the South, many more welcomed the end of the fighting.

Yet the upshot might well be that the threat of B-52 attack had at least been effective enough to maintain the fighting, in the sense of deterring Hanoi's move to total victory. The threat of conventional air attack had not sufficed to force a Communist surrender, but it for the moment worked to preclude a Communist victory. Bombing may not have "failed," in the terms of the goals of those who had ordered the bombing.

Aerial Bombardment: The Broader Question Of American Interventionism

Is the United States therefore to be judged excessively technology-bound, and in which way? A fixation with technology could encourage brutality at a distance, via bombloads dropped from B-52s, in lieu of the bayonet charge of the infantryman. But a parallel fixation might lead or mislead Americans into imagining that they are waging careful and clean bombardment campaigns, counting on the Norden bomb-sight in 1942 and sophisticated radar guidance or "smart bombs" in 1972, to impose military damage while limiting civilian damage. Perhaps the American instinct either way is to make "full use" of whatever technology is at

hand, the B-17 or the B-52, with inhumane consequences possibly alternating with the more humane.

Yet we have made a <u>prima facie</u> case here that aerial bombardment sometimes produces the political results governments desire; it may even have done so in Vietnam. If one disapproved of Johnson's or Nixon's judgement on the legitimacy of various factions in Vietnam, this would not by itself indict the air campaigns they launched as mindless technological tinkering. Other states have tried to harness the same tools, the Egyptians in Yemen, the Israelis over Arab territories in the Middle East. The American example may indeed have been infectious, for the first American bombings of North Vietnam were very quickly followed by Turkish Air Force raids on Greek positions in Cyprus, and then by the continuing series of Israeli air attacks on Arab positions. Yet these raids, along with the British plans and ventures of the years from 1913 to 1945, suggest that reliance on bomber aircraft is hardly just distinctively American.

To wage or evaluate a bombing campaign in this day and age with a view only to military impact is foolish, for the possibility surely exists that an enemy leadership can be dissuaded from fighting, even before it loses its ability to fight. Who has ever possessed an air force capable of such morale—bombing or terror-bombing without exploiting at least some of this capability? If two or more air forces possess such a capability, a mutual deterrence may be established by which wars can be kept limited, by which civilian destruction can be held down. The world's morality disapproves of terror-bombing, moreover, such that most states will have to pretend that their intention was to bomb military capability, rather than to be brutal. But as noted, American morality has disapproved of such bombing even more than the average for the world as a whole, and U. S. policy has been affected by this.

To change the question ever so slightly, now, what role has the aerial bombardment option played in shaping the extent of American military commitments and foreign policy in general? Can it be that expectations of positive impact in air warfare have produced exaggerated expectations more generally about the utility of military force, about how much American power and influence can be projected into other countries and other continents?

The American discussion of airpower options in the 1930s clearly shows an awareness of the issues here. In a certain way, the bomber seemed clearly to be an offensive weapon, a weapon which would have most of its utility when extended into someone else's airspace, poised over someone else's cities or military bases. We thus see a memorandum for the Army Chief of Staff in 1936 clearly condemning plans for procurement of a long-range bomber, precisely because it would be a weapon of intervention or aggression at a time when the foreign policy of the United States still called for isolation and self-limitation in foreign policy goals.

The subject airplane is distinctly an airplane of aggression. It can bomb points in Europe and South America and return without refueling. It has no place in the armament of a nation which has a National Policy of good will and Military Policy of protection, not aggression. 35

American foreign policy was, of course, to shift its emphasis soon enough, as the menace of Hitler was to make isolation look impossible or dangerous. As a quite logical corollary to all of this, the extension of military-power suggested by the aerial bomber thus ceased to be a liability or an embarrassment, rather becoming an asset for making the power potential of the United States tangible on the continent of Europe. We thus find President Roosevelt suddenly expressing considerable enthusiasm

about such weapons, in decisions which were to prove altogether gratifying to the advocates of an expanded air force.

To the surprise, I think, of practically everyone in the room except Harry Hopkins and myself, and to my own delight, the President came straight out for air power. Air planes—now—and lots of them! At that time, the War Department was handling the entire expansion for the ground and air forces, but F.D.R. was not satisfied with their submitted report. A new regiment of field artillery, or new barracks at an Army post in Wyoming, or new machine tools in an ordnance arsenal, he said sharply, would not scare Hitler one blankety—blank—blank bit! What he wanted was airplanes!36

Some might see analogies between the American "interventionism" that drew us into war with Hitler and the "interventionism" that drew the country into the Vietnam War. Others, of course, would indignantly deny any parallel between the two. So far as discussions of aerial strategy are concerned, the 1930s are also not lacking for discussions of airpower potential for suppressing insurrections in more economically underdeveloped areas, i.e., in moves intended to preserve European Empires against the "national liberation movements" of the time. The Royal Air Force, quite consistent with its well-developed belief in the "knockout punch" power of aerial bombardment in general, developed and practiced a theory of "air control" as a means to suppressing insurpections in Iraq and British Somaliland, 37 a technique then borrowed by the Royal South African Air Force against rebels in Southwest Africa. "Air control" came very close to being explicitly a countervalue or countercivilian technique, calling for the aerial bombardment of the villages from which the rebels had come, whether or not the natives in rebellion were known to be back in the village at the time.

In the British view, such techniques would deter rebellion. They would, moreover, deter rebellion more cheaply and effectively than if a

ground army had to march and fight its way to the village to apply the retaliatory punishment more directly. Air power could thus maintain and extend more of an empire than armies could, establishing police authority and law and order where it had not appeared before. The technique, of course, was closely comparable to the shellings of coastal cities of "gunboat diplomacy," but could be extended inland. All of this, of course, reminds one of the sea-and-airpower mix so fondly relished by Americans as the means to maintaining a position in Asia.

Sometimes the theories of impact propounded here have not been based on any straightforward rational motivation, i.e., "they will not want to attack anymore because we have made the price too high." Rather it has been based on a meta-psychological theory that the vision of aerial attack will be so awesome as to be directly incapacitating, a blow in an exchange of machismo, where the more backward side lacking an air force simply loses its nerve. Such were occasionally the expectations of the RAF in its colonial operations. Such have sometimes been the expectations expressed by Israelis in explaining their air attacks on refugee camps in Jordan or Lebanon. The simple prospect of hostile overflight, inflicting "sonic booms" on Beirut or Damascus, could have an effect by this calculus, even when no material damage at all is being inflicted.

In the 1930s, the United States also experimented with the use of airpower in counterinsurgency situations, as the Marine Corps allegedly perfected dive-bombing techniques while chasing after Sandino in Nicaragua. Yet the American emphasis on "accuracy" again comes to light here, as accuracy is precisely what dive-bombing was to become touted for. Presumably one was scoring direct hits on concentrations of Sandino's mounted guerrillas, rather than bombing Nicaraguan villages.

There is, then, a link between the American faith in airpower and enthusiasm for overseas commitments. We have already mentioned the unsettled question of whether the American public might not have tolerated a forward deployment limited to airpower continuously into the future, but for the decline in President Nixon's domestic political position.

If the Guam Doctrine had any concrete meaning at all, it was simply that U. S. air and naval power would combine with the Asian ground forces of regimes friendly to the U. S., to repulse or deter an adversary's attacks.

Vietnam is presumably not the only theater in which the threat of American air raids had been used to discourage Communist attacks. The protection of South Korea ever since 1950 has seemed to depend on a blend of American commitments, in part the threat of American ground forces fighting another conventional war, but augmented by the prospect of major conventional aerial bombardments of targets around North Korea and augmented also by a latent threat of escalation to the use of "tactical" nuclear weapons.

One generalization seems safe. If Americans lose their faith in airpower, they therefore lose a substantial portion of their commitment to protecting such outlying areas. Vietnam is lost, but what of Korea and Thailand and Iran and Yugoslavia? Some would welcome the termination of lingering American military commitments for these areas, also, while others would not. After the experience of Vietnam, however, relatively few Americans would want to base such commitments primarily on ground force commitments; any statement that "bombing doesn't work" more typically amounts to a shorthand for "America shouldn't get involved there."

Pin-Point Accuracy: Déjà Vu

It is thus somewhat paradoxical that the very end of the Vietnam War may have launched some new enthusiasm in the American military establishment for more precise (and therefore once again more promisingly effective) air warfare techniques. The final bombardments of Hanoi and Haiphong brought into use the various "smart bomb" devices which a handful of Air Force officers had been developing throughout the previous decade, despite the opposition or disinterest of their superiors.

Now normally designated Remote-Piloted Vehicle (RPV), the slow development of such devices is now cited as a classic case-instance of the parochial venality of the professional military. The Air Force is commanded by pilots, who continue to have pilots' career interests at heart, who therefore deliberately or otherwise held back such weapons which might ultimately have threatened to put human pilots out of business. Even the RPV title would seem to be a euphemism, minted by the backers of such devices to try to reduce such opposition; in candor, the new weapons might better be labelled unpiloted vehicles.

Having wasted enormous numbers of dollars and lives in trying to hit specific North Vietnamese targets by more traditional methods, the United States thus belatedly applied the "smart bomb" techniques with incredibly fine results. The promise is thus that one could repeat the air offensives of the 1960s in the future with lower costs and greater results. Since the polls show that the losses of bomber aircraft and air crews rank high among the American public's objections to bombing, this would thus provide administrations with an important antidote to such concerns.

But the "smart bombs" of course go beyond fears for aircrew safety, because their promise of "pinpoint accuracy" reopens all the discussions of morality and opportunity we have been tracing above. As in the final bombings of Hanoi, but now even more so, one can tell one's self, and one's critics, that a superbly counterforce bombing campaign is being waged. Specific bridges or factories are being hit, while hospitals and residential areas are being spared. If implemented seriously, of course, this would mean that the "bonus destruction" of such bombings would indeed be reduced. Perhaps an enemy's war economy and war capability could at last truly be crippled, while punishment of civilians was, at the same time, indeed avoided.

Yet the same pinpoint accuracies would open other avenues again also. The increased accuracy of such guidance systems could enable one to apply suffering in very measured doses indeed, destroying a particular cultural monument or a particular electric power plant feeding a residential area, without hitting the residences themselves. Aerial bombardment, like guerrilla war and some other contests of politics, can be a means of "torturing, not killing," of trying to apply enough disutility to dissuade and deter, while not applying so much that additional escalation or outside-world condemnation would occur. Accuracy may thus be put to varying uses in the future, just as the promised bombing accuracy of the past has been put to varying uses.

There is also again a risk that expectations of increased accuracy will affect nuclear and conventional warfare systems alike, perhaps causing strategic analysis to deemphasize the distinction between them.

The improved versions of the remote-piloted vehicle (RPV) may after a time come to resemble the improved versions of the cruise-missile now being

sought as an augmentation to the strategic nuclear deterrent force. The phrase PGM (precision-guided missiles) is indeed already being applied to improvements in the guidance system and terminal accuracy of weapons all across the spectrum. When this is combined with renewed speculation about new nuclear warheads with extremely small explosive yields, and/or with very small amounts of radioactive fallout, the risk becomes greater that we may lose an important arms control distinction.

As noted, such extremes of accuracy could be clearly destabilizing if developed for the strategic nuclear weapons themselves. A failure to maintain the line between conventional and nuclear tactical weapons would, moreover, erase a most valuable firebreak of limited war, a firebreak which has been respected ever since Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Happily, the odds are that the stragic nuclear forces will never come to seem preemptively vulnerable, if only because the fraction that is deployed on board submarines on both sides will not be preemptable, no matter how accurate missiles become. Happily, also, it remains likely that nuclear weapons will be put to "tactical use" in any repetitions of the Vietnam War. Yet the B-52s may indeed come into use again with conventional explosives, perhaps this time with all the greater accuracies described above.

One central argument of this paper is thus all too aptly illustrated by the very familiarity of the discussion that will emerge again about such super-accurate weapons, the PGMs. Once again, advocates of the use of such weapons will try to avert moral condemnations by claiming that no immoral damage is being done, no non-military targets are being bombed. Once again the critics of bombardment will see this as confirmation of their own view that there could never be a justification for bombing such

non-military targets. Once again, the bombers that "intended to" avoid hitting hurtful targets may rejoice in the "inadvertant" "bonus" of having done some such damage anyway, not because they are sadistic, but because they know there is a non-trivial possibility that imposing such pain will dissuade opponents, even when the opponents capabilities cannot be crimped.

Once again the debate will not call a spade a spade. Once again the debate will consist of euphemisms and misleading evaluations purporting to take such euphemisms as serious statements of administrative purpose. This may all, of course, only be the irreducible flow of static in the communications system, but it remains static nonetheless.

Notes

- 1. Fuller discussions of the issues of pre-1945 air strategy are to be found in Bernard Brodie, <u>Strategy in the Missile Age</u> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959) and George H. Quester, <u>Deterrence</u> Before Hiroshima (New York: John Wiley, 1966).
- 2. United States Army, Air Service Tactical School, <u>Bombardment</u> (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1926).
- 3. Text in Wesley Crayen and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948) Volume I, pp. 51-52.
- 4. Gallup Polls of April 2 to 7, 1938, cited in George Gallup (ed.) The Gallup Poll (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 97.
- 5. Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany (London: H.M.S.O., 1961) I., P. 734.
- 6. A full statement of the author's views here can be found in George H. Quester, <u>Deterrence Before Hiroshima</u> (New York: John Wiley, 1966), pp. 105-122.
 - 7. Craven and Cate, op.cit., Volume III, pp. 638, 725-727.
- 8. Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Operations (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 477-493.
- 9. For some interesting analysis here, see Paul Kecskemeti, Strategic Surrender (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958).
- 10. See Robert Osgood, <u>Limited War</u> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).
- 11. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Over-all Report (European War) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 38.
 - 12. Ibid., pp. 97-98.
- 13. For interesting analysis of the incomplete German economic mobilization, see Burton H. Klein, <u>Germany's Economic Preparation for War</u> (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959).
- 14. See Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," <u>Public Opinion Quarterly</u> 12 (Summer 1948), p. 290.
 - 15. Craven and Cate, op.cit., Volume V, pp. 609-611.
 - 16. Ibid., p. 611.
- 17. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (Pacific War) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 16.

- 18. This author's extended views on the development of U.S. massive retaliation doctrine can be found in George H. Quester, <u>Nuclear Diplomacy</u> (New York: Dunellen, 1970).
- 19. For a prime example, Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara Before a Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations, January 23, 1967, pp. 52-53.
- 20. The text of the McNamara Ann Arbor address can be found in U.S.A.C.D.A., <u>Documents on Disarmament: 1962</u> (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), Volume I, pp. 622-628.
- 21. Fred C. Ikle, "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century," Foreign Affairs (January 1973), Volume 51, Number 2, pp. 267-285.
- 22. See, for example, Donald G. Brennan, "The Case for Missile Defense," Foreign Affairs (April 1969), pp. 443-448.
- 23. Bruce M. Russett, "Assured Destruction of What?" Public Policy (Spring 1974), Volume 22, pp. 121-138.
- 24. For a fine overview of the ins and outs of nuclear targetting strategy here, see Desmond Ball, <u>Deja Vu: The Return to Counterforce in the Nixon Administration</u> (Los Angeles, California: California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, 1974).
- 25. R. F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961), pp. 439-52, 626-627.
 - 26. Ibid., p. 481.
- 27. For a presentation of such a conclusion, see the summary analysis of <u>The Pentagon Papers (Senator Gravel Edition)</u> (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972) Volume IV, pp. 18-21.
 - 28. Text cited in Ibid., p. 200.
 - 29. Ibid., pp. 133-138.
 - 30. The New York Times, January 5, 1973, p. 1.
- 31. Lou Harris Survey of January 1973, presented in <u>Current Opinion</u> (March 1973), Volume I, Issue 3, p. 27.
- 32. For an extended discussion of the Vietnam bombings and the American reasoning behind it, see the report of the Cornell Air War Study: Raphael Littauer and Norman Uphoff (eds.) The Air War in Indochina (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972).
- 33. See Ernest R. May, "Lessons" of the Past (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 125-142.

- 34. Gallup Polls of February 1-6, 1968, cited in Gallup, op.cit., p. 2106.
- 35. Text in Robert W. Krauskopf, "The Army and the Strategic Bomber: 1930-39," Military Affairs (Summer 1958), Volume 22, p. 85
- 36. H. H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper and Bros., 1949), p. 177.
- 37. Hilary St.G. Saunders, Per Ardua (London: Oxford University Press, 1944), pp. 287-294.

THE DYNAMICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Over time, psychological warfare has gone through astounding developments. From the earliest days of warfare, it has always played its role in all aspects of war: strategy, preparations for war, and actual war fighting. The reason is that to all aspects of war there is a psychological component, obviously: and just as fear, lack of confidence, lack of belief in one's cause or in one's leadership are serious military liabilities, the opposite, such as courage and confidence and a healthy belief in the righteousness of one's military effort — and of course low morale in the enemy camp — are worth their weight in tanks and planes.

Strangely enough, as technology and the art of war in general has advanced, psychological warfare has become even more important, until today it has really become the center piece of international conflict. Most people, hawks and doves alike, say nowadays that if the nuclear weapons are ever launched "the war is already lost", partly because they think victory cannot be attained, partly because they think that even if it could be attained, the cost would be too high. In other words, for the first time in history the weapons are expected to do their job, whatever that job is, simply by existing without being actually used, i.e. exclusively by their psychological effect. Of course, to some extent that was sometimes the case in the past as well; "saber rattling" was meant to make actual fighting unnecessary. But as subsequent events showed, psywar in past eras generally did not substitute for real war.

But nowadays, almost every military deployment or procurement is Hairly meant to have psychological effect even though — or perhaps because — the weapons are only real. When people speak of strategies in our day, they really speak of certain military constructs that are meant to convince the enemy before he starts that the game is unwinnable or too costly, so that he refrains from fighting altogether. Thus, psywar now occupies center

stage. This is quite different from all the situations of the past where it was understood that military action in itself would come into play. Until very recently the principal function of psychological warfare was always seen as merely enhancing military action, to tip the balance, to speed up a trend to induce a surrender, to paralyze through fright or disappointment or lack of faith — but not to substitute for violence altogether.

Indefinability

Psywar is very broad and multi-faceted, so much so, in fact, that despite the most valiant efforts by practititioners and theoreticians alike it has never been satisfactorily defined. This is of course very upsetting for social or any other scientists who feel that they must and can define anything. But psywar operates and is operated in a million ways, between wars and during wars. Psywar can be a specific and clearly delineated psywar move, such as the writing and launching of a leaflet against enemy troops, and it can be a military or political move accompanying some strategy. It can be something one does or something one says, or something one does not do or does not say. It can be the truth, as in white propaganda, or at least what the psywarrior considers to be the truth, or it can be a lie, as in black propaganda. It is always propaganda, at least in part. In the broadest sense, it is communication, verbal or non-verbal; it can be and often is an act of defiance or compliance, or a series or acts adding up to a certain psywar-determined behavior. It can be aimed at enemy leaders or enemy soldiers, or at allies or neutrals. It can be an action on the homefront that has repercussions abroad. It is just about everything and everywhere, which is why it cannot be successfully forced into the corset of any definition.

Psywar is not only multi-faceted but multi-tiered. For example, if we take such a simple, direct, obvious act as writing a leaflet and dropping it on an enemy force, we commit an act far more complicated than if we unleash a

a hail of bullets. For the leaflet must have a content, it must say something, address certain people, contain threats or promises, and so on. The leaflet will, even if the message is simple or appears to be, be the product of many things such as psywar intelligence, our appraisal of what the target audience is susceptible to, past experiences with such leaflets, and so on. The leaflet will of course always be an appeal to action or non-action, a persuader or dissuader of sorts. Most importantly, it will contain several messages, some of them perhaps unknown even to the sender. This is a very important point, and often overlooked by psywarriors.

If the psywarrior who generally considers himself as powerful as Zeus and as benevolent as St. Francis throws a verbal thrust at somebody, he often thinks that the recipient will only respond to the content of the message. But experience in war and peace shows that the recipient asks first and perhaps foremost: Who is talking? The question therefore is not merely whether the psywarrior speaks the mot juste, but whether he has one of half a dozen different forms of credibility. If he has not, the words don't matter and — the message will not get through.

What is it that psywar is really trying to do? Generally, its aims are clearer and simpler than its methods. The aim always is the same: to obtain an advantage over hostile forces of one kind or another at little cost and in short order. The dream of the psywarrior is always to blow down the walls of Jericho with his trumpet, to confront some ferocious and determined enemy and, by saying the right word, see him drop his weapons and exclaim: You said it, brother! But how to get there? How to, as the psywarrior often puts it, depress or destroy the enemy's morale?

One way of describing what psywar is trying to do is to say that it wants to make an impression, convey an image of one's own camp, and also create an impression and project an image of the camp of those whom it addresses. Reduced to the most elementary terms, the object is to say convincingly: I'm righteous, and I'll win: you're evil and you'll lose.

Moreover, if you lose and I win, it's good for both of us. In other words, it is an effort by one nation or group to make a favorable impression on others. This is extremely difficult because the total impression one conveys, as a nation, or an individual, always consists of so much more than what one says or displays at any given moment. Past performance and a million other things play a role, and many of the things are outside our control.

The Psywar Arsenal

There are several ways in which psywar efforts can be channeled. The basic arsenal of the psywarrior, of course, are threats and promises -two types of communication which from time immemorial have been used by some people to influence the actions of other people. But in order to have their effect, the threats and the promises have to be credible in several ways. Whether they are credible will again depend on many things. One of these will be whether the promises or threats are, in themselves, "true," that is: can they be carried out? If I offer a million dollars to someone in return for some action of his, much will depend on whether he believes that I can really pay a million dollars. Obviously, if I can make him belerive this without it being so, that might be enough: but on the whole it will be far easier to make him believe it if I am in reality a very rich man. Thus, one can make one basic statement at least: the truth to the extent that it exists, is easier to project than the lie, especially in the long run. One can say that psywar, to be effective, generally must have at least some truth on its side. This in turn shows that psywar has limitations and can always only be an adjunct, a supporting weapon, an amplifying device. It is particularly in this respect that psywarriors often err, thinking that psywar can operate independently of the general situation and attain unlimited effects if it is clever enough.

But whether our communication to some hostile force is credible will depend on many more things than merely on whether the communication is wholly or partially true or not. It will depend, for example, on the state

of mind, the views, the indoctrination (as we call it) of those we wish to influence. And any hostile power will at all times bend every effort to keep itself collectively immune in mind and soul against psychological inroads that would be debilitating. In a way, what every power tries to do, is to keep itself truth-proof when things are wrong or go wrong. Both antagonists generate public opinions inside their domains among high and low soldiers and civilians, that make it difficult for any outside message, no matter how plausible or righteous, to get through.

Thus, as to all other warfare, there is a defensive and an offensive side to psywar. The difference is that physical warfare, be it offensive or defensive, is targeted exclusively on the enemy, whereas comprehensive psywar is targeted both on the enemy, seeking to reduce him, and on one's own camp, seeking to uphold its fighting ardor and to make it impervious to hostile appeals. Generally, the domestic defensive aspect is not really looked upon as part of psywar, but it is part of it nevertheless, and is becoming more so. We will say more about that later.

The ultimate aim of any leadership is that its own masses of soldiers, civilians or both, be true believers to the largest possible extent in the largest possible numbers. Just as it depends not only on the force of a projectile but also on the thickness of the armor whether a hit gets through, the effects of psywar depend just as much on the other side's weaknesses and susceptibilities as on its own strength of one's own appeals.

Psychological Enemy

These weaknesses are generally referred to as *vulnerabilities*, and the psywarrior, particularly the psywarring intelligence person, does all he can to ferret out these vulnerabilities so that the psywar operators can exploit them. Potentially these vulnerabilities are endless. They can consist of doubts, grievances, fears — but they can also consist of hopes that are unrealistic, loyalties based on premises that can be proven wrong and

so on. Such vulnerabilities can be both ideas and things, which are inter-connected. If it is a fact that my antagonist lacks fuel, but this is not known to his people or soldiers, the emotion of fear or doubt can be generated in his camp, if this fact can be convincingly projected.

Supporting Actor

This shows again that psywar is an intensifier rather than initiator—that is one of the basic rules of psywar that is often overlooked and that points to both its strengths and limitations. If you tell a fearless fellow out of the blue that you will punch him in the nose, he is not likely to turn quickly into a spineless coward? Everything is against that: the reality situation, his conditioning, his value system. But if you similarly threaten someone who is already not too sure of himself and perhaps afraid of a fight, you might intensify his feelings to the point of his taking the action, or desisting from the action, you want him to take or desist from. If you offer a bribe to an entirely upright politician — you understand I'm engaging here in a purely theoretical exercise — you have less chance of having him accept it and doing your bidding than if your antagonist is already on the slippery slope of graft and corruption.

Thus, the supporting, intensifying role of psywar is central. Unfortunately, the fact that psywar depends to such a great degree on recognizing its own limitations in this respect is often disregarded, especially when things go wrong, as in Vietnam. For several years, I had occasion to study the intellectual and spiritual make-up of enemy soldiers in Vietnam and I can say without doubt that the psywar we directed at these people was of the most exquisite stupidity. It was all based on misconception and wishful thinking and, of course, in that respect it was like the conduct of the entire war itself.

Psywar, we said, is best when it tries the modest step of intensifying what is, rather than creating something new. If it tries to turn the believer

into a doubter and the doubter into a disbeliever, it will have a better chance of succeeding than if it tries to turn the believer into a disbeliever in one sitting. But even in trying to intensify — or, if there is such a word — detensify feelings and convictions gradually, psywar must know exactly what it is dealing with, and often it does not.

For psywar purposes at least, believers can be roughly divided into two groups: those who believe in eventual victory on military grounds, and those who believe in the righteousness of their cause. Often, these two run parallel, in that the person who thinks his cause is just will also think his cause will prevail. But that is not always the case, particularly among more sophisticated people.

The two types of conviction — that one is stronger and that one's cause is more just — are often found on both sides in a war, and they, of course are the overall targets of psywar. Both may yield to contrary claims or evidence. The enemy's faith in his own strength or even invincibility can be gradually eroded by tangible shows of strength if one's own is superior, if it in fact exists. When the Allies landed in Normandy in World War II, this was not just a military-strategic blow to the Reich but also a display of Allied strength and German weakness that had an eroding effect on German assessments of their strength. And psywar could and did do a great deal to exploit this, i.e. to intensify the psychological effects of the landings.

The other psywar prong of which I spoke, the attack on the belief in the righteousness of the cause, requires a different approach on the part of psywar. It is an infinitely complicated matter and defies the establishment of theoretical rules; it needs to be judged from case to case. But experience shows that the assault on ideological structures is not psywar's strong suit. Psywarriors are often addicted to preaching the righteousness of their cause and the unrighteousness of the cause of their opponents, but they generally do so without any noticeable effect. No amount of psywar ever seems to have shaken the belief of real Nazis that Hitler was a good man and that his cause and theirs was just: in fact they still think so.

But most Nazis, even if they continued to adore their Fuehrer, gradually began to disbelieve in final victory, and there psywar -- which on the whole was excellent and ingenious in World War II -- managed to intensify, to accelerate, to consolidate such corroding doubts and other emotions.

It should be mentioned that even if psywar succeeds in shaking the belief of a number of people in the righteousness of their cause, it may only have won a Phyrric victory, because most people then still seem to prefer victory of their side over defeat. It seems to be a fact of life that most people would rather be unrighteous and victorious than righteous and defeated. This is a very important psywar consideration.

This leads us to one of the central points in the dynamics of psywar, and to one of the clearest psywar laws that emerge. People on the whole seem more susceptible to psywar efforts in the non-ideological than in the ideological realm. If the situation warrants it, it is easy, and to persuade people that they will lose than that their cause is not just, and even if psywar can convince them that their cause is not just the payoff may be minimal, as they still do not want to be defeated. But this does not mean that the psywarrior can go overboard in the material sphere, take a contemptuous view of his opponent and simply offer him a few material things in return for surrender. We will see later how such an approach failed in Korea and Vietnam.

Psywar, which operates explicitly or implicitly with the carrot and the stick — and preferably with both simultaneously — must always consider very carefully and dispassionately what carrot and what stick is likely to have what effect under the given circumstances. In order to be well guided, it must above all have a certain respect for its opponents. To be "hard-nosed" and assume that any enemy soldier will gladly throw away his weapon for a handful of minor material handouts is just foolish. It is equally foolish, when fighting against what we call totalitarian forces, to assume blithely that every person in such a force feels oppressed and exploited and yearns—to share with us The Blessings of Liberty. Particularly in

Vietnam we altogether misjudged the enemy by assuming that the so-called fighters in the VC and NVA were all unwilling pawns smarting under the iron rule of ruthless and fanatical cadres. We based our appeals on this complete misconception of reality. To know something about how the other side really functioned in Vietnam, and to see how our pwn psywarriors' believed it functioned, made one wonder who was hopelessly "indoctrinated" and who wasn't. Sool (Sy Was Lufelli paux in Caracial to fool 19 parts.

Big Mistakes

Basically, this is no more than common sense, but it is surprising when we study past psywar to see how fantastically wrong our psywarriors have often gone when determining what, in their view, was a suitable carrot. During the Korean War, my old friend and fellow psywarrior from World War II days, C. D. Jackson, by then President Eisenhower's adviser on psywar, came up with the absolutely asinine idea of offering Korean MIG pilots 100,000 dollars for defecting and landing their planes behind our lines. Jackson was a very flamboyant man and certainly an excellent propagandist for his ideas, and his ploy, regarded by many as a stroke of genius, received much play in the press. Our airfields were readied for the mass arrival of Korean MIGS (I am exaggerating a bit here). But none arrived. I should say: Of course none arrived.

The reason, was, naturally, that even though 100,000 dollars seems like a pretty fat carrot, it really is not a very attractive one under the circumstances. We all, I take it, would like to get a quick 100,000 dollars. But would we, in return for it, go into permanent exile to a very foreign country, earn the contempt of our friends and fellows, and live with our 100,000 dollars in a strange, uncongenial land? Moreover, the 100,000 dollar offer clearly was no binding contract, it was just a promise on the radio, and how would we know that we would really get the 100,000 dollars or be permitted to keep them? In fact, how would we know that immediately upon arrival we would not be imprisoned, humiliated and perhaps even executed for having dropped bombs before? Thus the offer would not be

very attractive to us. Why should it be to them? What Jackson failed to do, and what so many psywarriors fail to do, was to put himself into the shoes of the recipients of his message; he operated from an entirely egocentric vantage point.

One should add that, besides, pilots tend to be an elite corps in every nation and therefore doubly hard to crack, particularly with simple material temptations. We all know that a few Czech and Polish air force pilots have come over since the Soviets turned their countries into satellites — but significantly without the promise of material inducement or reward. In their cases it was strictly an ideological matter, but not one induced by our psywar.

In this connection let me speak about a particular piece of psywar that occurred during World War II and aroused enormous attention. It was Franklin Roosevelt's "Unconditional Surrender" formula for Germany. I don't think I have ever seen Mr. Roosevelt praised for this declaratory and actual policy. A thousand voices have condemned him for it, and entire books have been written about it, all on the negative side. Both our professional and our amateur psywarriors -- and who does not count among the latter? -- have insisted that the Unconditional Surrender formula prolonged the war by uniting the Germans and stiffening their resistance; that this piece of psywar, instead of dividing the enemy, united them. This is complete nonsense. The Unconditional Surrender formula, which served many purposes at home and abroad and was directed at allies, enemies and also the domestic scene, simultaneously had a powerful negative effect on the Germans. It showed them, for the first time, that America really meant it, and that America had the self-confidence to smash the Hitler state. It showed them for the first time that their continuing wish dream and misconception, to the effect that American would in the end still try to balance Germany off against the Soviet Union, was not valid. It convinced many of them, who had marvelled at the ways in which Hitler had, again and again, been able to produce appeasement in the West, from Chamberlain on down, that the game now really

was up. They knew that they did not have a chance against the combined might of the Soviet Union and the United States if both powers brought their strength to bear on them, and they realized, finally and years too late, that this power was really poised to crush them. Most importantly perhaps, they realized that a continuation of war fighting, merely in order to be able to negotiate a peace from a position of at least relative strength, was now a waste of effort and blood and time. Before the Unconditional Surrender formula many Nazis who no longer believed in total victory at that time, had still fought on with all their strength in order to get better peace terms. The Unconditional Surrender formula showed them that they might just as well quit, indeed were better off giving in, as there would be no negotiating at all, not from strength or otherwise. Naturally, they could not and did not give up right away. But the Unconditional Surrender formula stands, in my opinion, as one of the great psywar coups of all time, for the effect it had on the enemy and everywhere else in the world. It was tremendously discouraging and tremendously divisive for the Germans, and forced them to think in terms other than Hitler suggested to them. It really drove a wedge between the Germans and Hitler.

Importance of the Context.

Perhaps the greatest constraint on psychological warfare is that it always deals with relative rather than absolute things, which is easily forgotten. It clearly emerges from all psywar intelligence, collected during and after the last three wars, that the recipient of any message weighs the direct or implied promises or threats in terms of the price tags, whereas the psywarrior who makes these promises or threats tends to weigh them in absolute terms. The psywarrior tends to say: I'll give you a Rolls Royce. But the recipient of the message tends to think: maybe he even means it, but what is the price tag? The psywarrior makes a threat, but again the recipient tends to ask: what is the cost to me if I yield to the threat? The psywarrior rarely understands that the force of an appeal or a

threat is relative, not absolute. This promise of a five dollar bill may induce my waiter to bring my dinner faster, but it may not make a mother abandon her children. Therefore, if psywar does not understand the entire context within which the recipient of the message lives, it cannot succeed. A good example of psywar disregard for reality contexts was a leaflet, of which millions were used in Vietnam, asking the soldiers "to stop this fratricidal war." In the first place soldiers cannot stop wars even if they wanted to. In the second place, the war was no more fratricidal for them than for the other side. Thus, whereas it is indeed undesirable to end a fratricidal war, most people will feel that as long as it is being waged anyway it is better to win than to lose it.

There is, in other words, no limit to the stupidity and ineptness with which psywar can be waged. This is a very serious matter, because certain self-correctives which generally operate in other forms of warfare, are absent in psywar. Good feed-back is often missing. An inept commander of troops or an incompetent pilot will come to grief only too quickly and visibly. But a psywarrior can go on forever without coming face to face with his failures or incorrect assumptions and conclusions. It is therefore very important to professionalize psywar, to think through theories and doctrines, to train people and improve the state of the art. True, much has been done to formalize and institutionalize psywar since the days of World War II when all was improvisation. But psywar's record in Vietnam was so dismal that surely much more needs to be done.

In fact, if psywar were more developed and sophisticated, it could in and by itself fulfill some crucial function other than psywar. This may sound cryptic; so let me explain. In Vietnam any truly sophisticated psywar intelligence efforts could actually have led to the inescapable conclusion that there were no vulnerabilities for effective psywar which, translated into the big picture, would have meant, that there were no vulnerabilities for effective war, period. For just as we have said that effective psywarfare appears possible only in conjunction with effective

general warfare, we might turn this around and say where there is no opening for good psywarfare, there is no opening for good warfare at all. And so it was indeed in Vietnam.

Contemporary Psywar

But I think the time has come for me to talk a bit more about the psywar of the present. In our days we live thronically either in a cold war or in a detente or in something in between. We are living in chronic antagonism with the Soviets in particular, but also with the Chinese; with all those whom we regard as allies; and finally, in a way, with our own allies, too. As in the 19th century, a gigantic game is being played on earth, a gigantic power game. It is largely played with trade, money, goods, politics, weapons, postures and also still with ideologies, even though our friend Daniel Bell has said that ideology is dead. Although we continuously suppress the thought, there is the possibility, indeed the probability, that one or the other "side" will eventually emerge as the winner, perhaps in a war, but presumably in some other way, perhaps with little wars on the peripheries, perhaps not.

In all this our big weapons—and theirs—play a strange and unprecedented role, in that they are much more powerful but also much less usable than earlier weapons. What this really means, as said before, is that psychological warfare has attained a role of unprecedented importance, certainly in times of peace. If we look closely, psychological warfare permeates everything in our day, indeed controls everything, one might also say is everything. It plays a new and dominant role. With the advent of the nuclear weapons and the so-called balance of terror, the entire concept of defense, central to all warfare of the past, has been replaced by the concept of deterrence, which is clearly and entirely a psychological concept. Weapons can win wars by killing and disabling, but when we talk about deterrence of terror or even such things as unacceptable damage we are simply in the realm of pure psywar. And every strategist is his own parlor psychologist. When a military or civilian

leader nowadays calls for more bombs or ships or whatever, he does not promise that these will do such and such damage, but that they will deter, compel, restrain, consolidate the balance of terror--all by their very existence, not by their use. How does he know? Again in the old days, wars were a mixture of threats and violence, but mainly violence. Now the contest takes place entirely in the area of threats, with no violence. Truly, we live in the heyday of psywar. But does our psywar make sense? Was the Soviet Union, an incorrigible aggressor in our view, really effectively deterred over the years? Or was the Soviet Union merely driven into other channels of aggression? Will it remain deterred? Or is it, perish the thought, perhaps not even an aggressor as we picture an aggressor and would not have attacked even if terror had not been so evenly balanced? Are we now to live forever in a psywar stand-off, for that is what the current situation appears to be? And, if we want out, must we change our weapons or our psywar? Or both? It might be mentioned in this connection that the word posture--military posture, forces posture, defense posture -- which came in only with the nuclear age, is also a psywar term, as it connotes threats, or a readiness to act in certain ways. Posture is and is meant to have an effect without any action taking place. In other words, it is a psychological device.

Is there a way out of the psywar stand-off or perhaps even a possible psywar defeat? Our leaders apparently conduct their psywar without theory or design, trying all ploys simultaneously, thundering threats one minute, issuing statements of cooperation the next, committing themselves to world peace through strength, complaining about Angola, bargaining at SALT, and worrying all the while about yet another purely psychological event: credibility. Henry Kissinger insisted during the entire Vietnam war that, if we ever gave up, we would lose credibility in Moscow. How does he know? And what does it mean? Now that Vietnam is gone, is our credibility in Moscow really also gone? And if it is, are we done for? And if it is not, if we still have credibility in Moscow even though we

lost in Vietnam, was Kissinger then wrong all along in pushing the Vietnam war?

Is it permissible, as some suggest, to play psywar with food? Is it possible? Might it be counterproductive? To ask such questions is to elicit a flood of answers, but all are of dubious reasoning and have little authority. What is left nowadays of the concept of coercion, so dear in the fifties and early sixties to men like Tom Schelling and others who—surely without being psychologists—were dealing with terms and concepts that were entirely psychological?

This brings us back one last time to Vietnam. In Secretary MacNamara's and General Taylor's minds, the Vietnam situation was ideal for psywar on a grand scale. Hanoi had no air force whereas we had all the planes, including the B-52s. We had all the resources, the money, the technology; they had just a little bit of territory and a small army of small men ("a fifth-rate force," as one of our generals put it). Ergo, reasoned Messrs. MacNamara and Taylor, we never even had to use our power or only very briefly, as the other side must surely be intelligent enough to know that they will be destroyed if they don't give in. It was, in our current silly phrase, "as simple as that." According to all the theories of the fifties, you did not have to conquer; you could coerce or compel the opponent by showing your arsenal and your resolve to use it, and if the arsenal was impressive enough, and your resolve credible, the other fellow would give in. A simple psychological operation rather than a military one. Of course, when this proved a dismal mistake and failure in Vietnam, all the actual military weapons were used fiercely and for years, though once again mainly for psychological purposes: the armchair psychologists expected to break what they called the "morale" of the enemy and induce him to surrender, this time not so much by threats as by the infliction of actual pain--vet another psychological operation, based on yet another psychological concept.

I do not believe for a minute that all the so-called strategic concepts with which we operate in the world at present, such as resolve,

deterrence, coercion, compellance, balance of terror, unacceptable damage, and so on, have been thought through or provide any basis for intelligent military or political action. Everything, I said, is psywar nowadays, but that psywar is chaotic, improvised, contradictory, and therefore probably both dangerous and not very effective. In Vietnam our psywar failed on the microlevel as it failed on the macrolevel. In the world arena today, it seems to run pretty wild. It must somehow be tamed, understood, organized, and made more realistic and brought more in tune with the real situation, if we do not want to be ultimately defeated by our own mistaken concepts of what psywarfare is and can do.

Future of Psychological Warfare. Contemporary analysts assume that experts can see into the future, at least more so than non-experts; so, let us say a few words on the future of psywar as we see it.

Even though, in the current strategic situation in the world, psywar permeates everything and is a necessary or inevitable component in all manifestations of national rivalries and antagonisms even long before the threat of armed conflict appears on the horizon, the important thing is not to lose sight of the limitations that face the psywarrior. The psywarrior has plenty of room to maneuver and, if anything, that room is likely to expand in the coming decades; still, if he fails to maneuver within the room he has and surrenders to fantasies of omnipotence his efforts are likely to fail altogether.

At the present time, the big nations are particularly anxious to project two things: capabilities and resolve. Both offer opportunities to the psywarrior, but both are beset with problems. Even though capabilities are relatively easy to project, partly because each side knows such a lot already about what the other side can do, the problem remains that one does not want to give away military secrets either. To some extent one wants the enemy to know that one is very strong, but on the other hand one also wants to leave him somewhat in the dark as to how strong one really is. One wants to obtain advantages from being overestimated but also, in certain instances, from being underestimated.

One simply wants to project the image that one walks softly but carries a big stick, but if one were to make a new invention, for example, some technological breakthrough that would not be automatically public knowledge, would one want to advertise it in one's psywar program or not? This is a problem. But in all one wants to project great strength, of course, which is relatively easy. If one possesses it, it tends to project itself.

The projection of resolve is much more complicated, of course. It can take many different forms, and it can entail many different risks. As we said before, Secretary Kissinger kept insisting that a retreat from Vietnam would ruin our credibility in Moscow, which would lead to the conclusion, in a way, that the entire war in Vietnam, despite its terrible sacrifices and devastation was not "real" but only an element of psywar between the superpowers. One could also say, perhaps surprisingly, that seen from that angle, the war in Vietnam was a success, for it certainly demonstrated a great deal of resolve over a very long period of time, albeit resolve without bearing fruit locally. It showed, among other things, that the U.S. can be foolishly persistent and escalatory, which undoubtedly does something in how Moscow assesses us, even though we cannot know just what.

In any event, Moscow has some overall assessment of our resolve, just as it has an overall assessment of our strength, and we want to affect these assessments with our psywar. As stated, we want Moscow to believe in our resolve to bring to bear our capability if needed from our point of view. However, it is not likely that this is possible beyond a certain limited extent. As long as there exist, more or less, mutual assured destruction capabilities, it just is not likely that we would go all out, unless they were to go all out, which they are not likely to do for the same reasons we are not likely to do it. Presumably what we really want to project with our psywar is that we are resolved to take relatively high risks. This really gets us back to the brinkmanship of John Foster Dulles, whose publicly announced brinkmanship may or may not also have been merely a psywar ploy on his part.

In any event, the psywar that the U.S. and the Soviet Union are at current waging against each other is a sort of hall of mirrors, a psychological stand-off. In such a situation a so-called open society such as the United States is at a certain disadvantage. The reason for that is that a democracy has a more difficult time both with regard to psywar actions, such as the widely advertised procurement and deployment of weapons, and also with regard to psywar communications, such as aggressive declaratory policies. To everything we do in the psywar area, there is a domestic component. Psywar, more than ever, depends quite critically on what used to be called the "home front." The psywar expert may think that a stiff line is indicated at the very time when the "Cold War" is under attack at home, and he may want to use a conciliatory line just when the home front has tired of what it understands by detente. Thus, the psywarrior in order to proceed at all, and in order to maintain credibility with his opponent, needs public support.

One of the unfortunate and sinister aspects of psywar in a democracy is that in order to get this support, the psywarrior will try to propagandize his own population so as to insure himself of support. Whether or not he can count on public support for any of his lines, hard or soft, will depend on what the public thinks of the adversary, and this in turn will depend on what the government will tell the public. The public, according to legend, is expected to make up its own mind on the basis of all the facts presented to them by the free media. But even though this process still works to some extent, it seems to be diminishing as matters become increasingly complex, and everyone, almost, is dependent on his favorite oracle.

It follows from all this that psywar is not only becoming more important all the time, but also more dangerous for a democracy to practice. Yet it is not only here to stay, but it has become a permanent feature of government and foreign policies, to a far larger extent than ever before. Therefore, psywar is very much the people's business, just

as actual war is very much the people's business, and the people, through Congress, would do well to keep a sharp eye on their psywarriors' activities abroad and at home.

Discussion Draft

COMMUNICATIONS, COMMAND AND CONTROL: THE NERVES OF INTERVENTION

Davis B. Bobrow

The views expressed in this paper are the personal opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any organization with which he is affiliated.

COMUNICATIONS, COMMAND AND CONTROL:

THE NERVES OF INTERVENTION

Davis B. Bobrow

"Effective government of large areas depends to a very important extent on the efficiency of communication... The written record, signed, sealed and swiftly transmitted was essential to military power and the extension of government. The monarchies of Egypt and Persia, the Roman Empire and the city-states were essentially products of writing."

—— H. A. Innis

"Freedom of will, consequently, is the same as the ability to make decisions with a knowledge of the problem."

--- F. Engels²

"Communications channels are the central nervous system of any military organization."

--- Mollohan Report3

<u>Command</u> -- to direct with authority... be the master of... to issue an order or orders... a character, symbol, or item of information for instructing a computer to perform a specific task... Antonym: obey.

--- Random House College Dictionary

<u>Control</u> -- to exercise restraint or direction over... to test or verify... a device for regulating and guiding a machine.

--- Random House College Dictionary

INTRODUCTION

Discussions of the impact of new technologies on military matters tend to concentrate on weapons, e.g., precision guided munitions, and their ancillary hardware, e.g., radars. This emphasis is understandable to the extent that one is overwhelmingly concerned with set piece battle engagements under simple conditions and wishes to treat military systems as in effect unitary actors with an integrated and coherent

physiology. These concerns may arise from a more or less laudable set of starting points: intellectual tractibility; professional responsibility; political feasibility. The problem of course is that such emphases and assumptions operate to ignore increasingly prevalent realities about national security environments and people and institutions with national security responsibilities. And the ignored realities are especially crucial with regard to questions of military intervention and near-invention.

My concern in this paper lies with technologies which are not weapons in any customary sense but deal with information about others and about ourselves. The pertinent technologies are those of satellites, computers, and signal transmission including encryption. These technologies do play a critical role in deterrence of general nuclear war and, to the extent that deterrence of general war has relevance, in situations of local conflict as well. However, it is when we move away from the scenario of a small number of massive force exchanges by military commands which have massive nuclear destruction as their sole mission that information technologies become of immense and complex interest. The more sequences of strategic interaction which a policy problem poses and the more varied and distributed are the participants (friend, foe, neutral and internal to one's own institutions), the more one must come to grips with the issues of communications, command, and control and the component technologies.

To do otherwise is to ignore many of the consequences and limits of intervention. It is to endow policy-makers with knowledge which they may well not have and to gloss over manifest limitations on wise decision-making. And it is to assume that tables of organization and weapon inventories provide the necessary and sufficient state informa-

tion to predict how the military will work in practice. Lack of attention to communications, command and control by national security analysts in this country has resulted in chronic overestimation of the capacity of the U.S. to play military chess games and to a general lack of realism about the realities of intervention. It leads to plans and outcome estimates which assume that Weberian notions of bureaucracy characterizes how national security organizations and the military really work. It leads to the assessment of alternatives as if perfect information were present ala economic retionality models, or at least as if the imperfections of information were known.

While this paper will discuss some of the major technologies, it seeks primarily to provide a frame of reference for thinking about communications, command, and control with respect to military intervention and to illustrate the approach with examples to the extent that the public record allows. The issues and their implications are ones which fall centrally within the expertise of the social sciences. Unfortunately, few social scientists have gone beyond general cybernetic theorizing to specifically discuss the set of problems involved in what we shall henceforth call ${\rm C}^3$. One can only be impressed with the wisdom of many of the technologists and military professionals who have worked on ${\rm C}^3$ matters yet the problems surely deserve more attention from those who specialize in the behavior of people and large organizations. 6

General context for c3

c³ can best be thought of instrumentally as a collection of people, technologies, and procedures which function in a context. The context is both international and domestic. The instrumental purpose is to

facilitate achieving desired external states of affairs by improving the performance of the participants in one's own national context of intelligence, planning, policy selection, and implementation. The profile one has of the external and internal context of C³ and one's notions about the purposes for which military forces may be used drive appraisals of C³. Since the components of C³ all have substantial lead times --- training people, developing/procuring/deploying technology, and modifying procedures --- relevant notions of context and purpose must be anticipatory, i.e., embody some view of the future.

In this section, I will suggest one plausible set of views about the future and draw their implications for C^3 . These deal with the broad shape of the international environment, the nature of warfare and weapons technology, and national decision-making processes. The focus of this essay does not allow for a lengthy defense of these predictions. What is important for our purposes is less their acceptability than conveying the implications of general views on these matters for C^3 analyses. Treat this as an invitation to substitute other views and trace their C^3 implications.

We expect the U.S. to experience a further relative decline in military and economic power and to replace blanket obligational commitments to come to the military defense of others with specific assessments of the quid pro quo benefits and costs to this country. The U.S. military presence overseas will decrease further and cross-the-board notions of which nations are hostile or friendly will be replaced by perceptions of specific, selective and rapidly changing areas of cooperation and opposition. An increasing number of governments and movements will be able to impose substantial damage and casualties on the U.S.

should we engage in military intervention. Incidents treated as crises will occur in a wide variety of geographic areas and involve a very diverse range of issues and actors. In part because of their variety, crises will increasingly involve ad hoc coalitions on both sides rather than neat lineups established by formal alliances and treaties. The members of these coalitions will have different stakes in any given crisis and accordingly will not want to depend fully on anyone else for their C³. Crises will be salient issues with many possible ramifications and there accordingly will be a desire for centralized management at the national level.

The joint consequences of these developments bear centrally on the problem of military intervention. First, U.S. guarantees to use force in situations other than the direct defense of U.S. territory will have less credibility in the absence of specific, reinforcing military signals. Second, U.S. thresholds of value which must be crossed to warrant the use of any particular level of force or degree of military intervention will rise and thus there will be a demand for more intermediate options. Third, there will be an increased need to have bargaining capability and bargaining latitude following any particular military step and termination will be required as an always available option.

Fourth, the reliability of use of any particular foreign base or facility will become increasingly questionable.

For C³, we can draw some conclusions about desired properties and probable performance expectations. First, it will have to make credible to U.S. and foreign decision-makers the feasibility of selective military actions and pauses in the application of force. Second, it will have to be based on technology which is unilaterally controlled and

available for use at will. Third, it will have to provide the highest national officials with a wide-range of information about all of the parties involved in the crisis or potential intervention situation--- including ourselves --- and the ability to guide our behavior in detail. Thus it will have to enable unfiltered communication between the highest level officials and action elements of the military. Fourth, the capabilities will have to be global rather than area bound. Fifth, they will have to allow for flexible, quick netting given uncertainty about the actors, issues, and U.S. instrumentalities which may be involved.

Such integrative capacity is needed within U.S. forces, between U.S. forces and allies in a particular situation, and between central U.S. authorities and the leaders of all involved parties. It is important to emphasize that on the U.S. side, our highest officials will be best served by a C³ capability which links together elements of the U.S. government within and without of the military at home and abroad.

The properties which seem desirable are in no way alien to the common language use of communications, command and control as hopefully the quotations which begin this paper make clear. Realizing these prescriptions in practice is a more difficult matter under the conditions stated so far and those introduced later. Suffice it to say that these properties are essential to the genuine availability of the option to pursue effective coercive diplomacy.

As George and his colleagues have argued 7, effective coercive diplomacy requires centralized management of the use of intervention instruments and signals of intent. It calls for speedy and accurate communication up and down through institutional hierarchy and a high degree of compliance with central directives. Clear signalling, another

requirement for effective coercive diplomacy, implies signalling discipline and action discipline. Signalling discipline is necessary to reduce noise which obscures messages or leads to their misinterpretation. Action discipline is needed if signals are to be followed by sufficient pauses to enable considered response. And, of course, communication channels must be available. These requirements must be met to pursue the tactics of coercive diplomacy: appropriate demonstration; graduated escalation; and continuing diplomacy. The emphasis throughout is not on inflicting maximum damage but rather on communicating that others may either modify their policy or face costs well beyond the likely benefits they will accure from persisting in the confrontation. The judgment as to whether or not U.S. officials should have the option to pursue effectively or think that they can pursue effectively coercive diplomacy lies outside the scope of this paper. They have that option in practice only to the extent that U.S. c^3 permits.

Before we turn to some elements of future warfare and non-C³ military technology, two additional points should be introduced into the discussion. The effective pursuit of coercive diplomacy carries with it a massive intelligence burden in terms of knowledge and its distribution through communication to decision-makers. Three facets of intelligence information stand out in this regard: first, indications and warnings of approaching confrontations, the withdrawal of third parties from a continuing or impending conflict, and the exploitation by adversaries of pauses: 2) estimates of the probability that particular signals will be received, interpreted and responded to in particular ways including the value attached to incremental coercive actions by the U.S. and its associates and of delay or failure to respond to coercive actions by adversaries (all of which imply intelligence about their C³ systems); and third, estimates of adversary and third party perceptions of our C³ capabilities and the

extent to which we indeed have the knowledge and control which effective coercive diplomacy entails. Parenthetically, these intelligence requirements may themselves give rise to actions on our part whose consequences raise serious intervention issues. We can all recall potential international crises triggered by attacks on intelligence collectors, e.g., Liberty, Pueblo, EC-121.

Finally, the effective use of coercive diplomacy wipes out some well-entrenched functional and thus bureaucratic distinctions foremost being that between "strategic" and "tactical" resources. In the world we envision, situations with military intervention possibilities become matters of the highest importance to national decision makers and strategic ends are played out through tactical actions. A C³ system which reflects this fact has integrative possibilities which span levels of authority and bureaucratic territoriality as must the intelligence provision discussed earlier.

When we turn to the nature of future warfare and military technology as these bear on C³, several characteristics require our attention. These are: 1) the sheer volume of information; 2) the severe lack of time that can be afforded without incurring substantial opportunity costs; 3) the necessity for coordination between weapons systems, units of the same military arm and across arms and services, and cooperating national military establishments; 4) the geographic dispersion of relevant forces; 5) the feasibility of inflicting destruction with low collateral damage.

Those who manage and engage in military interventions, be they civilian or military, are increasingly liable to be exposed to massive doses of information. In part this reflects the increased use of

reconnaissance satellites, drones, and remotely piloted vehicles. Satellites are widely used for early warning, ocean surveillance, SALT I monitoring, and for close examination of crisis areas involving the collection of photographic and electronic intelligence. Observations may either be transmitted to receiving stations or dropped in a capsule for recovery and interpretation. The extent to which satellite coverage of particular areas will be available depends on a host of factors including the number of satellites available for specialized launches, their maneuverability, and the feasibility of providing targetting commands to them once in orbit. The quality of the coverage is at least in some cases dependent on the weather and obviously the weather is more or less good from a satellite reconnaissance point of view in different regions of the world. Important efforts are apparently underway to provide real-time reconnaissance in which observations are immediately transmitted to a data-relay satellite and thence to earth. Drones and remotely piloted vehicles provide a relatively economical and less constrained design alternative to manned aircraft. Used extensively for photographic reconnaissance activities in Southeast Asia, they are increasingly being developed for battlefield intelligence gathering, electronic intelligence, and electronic warfare countermeasures. Drones and RFVs have been and are being built with a variety of observation capabilities: photographic cameras, infra-red line scanning systems which can transmit observations to the ground in real-time, television equipment which can transmit pictures in realtime to airborne receiving stations, and radars. These platforms can also play a significant role as tactical communications relay systems. All of these applications as well as those of target designation

imply reliable communication to and from the drone or RPV. 11

Another source of the information explosion lies in sensor systems associated with the image of the automated battlefield. These augmentations to the human senses span a number of technologies. The sensor types include accustic, seismic, radio frequency, magnetic, chemical, radar, and infrared. Directly or through relays their observations are transmitted to a decision point which may be human, computer, or both to provide the information to focus the application of weapons. 12

From a C³ perspective, these innovations massively boost transmission volume requirements and the dependence of commanders on communications. With respect to command and control they pose massive problems of digestion, of discriminating pattern recognition. Reconnaissance and battlefield sensor observations only improve military performance when they can be interpreted accurately and meaningfully. Pattern recognition and interpretation become critical. To the extent that these tasks are delegated to computers, command and control quality depends critically on foresight about the diagnoses of patterns and on the reliability and survivability of the input data and the software. It also depends in extremely critical ways on the discriminating power of the sensors and the pattern recognition software lest one confuse adversaries with one's own and neutral forces or decoy with reality. To the extent that pattern recognition and interpretation are delegated to subordinates, command and control quality depends on their knowledge and acceptance of certain rules of interpretation and of engagement. These rules may not be stable throughout a military intervention. If they are changeable, still another communication burden must be satisfied.

Information volume per se need not stress command and control if

ample amounts of time for digestion are available. The striking feature of evolving military technology is that information multiplies and time for effective action based on it shrinks. The general nuclear attack problem which triggered advances in the principal C3 technologies well illustrates the set of considerations at work. Concerns with deterrence and fear of incurring a first-strike led to the proliferation of high technology intelligence collection means, transmission and analysis networks, and computer centers to provide strategic and tactical warning of such an eventuality. Yet at the same time advances in weapons technology reduced the period between the launch of any attack and its impact. Information expands while other phenomena work to constrain the time for wise use of it. This example can readily be applied to the conventional battlefield as well with acceleration in the speed, reach and rate of fire of major offensive and defensive systems and in the general rate of destruction in battle, e.g., the attrition rates in the Yom Kippur war. In effect C technologies are racing weapons technologies to provide the capacity for sound decision which the weapons technologies assume for their owner and work to take away from an adversary. These time-shrinking trends explain the technological emphasis on "real-time" information through almost instant communication. However, for C3 one must also consider the time for interpretation, decision, transmission of orders, and their implementation.

Faced with the prospect of little time for analysis, choice and implementation of decisions, one recourse is to pre-structure sequences of interpretation and action with heavy reliance on computers to apply the structure to incoming information and outgoing directives. Once

again the issues of foresight and reliable and coherent expression become crucial. Pre-structured sequences imply the ability to conceive of alternative situations which may arise and of preferred and feasible responses to those situations. The decision rules which underly these conceptions when they are in effect built into policy must be clearly conveyed to those who write the relevant software and ought to pervade their product. Experience with complex computer programming raises questions about the level of consistency required even if we grant sufficient foresight. 13 Another recourse in the face of time-poor and information rich decision problems is of course decentralization and delegation. Three problems with this solution need to be recognized. First, it assumes the realism of an assumption of stable decomposability, i.e., that relatively independent units or chunks of the problem can be identified well in advance and preserve their boundaries over time. 14 Second, it assumes that in situations where the stakes are high indeed in a political and collective welfare sense, high-level national leaders will look with favor on delegation. Third, even under the assumption of stable decomposability, decentralization still requires coordination and that in turn requires communication. Steps toward decentralization may moderate the time-bind for command and control which advanced military technology creates and even reduce the information overload problem at the pinnacle of a command hierarchy and the communications needed to and from that pinnacle. However, there is a somewhat offsetting requirement for numerous links among the decentralized command and control units.

The coordination issue also is becoming more complex and demanding

The technology and the doctrine associated with advanced weapons assume

that numerous other weapons systems are in coordination and communication. Doctrine envisions coordinated operations across service lines and, in military alliances, across national lines. Under the conditions of information and time we have discussed, these coordination assumptions are no better than the C³ to turn them into realities. The implications here are of course technological and institutional. Technological requirements are that the communication systems are accessible and in some sense transparent to each other. There are then issues of electronic design and of language and codes. They are unlikely to be dealt with adequately without authoritative guidance to achieve standardized communications technology among the parties intended to coordinate their actions.

Institutionally, coordination requires agreement on procedures and authority. Some of these agreements pertain to communications per se, e.g., message priorities and spectrum allocation. Others go to the central issues of autonomy and subordination across service and national lines. If these are unresolved in peace-time, it is wishful indeed to expect them to be resolved quickly in the teeth of a major crisis or active, intense war. And most importantly, accessibility to and transparency of one's C3 implies a substantial element of trust and confidence in cooperative intent. Indeed one can argue that the failure to meet these C3 requirements evidences distrust and somewhat shaky cooperative intentions. There is a tension between these issues and the very uncertainty of the international situations which will arise with the fluidity we expect in the identities of allies, neutrals, and foes in possible military intervention situations. One adaptation to these competing problems is to have multiple C3 systems some of which are widely accessible and transparent and others of which are unilateral and tightly held. That does involve expense and should it be a policy adopted widely, it injects a serious

element of uncertainty into estimating the extent to which any military party has entered a binding commitment to any other.

The geographic dispersion of military units relevant to most intervention situations compounds the coordination problem. We are far removed from the time when a commander sould literally overlook his forces from some "commanding height." If the removed high-level commander cannot directly observe what is going on, the situation is little better at lower levels. Indeed the crew may be the largest complement which knows what anyone else is doing from direct observation and even then have such knowledge only about fellow crew members. C3 and its component technologies become the basis then for monitoring conflict situations, for monitoring one's own forces, for selecting course of action, and for directing forces. It is difficult to overestimate the dependency all this implies. Dependency suggests two other criteria to bring to bear in thinking about C3: survivability and security. If effective military performance depends on C3, it is only prudent to be concerned with the extent to which it will be there. Accordingly, it is sensible to take into account the hazards of man and nature to which it may be vulnerable. 15 These include direct destruction, disruption through degradation by intentional human action (e.g., jamming, insertion of misinformation), poor performance due to unintentional human action(e.g., fatigue, distraction), and, finally, breakdowns due to weapons effects (e.g., electro-magnetic pulse) or natural phenomena (e.g., earthquakes) or mechanical failure. While expensive, redundancy is perhaps the best protection against these problems. Any attempt to judge whether or not C3 systems are redundant enough involves considering the problems of "end-to-end survivability" in the sense of technological or human bottleneck nodes in a communication and command network. And it is crucial to begin by discarding any premise that the most probable bottleneck nodes are the most technologically advanced parts of a c³ system.

Survivability deals with the availability of one's own C3; security deals with making it available to current or potential adversaries. The more one must transmit information to and directives from decisionmakers prior to military actions and the greater the extent to which they must engage in electronically mediated conversation among themselves, the more opportunities adversaries have ceteribus paribus to interpret information and command messages and to foil them actively or passively. Accordingly, there is some trade-off between massive relaying and information passing and coordination of guidance for command and control and effective military action against a technologically advanced adversary. If communications security through a host of countermeasures against penetration does not keep pace with dependence on communications it may well reduce military effectiveness. The tradeoff between information and coordinated action versus granting an adversary advance notice and even opportunity for preemptive action cannot be calculated usefully except in specific situations. In principle it is always present as the record of World War II and the Yom Kippur war demonstrate. Within the domain of C3 there is then an issue of maintaining or achieving some sort of symmetry between dependence on traffic via technology and the security of that traffic.

Another element of the military technology context with strong C³ implications involves weapons intended to inflict destruction with low

collateral damage, so-called practicion guided munitions (FCMs). The issue of what is in normative terms low collateral damage merits careful examination and it may well be that we are unduly jaced morally by our visions of and indeed use of saturation killers. Given our concern in this paper with Co we will set aside that set of important issues and turn instead to two others: how do the weapons "find" their target and how does one know what damage they have wrought. With all due respect to certificates of accuracy and confined CEP's, they do not render these questions moot. Instead answers to them are key intervening variables which, if mis-estimated, have serious implications for the consequences of military intervention and the limits on our ability to confine its scope and intensity. Target acquisition relayed to weapons systems and damage assessments after PGMs are used are C3 functions. Our confidence in their quality will depend in turn on the extent to which C3 systems seem sound with respect to the considerations discussed above. Finally, it is important to recognize that the intervenor often will not have a monopoly: of PGMs. The ability of small numbers of persons to operate some varieties of these weapons and their diffusion through the world raise a prospect of special vulnerability for our equipments and elements susceptible to being located and locked onto by PGMs. C3 facilities and equipments are often emitters of signals by their nature. It may well be that PGMs have among other major impacts increasing the feasibility of attacks which disrupt or "behead" C3 systems without imposing the massive general damage to military forces or civilian targets of value which tends almost automatically to trigger a massive (if somewhat blind) coercive response. If as an intervence we are particularly dependent on valuerable, fancy Co, the diffusion of MGMs may work to our net disadvantage

against a less dependent adversary.

The third major element of the general context for C3 is that of national decision processes with reference not only to high-level officials but also to the behavioral styles of the individuals and bureaus feeding, participating in, and supposedly responding to C3. Clearly a comprehensive treatment of such a broad subject is impossible here. Numerous thoughtful surveys and case studies of crisis management involving military intervention or near intervention are readily available. While all plausible instances of military intervention are not crises, I would argue that relatively probable instances of future U.S. military intervention are more analogous to crises than they are to prolonged conventional campaigns, general nuclear war, or rather quiescent and prolonged occupation and peace-keeping situations. Whices seem useful to note a number of fairly well-established properties of at least U.S. decision processes pertinent to military intervention in crises and their implications for the C3 our national security establishment will seek, for how that C3 will probably be used, and for the sorts of compensations for distortions in decision processes which one hopes C3 will facilitate.

No national security establishment is unitary or homogeneous in the considerations which it seeks to satisfy through C³. At the risks of engaging unduly in caricature we can identify different emphases which will enter into the C³ which an establishment seeks. Of course what actually is developed, procured, institutionalized and practiced will then depend on quite specific configurations of bureaucratic and political power and interest. It is reasonable to assume that specialists and specialized bureaus will seek the technology and procedures must conductive to their specialization and will seek to minimize compromises with other specialists.

Communicators will concentrate on massage transmission in terms of volume, speed, reliability, and signal-to-noise ratios. Operational commanders will concentrate on the ability to direct forces subordinate to them effectively with minimum outside interference. Intelligence specialists who supply information about relevant others will be primarily concerned with supplying it to their own superiors and protecting the sources of supply. High-level military officials will be primarily concerned with maintaining a clear grasp of the status of their own forces and achieving military success along sanctioned lines of command through the execution of well-staffed out and previously approved plans. Civilian officials responsible for defense matters will primarily be concerned with national. policy options and military compliance with established policy directions. Civilian officials principally involved in bargain og with adversaries and third parties will be primarily concerned with the signalling use of forces, with perceptions of intent and capability, and thus wish to be insured that control is absolute and detailed from their level. The highest level political officials will give C3 little attention except in periods of stress, but if asked will emphasize their need to know that strong actions are really necessary and to counsel with trusted advisers. their desire for many alternatives and as much time as possible, their need to be intimately involved in the details of ongoing intervention in a highly public way, and their insistence on hedges against intervention getting out of hand and going beyond what they had in mind.

One can obviously elaborate this list almost ad infinitum through more and more refined categories of specialists. However, three general points are already clear about the probable 03 posture these tendencies yield in the absence of extremely strong countervalling influence. First.

there is likely to be much more attention paid to vertical within hierarchy C3 than to C3 horizontally within or between hierarchies, or diagonally across hierarchies. Second, everyone tends to pay much more attention to asympts of C3 which are under their jurisdiction or involve support for their technology, information requirements, or command authority than to those aspects outside of their jurisdiction or which use their technology and information and exercise authority and restraint over them. This tendency would not matter if all the participants in C3 related to military intervention would pay equal attention to it and have equal resources of money and human capital to pursue their concerns. That sort of balanced situation simply does not prevail in complex national security establishments. The highest levels of decision probably pay the least ongoing attention and their inverests and needs are least likely to be well represented in the ongoing design of C3 other things being equal. With complex technology involved and a cultural set of preferences for technology, resources clearly favor those involved with the most technological rather than the most human intensive parts of C3. And this tendency may well not be compensated for by judicious recognition of where major choices of goals, resolutions of uncertainty, and coordination of actions has to take place. Third, the net results of this situation are likely to be substantial problems of C3 balance and system coherence. Technologically, one tends to get a proliferation of specialized hardware. In terms of information processing, one tends to get overload at postautomatic data processing points. In terms of communication, critical links are not there.

The situation and consequences described above are not unusual ones for public policy and there will of course be the customary adaptations

over time which one would expect from instrumental rather than causal learning. 17 In effect specific areas of unsatisfactory performance found through experience are fixed in a relatively piecemeal fashion but systemwide alternatives go rather unexplored. In the U.S. case there obviously has been instrumental learning about inabilities to communicate information and orders sufficiently promptly between field units and central decisionmakers, e.g., the autopsy results from the Pueblo, Liberty, and EC-121 incidents. 18 The need to use non-governmental communication channels between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. leadership in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis provided impetus for the "hot line." Such adaptations are generally helpful but they do not come to grips with the fundamental problem. The set of tendencies we have noted in effect results in decision support systems designed by some people for others who find themselves in decision situations asking questions, seeking alternatives, and issuing orders which no central design unit envisioned or was able to turn into operating c3 equipment and procedures. The more variable the range of environmental problems which raise questions of military intervention, the more likely this outcome seems.

In real intervention situations, a number of behaviors tend to occur with fair regularity which are pertinent here. First, the sheer volume of information and messages which participants in the C³ system generate increases enormously and the importance attached by originators to any piece of it undergoes rapid inflation. Forwarding capacity becomes inadequate and major backlogs occur. The inflation of importance attached to given pieces of information defeats the purpose of precedence category systems. Second, the need for and attempts to coordinate along lines other than narrow vertical hierarchies increases rapidly and if "official"

C3 systems do not facilitate such coordination participants at all levels in the national security establishment seek ad hoc ways to do what they feel necessary and appropriate. Conferencing behaviors are one manifestation of such adaptations where the conferees set aside considerations of communication security. At high decision levels, executives turn to trusted advisors whether or not these advisors have the benefits of the information provision which advanced C3 systems are intended to supply. Third, the involvement of high-level, non-specialist officials increases rapidly and with that the sorts of information sought and action alternatives which the C3 system is asked to assist with change from those expected by lower-level specialists. Fourth, in part because of the information overload problem and in part because of unexpected questions, much of the information content of the C3 system goes unused and those variables which are used are rarily reexamined as frequently as they can be updated by component technologies. Information rarely is sufficiently current to meet the specification of a cybernetic system which calls for feedback on the consequences of the last action or decision before taking the next step. Fifth, command elternatives seem to be less constrained by what high level officials can know and stipulate than by the habitual modes of thought and operation of those who must implement them. The inevitable detailing out of command directions seems to drift toward previous practice in the "system" and the consequent actions may be ones which, if known to central decision-makers when they issued their general command, would have led them to choose differently.

Finally, as the intervention or near-intervention unfolds, conflicts of goals and priorities become exace coated. Different participants place different priorities in between bringing situations within some tolerable

range and achieving very focused pre-selected outcomes, and among a host of considerations such as U.S. domestic political support, Soviet perceptions, and military victory in the theatre of engagement. The more militarily stressful and prolonged the intervention, the more the performance of the C³ system tends to degrade in terms of the fieldity of information sent upward and compliance with commands downward. From the viewpoint of central political authorities, the point is not to continue the intervention indefinitely certainly not while it continues to take lives, consume material, and threaten escalation and reprisal. Accordingly, they will seek to use C³ in ways which facilitate signals of cooperative as well as of hostile intent. As a result the central they exercise may easily become strained and the information they receive from those caught up in hostilities may be distorted in numerous ways.

The discussion of C³ in the context of a complex institutional decision process up to this point has been cautionary and observational.

Before we leave this part of the context it is important to dwell on certain pervasive tendencies in decision processes which C³ can be designed to ameliorate or to intensify. Some of these understandable, if unfortunate, tendencies are drawn from the crisis literature; others, from decision analysis work on human estimation of probability and untility. Students of crisis management behavior have reported frequently on decreases in the number of alternatives considered, the ability to invent new alternatives, and in consideration of information which contradicts prior premises. They have emphasized the prevalence of conformist thinking, subjective foreshortening of the time available for decision, reversion to unthought through historical analogies, increasingly negative stereotypic thinking about the adversary, and inattention to alternative possible outcomes from one's own actions. The information storage, processing,

and presentation elements of C3 systems whrough their machine based software, procedures, and human staff's can make these tendencies worse or help to curb them. With proper forethought, one can imagine that these elements will almost automatically present alternatives be it with regard to indications and warning or one's own options, facilitate dynamic planning and reprogramming, and make salient information counter to established conclusions. One can imagine objective calculation of the opportunity cost of delays in decisions (or the range of probable costs) presented clearly, similarity checking routines to compare current decision situations with suggested historical analogies, alternative models of adversary decision processes and constraints which would explicate their behavior, and causal path displays to show a variety of paths from a given action choice into the future. Information science used in this fashion cannot sway those who do not wish to attend to it but it can affect and assist those who are accessible but under severe pressure. Alternatively, one can imagine funnel-like information elements of C3 systems which increasingly filter out alternatives, present impossibility conditions for non-consensus views, suppress contradictory information, and increase the intensity of feelings about the need for immediate decisions.

It is important to note that the impact of C³ systems on these matters will be more a consequence of their soft than of their hard ingredients. To pursue this matter further, there is substantial evidence that people are prone to make a number of errors in their estimates of the present and future. One can readily imagine subroutines in computer programs and sections in information display formats which would show the implications of these biases with audiences than in a position to accept the correction for bias or at least to decide how to handle the

questions about the importance of such liases in their judgments. Represcutativeness bias follows from inattention to prior probability, base frequency, sample size, reliability of our ent descriptions, predictability, information redundancy and correlation, and the regression effect. Availability bias follows from inattention to differences in retrievability, search strategy effectiveness, imaginability, and lore-based correlations. Anchoring bias follows from inattention to insufficient adjustment from initial values and plays itself out in undue conjunctive optimism or disjunctive pessimism. These errors are particularly relevant to military intervention appraisals. Intervention planning is prone to conjunctive optimism or overestimation of the probability of success. The success of each step treated as simple may be quite probable (especially of the first ster), but the overall probability of success with a large number of steps can be rather low. Assessments of the risks of intervention are prone to disjunctive pessimism or underestimation of the probability of failure. The probability of each unwanted event occurring treated as simple may be quite low (especially of the first event), but the probability of the intervention plan breaking down if there are a large number of unwanted events can be rather high. 20 As an alternative to surfacing these biases and showing their implications, C3 systems can ignore them and instead exacerbate their effects because of perceptions that elaborate information technology and modern information displays are in some special sense objective.

Our discussion of C³ in the context of decision processes suggests some additional evaluative criteria: 1) the extent to which it is the product of normal bureaucratic processes; 2) the extent to which in relevant situations participants in military intervention resort to informal "patches" on the extant systems; and 3) the extent to which the "soft" components of C³ systems exacerbate or smeliorate well-known problems in decision-making and estimation. Together with the criteria raised

by our anticipations about the internative environment and military technology, they can help us appraise the national security performance we can expect from \mathbb{C}^3 innovations.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON U.S. C3

The general observations to this point provide a framework for some more specific description and commentary on U.S. C³. The public record consisting of Congressional testimony, committee prints, and major statements by high Department of Defense officials does provide a general sense of the existing and planned systems, priority problems in official eyes, and management arrangements.²¹


On May 21, 1970, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard established the Office of Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications). Before that time there was no unified management center in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and this action held promise even if it was confined to only one "C" -- telecommunications. Subsequently retitled several times, by February 1974, command and control had been added to its charter under the banner of Director, Telecommunications and Command and Control Systems. While the previously existing Defense Communications Agency (reporting to the JCS) had been responsible since 1960 for establishing a Defense Communications System, it had and has little control over tactical communications which have remained under the control of the military departments. In 1971 even whe 25% of Department of Defense communications included in DCS were composed of personnel and facilities all of which belonged to the military departments. In February 1975, the Special Subcommittee on Defense Communications of the House Committee on Armed Services concluded that there was still no effective central authority

over defense telecommunications and that the services continued to protect jealously their prerogatives.

What does this bit of institutional history imply? Quite simply it suggests that it is purely fortuitous if deployed U.S. C³ facilities, technology, and equipments have much likelihood of complementing each other. Given a procurement lead time of a good ten years we have some sense of the limitation on synergy in the U.S. C³ system. Second, it suggests that the institutional roots of C³ are overwhelmingly in the military departments rather than in the domain of elected authority, the Office of the Secretary, the JCS. or the CINC. The inheritance of C³ runs counter to centralized high level management of military intervention and of our forces in general.

The chosen instrument to remedy these shortcomings is the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). Under the authority of the WWMCCS Council, it is intended to bring high-level policy perspectives and coherence to Defense C³. To get a grasp of WWMCCS competence it may be helpful to introduce two charts. The first shows the core systems of WWMCCS in the context of an illustrative network of U.S. military C³. Two points merit notice — the nuclear emphasis and the limits on its primary governance to the systems of the Unified and Specified Commands.

Chart I suggests that there are in effect three realms of communications equipments and procedures which among them are to handle the four types of missions which U.S. C³ should support: strategic or limited nuclear war; intense short crises; prolonged conventional military operations; and routine military functioning. The chart suggests that WHMCCS as shown has the scope to integrate C³ for nuclear missions but that it has something less than governance over the set of C³ involved in the most likely situations of intervention and near-intervention which are intense,



-27-


short crises, and prolonged conventional military operations. The integration effective C³ for those situations requires is supposed to happen through what are ubiquitously called interfaces. In Chart II some interfaces are shown schematically. The core of WWMCCS is the National Military Command System (NMCS) and the directly related "national" command centers be they ground-based or airborne.

Chart II gives some sense of the linkage problems but does not display the variety of interface modes with very different probable performances in terms of survivability, reliability, and speed. At one extreme is interoperability where linked technologies move messages quite smoothly. At another are messages centers with numerous human steps required. At one extreme, conferencing, and skip-echelon arrangements would allow for direct communications from the President to a military field unit and direct simultaneous communication among geographically and hierarchically scattered parties; at another, messages move serially through command levels. Clearly one requirement for strong, effective linkage is compatible automatic data processing (ADP) given communication volumes of many megabits. Major efforts have been reported to insure compatible ADP at the heart of WWMCCS but that leaves the complex, extended periphery. The quality of the linkages is obviously crucial to the performance one can expect of U.S. C3 since bottleneck nodes degrade the effective performance of a network.

WIMCCS deserves to be assessed as a system not assumed to be one because it is called a system in official directives and tables of organization. A man-machine system exists when the component elements not only are out of research, development, test, and evaluation but are deployed and built into the standard operating procedures of the relevant

CHART II

WWMCCS SCHEMATIC



institutions. Accordingly, it is important to distinguish between the system as promise and the system as reality. To the extent that one wishes to estimate the time to fulfillment of the promise, two sorts of information need to be considered. The first is the time until components being developed will be internalized into the national security establishment. The second is the extent to which there is a valid, coherent system architecture driving development of hardware and the soft elements of future U.S. C³. Without such an architecture, the whole may well be less than the sum of the parts.

The public record suggests that at this time WWWCCS is largely a paper system. Priorities for realizing a working system relate to the nuclear forces. In part this stems from the realization reflected in Secretary Schlesinger's statement several years ago that our nuclear weapons were more survivable than the C³ related to them. ²³ In part, it reflects the extremely complicated and crucial C³ implications of the policy of nuclear response options and flexibility. Major development and procurement programs are underway to support nuclear C³ including the Advanced Airborne National Command Post (AABNCP), the Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network (MEECN), more survivable Air Force Satellite Communications (AFSATCOM II), Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) communications with the nuclear submarine force. Other programs concern C³ for theatre nuclear forces, especially in NATO. Many of these programs are expected to continue well into the 1980's before full procurement and deployment.

For the non-nuclear situations in which military intervention may well be a more likely eventuality, we find an even more extensive gap between the term "system" and reality and severe performance limitations.

This domain is that of the Defense Communications System and the tactical communications rings in Chart I. There are substantial problems of capacity, security and reliability. The first phase of efforts to improve the transmission system in Europe are not programmed for completion before 1980. Within the services, message handling and processing is still largely manual and while there are five-year automation plans, we are only at an early stage of those five years even according to plan. The Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) essential to the WWWCCS crisis management capacity requires a set of DSCS Phase II satellites to have global coverage but there have been a number of launch failures and the set is not scheduled for launching until well into 1978. The Joint Tactical Communications Program (TRI-TAC) is critical if there are to be effectively coordinated tactical operations by elements of several of the U.S. military services which are not easily accessible to adversary electronic intelligence (as our communications were in Vietnem). 24 The TRI-TAC program was supposed to have provided an all-digital system in operation in the mid-80's with the first production switch delivered to the field by 1976. The program switch, the pacing item, will now not be delivered until late 1979 with the full system operational date slipping at least into the late 1980's. 25 Navy reliance on High Frequency (HF) radio has not provided the accuracy, capacity or all-weather availability which effective intervention performance tends to assume. The solution, the Fleet Satellite Communications System (FLTSATCOM) was supposed to be available by 1976 but that has now slipped to 1979 though interim technologies are being used. As for the Army's Ground Mobile Forces, DSCSII even when available will not provided the wartime C3 which military plans and operations call for. A program of satellites and terminals for that purpose

was approved for development in early 1974.

For these future operating systems to enhance C3 as much as their technological capacity allows, they must be fitted together effectively from end-to-end of a heterogeneous information collection - decision implementation process. The framework for that to happen ideally should exist before technology developments which limit possibilities take place. One way to convey an appreciation of the complexity of the architecture task is to note that kinds of questions whose answers have strong implications for c^3 systems. For some envisioned set of national security situations, what functions will the C³ system have to support? Possibilities include indications monitoring, initial crisis assessment, response planning, action selection, execution, operations monitoring, threat assessment, resource analysis, damage assessment, adjustments to degradation in the C3 system itself. Who will have to coordinate and communicate with whom? Beyond the possibilities within U.S. military forces, inter-agency and inter-governmental coordination may be involved. How current must information including commands be? What is the dependency of each relevant actor on different sorts of information? What precedence should different messages have based on the acceptable time for them to be developed, transmitted and received in intelligible form by their audience? What mode of communication is most desirable (voice, data, graphics)? What volume of communication will be required? How secure must that communication be? Answers to these questions reflect and embody positions on the basic issues of who should control force toward what ends and on the degree of valid foresight that is possible about international futures. They demand some position on the continuing controversies about command and control: centralization versus decentralization; automated versus manual systems:

direct versus serial information flow; and ad hoc versus formal contingency planning. The public record suggests that major efforts at WMMCCS architecture have and continue to lag major satellite and ADP investments even though those investments may not yet have resulted in a great deal of deployed technology. The public record does not suggest that the philosophy, embodied in the architecture has been or is being hammered out by high civilian authorities including elected officials to safeguard against institutionalizing distributions of authority and definitions of value considerations about military matters which they do not accept and omitting ones they take for granted.

The quality of past performance of C³ systems with respect to the situations pertinent to coercive diplomacy below the nuclear level has been substantially imperfect. Relevant historical situations of intense, time-consitive crises and or military actions in prolonged conventional military interventions provide examples of C³ failure in an instrumental sense. Given the emphasis on highly time-sensitive crisis management represented by the U.S. military alert in October of 1973 with its overwhelming reliance for signalling on electronic reconnaissance communicated to national decision-makers on the part of both the U.S. and the Soviets, ²⁶ it is important to point out some rather recent experiences with instant crisis C³. We draw on several Congressional reports for these examples: ²⁷

a. Four messages, ordering that U.S.S. Liberty be moved away from the coasts of Israel and the United Arab Republic, were directed to that ship on June 7-8, 1967. The first of those messages was released by the sender about 13 hours before the time the ship was attacked, while the last was released for transmission 3 1/2 hours before the attack. Note of them had reached Liberty prior to the attack. Two messages were mistrouted to the Pacific rather when to the Mediterranean. One of those, upon being retransmitted to the Pentagon,

was then missent to Fort Meade rather than U.S.S. Liberty. The other was not placed on Fleet Broadcast until 9 hours after the attack on U.S.S. Liberty. One copy of a message was lost in a relay station and never relayed. All experienced inexcusable delays for in-station processing.

- b. On January 23, 1968 two messages were dispatched from U.S.S. Pueblo with a Pinnacle designation. That designation denoted a message of major significance and required immediate delivery to national command authorities. As a result of delays for processing, these messages required 2 1/2 and 1 1/2 hours, respectively, before they were delivered to national command authorities in Washington.
- o. Three messages, reporting that an EC-121 aircraft was being tracked by North Korean aircraft, were dispatched to the Joint Chiefs of Staff from Korea on April 15, 1969. Those messages required 1 hour, 16 minutes; 3 nours; and one-half nour, respectively, for transmission to Washington.
- a. Analysis of Navy message traffic in the Mediterranean during the Jordanian crisis of September 1970 ... revealed that outgoing traffic experienced the following delays: Flash, 33 minutes; Immediate, three hours, 16 minutes; Priority, nine hours, 58 minutes; Routine 15 hours, 36 minutes ... In fact, the overall performance of the system in the Mediterranean in September 1970 was not significantly improved over its performance in June 1967.

The examples up to this point are all more than five years old. Let us turn to the Mayaguez seizure crisis of May, 1975. There are substantial indications of numerous, serious C³ failures including: 1) lack of knowledge as to whether or not the seizure was authorized by the Cambodian government; 2) inability to communicate with the Cambodian government; 3) inability to quickly receive communications from the Cambodian government at a sufficiently high U.S. level of authority to interrupt authorized military actions; 4) inability to insure that U.S. forces in the area did restrain themselves in line with the intent of central authorities: and 5) inability or unwillingness to terminate conflict without further escalation once one's demands with no precise deadlines had been met.²⁸

Given the more general emphasis in instances of prolonged military intervention on bargaining to some resolution short of elimination of adversaries, the failure of the U.S. military in Vietnam to comply with damage-limiting instructions, for example, with respect to bombing and the treatment of civilians, raises important reservations about command and control.

C3 systems need be no better than the instrumental use they are supposed to play in national security matters. There can be little doubt that estimates of the consequences and limits of intervention need to be realistic about U.S. C3 performance. Expectations which will not be fulfilled can have no positive result. To treat promised systems as if they were operating systems and to downplay critical human elements in C3 can only foster dangerous illusions. With regard to military intervention, there seems little reason to assume that its context, consequences, and limits are fully controllable even with regard to our own behavior. There is little wisdom in striking political-military postures and proclaiming doctrines of coercive diplomacy unsupported by a C3 capability. That can only lead to unnecessary risks of three kinds: 1) self-delusions about the ability to fine-tune military intervention; 2) pre-emptive or at best highly vigilant, threat cycling behaviors by adversaries who may suspect that U.S. C3 does not enable the rapid, limited, controlled use of force enunciated by policy; and 3) domestic political attacks on administrations which do not engage in military interventions since these would be "surgical" and "clean."

Effective C³ does not guarantee wise policy. It helps provide some necessary conditions for the efficient execution of chosen policy. If crisis-management or military intervention has had disappointing results in retrospect, the mere presence of poor C³ does not provide a sufficient base for deciding what should be done differently in the future. Surely fighting the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time, for the wrong reasons is the ultimate failure of intelligence, authority, and restraint no matter how well what we formally define as C³ systems perform.

FOCTNOTES

- 1H.A. Innis. Empire and Communications, Oxford University Press, 1950, pp. 7, 12.
- Quoted in V.V. Druzhinin, D.S. Kontorov. <u>Concept</u>, <u>Algorithm</u>, <u>Decision</u>. <u>Published Moscow</u>, 1972, translated and <u>Published under the auspices of the U.S. Air Force</u>, U.S.G.P.O., 1975, p. 6.
- Review of Department of Defense Worldwide Communications, Phase I.

 Report of the Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, 1st session, May 10, 1971, p. 1.
- For a stimulating theoretical treatment of maladaptive foreign policy, see: James P. Bennett, "Foreign Policy as Maladaptive Behavior," Papers of the Peace Science Society (International), Vol. 25, 1975, pp. 85-104.
- ⁵On the general perspective, see: Karl W. Deutsch. The Nerves of Government, Free Press, 1963. For a discussion of the evolution of Command and Control in the 1960's and a useful bibliography on materials published during that period, see: Judith A. Merkle. Command and Control, General Learning Press, 1971.
- Over the years my understanding of the technologies and policy issues involved in C has benefitted enormously from many experts (none of whom may agree with anything in this paper) including: Arthur Biehl, Eugene Fubini, Charles Herzfeld, Kenneth Jordan, Dorothy Pavkov, Kenneth Plant, Eberhart Rechtin, and Howard Yudkin.
- 7The seminal treatment is that of Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William R. Simons. The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, Little, Brown, 1971. My thinking about the perspective has benefitted greatly from discussions with Steve Chan.
- 8For analyses of these cases with respect to communications, see: Review of Department of Defense Worldwide Communications, Phase I, op. cit.
- The need to cut through the strategic/tactical distinction does not find expression in the legislation establishing the new Senate Intelligence Oversight Committee or in President Ford's

Executive Order 11905 (February 13, 1976) on the control and direction of U.S. foreign intelligence. The need to bridge the gap is recognized explicitly by Secretary Rumsfeld in his discussion of C in Report of the Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, to the Congress on the FY1977 Budget and its Implications for the FY 1978 Authorization Request and the FY1977-1981 Defense Programs, January 27, 1976, p. 175.

- 10 For useful summary discussions of reconnaissance, see: Ted Greenwood, "Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Arms Control,"

 Adelphi Papers, No. 88, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972; World Armaments and Disarmament:

 SIPRI Yearbook, 1974, M.I.T. Press, 1975, pp. 287-302; World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook, 1975, M.I.T. Press, 1976, pp. 378-401.
- For a useful summary discussion of drones and RFVs, see: Ibid., pp. 339-377.
- 12 For an overview of the automated ballefield, see: Frank Barnaby and Ronald Huisken. Arms Uncontrolled, Harvard University Press, 1975, pp. 49-73.
- 130n the problems of complex software, see: Ralph E. Strauch,
 "Information and Perception in Limited Strategic Conflict,"
 RAND P-5602, Feb. 1976; Joseph Weizenbaum, "On the Impact
 of the Computer on Society," Science, Vol. 176, May 12,
 1972, pp. 609-614; Morton Gorden, "Burdens for the Designer of a Computer Simulation of International Relations,"
 in Davis B. Bobrow and Judah L. Schwartz(eds.). Computers
 and the Policy-Making Community, Prentice-Hell, 1968,
 pp. 222-245.
- 14 On the general properties of the cybernetic paradigm for polity decisions, see: John D. Steinbruner. The Cybernetic Theory of Decision, Princeton University Press, 1974.
- 15 For some informed discussions of computer and telecommunications interdependence and dependence with a view toward the consequent vulnerabilities, see: Ithiel de Sola Pool, "The International Aspects of Computer Telecommunication," Research Program on Communications Policy, Report #15.

 M.I.T., Feb. 4, 1975; "The Vulnerable Computer Society," Secretariat for National Security Policy and Long-range Defence Planning, Ministry of Defence Sweden, 1976:4.
- 16 Some particularly helpful works are: Charles F. Hermann (ed.).

 International Crises, Free Press, 1972; Irving L. Janis.

 Victims of Groupthink, Houghton Mifflin, 1972; Greham T.

 Allison. The Essence of Decision, Little, Brown, 1971;

Raymond Tanter, "Crisis Management across Disciplines,"
The Bendix Corporation Applied Science and Technology
Division, August, 1974: Cristine Candela, "Decisionmaking during Crisis," The Bendix Corporation Applied
Science and Technology Division, August, 1974; Avi Shlaim,
"Failures in National Intelligence Escimates," World
Politics, Vol. XXVIII, April, 1976, pp. 348-380;
Howard B. Shapiro, "Crisis Management," Human Sciences
Research, HSR-RR-75/3-Cr, March, 1975: Howard B. Shapiro
and Fatricia L. Cummings, "Problems in the Use of Ad Hoc
Structures in DOD Crisis Management and Implications for
Change," Human Sciences Research, HSR-RR-76/1-Nr, 15 March
1976.

- 18 Review of Department of Defense Worldwide Communications, Phase I, op. cit.
- 19 Some empirical evidence of the attention to cooperative as well as hostile behaviors is presented in Linda P. Brady, "Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using Transitory Qualities of Situations," CREON Publication #51, Mershon Center, Ohio State University, 1975.
- On the pertinent psychological research, see: Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "Judgment Under Uncertainty," in Richard Zeckhauser, et al. (eds.). Benefit-Cost and Policy Analysis 197h, Aldine, 1975, pp. 66-80. On some implications for international policy systems, see: Davis B. Bobrow, "Policy Attention and Forecast Bias," Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Feb. 25-29, 1976.
- 21 For detailed discussions, there is little substitute for the testimony in the House and Senate over the years by the Director of the Defense Communications Agency and, since 1970, the incumbents of the OSD offices called at different times Assistant for Telecommunications to the Secretary of Defense. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications), and most recently Director. Telecommunications and Command and Control Systems. For more policy-oriented overviews, the recent posture statements by Secretaries of Defense Schlesinger and Rumsfeld are especially useful and it is important to look both in the sections dealing with nuclear forces and those explicitly entitled "Communications, Command and Control." Reference has already been made to the House report entitled Review of Department of Defense Worldwide Communications, Phase II, Report of the Special Subcommittee on Defense Communications of the Committee

¹⁷Steinbruner, op. cit.

on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, Oct. 12, 1972; and Review of Department of Defense Worldwide Communications, Phase III, Report of the Special Subcommittee on Defense Communications of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, Feb. 7, 1975. Finally, a useful overview of new technologies from an official point of view is that of Thomas C. Reed, "Command & Control & Communications RDT & E," Signal, Oct., 1975, pp. 6ff.

- Report of the Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, ..., op. cit., p. 173.
- 23
 Report of the Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger, to the
 Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget and FY 1975-1979
 Defense Program, March 4, 1974, p. 74.
- Report of Department of Defense Worldwide Communications, Phase II, op. cit.
- Report of Department of Defense Worldwide Communications, Phase III, op. cit.
- 26 The New York Times, Nov. 21, 1973, p. 1 ff and Nov. 22, 1973, p. 1 ff.
- 27 Review of Department of Defense Worldwide Communications, Phase I, op. cit., pp. 3-4; Review of Department of Defense Worldwide Communications, Phase II, op. cit., p. 16501.
- Seizure of the Mayaguez, Part I, Hearings Before the Committee on International Relations and Its Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs, House of Representatives, 94th Congress, 1st Session, May 14-15, 1975.

ADVANCE COPY FOR CONFERENCE DISCUSSION

NEW WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY AND ITS IMPACT ON INTERVENTION*

James Digby

. San Artista di Maria

I. SOME QUESTIONS

Over the past few years considerable attention has focused on a new generation of non-nuclear weapons. At their best, some promise to make the more traditional weapons—which would be less cost effective and quite vulnerable—obsolete. But as discussion of these new weapons continues, a number of points have been raised which identify serious shortcomings in the practical use of these new weapons and which indicate that they are not likely to be used at their best as military mass meets military mass.

This paper will touch on some arguments on both sides of this discussion, and it will cover some technical aspects of new weapons, especially precision weapons, but prior to that discussion some perspective on the relation between technical means and political behavior is appropriate.

Raymond Aron, looking back at two world wars, pointed out that the availability of technical excess had caused nations to replace definite war aims with "sublime--and vague--principles," and he

^{*}Parts of this paper draw on a forthcoming study for The California Seminar on the implications of the spread of new non-nuclear weapon technologies.

discussed the consequences in <u>The Century of Total War.* A few years</u> later, in 1956, Aron wrote a brilliant essay on war, <u>De la Guerre</u>, which is just as much worth reading today as it was then. Following a discussion of the views of those optimists who felt the atomic weapon was so diabolic that it would put an end to war, and those pessimists who heralded the approach of the apocalypse, Aron declared himself a "realist" and said:

Optimists and pessimists are concerned with the future. Only the realists deal with the present -- that is, with a world in which two states have the means of destroying one another and are therefore condemned to suicide or coexistence. In this present which must be measured in years, perhaps in decades, politics do not radically change; they do not exclude violence within nations or in the relations between states. Neither alliances nor revolutions nor traditional armies have disappeared. Frontiers are not unchangeable, transfers of sovereignty have not abated. More than ever, the diplomatic field is a jungle in which "coldblooded monsters" are at grips with each other. More than ever, all possible means are resorted to-all except one, the use of which might well be fatal and which nevertheless profoundly influences the course of events, just as the British fleet used to assure the freedom of the seas, while anchored at its bases.**

Thus, it might be said that we are still in Aron's "present," that it has, in fact, lasted for decades, that the monsters stalking the world jungle have used increasingly powerful means—all except one—and that this conference will be exploring the mechanics of the

^{*}Doubleday and Company, Garden City, New York, 1954.

^{**}Raymond Aron, On War, (Terence Kilmartin, Translator), Doubleday & Company, Garden City, New York, 1959, p. 16.

new means and the limits of their use. While the nature of politics has not changed radically, the military moves available to political leaders are both more varied and available to more players.

This leads me to four sets of questions which suggest why it is important to understand the new generation of weapons, questions which link these weapons to the theme of this conference:

- o Is military power becoming more divisible? It appears that many of the new precision weapons are well-adapted to being used in small packets. Thus, can small states increasingly dispose of military power in significant degree?
- o Is military power—with the new weapons—becoming more usable? If so, this has its good points, and its perils, from the American point of view. While the new weapons might help the United States to back its political moves with a more credible threat, there might be an increase of confrontations—with or without American involvement—which reach the stage of actual combat.
- o Will military power—in use and threat of use—be applied more precisely? Military intervention <u>can</u> increasingly be threatened with means which are tailored to objectives. To what extent will powers actually be restrained? (Their aim should be to get their way without needless risk.)
- o Will there be a trend toward more precise political objectives? The overhanging threat of nuclear intervention should serve as a great incentive to antagonists in non-nuclear war to avoid vague and grandiose goals which might widen conflict.

* * *

The next section of this paper discusses the mechanics of the new weapons, and later parts discuss the increasingly varied ways they might be used. It is my view that understanding these more technical matters is a prerequisite to full consideration of the four sets of questions raised as well as to exploration of the limits of the use of these new weapons and of the limits of military intervention.

II. ENGINEERING EVOLUTION AND DESCRIPTION OF THE NEW WEAPONS

There is a variety of advances in weapons technology—new kinds of tank armor, new submarine hull designs, automated test equipment—to name just a few. However, I shall focus here on a set of developments which seem central to the topic of precise application of military power, the developments which have resulted in a new generation of precision—guided weapons and remotely piloted vehicles.

Some Definitions.

Elsewhere I have defined precision-guided munitions (PGMs) this way:

A guided munition whose probability of making a direct hit on its target at full range (when unopposed) is greater than a half. According to the type of PGM, the target may be a tank, ship, radar, bridge, airplane, or other concentration of value.*

This definition includes a wide variety of weapons, with the term "munitions" indicating that they are designed to impact on their target. Thus the increasingly important category of cruise missiles is included, and I shall be saying more about them later on.

^{*}This definition is slightly modified from one I give in Adelphi Paper No. 118, Precision-Guided Weapons, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (London), Summer 1975.

A related and overlapping class includes remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs). Many of this class are designed to be recoverable and are used primarily to carry reconnaissance equipment or devices such as laser designators. Others, designed to impact at the target, qualify as PGMs. An RPV may be defined this way:

A vehicle which is piloted from a remote location by a person who has available much of the same piloting information he would have if he were on board.

Some people are considering RPV techniques for tanks, submarines, or other vehicles, but in its most common use the term refers to aircraft.

To further define the two classes, consider Tables 1 and 2, which show illustrative examples of PGMs and RPVs from a number of countries. Walleye and Condor, listed as RPVs, are also PGMs.

Technical Basis.

Three technological advances have greatly facilitated the development of these new weapons:

- o The capability to produce practical transmitters and receivers which use much higher frequencies than those used in the past. These high frequencies have made it possible to obtain angular accuracies approaching those obtained with visual telescopic sights.
- o Progress in microelectric circuit designs which permit quite complex signal processing and storage to be handled in small, reliable, relatively rugged devices.
- o Progress in the design of non-nuclear warheads; these new designs permit much smaller weapons to have the capability of destroying targets that formerly required much heavier warheads.

Table 1
Examples of Precision Weapons

	Designation	Developed by	Range	Guidance	Comments	
ANTI-AIRCRAFT						
	SA-7 Grail	Soviet Union	2.3 miles	Aimed optically; then infra-red homing	Portable infantry weapon; shoulder fired	
	Rapier	Britain	3.5 miles	Optically tracked; radio commanded		
	Hawk	United States	25 miles	Homes on radar reflection	Long deployed on NATO Central Front	
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE .						
	Sagger AT-3	Soviet Union	2 miles	Optically tracked, wire guided	Anti-tank missile in wide service	
	TOW MGM-71A	United States	2+ miles	Semi-automatic optical tracking, wire guided	Anti-tank missile; 100,000 produced	
	Нагрооп	United States	60 miles	Radar homing	Anti-ship missile. Can be launched from surface ships, aircraft or sub- marines	
	Tomahawk sea- launched cruis missile		1400 miles	Navigates by terrain comparison .	Launched from surface ships or submerged submarines	
AIR-TO-SURFACE						
	Pave Way	United States	Free fall	Homes on laser spot	Based on 1000-lb. or 2000-lb standard U.S. bomb	
	Rockeye	United States	Free fall	Homes on laser spot	Anti-tank bomblets, carried in dispenser	
	Maverick	United States		TV-guided; locks on and homes on target	Anti-tank missile	
	Martel	Britain/France	35 miles	TV-guided or homes on enemy's radar or radio		
				emissions		

Source: The Economist, March 27, 1976, pp. 3-5.

Table 2

Examples of Remotely Piloted Vehicles—All U.S.

Designation	Weight	Comments
Praeire	75 lbs. (dry)	Miniature recoverable aircraft carries reconnaissance devices and laser designator; under development.
Walleye II	Approx. 2000 lbs.	Free-fall bomb guided from remoted TV picture; used in 1972.
Condor AGM-53A	2130 lbs.	Anti-ship missile for late 1970s. Various forms; can be remotely steered from TV picture.
Compass Cope	Approx. 14,000 lbs.	High-flying, carries reconnaissance devices; recoverable.

Source: Aviation Week, March 17, 1975, pp. 83-97.

Perhaps the main thing to say about PGMs--if they are used under the conditions for which they were designed--is contained in the following statement:

Accuracy is no longer a strong function of range; if a target can be acquired and followed during the required aiming process, it can usually be hit. For many targets hitting is equivalent to destroying.*

This statement also gives some clues as to what might go wrong. For example, the actual experience in the 1973 war in the Middle East showed that acquiring targets and then recognizing which were hostile and important, was a very difficult job. That war also showed that it was possible to evade relatively slow PGMs, like the Soviet-supplied Sagger antitank missile, during their 15 to 25 seconds of flight. Israeli defenders learned quickly to take Sagger crews under fire during the time they were guiding their missiles. Finally, it can be noted that there are a number of ways of interfering with the seeing process.

For some of the earlier missiles which use visual sighting, darkness, battlefield smoke, or ground fog may prevent sighting. (Later systems using long-wave infrared will expand considerably the conditions when seeing will be possible.)

Manpower Needs.

An important question to ask about all new systems is what impact they have on manpower requirements. Some of the PGMs require very little training. For example, with TOW, the American-made wire-guided antitank missile, crews are considered trained after a week of instruction, including just one day of actually firing the weapon.

^{*}Slightly modified from my previously cited Precision-Guided Weapons, p. 4

But TOW has a semiautomatic feature, requiring only that the target be tracked. Others, like the Sagger and the British Swingfire, require that the crew fly the missile into the target. Thus the crew must track both the missile and its target. This job is significantly harder and imposes substantial additional requirements on training—an observation which was borne out by reports from the 1973 war on the selection and continual retraining of Egyptian missile crews. There are also longer-range PGMs which appear likely to require very substantial efforts in crew training. Nonetheless, the point should be noted that Egyptian, Syrian, and North Vietnamese crews gave a good account of themselves in handling various Soviet-made guided weapons.

Maintenance.

The impact of new systems on maintenance needs must also be taken into account. Again taking TOW as an example, experience has shown that its design, which calls for the missile to be left in the container in which it was shipped from the factory until it is used, has worked well. Maintenance is required principally with respect to the tracking equipment and training gear. But others of the new systems which contain many functions—like Condor—are likely to impose quite severe maintenance requirements, comparable to those being experienced with the highly integrated multipurpose systems of several modern aircraft. Small powers will need to be very cautious in listening to the sales arguments for high-performance, but trouble—prone systems.

III. IMPLICATIONS FOR MILITARY POSTURE, WITH EMPHASIS ON THE SMALLER STATES

In this section I examine some implications of the new generation of weapons, with particular reference to those aspects which would permit their use in relatively small packages, including their use by the smaller powers.

First, both in superpower use in a major engagement and in small-power use in lesser combat situations, the nature of the new weapons is likely to encourage tactics which employ small independent units, perhaps as small as mobile squads with two or three men each. Even such small squads could be quite powerful if equipped with 5 or 10 precision weapons. Weaponry for self-protection might also be carried by some squads, with antiaircraft missiles and anitpersonnel weapons as well as the antiarmor weapons which are likely to be primary armament. Besides being quite powerful, these small units would have the advantage both of being more concealable and of permitting the distribution of forces in a way which would tax the target acquisition and the command-control systems of the opponent. It might be expected that both sides would sooner or later break up their forces into these small groupings.

Naturally there are some counterarguments, among them the strain which the control of many independent units will place on command systems and the fact that larger groupings of forces could enjoy more of the benefits of mutual support. But to the extent that this small-unit trend occurs, a small portion of a battlefield occupied by a superpower might bear substantial resemblance to a battle arena occupied by a smaller power. Many of the ingredients of force would

be just the same, many of the tactics would be the same, and the ability to hold ground or take it over a limited area might be about the same. (Two exceptions will be noted below, when the uses of combined arms and of the supporting structure for PGMs are discussed.)

Secondly, it is likely that forces employing the new weapons could be much more easily moved about than traditional forces.

Clearly it is easier to move enough TOW missiles (which weigh 40 pounds) to counter an armored division than it is to move enough defending tanks. It is even likely that a decade from now, when PGMs and RPVs having a range of several hundred kilometers may be available to support an offensive thrust, that these PGMs and RPVs can more readily be moved into launch position than the forces for a more traditional offense. This enhanced mobility would seem to affect both lateral deployment—redeploying forces along a front—and deployment from a central reserve.

A third point has been widely noted: the current generation of PGMs is likely to be good for forces tactically on the defensive. This is clearly true for those current weapons which are specifically designed for antitank or antiaircraft uses. In one respect this may be true much more generally: the important task of target acquisition is more readily handled against a force which is moving over unfamiliar terrain as an offense usually must, by comparison with a defending force which can be stationed in previously prepared emplacements and provided with a substantial degree of concealment. Note though that having a good defense at the tactical

level may support an offense at the strategic or campaign level, since an efficient defense would permit a concentration of forces for a thrust. In addition, future postures are likely to include PGMs and RPVs of substantially longer ranges, capable of functions generally associated with offensive thrusts.

While the taking of ground in the traditional way may not be appropriate to the new weaponry, there may be substituted a kind of leapfrog tactic whereby desired objectives are attacked first by suppressing their defenses, then followed by an attack by airdrop or by helicopter-borne forces, then defended heavily with the attacker's own defensive PGMs. Thus it would be premature to say that the acquisition of PGMs will uniformly add to the stability of those third-world areas to which they are transferred.

Many companies in many countries. For many current systems, the development and production processes are relatively easy, and production is, in fact, underway in many industrial countries. As longer range PGMs become more numerous, there will probably be an increasing tendency to develop guidance and payload packages separately from vehicles. It will still require the huge industrial firms of the large nations to build complex, multipurpose penetrating weapon systems where each part is tightly integrated into the vehicle, but many sensible designs will be producible by smaller companies. While hardly approaching the level of cottage industry yet, significant numbers of the simpler precision weapons or payload packages may be produced by factories in third-world countries not many years from now.

Despite all these newly feasible ways to use precision weaponry, small and medium powers will still need to allocate a fraction of their defense funds to traditional weapons. There are certain situation which call for tanks, not PGMs. Moreover, a conservative approach would call for concern about a number of difficulties with the new weapons. Some of these are being worked out by the larger powers and arms suppliers; some are too formidable for early solution.

For example, I have already noted that the early-generation PGMs, which use visual guidance, are subject to such simple countermeasures as smoke and camouflage, and they cannot work in the presence of heavy dust, bad weather, or darkness. Later kinds of guidance systems cope with some of these problems, but as this class of weapons becomes increasingly important to success, so the efforts to counter them will become both more vigorous and more ingenious.

This points up an aspect of using the new weapons which may put small powers at a relative disadvantage compared to medium-sized powers: the value of using the new weapons as a part of combined-arms strategy. The Soviets have developed this sort of strategy to a high degree, and some of the more successful Arab attacks in the 1973 war followed Soviet precepts. On the other hand, when Israeli tanks thrust into the Sinai without infantry support they encountered exceedingly high losses, a matter which was later rectified as Israeli infantrymen took Arab antitank missile crews under fire while the Arabs attempted to guide their weapons.

An even more important aspect of fully exploiting PGMs has been relatively neglected until recently: the supporting structure. Many analysts have emphasized the great technical improvements which give PGMs almost a "one shot, one kill" capability in one-on-one engagements. But in a large-scale conflict, the characteristics of individual weapons, taken one-on-one, could be dominated by the way thousands of weapons of several types are made to work together in a mutually supportive way, and applied effectively to thousands of targets.

This supporting structure has several elements: (1) the advance reconnaissance which localizes targets, (2) the target acquisition system which identifies individual targets right up to trigger-pull, (3) the command function which allocates and marshals the new weapons to the place where they are needed most, (each weapon represents substantial military power which a defender would not wish to leave where it will see no use), (4) the transport (perhaps laterally) of the new lightweight but powerful weapons systems, and—most importantly—(5) the network which replenishes expended weapons.

The importance of this supporting structure can be appreciated when one considers that a brigade commander in World War II might do his job from a situation map that showed where ten enemy infantry battalions and three tank companies were located. In 1980, he and his subordinates might need to keep track of 500 to 1000 individually moving and independently powerful squad-size units. To fully exploit his PGMs, each of these targets would have to be acquired on an individual basis.

For a large-scale war, along NATO's Central Front, for example, or along the Sino-Soviet border, a decisive aspect might be the destruction of the enemy's supporting structure. Thus each of the five elements named will need to be as survivable as possible, and not easily disrupted. For instance, NATO commanders would need to insure that replenishment supplies of antitank missiles would continue to arrive at resupply points during battle, and that the quantities on hand and pathways for resupply be designed to hold up under the attacks that would undoubtedly be pressed against them.

For a small-scale war, where the numbers of targets presenting per day were in the tens rather than thousands, the single-shot kill probability or one-on-one weapon performance might be the dominant factor. But there is an intermediate case of considerable interest in connection with the consequences of arms transfers to the nonindustrial countries, where recipients might acquire hundreds of the weapons themselves, but not be capable of dealing with all elements of the supporting structure. Another war in the Middle East might well be of this intermediate size. As a part of U.S. policy on arms transfers to the Middle East, it is important to think through the extent to which our government could exercise some continuing control over their large-scale employment through controlling reconnaissance or replenishment functions essential to the full exploitation of the weapons. It is equally important to think through just how a limited size of supporting structure may serve to limit the size of military intervention by any of the newly armed smaller powers.

IV. NEW WEAPONS AND INTERVENTION: THE SUPERPOWERS

There seem to be two pathways to weapons acquisition in the U.S. One path stresses the new precision weapons, which are generally small in size, many of which are relatively cheap, and which (because of having terminal guidance) tend to have a performance not greatly influenced by their conditions of launch or the type of platform which carried them to the launch point. This property lets them be designed independently of their platform, and permits an updating of weapon payload without necessarily changing an adequate and proven vehicle. The weapon and vehicle can obsolesce at different rates. In general, these weapons would be needed in great number.

The other path includes the more traditional weapons, many of which are increasingly large in size, and increasing in complexity, in failure rate and—especially—in unit cost. By and large the weapons systems given the highest priority by the services are all of these things, in part because these weapons systems have multiple functions. Typically, these weapons systems are an integral, interwoven part of a vehicle intended for use directly in the combat area. Such systems include deep-penetration fighter bombers, new tanks, and nuclear-powered guided missile cruisers. (Current examples of these systems have unit costs, in FY 1975 dollars of about \$13 million, \$1.9 million, and \$370 million, respectively.)

There is, of course, a middle ground between the two paths.

Successive U.S. Directors of Defense Research and Engineering have called for a "high-low mix," that is, for the building of some

relatively cheap systems and some which are expensive. This policy is aimed at the procurement of sufficient numbers of systems to man the necessary locations, but without sacrificing the knowledge obtained in the course of developing the more complex equipment.

Another kind of middle ground comes about when the large penetrating platforms are made to carry the simpler and cheaper precision weapons. However, recent experience shows that the "high-low mix" is more an exhortation than an actual policy which the services and the Congress support. For example, the Army's highest priority for development goes to the "Big 5": the XM-1 tank, the MICV mechanized combat vehicle, the AAH armed attack helicopter, the SAM-D air defense missile, and the UTTAS utility helicopter. And even Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, when Chief of Naval Operations, could not sway much support for his proposition to procure more numerous medium-sized ships in the place of fewer large, nuclear-powered ships.

In the United States many complex cost-effectiveness analyses have been made comparing postures heavy in the traditional weapons with those emphasizing new weapons; none are likely to be entirely believable before the collection of a great deal more empirical data. My own view, based on several years of analysis of the relevant pieces, is that those postures heavily emphasizing precision weapons can do an adequate job ten years from now for less money than the traditional weapons would require. Correspondingly, I think current trends in the costs and vulnerabilities of the traditional systems indicate that postures relying primarily on them can hardly be afforded unless U.S. defense budgets increase greatly.

The Soviet policies on weapons procurement are clearly different, and like most Soviet policies their basis is not well understood by Americans. One thing is clear, though: they believe in grinding out multiple copies of the same weapon system in great numbers. It is almost as if their weapons come from a series of sausage factories. The existence of the flow seems a goal in itself. In submarines, in small surface vessels, in artillery, in fighter interceptors, and in tanks, the numbers continue to increase, with the new models often added to field dispositions without retiring the old. While a decade ago many Soviet designs seemed outdated to Westerners, recent weapon types have combined substantial sophistication with procurement in great numbers.

Until the mid-1960s most new Soviet weapons systems were incremental improvements based on well-tested predecessors. More recently, they have deployed both incremental improvements and quite novel systems, with the latter including the mobile SA-6 antiaircraft missile, the ZSU-23-4 optical-or-radar-directed gun, and the important new armored combat vehicle, the BMP. Their precision air defense missiles are quite advanced, they have long had sea-based guided cruise missiles of varying degrees of sophistication, while their great production of wire-guided antitank missiles has been of rather unsophisticated models. Their progress in air-to-surface PGMs and laser-guided bombs appears to be well behind that in the United States. While much of the Soviet debate over how much emphasis to place on the

new technology and how to exploit them remains hidden, it does appear to have been a period of doctrinal turmoil.*

In the United States the continuing Soviet build-up and the availability of new types of weapons have not only led to the current debate on the adequacy of American defenses, but have raised the complex question of how the United States budget should be allocated between traditional systems and the new classes of weapons. It is the latter choice that bears most directly on the question of usability and precision of objectives which my last three questions raised at the outset. For the following discussion assume that the two classes are (by some measures) equally effective per dollar spent. One would still expect some differences in their usability and in the way they would be deployed. The trend to fewer weapons with high unit costs might, encourage a trend toward keeping these weapons in a central reserveoften in the United States-from which they would not be moved lightly. Nor would deploying this reserve be very easy in a physical sense. On the other hand, sea-launched cruise missiles, air-launched cruise missiles, and many of the antitank and air-defense missiles could be deployed peripherally and could be moved to a new deployment with relative ease, if not in terms of political considerations, at least in terms of physical and strategic ones.

With larger, more expensive weapons, one would expect that prudence would dictate less of a tendency to risk each weapon, since each loss would be so significant. The smaller precision weapons, on the other hand, might seem more usable to national authorities

^{*}Some aspects of the Soviet antitank debate will be treated by Philip Karber in a forthcoming issue of Survival.

both because the minimum quantum of arms risked would be low, and because the military damage done could be more precisely controlled. For those precision weapons of short range, there is the added factor that their use would be more likely to be seen as reactive instead of aggressive. They might be more usable in small numbers because their totality might seem less threatening in an aggressive sense.

Not all classes of PGMs would always seem non-aggressive, however. Consider some of the limited nuclear options so often discussed by former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. Some of those options could be carried out by non-nuclear missiles, most notably cruise missiles. The usability of such weapons would appear to exceed the usability of nuclear weapons of similar range, but still the total sequence of events following such use could never be predicted with much confidence. Whether such a capability would lead to substantial changes in stability is hard to say, given the present level of understanding of these matters. In any event these chains of events can hardly be considered without considering specific contexts, a matter too ambitious for the present paper.

What can be said is that if a country decided that such a capability looked attractive from a strategic point of view, cost considerations would be unlikely to stop its acquisition and there would be no requirement for a great industrial infrastructure. Many countries will be able to afford from 50 to 500 long-range cruise

missiles by the end of the 1980s. Deterrence, for a time almost the exclusive province of the Americans and Russians, may be "parcelled out."*

Summing up on this point, I believe that the new precision weapons make an adequate defense posture for the United States more affordable. They also make both American military power and Soviet military power more usable. They may reduce the superpower monopoly on deterrence—with some unknowable effects on stability. I am not prepared to say that all of this is good, but I am prepared to say that it is different, and that significant military power is going to spread among more national actors.

V. LOWERING RISKS THROUGH ARMS LIMITATION AND RESTRAINT IN WEAPONS USE

This final section will discuss the new weapons in respect to three matters: (1) the effect of dispersing powerful weapons to the smaller states and prospects for the control of this dispersal,

(2) some prospects for holding down arms purchases by the superpowers themselves, and (3) prospects for restraint in weapon use.

The shift of economic power from the established industrial nations towards those rich in resources has created a market for arms so great, with buyers and sellers so diverse, that curbing sales is impossible, and even modulating it is difficult. The trends we have seen with respect to the oil-producing nations may be a precursor

^{*}See the forthcoming book New Arms, New Aims: Beyond Nuclear Deterrence, Johan Jørgen Holst and Uwe Nerlich, eds., Crane Russak, New York. See especially the chapter by Holst.

to more general shifts which will include the exploitation of ocean areas in newly claimed zones (with all sorts of designations). The potential value of ocean areas which will be claimed by states like Panama or the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen will not usually be proportional to present land resource values. These new riches will bring forth the invidious behavior of neighbors as well as of local factions, so that rulers will have incentives to buy arms at the same time they have the means.

What possibilities are open to the present industrial powers to affect these arms build-ups? The discussion in Section III suggests at least five avenues to explore:

- (1) Attempting to shift purchases from ranks, fighter bombers, and Pershing-type missiles to highly effective, shorter range precision weapons.
- (2) Endeavoring to retain—to the extent possible—super—power control over the "supporting structure" which is so necessary if precision weapons are to be used effectively in large-scale combat.
- (3) Maintaining tight controls over the export of guidance technology for longer range missiles such as Pershing II and the sealaunched cruise missile.
- (4) Reducing the initiative for nuclear weapons acquisition by encouraging the substitution of precision non-nuclear weapons, while at the same time making the ingredients for a deliverable nuclear weapon capability difficult to obtain.
- (5) Encouraging restraint and precision in the application of military power. (More will be said below about restraints in the use of weapons.)

None of these avenues has been very thoroughly explored; if adopted by the United States all have within them the seeds of risks. They deserve a great deal more attention before actual moves can be taken.

The second matter—an understanding to hold down arms purchases between superpowers—draws on a solid, but sometimes neglected, incentive for arms control: saving money. The large traditional weapons are becoming more expensive, more vulnerable to precision weapons, and more susceptible to being replaced by smaller weapons. (This is not to say that the newer systems have no problems, nor that tested weapons be abandoned before there is confidence in the alternatives.) In addition, there seems a good chance that several decades from now there will be a much greater separation of weapons from their platforms, and that the tightly integrated systems will increasingly seem inefficient. So the question arises whether there might be sufficient mutual advantage to the Soviets and Americans to form the basis of an agreement to limit certain traditional classes of arms. To the most ardent advocates of arms control, this might seem too modest an anticipation of the invevitable. On the other hand, such anticipation could save hundreds of billions of dollars over the decade of the 1980s, money which might be put to more productive uses.

The third matter is an even more neglected aspect of arms control; the limitation of damage through restraint in the <u>use</u> of military systems. While the best way to avoid damage is to avoid conflict, we live in an imperfect world. Thus it is important to

consider restraint in use, a restraint which would be greatly facilitated by the new precise weapons and by current tendencies in both Washington and Moscow to treat the battlefield use of nuclear weapons as less and less inevitable. The idea is that it is now possible to lower damage done to unintended targets, while efficiently dealing with intended targets.* Civilian casualties could be minimized. Military forces could be very efficiently used. And, most importantly, a military commander could convey a more precise signal while the military damage is being brought about, a matter of great importance when a non-nuclear war is being fought under a threat of escalation.

* * *

This paper is intended mainly to introduce a number of arguments relating to the four questions raised at the beginning and not to provide answers. But I come away from its discussions with a view that military power is, in fact, becoming more divisible. Many of the new weapons systems seem to me more readily usable, and usable in smaller packages, than the traditional systems. I have only mixed feelings about whether military power will be used more precisely or whether political objectives will, on balance, be set forth to friend or enemy with a correspondingly greater specificity. While there are many promises in the new technology—for economy, for less unnecessary damage, for bringing about certain restraints in arms acquisition as technologies change—there are also dangers.

^{*}Henry Rowen and Albert Wohlstetter call this the "dual criterion."
See their chapter in the forthcoming book edited by Holst and Nerlich, cited on page 17.

There are the dangers of less inhibition in starting combat and of the addition of more military actors, including some who may not seek stability. Military intervention has a new and more flexible arsenal; its students have new and serious responsibilities to probe the consequences. THE LOGIC OF DETERPENCE: MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY

by MORTON A. KAPLAN

World War II ushered in the era of nuclear weapons, rockets, and jet planes. Since then, the layman has become interested in military strategy in a way that was not true in the past. He has learned how technological revolutions have occurred every 7-10 years and how these have influenced strategy. Thus, his attention turns to the Sunday supplement features that emphasize technology in the study of military problems -- a perception that is reinforced by the impact of technology on modern life. Surely the problem is important, but most of this paper will be devoted to the thesis that the public debate has too much emphasized force levels and military technology to the virtual exclusion of more important concerns.

Except for periods of actual war, military force -- and consequently weapons technology -- on the whole has been a latent, rather than a directly determining, factor in recent international history. Politics and economics consistently have played more central roles in determining the outcome of events. This does not mean, however, that military force is unimportant, or that it should be neglected. Nor is its role

necessarily smaller today than in the recent past either in fact or in the opinion of world leaders, even though the need for American military support was more central to the consciousness of European leaders and politics during the height of the cold war than it is today. It would not be prudent to ignore the fact that military force might be a determining factor in a crucial decision process.

The role of military force in international relations is much misunderstood. In particular, the partisan debate over the U.S. defense budget has obscured the relationship between military force and national policy. Too many claims have been made both for deterrence and against "big" military budgets. Therefore, we will attempt to clarify the relationship between deterrence and military force before we discuss more important topics, including the role of military force in international relations and some complications that might arise from the increasing importance of Communist parties in Latin Europe.

Before we continue, however, we should distinguish between "strategy" as that term is used in the West and "strategy" as it is used in Soviet Russia. Western thinkers tend to use "strategy" in primarily a military sense, whereas Soviet analysts, more correctly in my view, regard it as applying to the entire correlation of forces, including the economic and

the political. Will weapons technology affect strategy in this sense?

The Ambiguity of Concept Use in Strategic Debate

The social science and military literature, the media, and Congressional debate are filled with words that evoke psychological meaning but that have little concrete relevancy at the level of generality that is usually employed. Such words include "détente," "deterrence," "intervention," and so on. These words neither prescribe policies nor determine consequences. No one has ever captured an intervention in a butterfly net nor has an instrument yet been invented that can register the presence or absence of a state of deterrence. I do not intend to suggest that these concepts are as mythical as the fabulous unicorm, which in any event can be described, if not captured. However, abstract concepts such as deterrence or intervention may "cover" generically different types of phenomena that have less in common than the attribution of a common name suggests.

For instance, it is widely asserted that nuclear deterrence has worked for the last twenty-five years in Europe. However, to sustain the hypothesis that nuclear deterrence has worked, we should first have to establish that the Soviet Union has had at least some intention of engaging in that which was to be deterred, e.g., a military attack upon Western Europe. Moreover, even if the intention did exist, we should have to show that the American nuclear system rather than political or military factors forestalled its manifestation.

If, on the other hand, the absence of major war is not the only sign of successful deterrence, it may be the case that deterrence has not worked in Europe. For instance, the American nuclear monopoly did not deter the Berlin blockade, the civil war in Greece, or the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia.

More accurately, to sustain a hypothesis concerning deterrence, it must first be made specific and then tested against counterfactual conditions. For instance, suppose that we were able to obtain Politburo records that showed that Stalin had intended to attack Western Europe during the Korean War and that he had been deterred by fear of American nuclear reprisals. Would this then establish even the limited proposition that at least in this period with respect to this type of deterrence objective the American strategic nuclear system was capable of deterring a Soviet military attack on Western Europe? Unfortunately, even in this case, the evidence would

not necessarily sustain the hypothesis except on the assumption that no variations in other environmental conditions would affect the result. For instance, suppose counterfactually that there had been a Congressional debate on the use of nuclear weapons that had spilled over to the public and that had made clear to Stalin that the American government was unwilling to engage in nuclear reprisals and that the European nations were unwilling to pay the costs of nuclear war. Would he still have been deterred? If he would not have been deterred in this, or in other relevant cases, then the counterfactual conditional requirements for an assertion about deterrence, even in this limited case, would not have been met. And the historical evidence would support only a much more severely restricted hypothesis.

Are General Discussions Worthless?

From the foregoing comments, it should be clear that I do not think that a general discussion of deterrence or intervention, to the extent that such terms have meaning, has direct applicability to real world cases. Moreover, even if the discussion is extended to political and economic factors, particular contextual conditions -- conditions that could vary radically from period to period or from case to case -- might be determinative. On the other hand, I do not wish to throw

the subject of deterrence completely out of court even if general statements are not directly applicable to cases.

Abstract discussions of deterrence do have value provided that they are understood and employed appropriately. And in this discussion technological changes in weapons systems constitute a key variable.

However, before we examine even the limited value such discussions may have, it will be useful to relegate to the dustbin some of the misrepresentations of strategic thinking in which some critics have indulged. Anatol Rapoport, for instance, has insisted that strategists employ game theoretic analysis to arrive at their conclusions and that their formal prescriptions tend to be swallowed "whole hog" by policy makers. Neither the strategists nor the policy makers have been so gullible. Just as a study of what it takes to build a Venus probe is not determinative of whether it is advisable to build it, so the study of what it takes to provide a certain level of second-strike capability in the event of a first-strike by a military opponent does not determine whether one wishes to pay the economic or political price of buying that capability under real-world conditions, let alone of using it. Yet, clearly, such studies are useful, and even essential, in arriving at the latter decisions.

Moreover, the usual charge that these studies assume the rationality of other nations is irrelevant. If a person has an enemy who wishes to kill him, it is no argument against hiring a bodyguard, if one can afford it, to point out that a sufficiently irrational enemy may succeed in killing him anyway. Rationality is not an either/or proposition. An irrational enemy might not be totally irrational or totally unresponsive to real world conditions. Even if he is willing to take high risks, one might make the risks high enough for him to reconsider, thereby reinforcing whatever degree of rationality he has.

Strategic Design

It is desirable to design military systems to raise the costs of war for a potential aggressor and to permit a defender to use time to avoid war or to reduce the scale of combat.

However, the military strategist cannot know with any degree of assurance the circumstances under which a weapons system, presently on the drawing boards, may have to be used years hence, or what the future political behavior of a potential enemy may be. There will be a very large, although not infinite, array of factors that will affect future decisions; and almost surely some of these will surprise us. Therefore, the most useful line of analysis for the strategist is one that

abstracts from the variable non-military characteristics of potential future worlds. The military analyst is interested primarily in how military systems potentially interact with each other. He needs to solve his "design" problem, not that of the policy maker who must choose a real-world course of action in a real future world.

Such strategic studies are intimately linked to technological analysis; however, they bear upon the issues to which we will address ourselves in this analysis only at the margin.

Therefore, we shall not attempt to replicate any of these studies or to deal with their conclusions. They are of primary interest to students of military strategy rather than to scholars in the area of national security policy or to informed citizens.

Finite Deterrence, "Overkill," and Military Budgets

It may be useful to make a few brief statements about strategic military issues such as finite deterrence and "overkill" because such concepts are often used to defend low military budgets and because the usual arguments that employ these concepts either explicitly or implicitly are more often than not misleading.

There are often good arguments for reducing military budgets but "finite deterrence" or "overkill" are not among them. Some attempts to lower present military risks may

weaken the economic capacity of a nation in ways that substantially increase future risks. Attempts to fund the defense budget adequately may cut into, or at least appear to cut into, other legislative programs so destructively that the degree of consensus underlying foreign policy is gravely diminished. Policies based on military strength may convince potential allies that one's motives are insupportable, thereby weakening required systems of alliance.

On the other hand, attempts to trim the military budget are often accompanied by rhetorical arguments that make little sense. For instance, it may be argued that both sides have overkill and that you cannot kill the same people more than once. Or it may be argued that if you can destroy the ten major cities of an opponent you can deter him from attacking you or an important ally.

"Overkill" -- a horrendous term -- exists only if one assumes that an attacker can afford to expend his missiles without keeping some in reserve, that all these missiles are in fact deliverable, and that they can be used in a optimal pattern of distribution. This is not the place to dwell on the arithmetical mistakes of "overkill" demonstrations, on their strategic inadequacies, and on the extent to which the capability to use weapons stocks changes drastically depending

upon attack scenarios and upon quantitative and qualitative technological changes in weapons systems. The position basically substitutes emotion for analysis.

The minimal or finite deterrence argument is very much like the doomsday machine argument, a concept for which Herman Kahn is often attacked. Few people understand that Kahn always used the concept as a reductio ad absurdum. He was trying to show that a system based on deterrence only is ridiculous. If an enemy is intelligent, he will attack under the planned threshold of response and confront the defender with a choice between surrender and suicidal response. Probability thresholds, such as Thomas Schelling has written about, if intended seriously, do partake of a "Strangelove" character.

I am not, however, arguing that finite deterrence will necessarily fail. Under many circumstances even modest deterrent capabilities may work. Although I cannot prove it, I believe the Soviet Union would have had a number of second thoughts about invading Czechoslovakia in 1968, despite the massive air suppression that was available to them, if the Czechs had had just a few nuclear weapons. I am far less confident that even with nuclear weapons the Czechs would have been able to deter the Soviet Union from political and military pressures

that probably would have forced substantial compromises upon them. And, in a more protracted political contest, the Soviet Union conceivably might have forced the Czechs to disable their nuclear weapons if they had possessed some. Right and Wrong Strategic Metaphors

One of the problems with respect to finite deterrence is that the wrong metaphor is in the heads of those who accept this posture. They see the risks of nuclear attack as a highly abstract proposition and misinterpret the significance of the low probability that such weapons will be used. Their implicit metaphor is somewhat like betting on horses or playing the stock market. However, the nuclear situation is much more like Russian roulette than like investing in the stock market. Investing in a diversified series of blue chip securities usually is a perfectly sound procedure, because the odds are with one, despite the fact that investment in government bonds might be much safer (except during periods of inflation). However, if one is handed a revolver and five of the six chambers are empty, the argument that shooting oneself in the head is not very risky because the odds are five-to-one in one's favor is absurd.

The fact that it is unlikely that something will go wrong is not relevant in a situation in which a catastrophe will

occur if it does. There is only one human history; and, in the case of Russian roulette, there is only one life. Unlike the cat with nine lives, the loser at Russian roulette will not get five additional chances to win.

The issue is, of course, somewhat more complex than the metaphor indicates. However, the complexity on the whole adds to rather than detracts from the conclusion I have reached.

Escalation and Deterrence

Most discussions of deterrence assume either a surprise attack or an either/or choice between peace and war. These alternatives are very unlikely and are probably relatively easy to deter; although, even so, a "Russian roulette" approach seems foolhardy. However, real world choices also include the more probable alternatives that a crisis will be pushed to the point of war, that a pre-crisis situation will be escalated into a crisis situation, and that an incident will be escalated into a pre-crisis situation.

None of the prior situations would justify the use of nuclear missiles; and their threatened use more likely than not would be counterproductive. In all of these situations, considerations of military balance, including the nuclear, will play a role in the decisions that are made. In some

of the cases, the military considerations will not be decisive, even in a marginal sense. In some cases, however, the military factor may be the one that swings the "balance" from a decision not to escalate to a decision to escalate. And, thus, even if, on balance, military power is less important in international politics than political factors, it may be decisive in particular, and perhaps crucial, cases. Moreover, the side that is militarily more vulnerable or that has fewer strategic options, or technologically less developed weapons, everything else being equal, is the side that is likely to lose from an escalation of a crisis.

It is true that everything else is not likely to be equal. If its political position is strong enough, the militarily weaker party may do well anyway. But if its political situation is weak, and this may differ from case to case, military weakness may be the major factor in producing a damaging crisis escalation that otherwise could have been avoided.

The foregoing is not even remotely worst case analysis. The worst case would be that the Russians would attack tomorrow. A penultimate worst case would be that they attack next year. Not even the most hard-hatted general has suggested a military budget that would optimize for the worst case. The problem with the finite deterrence argument is that it does

not optimize for reasonable variance within the set of cases that no prudent decision maker would ignore.

Arguments for Finite Deterrence

Not all analysts, however, accept these conclusions. Some regard strategic forces as inherently unusable. They point to the fact that American strategic forces did not deter the coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948, the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, or the Warsaw Pact attack upon Czechoslovakia in 1968. They argue, therefore, that the value of deterrence systems is limited and that the relative size of the system is unimportant in those cases in which they do produce deterrence. All these cases involved Soviet intervention in what the United States has regarded as the Soviet sphere.

McGeorge Bundy, however, takes the argument one step further. He argues that American strategic superiority has played no role in sustaining the U.S. position outside of the WTO area. In the Cuban missile case, he emphasizes the fear of both Khrushchev and Kennedy of resorting to nuclear weapons, the potent naval blockade of Cuba, and the logistical superiority of the United States with respect to Cuba as the decisive factors in the solution that was reached for that crisis.

However, numerous questions remain concerning Bundy's

analysis. Would the United States have used its conventional power as effectively as it did in 1962 if the Soviet Union had had the strategic superiority that the United States possessed? If one assumes that the Soviet Union would not have used such superiority, or even parity, to follow a different policy in the Caribbean, is it likely that the American policy in the Caribbean would have been responded to by the Soviet Union in Berlin or the Dardanelles? Finally, if the Soviet nuclear arsenal had been weaker, might we not have used the crisis to remove Castro as Brezhnev later removed Dubcek? We cannot answer these questions except to suggest that Mr. Bundy's answer comes far too easily. Would prudent decision makers ignore these possible consequences of the strategic balance? Obviously, I think not.

The Soviet Position

Perhaps, therefore, it is not entirely irrelevant that Soviet strategic thinkers tend to take the pro-deterrence side of the argument. For instance, according to V. Larinov, "the balance of forces in the world...has changed in socialism's favor. Inevitable failure awaits those in the imperialist states who are hoping through the arms race to strenghthen their positions in the international arena.... They do not want to renounce the false hopes of insuring a 'leading posi-

tion' for the United States...."

1. V. Larianov, "A Dangerous Line." <u>Pravda</u>, Moscow, January 15, 1972.

The well-known Soviet strategist Trofimenko, has said,

"/the/...further change in the alignment of forces between
the chief power of imperialism and the leading socialist
country in the latter's favor is the most important factor....

U.S. leaders are obliged publicly to acknowledge changes in
the strategic situation that are unfavorable for the United
States and to take into account the growth in the Soviet

2
Union's might...."

2. "Political Realism and the 'Realistic Deterrence' Strategy,"

U.S.A.: Economy, Politics, Ideology, No. 12, Moscow, 1971.

The problem is the old one that general principles do not decide specific cases. We cannot fall back upon the argument that certain military postures permit the implementation of certain strategies in principle while the failure to achieve them excludes those strategies. Charles de Gaulle might have been able to use an inferior French force in a nuclear demonstration against a superior Soviet Union where some other French leader might only intimidate himself by

thinking about the force de frappe.

The Strategic Nuclear Balance

In the broadest sense, then, whereas deterrence can be discussed quite usefully in terms of military strategic models that are not intended as prescriptions for policy, it becomes a dependent function of complex analysis in the real world of international politics. Let us, therefore, restrict the military component of our paper to a simple comparison of forces. Of course, this comparison is crucially dependent on military technology.

Let us first compare the intercontinental ballistic missiles available to the United States and the Soviet Union. As of 1975, the United States had 1,054 ICBMs, 656 SLBMs, and 432 long-range bombers while the Soviet Union had 1,618 ICBMs, 784 SLBMs, and 135 long-range bombers. In addition the Soviet Union had 600 IRBM and MRBMs with megaton-size warheads that were capable of hitting all of Western Europe.

In the ICBM category, the United States had 54 Titan IIs with five- to ten-megaton warheads, 450 Minuteman IIs with one- to two-megaton warheads, and 550 Minuteman IIIs with three warheads of 170 kilotons apiece. The Soviet Union had 190 SS 7s and 19 SS 8s with five-megaton warheads. They had 288 SS 9s with 18- to 25-megaton warheads and 991 SS 11s with

one- to-two-megaton warheads or with three warheads in the kiloton range. They had 60 SS 13s in the megaton range and 10 SS 17s with four warheads apiece in the kiloton range. In addition they had ten SS 18s carrying either 18 to 25 megaton warheads or five-to-eight warheads apiece in the 1cw megaton range. They had 50 SS 19s that were capable of being MIRVed to six warheads apiece in the kiloton range. In addition, the Russians have been enlarging their missile silo sites and digging large numbers of additional holes that they claim are for command and control systems but that could be used for additional SS 18s. And they have some BMD capacity.

The conclusions that can be drawn from these data are far from clear. Moreover, they likely vary with particular scenarios. On the whole, however, the Soviet force seems more survivable than the American force in either a large nuclear exchange or in minor retaliatory actions. Although the Soviet launchers are believed to be less accurate than American launchers, this is more than compensated for by their numbers and large throw weights. Moreover, the margin and significance of American accuracy is decreasing with time. The United States also has the lead in MTRVing its weapons, although the Soviet Union is apparently well along the road in this respect.

We have sketched only the broadest features of the strategic nuclear weapons systems. The interesting questions concern specific capabilities in different scenarios. It is not useful to attempt to discuss this at any length at a non-classified level. However, I shall make a few broad and admittedly controversial statements.

There is nothing static about the interaction characteristics of the U.S. and Soviet strategic systems. In 1969, there was reason to believe that the Soviet Union could have launched a first-strike against the United States that would have destroyed 95 per cent of its land-based missiles and bombers. At that time, it is believed that the command-andcontrol system for the Polaris fleet could have been put out of order fairly easily. Although there is reason to believe that the reliability of the Soviet system was taken into account in reaching these conclusions, there is no doubt that such an attack would have been very risky and would have involved maneuvers that had not been, and could not be, tested in trial runs. Thus, such a first-strike was not a likely candidate for implementation. Moreover, since then some of the more vulnerable features of the American systems have been corrected, although these judgments are always subject to qualification concerning unknowns and qualitative changes

in technology. At the moment, the submarine-launched Polaris system seems reasonable secure, at least with respect to the third of it that is always at sea. However, even this judgment rests upon a hypothesis that Soviet anti-submarine warfare research is proceeding along lines of inquiry similar to those used in the United States. And, even so, the Soviet SS-N-13 Savage is acquiring a capability against deployed nuclear submarines.

At least for the next several years, therefore, from a purely military standpoint, we are likely to be safe in disregarding the possibility of a first-strike during periods of relative normality in the international system. Only a revolutionary technological breakthrough -- for instance, laser defenses, on which the Soviet Union is spending large sums -- is likely to change the analysis at this level of generality, although less major breakthroughs may be decisive in particular cases.

The fact that a first-strike is far too risky a venture except in dire circumstances enhances general deterrence should it ever be needed. Moreover, the Soviet Union has too great a fear of China, too great a need for Western technology and capital, too many nationality problems, too many discordances with its WTO allies, and too great a sense of prudence to risk even a conventional attack in Europe in

the next decade unless a crisis escalates out of control in unexpected ways. Given Soviet needs and perspectives, it is likely to exploit only low-risk opportunities at the margin where Western political weakness or lack of skill provide opportunities. And, indeed, only such a Soviet posture provides any real prospect for the withering away of NATO that would permit exploration of maximal Soviet goals.

Thus, military analysis is the tail of the strategic dog. Furthermore, even to the extent that it is relevant, it cannot inform us to what extent the comparative status of alliance forces would influence national decisions to create crisis situations or to act strongly or weakly in crisis situations.

These are not questions that we can answer in general form. The nation that acts boldly today may act weakly tomorrow. England and France stood up to Nazi German during the spring crisis of 1938 but collapsed during the fall crisis as a consequence of second thoughts about their previous temerity. The Chamberlain government, which collapsed at Munich, felt constrained to act strongly and boldly in the Polish crisis. The United States was constrained politically from using its nuclear weapons against North Korea and North

Vietnam. Although this did not mean that these weapons never have deterrence value -- for at least some believe that Eisenhower's threat to use them may have precipitated the Korean armistice of 1953 -- we are again left without any general conclusion. And yet, despite these assertions, knowledge of the comparative state of military systems may be a key component in decisions in crucial periods.

The NATO/WTO Balance

Let us turn toward the alliance forces in Europe. As of 1975 NATO had 12 armored and 15 mechanized and airborne infantry divisions while the Warsaw Pact had 31 armored and 37 mechanized and airborne infantry divisions, of which 19 and 21 respectively were Soviet. In Southern Europe, as contrasted with Northern and Central Europe, NATO had 6 armored and 33 infantry divisions while the Warsaw Pact had 7 and 24 divisions respectively of which 3 and 5 respectively were Soviet.

In terms of manpower on the Northern and Central fronts NATO had 625,000 men whereas the Warsaw Pact had 895,000 of which 595,000 were Soviet. NATO had 575,000 troops on the Southern front and the Warsaw Pact had 345,000 of which 115,000 were Soviet. On the Northern and Central fronts NATO had 7,000 main battle tanks while the Warsaw Pact had

19,000 of which 11,500 were Soviet. On the Southern front NATO had 3,700 tanks while the Warsaw Pact had 7,250 of which 2,250 were Soviet. On the Northern and Central fronts, NATO had 150 light bombers, 1,250 fighter/ground-attack planes, 350 interceptors and 300 reconnaissance planes. The Warsaw Pact had 225 light bombers, 1,325 fighter/ground-attack planes, 2,000 interceptors, and 475 reconnaissance planes of which respectively 200, 900, 950, and 350 were Soviet planes. On the Southern front, NATO had 8 light bombers, 450 fighter/ground-attack planes, 275 interceptors, and 125 reconnaissance planes. The Warsaw Pact had 31 light bombers, 200 fighter/ground-attack planes, 625 interceptors, and 75 reconnaissance planes of which respectively 30, 50, 200, and 30 were Soviet planes.

There have been further increases in the Soviet forces since these figures became available. WTO forces have been consistently upgraded in the recent past. According to the New York Times of March 6th, 1976 General Alexander M. Haig reported that the Soviet forces in East Germany had increased by 100,000 men -- that is, from 250,000 to 350,000 men -- in the previous five years. According to General Haig, the balance in tactical nuclear weapons remains favorable to the West both in quality and quantity, but he said that the Soviet

modernization program is "highly dynamic." The density of the Russian ground-based rocket capability, whose launchers may become mobile, has produced a "dramatic increase" in Soviet nuclear might. This, he said, has been accompanied by a steady shift in the character of the Soviet tactical air arm from air defense to strike missions, including the development of a new fighter-bomber, the Su-19. The strength of Soviet motorized rifle divisions has increased from 11,000 to 12,500 men and armored divisional strength has increased from 9,000 to 10,000. There has also been an increase in the density of modern Russian armored tanks, mobile artillery, armored personnel carriers, and combat support structures that suggests "at least an increased consideration on the part of Soviet leaders of the so-called conventional phase" of war.

According to the New York Times of 18 March 1976, a

British defense White Paper states that the imbalance in conventional ground and air forces in central Europe has moved

"further in the Warsaw Pact's favor." According to the

White Paper, the WTO has two warships to every one of NATO's

and 50 per cent more combat aircraft. Moreover, the White

Paper estimated that the Soviet Union is producing nuclear

submarines at the rate of one every five weeks -- nearly

twice as fast as the West. The Soviet Union according to

the White Paper has 300 submarines of which 130 are nuclear-powered.

Various interpretations of these figures are possible. It is argued that the NATO tanks and planes are qualitatively superior. These qualitative advantages, it is said, offset Soviet quantitative superiority. Moreover, it is sometimes argued that very cheap and effective anti-tank devices are at hand that would neutralize the Soviet tank advantage. The Soviet or Warsaw Treaty Organization manpower advantage, it is said, will be offset after 60 to 90 days of mobilization by the NATO countries. This is further reinforced by the argument that the defender has a three-to-one advantage over offense.

The foregoing arguments represent what might be called the Enthoven school of analysis, after Alain Enthoven, who had been one of Robert McNamara's whiz kids in the Office of Systems Analysis of the Department of Defense in the 1960s. Almost no leading European military figure accepts this analysis. As long as five years ago, the late well-known French strategist, General André Beaufre, argued that a Soviet invading force could reach the Rhine in less than four or five days. Most analysts agree that the NATO situation has deteriorated since then, except for the possible advantages produced

by the new hand-held anti-tank weapons.

Those who oppose the "Enthoven" analysis concerning the advantage of defense would do so on a number of grounds. They would argue that some of the more recent optimism concerning defense stems from a misreading of the Israeli experience during the Yom Kippur War. After Israel went on the offense, the Egyptian and Syrian armies were placed in an extremely tenuous situation from which they were rescued politically and not by defensive capabilities.

Unlike the situation of the Israeli army -- the offensive capability of which reversed the tide of battle -- and of the Russian, NATO strategy, weaponry, and force formation are not designed for offense. The Egyptian-Syrian attacking forces in the Middle East were the equivalent of the total force of European NATO and were emplaced on a front of 170 kilometers as contrasted with the 700 kilometers of the European central front, excluding the northern and southern fronts. This emphasizes how thinly NATO forces would be spread in defending against the possibility of attack. And Soviet forces, whose doctrine stresses surprise attack and the blitzing of defensive capabilities, would be far more effective in use of weaponry than were the Egyptian and Syrian forces.

While placed in a defensive posture, the NATO forces would be too thin to launch a counterattack whereas the Warsaw Pact

forces could quickly mobilize a superiority of five- or even ten-to-one at the point of attack, rapidly using these dispositions to engage in flanking and roll-up maneuvers. Although attacking forces may not maintain the neatness of formation that is predicated in the planning rooms, their momentum does permit reasonable coordination. On the other hand, an offensive breakthrough reduces defensive forces to piecemeal tactics that, in a Europe that lacks sufficient room for defense, are inconsistent with a counter-attack. We are possibly 10 -- and at least 5 -- years from technological developments that are likely to change these conclusions.

Soviet doctrine recognizes precisely the advantage of particularly of surprise attack. attack, According to the late Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.A. Grechko, three types of attack may be contemplated. The first involves the encirclement and subsequent destruction of the enemy by the delivery of two main attacks in converging directions. The object is to shatter the enemy's defense and to push one's own offensive operations deeply into his rear. A second mode of attack involves one or more frontal attacks against an enemy's defensive position and the subsequent development of an offensive sideways to the flanks of the enemy position and deep into the rear. A third alternative consists of a single

attack designed to push the enemy up against an insurmountable natural barrier such as an impassable mountain range 4 or ocean.

4. Marshal A.A. Grechko, <u>Vooruzhenniye Sily Sovietskogo</u>

<u>Gosudarstva</u>, p. 307, quoted in P.H. Vigor and C.N. Donnelly,

"The Soviet Threat to Europe," <u>RUSI Journal</u>, Vol. 120 (March 1975), p. 71.

Soviet doctrine calls for at least a three-to-one manpower advantage at the point of attack although even this is
considered not quite necessary if numerical superiority in
equipment is maintained. Moreover, Soviet and Warsaw Pact
tactical air fighters are designed to fit their concept of
attack. Alain Enthoven's assertion of NATO qualitative
superiority in air is predicated upon the notion that Soviet
fighter planes will attack NATO bases. However, the Soviet
strategy, with some recent minor modifications, is predicated
upon the notion that air defense fighters should be concentrated
over the battle area to protect the ground forces. If they
should desire to hit air bases, they have many other weapons
systems fully capable of achieving this, particularly given
the poor protection of air bases and logistical supply systems
in the NATO area. Furthermore, the long-range interdiction

strategy of American air force doctrine is a long-term
stragegy that is not well adapted to defeating a rapid offensive that can achieve its purpose in a short period of time.

Even worse, because American air power is concentrated on
long-term objectives, American planes and fighter training
are not well adapted to the problem of tank-killing, a subject
of great importance in Soviet doctrine.

Even if it were conceded that we have demonstrated the basic inferiority of the NATO posture in the central European theater, it does not follow that the situation is critical. Even if the Soviet Union does not believe that the United States would use nuclear weapons as a response to a Soviet attack on Europe, the risk that it may do so might none the less deter Soviet attack, even in the unlikely event that the Soviet Union wishes to occupy and to administer Western Europe. Improvements in NATO Posture

If the "Russian roulette" principle makes us uneasy about the NATO posture, several strategic or tactical modifications would enhance the deterrence and/or fighting value of the NATO forces even without substantial changes in manpower or weaponry, either quantitative or qualitative. NATO might reorganize its forces as Stephen Canby of the RAND Corporation has proposed. He points out that the Warsaw Pact forces are disposed for a

rapid war and that they would not be highly survivable in a long war. On the other hand, the immediate potential of the NATO forces is gravely weakened by the fact that they are disposed for a long war. However, NATO cannot win a long war if it has already lost a short war. Canby would change the line organization of the NATO divisions to enhance immediate fighting power.

The value of Canby's recommendation in reinforced by the artificiality of the NATO assumption of a 60- to 90-day period of mobilization before war. This NATO assumption is based on the belief that war will be preceded by a long crisis. However, the NATO countries are democracies. Therefore, their governments would be under public pressure to solve a crisis peacefully. Mobilization likely would seem too provocative in many cases. However, the Soviet Union, both in the case of Hungary in 1956 and that of Czechoslovakia in 1968, engaged in negotiations as a cover for a surprise attack. And, even if one gives the Soviet Union the benefit of the political doubt, the WTO mobilization before a surprise (at least in the technical sense) attack in both cases is uncontested. Yet, during the 1968 crisis, NATO did call off a long-scheduled maneuver precisely to avoid the appearance of provocation despite WTO mobilization.

Despite this evidence from the past, the Western democracies would still be under domestic pressure to demonstrate their

peaceful intentions during a crisis. Thus, even if in principle there were 60 to 90 days to warning in the form of a crisis, it is unlikely that the mobilization capacity of NATO could be used, except possibly to a minor extent as a warning measure. For these reasons, the postulated 60-90 day mobilization period on which many calculations of NATO's strength are based is a "non-starter."

Other measures proposed for NATO are associated with General André Beaufre and Colonel Marc Geneste. General Beaufre was an advocate of a strategy that would depend upon the use of tactical nuclear weapons at the point of attack. He argued that if the weapons could be detonated before the Warsaw Treaty Organization forces penetrated far enough to be mixed with the NATO forces, then the potential destruction of WTO forces would be sufficient to make the attack at least problematical and perhaps infeasible.

The Beaufre strategy implies a degree of political, as contrasted with strategic, warning that could not be implemented in a democracy, for its implementation would have to be coincident with or perhaps even in advance of the actual invasion. Beaufre's response to such an objection was that the strategy was designed to deter and not to be used. He argued that the Soviet Union could not be sure that politics would interfere

with its use and that it would refrain from mobilizing its forces at the point of attack for fear that they would be destroyed at the moment of war's outbreak.

Other commentators are somewhat more dubious that General Beaufre of the deterrence value of a strategy not intended to be used and subject to such great political inhibition and potential Soviet manipulation during a crisis. And some feel that the threat of nuclear war in the German heartland at the point of attack would prove dismaying to the Germans. Variations of this strategy include the use of nuclear mines along the border.

Colonel Marc Geneste agrees that the Beaufre strategy would not work as planned -- that democracies could not make the decisions required to implement it. He argues, therefore, in favor of absorbing the first Soviet blow with thinned-out forces that would seek shelter behind Soviet lines and that would make use of tactical nuclear and conventional anti-tank weapons. As he knows, Soviet strategy, at least until very recently, called for attacking the defensive forces with tactical nuclear weapons before protected troops occupied the devastated area. Thus, Geneste is aware that his strategy would require the utilization of small scattered underground installations manned by small forces that would operate

independently. If this is feasible, its details have not yet been worked out by any military force.

Two other major NATO strategic doctrines have been proposed. The first is what might be called a dissuasion strategy. It is basically political rather than military in character although the linkage between the two elements is intimate. The dissuasion strategy is designed to reduce the value of the Warsaw Treaty Organization associates of the Soviet Union during an attack and to make the rear area of the Soviet front at least problematic.

There are two elements in the current NATO strategy that are inconsistent with dissuasion, although for different reasons. The Pershing and Sergeant missiles are one impediment to that strategy. Although the Pershing could do so only barely, it can hit the Soviet Union and, therefore, invokes the likelihood of Soviet pre-emption. The combination of large warhead, comparatively high fallout, and susceptibility to preemption by the Soviet Union makes these weapons systems provocative. Because Eastern Europe is their main target area regardless of what the Eastern Europeans do, they tend to push the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states more closely together.

The second source of difficulty lies in the QRAs, that

is, the quick reaction aricraft, sometimes known as FBS's or Forward Based Systems. Although almost any plane could be adapted to nuclear use, these are the planes that have bomb racks designed for nuclear weapons and that could carry them to the Soviet Union. They, thus, increase the incentive of the Soviet Union to hit them first. The bombs in these carriers are in the megaton range, thereby inclining the Eastern European states toward a Soviet strategy that would hit them first before they hit Eastern Europe. Moreover, although the warheads are kept under American control, QRA aircraft are operated by nationals of other countries, including Germans. The fear that Germans might gain access to nuclear weapons, load them on the QRAs, and attack the Soviet Union would weaken NATO cohesion during crises.

Although there is no sharp differentiation between a QRA and a tactical aircraft, there are pragmatic distinctions that can be made and that could even be confirmed from abroad. Although the QRAs would be valuable for hitting WTO airfields in Eastern Europe, they are vulnerable. A MIRVed and increasingly accurate Poseidon system could produce equivalent military results, if desired, with far less collateral damage and with small vulnerability. Moreover, SAM (surface-to-air missiles) could be substituted to a considerable extent for tactical air

strikes against Soviet air bases in Eastern Europe. In any event, WTO air bases are highly dispersed, far from attractive as targets, and the WTO planes are quickly transferable.

It is not necessary to remove the QRAs entirely from the NATO arsenal of weapons. They could be rebased in a sanctuary in England or the United States and returned to the continent if needed. The fear that Germany might use the QRAs, which likely would produce alliance measures that hobbled them during a crisis, would reduce their crisis-deterrence capabilities while they are based in Germany. Placing them in a sanctuary would reduce their vulnerability. In the latter case, they could be returned to Germany if needed; and this very fact would increase their deterrence value in a crisis.

The argument against removal and rebasing is that the QRAs are the American nuclear hostage to Europe. As long as the Germans believe this, as they do, their removal or rebasing would reduce alliance cohesion. Consequently, this aspect of dissuasion cannot be implemented until and unless the Germans think differently about the QRAs.

The removal of the QRAs, the Pershings, and the Sergeants might restore a nuclear firebreak in a central theater conflict. As long as they are present, there is a continual scale of nuclear weapons from the smallest to the largest. If they

are removed, there is a major gap in the system that might serve to deter escalation to higher nuclear levels. This argument, admittedly, is tenuous.

The dissuasion strategy must be distinguished from a strategy of disruption of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

The Eastern European regimes have no interest in disruption.

In the absence of a strong Soviet Union, they believe themselves vulnerable to popular pressures. Measures designed to place Eastern Europe at odds with the Soviet Union would be more likely to drive them closer together than farther apart. Moreover, any attempt by these regimes to neutralize themselves in peacetime likely would produce a violent Soviet response in a situation in which the chance of assistance from the United States would be both small and likely ineffective.

The dissuasion strategy, therefore, is designed to operate only in that circumstance in which the Soviet Union attacks, or considers attack against, NATO. It does not require the WTO members to refuse permission to Soviet troops to use their territories for attack or to interfere with Soviet utilization of local supplies or logistic facilities. Actions that hostile to the Soviet Union likely would produce a response these nations would not be disposed to risk. What would be required of them is that they not participate in a Soviet attack or

dispose their forces in such a way as to interfere with a NATO counterattack. On the other hand, NATO strategy would emphasize counterattack against Soviet forces rather than the occupation of Eastern European territory, although temporary occupation of directly bordering areas might not be avoidable in the course of combat. Naturally, NATO forces could not fail to attack logistic facilities and air bases in Eastern Europe. If, and only if, the Eastern European partners of the Soviet Union did not observe the limitations expected of them by NATO, would their economic and political infrastructures be hit.

Opponents of this strategy argue that its publication would be regarded as a threat to the Warsaw Treaty Organization. On the other hand, it does not have to be publicly announced; it can simply become known. It is also argued by some, including the well-known French analyst, Pierre Hassner, that in the event of the utilization of such a strategy the Soviet Union would replace the regimes of Eastern Europe. Whether or not this might occur is obviously a matter of argument. However, some observations may be in order. For the Soviet Union to replace such regimes in peacetime, before it knows whether its partners will observe such limits or not, or whether that question is even relevant, would be to pay

very high costs of an economic and political nature. And it would not ensure the reliability of WTO forces. To attempt to replace these regimes during a crisis would impose military costs and would undermine the credibility of Soviet threats.

Indeed, one of the major arguments for the strategy is that it would influence Soviet decision-making with respect to pre-crisis and crisis decisions. As long as Soviet threats decrease assurance in NATO and rupture the unity of the NATO partners, there is an incentive, perhaps counterbalanced by other factors, for the Soviet Union to escalate threats during a crisis. To the extent, however, that the escalation of threats engenders conflicts of interest within the Warsaw Treaty Organization, this acts as a deterrent to the Soviet Union and becomes an argument for those in the Soviet hierarchy who are against escalation.

The strategy has one other advantage. By removing the QRAs, the Pershings, and the Sergeants, and by using instead the MIRVed Poseidon fleet against targets in the WTO, the deterrence value of the British and French submarine fleet is enhanced. If Soviet bases in Russia and Eastern Europe were hit from sea, the Soviet Union could not be sure whether the attacking missiles came from American or French or British

submarines. The Soviet Union would hardly wish to engage in a long-range missile war with the United States. On the other hand, it would hardly make sense to hit France if the weapon might have been American. These uncertainties might possibly enhance the deterrence value of the British and French fleets.

There is one other device that might be used to enhance the credibility of NATO deterrence. The Eastern European WTO partners of the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, are outfitted with Soviet aircraft. It is possible for the United States to build bomb racks that fit those aircraft and to fit the bomb racks with nuclear weapons. There is no necessity of consultation with these countries and, therefore, no likelihood of disrupting their relations with the Soviet Union by designing and building such racks. There is no need to announce the existence of the system, for it would soon become known. One might even deny any intention of using it and discuss it only as a device for enlarging the alternatives open to some future American administration. However, the fact that Romanian or Yugoslav pilots might land on American carriers and take up such bomb racks or that they might land in a NATO base in Western Europe and pick them up would serve as a deterrent to Soviet attacks upon such countries or

excessive Soviet pressure upon them. Similarly, anti-tank weaponry might be stored in Europe for possible shipment to Yugoslavia or to Eastern European states that are under major Soviet pressure.

These tactics would not disrupt the Warsaw Treaty Organization; for, as previously pointed out, with the possible, but unlikely, exception of Yugoslavia these regimes have an interest in the maintenance of a strong Soviet Union. On the other hand, it would greatly limit the measures the Soviet Union could take if these countries do not wish to participate in a Soviet attack upon Western Europe or if for other reasons they find it necessary to resist Soviet pressures upon them. A decrease of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe for aggressive purposes against Western Europe would enhance the deterrence value of all Western European systems.

The Military Balance and Strategy

The military strategic balance is but one of the factors affecting the general strategic balance. The value of military force depends upon the situations in which it can function as a useful component of policy at particular force levels and in particular force configurations. The ways in which the status of forces in the NATO area affects alliance cohesion, the foreign policies of the member nations, their

willingness to support an adequate defense establishment and alternative declaratory military postures almost defy generalization. Furthermore, abstract discussions of force postures and force configurations tend to ignore the fact that changes in force postures and configurations are sometimes at least as important as actual force levels or configurations. These changes are signals in the international environment, both intended and unintended, that pass through the filters of interpretation of elites in alliance, neutral, and opposed bloc nations. They produce their effects in a rapidly changing world in which policy is adjusted not merely to the strategic but also to the economic and political, in a narrower sense of the last terms.

Conversely, political and economic factors can also affect force posture and configuration and strategic doctrine. A failure to manage money, trade, and resources in ways that minimize instability either for one's alliance partners or for important associates of theirs may strain cooperation within the force structure. The attempt to impose cohesion in policy -- as, for instance, the United States did with respect to oil during the Yom Kippur War in 1973 -- may change perceptions in ways that decrease the value of armed force for either deterrence or war fighting.

The Latin Problem in Europe

One extremely important problem concerning the adequacy of NATO lies in the Latin/Anglo-Germanic division among the Western European members of NATO. The strength of the Communist parties in the Latin members of NATO introduces a serious potential problem in terms of the functioning of the alliance. And it introduces serious problems with respect to American policy concerning the alliance. The current American policy -- which is to insist that no member of the alliance that has Communists in its cabinet can participate in the military planning of NATO -- apparently rests on two assumptions. The first assumption is that the Communist parties in these Latin countries are Trojan horses that only pretend to favor pluralism and to accept NATO as a defensive alliance. The other assumption seems to be that American warnings will be effective in keeping them out of cabinets. that is, that these warnings will serve as a form of political deterrence. These assumptions are questionable on several counts. In the first place, the history of the Italian Communist Party for the past twenty years gives some reason to believe that its announced positions on pluralism and NATO may be genuine. The French Communist party appears to have undergone a massive transformation of membership that may be

one of the effective causes in the recent changes in its declaratory policies on pluralism, although it is "outde Gaulling" de Gaulle on alliance issues. Secondly, there is no reason to believe that the electoral strength of the left in the Latin countries is likely to suffer a major secular decline and some reason to believe, especially in Italy and France, that a grand (C.D. and C.P.) coalition and a leftist coalition respectively are within the realm of the possible. American warnings against Communist participation in NATO governments may achieve their intended effect, but they may also produce stubborn resistance and resentment. Moreover, they may prejudice the argument for NATO should such coalitions come to power. Even should Italy and France, for instance, remain in NATO under leftist coalitions, the degree of confidence that is a requisite for effective policy may be gravely injured.

Moreover, in the early stages of Communist participation in governments in Italy and France, they are unlikely to hold crucial cabinet posts. The information they are likely to obtain concerning NATO probably is available to the Soviet Union from other sources. Furthermore, NATO can proliferate contingency plans to an extent that would bewilder the recipients of secret information.

On the other hand, it must be admitted that these develop-

ments do confront the United States with a dilemma. the Communists come to effective power in Italy and France and should they reject either pluralism or NATO, or perhaps both, then the effectiveness of NATO as a defense for the "thin skin" of Western Europe would be severely compromised. The distance from the East German border to Paris is roughly 300 miles, about the width of the state of Pennsylvania: a skin rather than an area having depth. The removal of the French sector and the neutralization of the Southern flank would transform what is at best a thin skin into a patch. Both depth and surface would be gone from the available fighting space. And with it would go not only the capability to employ the military forces available to NATO but the assurance that is a prerequisite to their employment. Furthermore, such a development likely would push Germany to the political right in a way that would bring other cruel choices to the United States.

On the one hand, it is far from clear that American opposition to Communists in cabinets in France and Italy either diminishes the likelihood of these events or increases the likelihood that the events would be benign if they do occur. And such pressure would increase the likelihood of a major rightist reaction in Germany. On the other hand, too

eager an embrace of Communist participation in French or Italian governments by the United States might discourage our best friends in those countries and might produce a flight of capital that would make democracy unworkable for any party. It also might prove embarrassing to the Communists in both Italy and France. They might come under attack from their own hardliners as bourgeois revisionists. And they might have choices forced upon them that they are not yet ready to make and that perhaps they do not yet understand.

Eastern Europe and American Policy

The Soviet Union clearly cannot exercise today the type of firm control over its Eastern European partners that will insure their political loyalty in crises except at a price it is unwilling to pay during time of peace. If the Communist regimes in the Eastern European states would feel insecure in a world without a strong Soviet Union, it is also true that many of them would feel excessively constrained in a Europe totally dominated by the Soviet Union. Excessive Soviet pressures against these leaderships would further increase the distance between the Soviet Union and the Western European Communist leaderships, unless NATO were so weak that fear would replace the desire for some reasonable level of autonomy. The very fact that Communist participation in cabinets in NATO

countries was consistent with the NATO alliance would weaken the Soviet argument for tight Soviet control of the WTO by undermining the argument that NATO is a threat to socialist economies.

Obviously this situation is fraught with danger. If
Soviet control were weakened too much and in too short a
period of time, the Soviet reaction might well be massive as
it was in Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, too great an
acceptance of Soviet control in Eastern Europe by the United
States might undermine its arguments for pluralism and autonomy as universal values and remove the moral basis of American
policy. Force reductions in Europe, agreements on the movements of people and ideas, the positions of Communist parties
in Western Europe, and the general context of world politics
will be among the factors that play a role in this development.

Middle East

We can speak with some confidence only of what would happen at the extreme ends of the force spectrum in the Middle East. Were the balance to swing radically in favor of the Arab states, the prospects for peace would be small indeed. Because they could win a final victory, unless the great powers were to preclude this, the costs of war would seem smaller than

the potential gains of war. On the other hand, if Israel could revert to the situation prior to 1954 when, under the conditions of the weaponry at the time and its superior skills in warfare, it had an effective defense in depth despite the smallness of its territory, we would predict that Israel would revert to a second-strike strategy. Although military forces and postures might influence our predictions with respect to the spectrum between these extremes, it does so only within the context of a specific analysis based on the richness of actual cases. We cannot effectively generalize in the abstract. The best solution to the problem of the Middle East is peace. But current American policy seems designed primarily to throw the Soviet Union out of the Middle East -- a policy the short-run prospects of which are greater than the long-run -- and may even be designed to avoid peace settlements as a corollary.

China

If we turn to China, we are concerned roughly with the "balance" between Russia, China, and Japan. If the reports are correct that the Russians were really considering an attack upon the Chinese nuclear facilities in 1969 and that they even inquired about the American response to such an attack, American opposition may have served within the complex Russian analysis as a component that produced the negative decision that was actually reached. But, even if this was the case, it would not have been the fear of an American military response that was decisive. Nor did Soviet fear of Chinese power deter a Russian attack. If the Russians were deterred, it was by a far more complex set of considerations, perhaps involving Communist ideology, but surely involving a consideration of the consequences for relations with the United States, for economic and trade policies, for the evolution of Western Europe, and for relations with the Eastern European states. These will be the factors that play a major role in the China case, although it cannot be ignored that the Chinese are disturbed by what they regard as a limited U.S. commitment to NATO and by U.S. concessions to Russia at SALT. The U.S. is also failing to develop its relations with China -- a factor that may be more important than the details of concrete policies.

The Possibility of Intervention

American capacity for effective intervention or assistance in or to beleaguered nations for a long time was handicapped by the emphasis of its strategic budget on central
nuclear war and its lack of investment in those weapons systems
that would be both effective and cheap to use in quantity in

lower level conflicts or threat situations around the globe.

Blind spots existed with respect to military systems and equipment that ranged from bombers to back packs and shoes.

For the next five years intervention, except possibly in the Middle East, will probably lack sufficient public support to make it feasible. Therefore, failures of preparation will not likely be important, particularly now that at least some of the deficiencies are being corrected, at least in part. However, public moods have a half-life of about 10 years. There is already some public swing in mood resulting from guilt feelings over our betrayal of South Vietnam. Any substantial shocks in the international environment will exacerbate these feelings by providing a rationale for a change in perspective.

When such mood shifts occur, they usually are more radical than the situation warrants. If they are accompanied by a panoply of weapons systems that permit only "ham-handed" responses, the likelihood of disproportionate behavior is increased substantially. The consequences of such perturbations can be reduced somewhat by adequate military budgets and appropriate force design. But the primary role in reducing (or increasing) perturbations will be played by general strategic policy, that is, by the type of international system

environment that will be produced by the political and economic policies that are chosen.

Political and Economic Strategy

The most constructive path for the United States to follow is one that de-emphasizes force in the world at the same time that it maintains adequate military forces. The United States furthermore should be carrying out a range of studies that will outline the possibility of economic and political measures: measures that would push force and weaponry even further into the background by creating a set of international structures that make force increasingly irrelevant to the perceived options of the states of the world. The OECD countries (primarily the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan) must return to a system of at least temporarily fixed (very slowly changing) exchange rates and arrive at a coordination of domestic economic measures that are consistent with those rates. The OECD countries, Russia, China, and the other resource-rich countries must agree on the stabilization of commodity prices, the utilization of high efficiency resources, R and D progress concerning less efficient resources, infrastructure planning for transitions in resource exploitation, and capital replacement measures for the exporting states. All the rich states must

be prepared to join a fund for development for the poor states. Successful pursuit of such measures will make force increasingly irrelevant. Failure to solve these problems, even if military budgets and force levels are reduced, will produce a degree of economic conflict that will destroy alliances, produce domestic upheavals, coups, and revolutions, and make force increasingly relevant.

The Role of Threat Systems

Force and the threat of force both can be deterred in Europe if U.S. strategy is adequate, barring the unforeseen. However, deterrence involves a balance of military, political, and economic measures. It cannot be analyzed from one framework alone. Nor is there any necessarily requisite level with respect to any one of the factors. The argument for a stronger military posture is a threshold argument, not an either/or argument. An adequate military posture raises the threshold for Soviet threat or attack and it guards against unexpected but far from impossible contingencies. Particular changes in the military posture, whether upward or downward, must be weighed against a multitude of effects within the broad spectrum of strategic interaction.

The major problem with the way in which the question is usually posed is that two ways of asking questions are con-

fused. If one were writing a report for the Pentagon with respect to the force levels and force postures the United States should propose for Western Europe, one would devise a set of unlikely but not absurd scenarios and relate alternative recommendations to them. For instance, it might be asked how the United States could respond in the event of a crisis in Europe involving the threat of Soviet intervention if NATO dissolves. We could then design weapons systems, deployments, and policies that would provide the maximum opportunity for deterrence in those circumstances. These would still be subject to specific policies based upon the particularities of the case. But they would provide the framework for considering what military systems should be purchased.

Other scenarios might consider situations in which
NATO is weakened either militarily or politically because
Communist participation in Western European governments does
reduce support for NATO. These scenarios could deal with
situations in which threats of political, military, or smallscale harassing or forcible measures might arise. The question of basing the QRAs, for instance, could be considered
within this framework. The Pentagon might also consider
actual attack scenarios and the possible use of tactical or

conventional forces.

In short, the prior situations can be war-gamed, at least in the loose sense of that term. And, to the extent that these games demonstrate that certain force levels, deployments, and ries, both declaratory and actual, either likely defeat the WTO forces or raise WTO costs gravely, we can then show that some of these combinations are superior to others in terms of lowering the risks of the threat or use of force.

Unfortunately, we demonstrate this only with respect to the questions that are being asked within this context. Such a demonstration bears only marginally upon the questions with which we opened this paper. And that topic that is circumscribed by those questions is the more important topic. Although the Pentagon should be sensitive to this latter set of questions, it would incapacitate the Pentagon to study it in any detail. Not only would changing conditions change the answers that would be given but increasing knowledge would change one's conceptions of what the answers ought to be.

This is one of the reasons why strategic analysis of the narrower type seems absurd to some people. However, its power and usefulness stem from the seeming absurdity, that is, from the fact that it does not attempt to deal with the rich world

of practical experience but only with the narrower world of largely military factors.

Moreover, richer analyses that give greater emphasis to political and economic factors may mislead us in a very practical sense despite their greater realism. We may come to the conclusion that force is not useful in the modern world. We may even assert that this is particularly true of nuclear weapons and that, for instance, the American nuclear capacity was useless in Vietnam. However, there is some evidence -- how important it is difficult to be sure -- that American nuclear threats did play a role with respect to the Russian withdrawal from Iran in 1946 and with respect to the compromised peace in Korea in 1953. Moreover, if the United States had had the will to win the war in Vietnam, it could have done so without the use of nuclear weapons from which it was deterred, apart from moral considerations, by the political price it would have had to have paid. And surely force worked in the Dominican Republic and Czechoslovakia. Thus, weapons, either conventional or nuclear, are not necessarily useless. And states that have them are not necessarily incapacitated from using them. Incapacitation always occurs only in some situations. Enhancement may occur in others. And these latter situations may be world-determinative. This is just another

example of the "Russian roulette" principle.

Conclusions

One reason we are so surprised so often by what occurs in the world is that we extrapolate from the past. Then we suddenly discover that the factors that produced the behavior in the past have coalesced into a new pattern that excludes some past behaviors and that permits and facilitates some radically new behaviors.

Can we foresee what crises of leadership might occur in the Soviet Union, what crises may evolve during the Yugoslav succession, what crises between the Soviet Union and its WTO allies may threaten to spill over and to build up pressure for actual conflict in Western Europe, or what transformations in one of the NATO countries, accompanied by WTO pressure, might influence the United States toward flexing its muscles if it has maintained a defense establishment that permits this?

An adequate strategic doctrine would maintain force postures, levels, and policies that provide reasonable opportunities for deterrence or war fighting if the unexpected occurs but that are used primarily as a reserve for a panoply of policies that raise the incentives for peaceful settlement and that raise the costs of the employment of threats or force.

Such a doctrine would involve policies that must be far broader than crisis management. Such a doctrine should be based not only on a view of what the world is like but also on a view of how the world may be transformed in accordance with national and international interests and values.

Because this panoply of policies would be oriented not merely toward particular results but toward constructing a framework within which particular results may be generated, it is necessary philosophical in character, for it mobilizes support by enhancing those political, economic, and human values that coalesce support while making manifest the will and the capability to pursue them. If one important aspect of the conduct of war is concentration on the waging of war, an essential aspect of broader strategy, particularly during peace, is recognition of the diversity, although compatibility, of aims among the various components of policy. A sure sign of the absence of strategy in policy is narrowness of focus -- concentration upon an identity among means and a grand coalition of allies who hold all these ends in common.

Strategy diversifies and harmonizes. Its structure contains themes, counterthemes, and themes within themes. Where events or conditions weaken one of its aspects, it contains

the potential for compensation in others of its aspects.

Our answer to the question concerning the relationship of the instruments of force, and technological developments in military hardware, to deterrence is that we cannot answer the wrong question. We can analyze this problem only in the concrete and never in the abstract.

The Consequences and Limits of Military Intervention

Changing Military Operations:

Mobility and Conventional Warfare

by Lewis S. Sorley, III

Perhaps the central strategic question of the nuclear age concerns the continuing utility of the use of military force. Now, some three decades after the introduction of nuclear weapons in warfare, we are still just beginning to come to grips with the impact of the existence of such weapons on conventional warfare.

It is easy to understand how, in the initial almost overwhelming impact of the fateful technological marriage of nuclear weapons and then intercontinental missiles as a means of projecting them, an instinctive reaction might well have been that the use of force could no longer be contemplated. And one can understand how, even with subsequent qualification of the reaction, making the formulation read that no responsible state could any longer contemplate the use of force, it might still appear that the advent of weapons and means of delivery of such devastating power would inhibit the use of force for fear of escalation to the unthinkable nuclear exchange.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Defense or the U. S. Government.

States monopoly and then preponderance of nuclear weapons. It quickly became clear that in many cases of contention, including those most likely to occur, the disparity between the ends sought and the nuclear means of applying force was simply too great for the threat or actuality of employment of nuclear weapons to be credible or contemplated. While "massive retaliation" was articulated as the centerpiece of United States strategic policy, it did not constitute a workable comprehensive response to military challenges; in fact, while massive retaliation was for a time the nation's declaratory policy, at least in the shorthand articulation of it, it never became the action policy. The gap between what was at hazard and the means of defending it was simply too great for those means to be used.

Situations arose in which the use of military force was considered or actually undertaken, and in which the application of nuclear weapons was clearly inappropriate, or appeared unlikely to beneficially influence the outcome, or both. Korea was one such case, perhaps the most illustrative of the less than universal usefulness of the war fighting aspects of strategic nuclear weapons. With it went the hope that the threat of nuclear war would serve to dampen conflict at lesser levels.

Whether it served to restrain or moderate those lesser conflicts, either during the period of United States nuclear monopoly (as in Korea) or later (Suez and Lebanon, for example) is less clear, but certainly in the case of the Cuban missile crisis the prependerance of United States strategic power (and the locus of the confrontation) appears to have impacted greatly upon the outcome.

An additional element which inhibited use of nuclear weapons had arisen, of course, when the Soviet Union in particular, and then several other states, acquired their own nuclear arsenals. Now there was added to the inappropriateness of nuclear response in many cases the threat of retaliation, eventually to be regarded as a certainty between the superpowers, and one against which there was no defense. Assured mutual destruction, or at least the prospect of it, has exerted a powerful influence on the United States for a number of years. 1

But while it may be easy to understand, given these unprecedented and potentially cataclysmic influences, how many came to regard force as no longer useful in the modern world, it is also important not to lose sight of the uses of force which were continually occurring during the same period. Among lesser powers the use of force continued unabated. Over the past three decades war has been a commonplace of international affairs. India has conquered East Pakistan, thereby transformed into

Bangladesh; Israel and various Arab states have four times gone to war; Greece and Turkey have fought over Cyprus; most recently Cuba has used armed forces to install a government in Angola. The list could be extended almost endlessly. While we might not agree with the objectives of the contending parties in these and other cases, we must concede that at least one side believed (before the fact, if not invariably after) that the use of armed force had some utility in its case.

The superpowers have also resorted to the use of force. The United States intervened, along with other United Nations members, to thwart the invasion of South Korea; in the Dominican Republic to prevent establishment of an unfriendly government; and in South Vietnam in an unavailing attempt to contain Communist expansionism. The Soviet Union, in an era when other colonial empires were rapidly breaking up, used force time after time to create a new colonial empire, bringing the Baltic states under its control, then all of eastern Europe, and decisively putting down challenges to its control in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Armed force has been repeatedly and successfully used during this period to overthrow existing governments in coups or full-scale revolutionary wars. Cuba, China and Argentina are only a few of the many

examples which could be cited. Escape from colonial domination has been achieved through the use of force, as in Algeria's establishment of its independence from France. And guerrilla movements have consistently turned to the use of force to achieve their objectives, with the Palestine Liberation Organization's success in obtaining United Nations recognition perhaps the most striking case in point. To an increasing degree, and this is a challenge to world stability that seems certain to grow much more severe, terrorist organizations of varying stripes have found armed force useful in pursuing their ends.

One could go on at extended length compiling illustrations of recent uses of force by major and minor powers, subgovernmental entities, and even small groups and individuals, both political and criminal. The range of examples would include, during the nuclear age, every variety of conflict situation imaginable except direct superpower confrontation: superpower against lesser state; lesser states against one another; superpower surrogates against superpowers, lesser states, or other surrogates; revolutionary, subversive, guerrilla or terrorist groups against established governments.

The objectives have been almost as varied: to effect domination (USSR over Czechoslovakia, for example); resist aggression (US/UN

vs. North Korea); overthrow the existing government (Castro in Cuba); displace the head of an existing government which continues in power (Argentina after Eva Peron); prevent establishment of an unfriendly government (US in the Dominican Republic); install a friendly government (Cuba in Angola); gain independence (Algeria against France); or split off and control a portion of a political entity (PLO and the West Bank). I have dwelt at what may appear to be unnecessary length upon the pervasive and continuing resort to conventional armed force in the nuclear era, even though it appears self-evident to me, because there are those who suggest "the possibility that the threat of nuclear war and the consequent rearrangements in international politics has brought about, at least for the time being, a remarkable suppression of conventional fighting."

In addition to the cited cases and others in which military force was actually employed, one might postulate many other instances in which having the capacity to employ force preserved desirable situations for the possessor, and often made it unnecessary to employ the force because it was clearly seen as equal to any challenge. While such cases are far more conjectural than those in which force actually came to be employed, and in which the utility or lack of it can therefore more readily be gauged, there is every reason to believe that strong states

would find their influence diminished, the pressures upon them increased, and the security of their interests lessened were their capacity to apply force to be reduced.

This is a reality which the Soviets understand full well. As one observer has pointed out, "the Russians have an acute appreciation of military power. They have always seen the political shadow of military power.... We don't have that appreciation. Perhaps here the academicians have been to some extent at fault because they generally preach that there is no political utility to military power." Perhaps it is too optimistic to expect that, having contemplated the events of the past three decades, there would be few who would fail to realize that military force has utility, political as well as military, and that this is a reality clearly perceived by many other states and, in a dangerous and uncertain world, ignored by the United States only at its peril.

The Political Utility of Force

While it can be demonstrated that, even in the nuclear age, conventional military forces have retained substantial utility, of equal and perhaps even greater interest is the political utility of such forces.

There is an evident and plausible connection between the existence of conventional forces; the context of events, including the perceived will

of authorities to employ military force; and the political effects. This causal relationship is evident across the entire scale from internal domestic influence to global power.

In terms of the viability of domestic governments, legal structures and social fabrics, the existence of military force provides a necessary ultimate sanction of governmental authority. This is not true only in states where a repressive and unpopular regime relies upon military force to maintain itself in power. It is also an essential element in the most open of governments, the more so as they incur certain vulnerabilities as a consequence of the very freedoms they seek to perpetuate. The capacity for ultimate resort to military force undergirds such governments' capacity to protect the rights of individuals, enforce the provisions of law, and reinforce where necessary the power of civil authority to deal with illegal acts. Elements of airborne divisions seldom need to be stationed at public schools to protect individual rights and prevent illegal interference with judicial injunctions, but were there no such forces to meet this need when called upon to do so, the vulnerability of the society and its representative government would be far greater. The political utility of military power in this domestic sense is apparent and immediate.

In international affairs, such political utility is often more remote, more tenuous, more conjectural. Nevertheless there is good reason to

believe that in many cases it is just as real and just as important as in the domestic sense. As Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Ellsworth has pointed out:

Other states, whether adversaries or allies, will mold their own policies and behavior upon their expectations with regard to U.S. actions. Those expectations are based partly on estimates of the capability of America's military forces in being, partly on assessments of the trends between ourselves and the Soviets -- and partly on estimates of our readiness to act.

The political utility of those forces which both the United States and the Soviet Union have stationed abroad are prominent cases in point.

The continuing presence of American troops in western Europe has not only provided the United States with a greater voice in the affairs of the region, to include exclusive provision of an American as supreme allied commander, pervasive influence through American custodianship of theater nuclear weapons, and guaranteed involvement of the United States in repelling any aggression against western Europe. It has also made possible the continuing assurance that the Federal Republic of Germany, emerging from the status of conquered nation to that of full and perhaps even preeminent (European) member of the North Atlantic alliance, remains a non-nuclear power. This political impact of conventional forces has been of incalculable value. It is problematical in the extreme whether the NATO alliance could accommodate a nuclear-armed FRG, to say nothing of the fears this would engender in the

eastern bloc. Yet it is equally hard to imagine Germany's willingness to forgo nuclear weapons without the contribution in both potential war fighting capacity and in manifestation of commitment represented by the presence of American troops. The political utility of those troops, which have not had to be committed to combat in the more than three decades they have been stationed in post-war Europe, is evident and enormous.

Soviet forces abroad in Europe have also had undoubted political utility, although marred by their having had to be used for war fighting on a number of occasions when the impact of their potential employment proved insufficient in itself to achieve their objectives. Unquestionably these concrete examples of willingness to actually employ the forces, as in Czechoslovakia in 196, have in turn enhanced their subsequent political utility. Maintenance of the preferred governments in power, direction and control of Warsaw Pact forces, and influence (if not total domination) in east European economic and political cooperation with the Soviet Union have all been enhanced by the magnitude, disposition and potential for employment of Soviet conventional forces.

Surrogate Measures

Clearly neither superpower wants a nuclear war if it can gain its ends by other less costly means. And neither wants to lose the

influence it has previously enjoyed in the world. Thus both have sought alternative means of bringing force to bear, means that lessen the risk of superpower confrontation. Faced with frustrating inhibitions on the use of their great power, both have tried a variety of alternatives. Alliances became a primary means utilized by the United States. The Soviet Union often used proxies, or provided support to revolutionary movements seeking to overthrow established governments. And, although they came to it by quite different courses, both superpowers came to view foreign aid as a means of attaining influence without the hazards of direct confrontation in the era of nuclear stalemate. The "reliance upon economic instruments by the United States and the USSR was based in part upon the fear of the consequences of competition on the military plane in a nuclear age."

These measures, while sometimes availing, have also been less than fully satisfying. It is unwieldy, slow and often frustrating to have always to deal through a surrogate, and never to be able to bring one's own tremendous power directly to bear. And just because inhibitions induced by fear of nuclear confrontation have kept both superpowers from direct encounters during this first brief period of acclimatization to the existence of nuclear weaponry is no reason to conclude that such restraints will continue indefinitely. Maneuvering in the strategic nuclear realm by one or both superpowers will be directed at developing

capabilities which could unlock the nuclear stalemate. These could range from a truly effective (which is not to say totally effective) anti-ballistic missile defense to a usable disarming first strike capability. Developments in warning, in hardening, in accuracy, in mobility, and perhaps later in exotic new systems could unbalance the strategic equation. All would have dramatic impact on the context of conventional warfare as well.

The search for means of reasserting superpower freedom of action need not wait on such developments, however. Given the overwhelming unwillingness of both major powers to enter into nuclear war present conditions we could, it seems to me, expect to see a great deal of cunning and ingenuity devoted to maneuvering political and military situations so that the opponent is the one faced with the decision to escalate the conflict to the nuclear level. Under such circumstances, it would be surprising indeed if the nation suffering the disadvantage decided to initiate strategic nuclear war rather than experience far less serious losses. Only if the alternative also amounted to massive destruction could we expect the loser to opt for nuclear devastation.

Under such circumstances the concept of the "nuclear umbrella," or extension of the protection of one nation's nuclear retaliatory capacity to protect an ally against aggression by another nuclear state, seems shaky indeed. The context in which this is usually discussed is that of a

Soviet aggression against a western European ally of the United States, or against Japan. In such circumstances it is at best problematical that American leadership would choose to initiate tactical nuclear war, much less strategic, to counter aggression not directly threatening the American continent. What is not so often considered, and ought to be more careful thought, is the range of symmetrical circumstances in which the United States might put the Soviet Union to the test of initiating nuclear warfare without being directly threatened itself before the fact. While none of these situations might come to pass, or even threaten to do so, one could for the sake of illustration imagine a range of situations ranging from intervention in the Middle East to neutralization of Cuba which could force the Soviet Union to make such a fateful choice or accede in the result. The critical point is that the opponent not be capable of defeating our initiative using conventional forces alone; if he can, then we have very restricted options. If he cannot, then we have the opportunity to influence events where necessary, and the Soviet Union, not we ourselves, would be faced with having to decide on nuclear war, a choice we can no more imagine its making (again, it must be emphasized, under present conditions) than they can imagine our making it.

The point of this extended, but relevant, digression is that the conventional warfare capability of a state is overwhelmingly important in maintaining its capacity to influence world events and in keeping the

nuclear threshold at the highest possible level. A state which is unable to resist aggression using conventional means has but two choices: escalate to nuclear warfare (if it has the means) or suffer defeat. With adequate conventional forces, it can prevent the opponent from winning conventionally, and can put upon that opponent the burden of deciding to escalate. By any standards of self-interest or rationality that we can imagine being applied, the opponent would choose to desist rather than initiate nuclear war, simply because a nuclear exchange would guarantee far greater disadvantage than could conceivably result in any other way. I have previously cited the exception to this, wherein a state such as the Soviet Union might, having made extensive preparations to survive a nuclear exchange with the least possible damage, be tempted to undergo such an ordeal for the potential relative advantage over a major rival that has not made such preparations for its own protection. Without such preparations, the choice of nuclear war would be especially painful for a Soviet government, which has to fear the chaos of major war as one of the few events which could possibly interfere with its iron grip on its own populace and its captive satellites. Perhaps even more inhibiting than the sure loss of millions of lives and the destruction of a major portion of the hard-won industrial base of the Soviet Union would be the probable loss of control of the new Soviet empire by those now in power.

The Projection of Power

Much strategic analysis appears to have been written in a vacuum. It is critically important, in considering what can and cannot be accomplished at an acceptable price, that what can be accomplished be recognized as in large measure a function of who wants to interfere with the doing of it. For us, in the contemporary world, this means preeminently the Soviets.

To argue that military force cannot accomplish all things, which is clearly the case, is far from having made a case for its having no utility. There has been, during the Cold War era, perhaps too little concern with geopolitical factors, and with how they translate into strategic advantage. One can accomplish certain things with given forces, provided the locus of conflict is favorably situated with regard to the location of those forces, the distance from their base of supply, the vulnerability of the lines of communications thus relied upon, the opponent's means of interdiction and his willingness to enlarge the conflict, and these same factors as they impact upon his forces. Thus the two crucial variables in determining what can be done, or alternatively what is required to do some specific thing, are the location of the conflict and the opponent. The practical basis of the concept of spheres of influence is simply the recognition that overwhelming advantages in the application of power accrue as a result of location. In

determining the size, stationing and equipping of our own forces, therefore, it is essential to take into account the kinds of things we might be forced to call upon them to do, where these things are likely to take place, and who is likely to provide opposition. Given the extreme difficulty of predicting the full range of possible future conflicts, one is driven to design "general purpose" forces having applicability in a range of conflicts. But the primary determinants of the design of those forces, and this is repugnant to the American desire to be free of outside influences, is and has to be the capacity of potential opponents and the probable locations of conflict, and this means at present and for the foreseeable future the Soviets and those places where their interests and ours come into conflict.

The determination of what those interests are and where they must be protected is of course central to design and deployment of military forces. Richard Barnet has recently complained in the pages of New Republic that "the discussion on foreign policy is taking place within narrow limits because the participants on all sides basically accept the same world view. There is a tacit agreement," he went on to say, "as to the goals America should be pursuing in international politics, shared assumptions about what is happening in the world, and a common faith about what American power can do." I would have thought such a state of affairs would be cause for rejoicing, especially in the wake

of an era of divisive and acrimonious debate which has led many to articulate the need for development of a new consensus. I would perhaps have argued that there has not yet emerged, at the time this is written, anything which could be described as a new consensus upon which to base a coherent force rationale for US general purpose military elements. Yet clearly only the United States possesses the capacity to pose an effective counter to Soviet strength and ambition in the contemporary world. Clearly the future hopes of many other peoples depend on the effectiveness of the United States in filling that role. And clearly the future prosperity and well-being of the American enterprise are dependent upon such action.

What is much less clear is whether the American people generally, and more particularly the leaders they will choose, possess the will to meet these responsibilities, the foresight to understand the consequences of failing to do so, and the resultant imperative to consistent, resolute and effective action to influence the course of world events. This does not, of course, mean solely or even primarily military actions. Nor does it mean determining those events, for influencing them is all any one nation can hope to do in an uncertain world of competing interests and ideologies. It means, rather, demonstrated

leadership in bringing to bear across the whole complex of economic, diplomatic, political and military issues the most constructive and purposeful example.

In the military aspect of this complex, what are the elements of the ability to project power? First, of course, there is the possession of forces in being. Then, they must be deployable, or pre-positioned, so as to be able to bring influence to bear. This entails forward basing, or strategic mobility, or both. Next they must be sustainable for the necessary duration of the conflict, which implies war reserve stocks, pre-positioned supplies and equipment, and the strategic logistics capability to accomplish resupply. These capacities may be enhanced through judicious use of security assistance and military aid, and through means of an effective system of alliances. Not that these latter are without their drawbacks, as we have come to realize more sharply since the oil embargo than before, but they can also markedly enhance the projection of power in appropriate circumstances. Availability of staging areas, overflight rights, port facilities and the like strongly influence the ability to project power, as can the denial of such assets to one's opponent.

With regard to the availability of bases, particularly staging areas such as airfields for refueling, and overflight rights, some consideration might well be given to the circumstances under which such

facilities are required. While most discussion of them centers around negotiations and agreements for their use, it should be recognized that in situations of sufficiently desperate need the United States could, and might be forced to, seize, defend and utilize key strategic ports or airheads, not confined to those belonging to the opponent. Furthermore, nations possessing such facilities which might be reluctant to commit themselves in peacetime to allowing the United States to use them in the event of war might see the situation differently when war actually occurred. Others might be unwilling to be viewed as having agreed to such use, but acquiesce in such use so long as it appeared that they were forced into it. Thus realistic contingency planning might well take into account bases not actually possessed, but potentially available for emergency use. Naturally consideration of Soviet capabilities ought to evaluate similar prospects for contingency use by their forces.

The Soviets are apparently impressed by the flexibility of United States general purpose forces and weapons and our capability for the projection of military power. In this regard, I believe too little attention has been paid to the complementary but different roles of projecting power on the one hand and interfering with the projection of

it on the other. In the context of use of the seas this problem is a familiar one, and it is generally recognized that it is far more difficult and demanding to control the seas, thereby guaranteeing unimpeded use of them, than it is to deny their use to others. The latter "spoiler's" role is one we have worried about a great deal, as many of our important allies and interests are separated from us by the oceans, and sea control would be important to us in cases where we needed to maintain support for them. But greater consideration of the opportunities which the sea denial role offers us, especially in an era of expanding Soviet interest in the projection of power, seems likely to be productive. Forces trained, equipped and deployed to enforce a quarantine of a theater of conflict could play an important and essentially peaceful and stabilizing role in a number of potential conflicts.

What, then, are the missions which conventional forces must be prepared to accomplish in the future? They will be, as they have been in the past, diverse and demanding. In addition to the customary requirements to be able to project power at a distance, to control use of the seas, and to seize and hold territory, as well as to defend against hostile attack and to lend support and assistance to allies, the new missions may well prove more difficult yet. Means of countering

terrorism, for example, seem likely to become more necessary in the future. And the impact on global power projection which has come to lean heavily on such sophisticated systems as navigation satellites, increasing vulnerability of strategic mobility means to cheap and widespread interdiction systems, the complexity of problems posed by conventional arms proliferation, potential penetration or neutralization of computer-based command and control systems, and other even more futuristic challenges in the offing guarantee that the lot of force planners in the future will not be dull.

The Nature of the Conflict

There has been, in the renewed attention to the prospects and problems of high intensity conventional war which has characterized the post-Vietnam period, much conversation about "winning the first battle of the next war." There is a great deal of common sense in this outlook, although it has been often misunderstood or distorted in resultant commentary. Simply put, concern about winning the first battle of the next war means that there is likely to be little time for preparation, the conflict will probably be intense and especially costly in terms of materiel losses, and thus such traditional strengths

as an expandable industrial base, mobilizable reserve forces, and the like are no longer of such import as formerly, since there would be no time to bring them to bear.

This thesis is certainly arguable. For one thing, it draws heavily on the data derived from study of the 1973 Middle East war, where major equipment loss rates were the highest thus far recorded. This experience may or may not necessarily be repeated in other future conflicts involving different opponents, or taking place in different environments. And while high loss rates might well deplete the arsenals of combatants more quickly than in the past, determined opponents could undoubtedly find means of fighting on, even if more primatively, despite their respective losses, if they were roughly symmetrical losses. Such capabilities as battlefield logistics and repair could prove even more important than formerly, and the recent trend in American ground forces of drastically reducing the combat service support in favor of a preponderance of combat elements could turn out to have been highly counterproductive. And if the fighting continued, even at less sophisticated levels, there could well be time for traditional mobilization to take place and to influence the outcome. We simply don't know how it will turn out.

In the service schools the time-honored method of dealing with such

unavoidable uncertainties is to observe that "it all depends on the situation." In more theoretical circles one now often hears the observation that such cases are "extraordinarily scenario-dependent." It amounts to the same thing: where one cannot be reasonably certain in advance which contingency will be faced, it is prudent to prepare for as general a case as possible. The aspect of the winning the first battle philosophy which seems most certain is this: it is important to survive the first battle as a viable fighting force, and this means, if not winning, at least not losing decisively. The forces in being, and capable of being employed in the opening stages of a conflict, do therefore assume tremendous importance. The United States had traditionally depended upon its industrial strength and capacity to field and equip a mobilized army when necessary. It has also depended on others to keep the conflict from being lost irretrievably and to buy the time need for such mobilization. Unless the forces in being are capable of sustaining the conflict through the period until mobilization can be effected, there may not be time in a future conflict for this capability to have any bearing. The utility of strong forces in being is apparent.

There is another important aspect of forces in being that ought to be emphasized along with the war fighting consideration. The deterrent effect of conventional forces has received substantially less attention than that of strategic nuclear forces, yet it may be a question of nearly comparable significance. This is true first of all because of the connection previously discussed between the adequacy of conventional forces and the nuclear threshold. Insufficient conventional forces are not only improvident in terms of the ability to counter hostile conventional attack; they also increase the likelihood of having to face the agonizing dilemma of resort to nuclear weapons or acceptance of conventional defeat. The stronger the conventional forces a nation maintains, the less likely it is to have to face such a dilemma. For a nation such as the United States, whose objectives are non-aggressive and defensive in character, this is an ideal posture, since it entails no initiation of situations which pose the dilemma; only their own aggressive acts could put them at such hazard, and they would have the additional alternative, not available to peaceable defenders, of simply ceasing the conflict with no loss to themselves.

A crucial component of conventional deterrence, as it is of the strategic counterpart, is willingness to employ the forces at one's disposal. I believe it is correct to represent the deterrent as resulting from the product of two factors: military capacity and the will to employ

tt. If either factor is zero, the product is zero; if either is minimal, the result is very low; if both are high, then the deterrent effect is also very great. In modern times, it is possible to know quite a lot about the real capability of a nation's armed forces, especially in an open society such as ours, and especially about the conventional forces. Thus the factor in the deterrence product which the state of the forces represents is not only fairly easy to determine and assess, but also to manipulate. The size of the forces, their equipment, their state of readiness, where they are stationed, the scope and frequency of the exercises in which they engage, and other such tangible factors can be enhanced, and are concurrently quite visible to potential opponents.

Furthermore, vigorous efforts to enhance and maintain such conventional force capabilities are viewed as being evidence of the other factor in the deterrence product, that of national will to employ the forces when necessary. The nature and intensity of the public and governmental discussion of the use of force in various international events is also a factor in communicating national will, but it is one often skewed by the vocal expression of minority views which may not be indicative; the state of the forces in being is a more reliable and tangible signal of what the people in general want and are willing to

pay for in terms of conventional forces and the disposition to employ them. And while that willingness is notoriously variable, especially when other nations come to be viewed as exploiting or taking advantage of the essentially peaceful outlook of the United States, the generation of the forces to implement a willingness to use them is far more time-consuming than a shift in intention. The forces in being are thus enormously important in terms of what can be done, given the determination to use them.

What, then, given some willingness to maintain forces, are the determinants of success in conventional war? This is very much bound up with the question of winning the first battle, or at least not losing it, so as to be around to win the last battle as well, and with concern as to whether future warfare will more likely be a short or a long war, the latter question involving many crucial questions concerning the structure, location and size of forces in being and reserve forces, if any, as well as the relevance of industrial capacity to national power in such a context.

One could articulate any number of factors contributory to military success in various historical or hypothetical situations. Among those which seem most enduringly important are the following: surprise, by far the greatest multiplier of combat power; tactical skill, and effective

means of command, control and communications to bring it to bear; mobility means, both on the battlefield itself and strategic; sustainability of forces; location of the conflict; ability to concentrate a preponderance of force at the critical juncture, far more important than overall superiority in numbers; morale of the forces, particularly important to the armies of a democratic state; and domestic support for the prosecution of the conflict. With regard to this latter factor, it is critically important, and we ought now to have learned this, that we develop and organize support for a coherent and consistent policy which operates to guide both the military endeavor and those aspects not strictly speaking military but of great importance in supporting prosecution of the military campaign, to include our political, diplomatic, economic and psychological initiatives and programs.

It is particularly important for policy makers and leaders to remember that it takes much longer to generate and equip forces than it takes for public opinion to change. Forces in being need not be employed, but forces which do not exist cannot be employed, no matter the urgency of the requirement for them. No prudent policy can be based on the absence of a capability.

The Nature of the Forces

Conventional forces are, or ought to be, almost continually in a state of flux, as new technology, changes in the world environment, and institutional maturation dictate necessary changes. Response to these stimuli is often delayed or incomplete, providing opportunities for advantage to potential opponents, and indeed one might argue that the essence of strategy is the early recognition and reaction to meaningful change.

American conventional forces at present pose a number of problems. The Army Chief of Staff, General Fred C. Weyand, has recently said that he is "not satisfied with the quality, the quantity nor the affordability of our equipment." That is reassuring, in that complacence is often a harbinger of defeat. One would expect changes in our forces, and to determine what those changes should entail we look to the impact of new technology and to the developments in Soviet forces. Great energy is need to counter the overwhelming tendency to believe, in the face of all evidence to the contrary, that the way things are is the way they have always been and, even more unrealistically, the way they will continue to be.

Genuinely revolutionary things are happening in the technology of

conventional warfare. In terms of those developments which are known and extant today, and thus will make a substantial difference in the next few years, none is more dramatic or challenging than the changes in guidance for conventional munitions. The difference can most simply be described like this: throughout the history of warfare, when a gun, a bomb, an arrow or any other projectile was aimed at an enemy, it was expected to miss; now it is expected to hit. It it virtually impossible to overstate the impact of that fundamental change. In the past, the accuracies of guns and bombs was such that a large number of shells or bombs had to be delivered in order to have reasonable assurance that the target would be hit. Artillery barrages showered shells on the enemy so as to achieve a mathematical probability that the target would be hit; the probability that any one shell would hit the target was less than the probability that it would hit, and usually very much less. Until now.

While it is easy to overestimate the potential impact of technological innovations, expecting them to provide the perfect solution, the impact of the improved conventional munitions is demonstrably revolutionary. The Thanh Hoa bridge in North Vietnam is a good illustration. This bridge, a vital link in both road and rail communications leading down the North Vietnamese panhandle, was attacked by hundreds of sorties

during the bombing campaign extending from 1965 through 196, was hit many times, but was never neutralized, although there were many losses of attacking aircraft. But when the tactical air assault against the north resumed in May 1972, the F-4s which struck the bridge were carrying laser-guided bombs as well as 500-pound bombs, and the bridge was left unusable. The new technology made it possible to do in one day what it had not been possible to do in three previous years.

With the advent of precision guided munitions, it is becoming fash-ionable to say that whatever target we can see we can hit, and whatever target we can hit we can destroy. While there may be an element of egen giller gertallandig og skiller i gjert gjargi. Etter til etter bledde overstatement for emphasis in this formulation, it does help to illus-. trate the changing nature of the problems of battlefield survival, 21 LT - 2 251. Thur 2 2 2 2 2 4 * 12 mobility, and effectiveness. One should also remember that it is in the nature of things that what one side can develop the other can also. To gauge the probable effectiveness of weapons systems in land warfare, it is necessary to envision them amidst the interplay of numerous weapons, troop dispositions and movements, terrain and meteorlogical conditions, intelligence and logistical impacts, and a panoply of other confributory and complicating factors. To cite one very simple example, the performance of an infantry-delivered antitank weapon is one thing on a test range pitting antitank against tank, or even tanks; it may be something quite different when overhead artillery fire, close air support, chemical or flame weapons, darkness, fog, cold, even partisan terrorism -- or some combination of the foregoing or many other factors -- is added to the calculus of battle. It may be observed, and with justice, that the scales could well be tipped the other way by swampy terrain, reduced visibility, lack of supporting fires or accompanying infantry; these factors and others can make tanks more vulnerable. The point is only that, in making the surpassingly difficult assessments of relative combat effectiveness which must be attempted, the seduction of single factor analysis must be avoided and the total combat environment must be dealt with.

To illustrate further, a photograph accompanying a recent discussion of the impact of battlefield guided weapons showed two infantrymen, clad in arctic overwhites, each with a man-portable antitank weapon, prone and alone in the midst of a vast snowfield. What are their prospects of survival under preparatory artillery fires? Or more pressing yet, how long can they lie like that and still remain combat effective? Even if they are packing a superbly crafted antitank missile, they must remain alive and functioning in the face of enemy action and the elements long enough to bring that combat power to bear.

The implications of the new accuracy in weapons are profound, and they extend from probable equipment and personnel casualty rates all the way to grand strategy. Taking the European case as an example, the viability of a conventional defense by NATO forces would seem to be substantially enhanced by the advent, even if the capability were acquired by both sides, of precision-guided munitions. Such weapons would seem inherently to favor the defender. If what can be seen can be hit, and what can be hit can be killed, then the necessity for the attacker to expose himself in the advance would become even more disadvantageous than in the past, while the defender's use of prepared positions, built-up areas, and natural cover would offer even more of an advantage than formerly. What developments in tactics and weaponry would the need to counter this increased defensive advantage be likely to engender? The answer would appear to lie with weapons which do not depend for their effectiveness on being able to see the target,. which would presumably be concealed and under cover. It does not take much imagination to link the chemical, biological and radiological protective capacity built in to the Soviet equipment which appeared on the Middle East battlefields to this perceived need. Failure to counter, at least by emphasizing defensive capacity, could be extremely costly to the western European defenders.

The impact on logistical considerations is also very interesting.

In World War I the British are said to have shipped more fodder than

ammunition to the front: some 5,500,000 ton's of cats and hay. The passing of the hay-burner from the battlefield changed the nature of the fuel that was shipped, but the advent of precision guided munitions could affect by orders of magnitude the amount of munitions that have to be stocked, maintained, shipped and manufactured. Where before masses of shells had to be fired in order to gain reasonable assurance that a few would find their targets, now we are talking about weapons which probably will hit what they are aimed at, and it would seem that ammunition inventories could be radically reduced. Those elements of the support force formerly engaged in trucking, guarding, caring for, and issuing that ammunition could be converted into additional combat power or support forces responsive to the greater lethality of the battlefield, with no concomitant increase in force levels.

On the strategic level, reduction of need for Atlantic transshipment of large quantities of one of the heaviest commodities could save shipping, free storage facilities in the combat theater for prepositioning of other needed supplies, even reduce the critical dependence on maintaining the seaways during initial stages of a conflict.

Countervailing factors may emerge which will diminish or negate one of more of the apparent impacts of this new technology, but the basic point remains clear: radical changes in available technology

present planners with both opportunities and vulnerabilities, and successful response involves thinking through the full range of implications and making those adjustments most helpful to one's circumstance. The pace of technological change continues to increase, and today's innovation may well be tomorrow's has-been. The high water mark of the viability of the helicopter on the battlefield was reached and passed nearly a decade ago, a realization that has yet to penetrate all those responsible for planning and fielding our forces. Even before the advent of manportable air defense missiles, with heat-seeking and other sophisticated guidance systems, the helicopter was becoming restricted in its survivability over the battlefields of Vietnam, where the opposition had no airpower at all. Just the arrival of the .51-caliber machine gun pushed US helicopters up from 2,000 to 3,000 feet to avoid ground fire casualties. with nap of the earth flying a distinctly inferior alternative, given the degradation of command and control, artillery direction and other common missions which such a flight profile entailed. It does not seem likely that we will ever see again the stacks of commanders' helicopters describing endless circles at successive elevations above a battle in progress on the ground, surely one of the more bizarre and unique features of that peculiar war. More to the point, the prospect of armed helicopters popping up from cover and delivering devastating blows against advancing armored columns is unlikely to be realized on future battlefields. One

can envision important, if severely restricted, roles for helicopters in future combat, but they are almost all behind friendly lines: evacuation of wounded, high priority resupply, command liaison. Certain limited offensive roles may persist against inferior or widely scattered opponents, especially in very fluid situations; these could involve raids, flank surveillance, and the like. But as a central element of offensive combat power, the helicopter has had its day.

While most hot gun helicopter pilots would not be happy to hear it, they have been supplanted (at least in the Soviet forces) by a squad leader in an armored infantry combat vehicle. This is somewhat hard to understand for those who think of such a capability in terms of the lumbering steel box which has been for so long (and still is) the US version of the armored personnel carrier. While an improved version continues under development, as it has for something on the order of a decade, the Soviets have been fielding since the late 1960s the BMP, a genuine armored infantry combat vehicle which features, among other things, two antitank missile systems (also useful against helicopters), provisions for the crew to fight from within the vehicle (US infantrymen must leave the shelter of their carrier to fight), and extensive built-in protection against biological and chemical warfare agents (lacking in both current and developmental US versions). Far

less vulnerable than a helicopter, it has impressive ground mobility, protection, and striking power, and is battle-tested and in service with forces in the field.

This is the kind of capability that ought to grab the attention of those who claim to be concerned with "winning the first battle." It also serves to underscore a crucial and too-little understood point. While the United States has for decades prided itself on the superiority of its research and development and industrial production capacities, the confidence one might have that these strengths translate into usable battlefield superiority should today be much tempered. For while it is true that in many, perhaps most, realms the United States retains the capacity to field superior weapons systems, in practice that capacity counts for much less in that in many instances we have failed to field systems embodying the superior technology, while our potential opponents have not only developed but produced comparable or better systems (tanks, armored infantry combat vehicles, and field army air defense systems are cases in point).

In designing systems for the battlefield of the immediate future, it seems likely that there will be a significant advantage to the side which, subsequent to an initial high intensity, high attrition meeting engagement, can reconstitute and maintain the continuity of combat effectiveness of its forces. Intra-battlefield mobility, the capacity to rapidly disperse, concentrate, reorient or redeploy forces in response to evolving tactical developments, is likely to be of great significance. Communications, transport, bridging and breaching capacity will be important. Intelligence, both of the battlefield and of broader compass, will be essential to effectively manipulating forces. Surprise will continue to offer important and possibly decisive advantages and, given the enhanced intelligence capabilities which both sides will enjoy thanks to satellite and communications technology, deception (never an American forte) may well decide the outcome. Given the lethality of the battlefield, supporting arms (infantry, artillery, air defense) must be able to accompany the tank/antitank force and survive in the same environment if they are to be effective.

Given the increased importance of forces in being, force readiness becomes more critical than ever, both as it contributes to war fighting capability and in terms of its effect on deterrence. It would be useful to achieve greater appreciation of the relationship between readiness and deterrence so as to make it work for us and permit us to gain maximum benefit from the actual readiness of our forces.

Some aspects of readiness, such as availability of repair parts and

trained logistical support specialists, are not readily visible in and of themselves. They can be made visible, however, by means of demonstrated performance of the combat elements engaged in maneuvers and exercises, including those which involve moving for substantial distances, demonstrating both mobility and reliability of the equipment. Since such readiness contributes to both war fighting capability and deterrence, it is to our advantage to advertise high states of readiness whenever they can be achieved, and indeed to recognize to a far greater extent than we have in the recent past how important readiness is to our overall conventional force capability. While we have ourselves helped to make the numbers of forces of various kinds fielded seem to be the most important feature of conventional force capability, we could, with some imagination in terms of exercise design and other means of demonstrating force readiness, make our qualitative conventional strength more visible at the same time we enhance its war fighting capability.

A continuing unresolved question in United States conventional war planning is the role which should be played by reserve forces. There is, on the one hand, the residual influence of the Minute Man image, with its attendant implication that the citizen soldier can turn from his fields, take down his musket, and defend the republic on a moment's

notice. Reinforcing this bit of folklore is what amounts to a powerful lobby in favor of maintaining (although not necessarily employing) substantial reserve forces. On the other hand there is the generally unsatisfactory experience of the very limited mobilizations of reserve forces at the time of the Berlin crisis (1961) and late in the Vietnam war (1968). Reinforcing the general pessimism of many, in the wake of these events, is a more general impression that it is simply not feasible, even as frequently as once or twice a decade, to mobilize reserve units whose members must customarily earn their livings at civilian pursuits which are often difficult to leave at unexpected times for indeterminate periods. This view holds that mobilization is a feasible response only to a very large, sustained and widely acknowledged threat, and that what is needed in the reserves is a cadre and training establishment to support such a general mobilization, not units for inefficient, politically difficult and problem-plagued partial mobilizations in a succession of lesser crises.

The utility of reserve forces as a recurring source of additional equipment for active forces could also, given such an approach, be explicitly recognized, and a more efficient custodial arrangement than dispersing the gear through a number of tactical units could be devised. Were such a rational and potentially useful restructuring of reserve forces into a training and mobilization establishment and equipment

surge repository to take place, it would of course be necessary to retain in the National Guard those forces needed for domestic roles.

What this recognition would amount to is this: Reserves are difficult to mobilize and deploy, especially for recurrent crises in which the physical security of the United States itself is not threatened; there are political difficulties in calling them up, and practical difficulties for those who are called, their employers, and of course their families. Should a crisis of major proportions occur, such an establishment could serve most usefully if it were prepared and equipped to commence the immediate training of large numbers of recruits, rather than deploying a limited number of units of varying degrees of readiness, willingness and utility.

Maintaining a Viable Conventional Force Posture

The calculus of interaction of general purpose forces is a complex one, far more difficult to analyze and assess than the strategic nuclear balance. It entails the complicated interplay of alliances, intertheater and battlefield mobility, time and distance factors, strategic and tactical surprise, intelligence and deception, sustainability of forces, mobility potential and the time available to bring it to bear, the will to maintain forces, and to deploy and commit them when necessary, and, in the event, the command, concentration, maneuver and

employment of the resultant forces to achieve success. While ground forces play the central combat role (along with, in the past, but to a lesser and possibly precipitously declining extent now, tactical air forces), important contributions are also necessary from naval general purpose forces (both ships and aviation, and especially in the projection of power), possibly some elements of the strategic forces (such as bomber aircraft), and mobilized civil elements such as the merchant marine.

The range of situations in which conventional forces might have to be employed, or in which their existence might have a beneficial impact, is impossible to specify in detail before the fact, and fraught with what Dante called "horrid perhapses." It is too late, when forces are needed, to set about procuring them. It is also not necessary, for a capability to be worth having, for it to be viable under all the worst threat conditions. In seeking answers as to the conventional forces demanded by a prudent policy, the instrumental questions include the following: What could be expected to happen if military forces were not available to us? Could military force achieve the desired objective, or any significant part thereof? Could it do so at an acceptable cost, with the cost broadly defined in terms of manpower, casualties, money, diversion of resources, opportunity costs, domestic impact, and the

like? Can the use of military force cause something to happen? Can it prevent something from happening? If the answers to these questions is even a qualified yes, then the penalties of failing to maintain adequate military forces in a world in which others are not so inhibited promises to be very severe indeed.

Notes

- 1. The idea that a stable balance, one in which the Soviet Union and the United States share a common interest in nuclear stalemate and a common belief in the desirability and reality of the stability of that relationship, has genuinely been achieved is not persuasive to me. On the contrary, I believe the Soviets seriously contemplate the possibility of nuclear war, and intend to be in a position (in strategic weaponry, civil defense of their population and industrial capacity, and psychological preparation) to win such a war. In this context, I understand winning from their standpoint to mean emerging from the conflict with a still viable society and economy and a residual of force superior to that of any potential challenger. I do not believe they have achieved this posture as yet, and hence their continuing caution with regard to nuclear war.
- 2. "Nuclear War by 1999?" The Washington Post, 4 January 1976, p. ___.
- 3. Wynfred Joshua, The Soviet Union: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow: A Colloquy of American Long Timers in Moscow, ed. Foy Kohler and Mose Harvey, pp. 205-206.
- 4. "Military Force and Political Influence in an Age of Peace," Strategic Review (Spring 1976), p. 10.
- 5. Robert S. Walters, American and Soviet Aid: A Comparative Analysis, pp. 4-5.
- 6. "The Great Foreign Policy Debate We Ought to Be Having," New Republic, 17 January 1976, p. ___.
- 7. As quoted by Eric C. Ludvigsen in "Weapons and Equipment, 1975," Army, October 1975, p. 117.
- 8. Richard H. Ellis and Frank B. Horton III, "Flexibility -- A State of Mind," Strategic Review (Winter 1976). pp. 28-29.
 - 9. Bernard and Fawn Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb, p. 197.

Changing Naval Operations and Military Intervention

Michael MccGwire

Navies have long been a means of bringing military force to bear in distant parts of the world, and the purpose of this paper is to consider the impact of contemporary developments on this traditional instrument of great power policy.

In a naval context, military intervention can include a cocktail party in Mobassa, a show of force in the Caribbean, naval inter-position off Iceland, carrier air strikes on Hanoi, or the landing of marines in the Persian Gulf. In this paper I have chosen to concentrate on the application of force as opposed to the display of force, for two reasons. First, our understanding of the processes underlying political-influence building is still very fuzzy¹, and becomes even more so when we introduce the nebulous concept of 'a naval presence'. And second, to the extent that a naval presence does have any political influence, this must stem from the ultimate possibility that the forces involved will actually be used.

Although this paper discusses military intervention both at sea and by sea, it stops short at the beach head, and military activity on land is only addressed to the extent that it is relevant to maritime operations. Similarly, although I touch on the political costs of naval intervention, the more general question of the political utility of military force is not addressed, since it comes within the purview of the more general, theoretical

papers.

However, so many assumptions about the contemporary role of force at sea stem from centuries past, that it is worth spending a moment on the relevant changes in the international environment. Mahan, who chose the term 'sea power' for its evocative ring rather than its usefulness as an analytical term, saw it as one of three interlocking circles, the other two being colonies and commerce. His theories about sea power and command of the sea derived from an historical analysis of the years 1660-1783, the height of mercantalism and monopoly trade, and were thought to have been validated by what G.S. Graham terms "The Illusion of Pax Britannica" in the nineteenth century. 3 But British naval power was not the sole or even the most important reason for the Pax Britannica, which resulted from a combination of various factors. Of these, the most important was "Britain's industrial supremacy, which made possible a phenomenal commercial development". 4 The period of the industrial revolution provided both the means and the stimulus for Western nations to establish more or less effective dominion over a world which seemed to lack viable political entities. The process was accompanied by the spread of a Western administrative infrastructure (part government, part commercial), throughout much of the world, and was supported by the belief in "la mission civilatrice" and "the white man's burden", and Victorian ideas about child-rearing and colonial government. Among the most important were the will to empire, the readiness of the imperial authorities to use force, and the knowledge of their subject people that resistance would lead to certain retribution, even if delayed. God was white and to spare the rod, spoilt the child.

Navies were prime instruments of such imperial retribution, and in

those days of coal-fired ships and manually operated gun mountings, sizable bodies of well-armed men could be landed at short notice, while the warship lay virtually invulnerable off shore. As recently as the Boer War (Britain's Vietnam), it was still practical to dismount naval guns and drag them by ox-cart to the battle front.

By World War I, attitudes towards empire were already changing, and the Western imperial tide had begun to recede. But even in the thirties it was thought unexceptionable to bomb villagers in the Aden Protectorate as a form of collective punishment, and on the shores of the Malaysian Archipelago and the China Seas, villages were razed as a discouragement to piracy.

Since the last war, attitudes and circumstances have changed radically. Of the latter, the most significant would seem to be the proliferation of nation states and their membership of the United Nations. The corrolary of this has been the progressive dismantling of the administrative infrastructure, which played such an important role in bringing imperial retribution to bear. There has also been a change in general attitudes towards the acceptability of coercive force. The circumstances in which long range intervention is likely to be acceptable have been progressively circumscribed, and in the last thirty years, coercive intervention by major powers has been successful only within their respective contiguous national security zones, where power gradients and political committment are both high. Effective intervention overseas now requires a favourable balance of political forces in the 'host' country, as well as sufficient weight of sustained response. But even if attitudes had not changed, warships would no longer be able to serve as the autonomous wielders of graduated retribution. The specialised demands of modern warfare mean that naval units now lack the military flexibility of the pre-war general purpose cruiser, with its numerous guns and comfortably large ships company. Meanwhile, the proliferation of sophisticated weapon systems means that warships are no longer invulnerable when lying offshore. Sensors have to be manned continuously with weapons ready at standby alert, and it is hard to spare a landing party without hazarding one's ship. The modern equivalent of the cruiser with its landing party is the carrier task force and its marine battalion landing team. But while the political effect that each could achieve may be comparable, the political stake involved is obviously very different.

None of this means that military intervention by sea is no longer likely or possible. But it has placed constraints on the almost casual use of force which used to be the norm. And it does mean that the economic and political costs are likely to be very much higher, and that the chances of a successful outcome are far less. However, while the utility of coercive force is increasingly in question, the threat of such force remains a powerful diplomatic weapon. Irrespective of whether it ultimately achieves its goals, coercive intervention is an unpleasant experience for the target country, and a credible threat is likely to introduce some element of deterrence to its political considerations.

There are two separate calculations involved in assessing the level of capability required for a successful intervention overseas. First, there is the level and type of force which is to be brought to bear on the target ashore, whether it be naval bombardment, carrier airstrike, or men and tanks. And second, there is the capability of getting to the area by sea, and of sustaining off-shore operations as necessary. This paper is only concerned with the second category, which includes the possibility that passage to the target area may be deliberately obstructed. This leads to consideration of intervention at sea, aimed

at preventing passage, and intervention by sea, aimed at securing passage through obstructed waters. The policy maker will also want to know the political costs of such ancillary operations, and how they compare with the political benefits that the major intervention is supposed to achieve.

Maritime intervention is a complex subject, and I therefore begin this paper by developing a discussion framework, which allows us to consider the level of capabilities and the types of cost involved.

I then look at the major operational developments and their likely effect on military intervention by sea, before turning to review the different types of intervention and why they could occur. And finally I consider certain differences between the Soviet and the U.S. approaches to oversea intervention.

* * * * *

The sea's strategic quality derives from the access it provides to non-adjacent areas. Maritime strategy is therefore about the <u>use</u> of the sea; using it for one's own purposes and preventing its use to one's disadvantage, in peacetime as in war. This navigational use of the sea breaks down into two main categories: (1) the conveyance of goods and people, and (2) the projection of military force against targets ashore.

The first category of use covers seaborne trade, which in a strategic context spells maritime communications. It also covers the movement of military cargoes in merchant ships, although this shades into the second category, particularly when a war is actually in progress. The shading is inevitable, since the military and commercial uses of the sea form a continuum. While we can identify what is purely military, there are few

commercial cargoes which have no military value. For analytical purposes, therefore, it is impractical to distinguish between military and non-military uses of the sea, except in the broadest terms, whereas the projection of force, and the conveyance of goods and people are functionally distinct.

The second category has two forms: the traditional one of bringing military force (actual or latent) to bear on coastal states; and the deterrent form of targetting distant land areas with nuclear weapons. We are here only concerned with the traditional form. This may involve the landing of troops or may be limited to standing off shore and striking targets with ship-borne weapons such as guns, missiles or aircraft.

There is also a third, instrumental cateogry: (3) the deployment of naval forces in order either (a) to prevent, or (b) to secure the two main categories of use. We all know that certain types of naval unit also embody the capability for projecting force ashore, but the analytical distinction between categories (2) and (3) is worth preserving. It serves to emphasise that maritime strategy is wholly about the use of the sea and only incidentally about the use of force at sea. Naval forces are only necessary to the use of the sea if attempts are being made to prevent it.

The ease with which use can be prevented depends on maritime geography and the type of use involved. A waterway (defined as any stretch of sea used for passage) can be described in terms of its geographic characteristics, lying somewhere on the continuum between narrow, shallow waters and the deep ocean. Narrow waterways, where ships must pass close to shorebased weapons, are relatively easy to obstruct, particularly if

they are shallow and hence mineable. It is far harder to prevent passage across an ocean waterway, out of range of land and with opportunities for evasive routing. By the same token, different types of use involve different capabilities and lengths of time at risk. It is usually easier to interrupt a flow of merchant shipping, then to prevent the passage of a naval task force.

As a general rule, it is also easier to prevent the use of the sea than it is to secure such use. This is partly because the means of preventing use are not limited to naval forces, and in narrow waters they include the simple blockship, the mine and a whole range of shore-based weapons. Naval forces are more important on the ocean waterways, the submarine being the most universal long-range weapon, but even here the task of preventing use can be shared by land-based strike aircraft and supported by satellite and shore-based surveillance systems.

However, <u>securing</u> the use of the sea against opposition remains a predominantly naval task . . . or at least the military means are primarily naval. There are of course other ways of securing use, including diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions.

We are now in a position to draw a box diagram, plotting the type of waterway against the type of use, and in each box we can show the minimum capability needed to prevent the use of the sea in such circumstances. We are not able to show the level of capability needed to secure the use of the sea, since this will also depend on the type & scale of opposition, which will vary between cases. However, we can show the type of costs which will be incurred in using military force to secure the use of the sea against opposition.

These costs can be economic, in the sense of increased demands on the

Minimum Capability Needed to Prevent Use : Cost of Securing Use

Types of Use Types of Waterway		The Conveyance of Goods and People		The Projection of Military Force	
		Trade	Military Supply	Stand Off Strike	Land Ashore
Passage	Ocean	II	: e	I : e	
	Narrow	VI : p		. IV	: p
	Diversion	e	e/p*	e/p*	
Terminal	Open	-	V.	III	IV
	Narrow	_	VI	IV	V

* Political costs are only incurred when timeliness is a critical factor

Legend: Level of Capability - I(high) to VI(low)

Cost: e - economic, p - political

domestic economy for defence expenditure; or they can be political in the sense of adversly affecting relations with other states. The type of cost is determined by the strategic quality of the waterway. In the case of narrow waters, this is geopolitical, in the sense that it stems from a combination of geographical configuration and the political control of the adjacent coasts. A military response to an attempt to prevent passage through narrow waters cannot avoid political costs and these will tend to be heavy, because it will usually require attacks on national territory.

The strategic quality of ocean waterways is primarily military, and stems from the reach and geographical distribution of maritime forces.

and their relative capabilities in the encounter zone. The costs of the military response to an attempt to prevent passage across the ocean are primarily economic, and as a rule, the response can be contained politically, unless it becomes essential to attack shore-based support facilities.

Between these two extremes lie those waterways which traverse seas within range of land-based weapon and surveillance systems, where the strategic quality will be some mix of military and geopolitical and the costs part economic and part political.

In this same context of securing use, there is a distinction to be made between the 'terminal' and 'passage' legs of a waterway. Obviously, the terminal of one voyage will be the passage of another, and the distinction will lie in the mind of the user. But it is somewhat akin to the distinction between ends and means and, depending on which applies, it influences the range of options open to the user, the relative ease with which use can be prevented, the costs of securing use, and the levels of political committment.

The point of immediate interest is that very rarely is the passage leg the only route between two terminals. It is therefore usually possible to divert round obstructions to narrow waterways, and although ocean waterways are more difficult (because the obstructions are mobile) some form of evasive routing is often practicable. This means that there is usually an alternative to insisting on passage, and consideration can be given to their relative costs.

The extra distance involved in accepting diversion, can be expressed in time and money, and this also will translate into economic and political costs. But in this case, the political costs will reflect

lost opportunities to influence events, or the inability to meet an important commitment. Political costs of this type will only be incurred when timeliness is an issue, as for example if it involves the deployment of military force in response to a sudden crisis, or the supply of a distant battle front by sea at the outbreak of a war.

Our diagram is now complete. The boxes for Trade in the Terminal area have been left blank to show that in most cases the coastal state will be concerned to secure rather than prevent such use of the sea. Where local conflict prevents such use, Trade and Military Supply would have the same indices. The political costs of securing use in Terminal areas are not shown, since they cannot be separated from the larger costs of the military intervention.

The diagram shows the minimum level of military capability needed to prevent use in the different situations. The assessment is intuitive, and I have arbitrarily divided military capability into six levels, reflecting both the range to which violence can be projected, and the degree. Level I (the highest) implies the capability for sustained attack on naval forces in mid-ocean, and is possessed only by the USA and, in certain sea areas, by the Soviet Union. Level II implies a lesser capability which could attack a strong naval force, but not sustain an engagement. Britain has this capability in much of the Atlantic, and China is moving towards this in the Asian-Pacific. Moving to the bottom end of the scale, Level VI implies the ability to prevent the passage of merchant ships through narrow shallow waters, perhaps using contact mines laid by junks or dows, and protecting them with field artillery from being swept. Level V would be able to prevent passage through less constricted waters

and might include torpedo and gun-armed coastal patrol craft. Levels

IV and III lie in between these two pairs. Level IV could cover broader,
deep-water straits and would include missile-armed craft and coastal
installations, and a measure of shore-based air support. Level III
implies a greater off-shore capability, either including submarines or
else reasonably effective surface forces, backed by shore-based air
strike.

These descriptions are deliberately vague, because military forces tend to be unbalanced and don't lie tidily along a smooth continuum of capability. The levels do however give some idea of the leverage provided by maritime geography, and the extent to which passage can now be controlled by coastal states in general, and straits states in particular.

* * * * *

Turning to the operational factors affecting maritime intervention, there have been significant developments in four main areas: advances in weapons technology, the dispersion of weapon systems among non-industrialized states, the Soviet Navy's shift to forward deployment, and international attitudes towards the rights of maritime passage. The last of these is of a different kind to the other two, and will be disposed of first.

Since the first two U.N. Conferences on the Law of the Sea in 1958 and 1960, there has been a remarkable shift in world opinion concerning the balance between exclusive and inclusive use of the sea. In 1958, the 'traditional maritime powers' were still fighting for a

3 mile territorial limit, and the South Americans' claim for 200 miles was seen as preposterous. In 1960, the compromise proposal for a 6 mile Territorial Sea, with an additional 6 mile Exclusive Fishing Zone failed by one vote to get the neccesary two-thirds majority. And yet by 1974, most nations, including the major maritime powers, had come to accept the much broader concepts of a 12 mile Territorial Sea and a 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone, and argument focused on the scope of national jurisdiction within that zone. This tendency has been reinforced by claims that archipelagic seas should be considered as Internal Waters, and that marine pollution could threaten the security of a coastal state. The dominating principle of 'freedom of the seas' has now been seriously eroded, and specific claims have undermined both the concept and the right of 'innocent passage' through territorial waters.

A new regime of 'transit passage' may yet emerge, but the net effect of these developments has been to make it more likely that in the future, coastal states will challenge, or even deny the right of passage to certain categories of ship, through waters coming within their various jurisdictions. It is also likely that such action will be seen as legitimate by many other countries, including perhaps the hundred or so members of the Group of 77. Passage through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran were denied to Israel in the past, and would serve as a precedent in the future.

Such challenges to passage will be all the more threatening because of advances in weapons' technology and the dispersion of sophisticated systems among coastal states. The former have enabled quantum jumps in such fundamental weapon characteristics as range,

accuracy, payload and systems reliability. These have been matched by an exponential increase in the capabilities of sensor and surveillance systems.

By depriving the seas of their capacity for concealment, the improved surveillance systems have simplified the problems of ocean interception by warships. They can also provide the target location data which allows long-range weapon systems to be brought to bear. Tactical systems with ranges from 300 miles (cruise missiles) to 1500 miles (aircraft) have been in service since the end of the fifties, but the emerging capability to strike moving targets with ballistic missiles at intercontinental ranges, is introducing a new dimension to maritime warfare. As long ago as 1972, the Soviet Union claimed that 'naval groupings' were targeted by the Strategic Rocket Forces, and we know that they are developing a homing re-entry vehicle for a medium-range ballistic missile. We are now moving into an era where maritime warfare will be fought as much by land- as sea-based weapon and sensor systems, and it is becoming necessary to distinguish between the 'reach' of different systems and to think in terms of 'global' and (for want of a better term) 'local' systems. In the middle ranges, such distinction will be somewhat arbitrary, but it becomes clearer if we allow that 'reach' covers responsetime as well as range. Thus an IRBM would come within global systems, while a medium range bomber would be at the high end of the local systems. Perhaps more important is the concept that 'global' systems are of a kind that can be launched from national territory (or from a strategically located submarine), to strike like a bolt from the blue at maritime

targets in distant sea areas, across intervening seas or territory, whereas 'local' system implies a more direct relationship between adversaries. Global systems will be extremely sophisticated and expensive, and in the main they are likely to be limited to the super-powers. Several components for such systems are already in service, and it seems clear that the Soviet Union (at least) intends to adopt an integrated 'all arms' approach to maritime warfare.

While the global systems introduce a new dimension, improvements in local systems have been equally dramatic. The main instrument has been the terminally-guided cruise missile, which allows a patrol craft to pack the punch of a battleship, and can be fitted to aircraft, surface ship, submarine or coastal defence installation. As important as the accuracy and payload of this weapon, is its range. This not only extends—a coastal state's reach to seaward, but the greater the range, the smaller the number of weapon-platforms needed to cover a given sea area or stretch of coast.

The homing cruise missile can be a deadly weapon against an undefended or unalerted target. But once the threat was properly assessed, it was appreciated that in many ways the cruise missile simplified the defence's problem. Early missiles were trans-sonic, and provided a reasonably homogeneous target which, within the existing state of the art, could be shot down or seduced. In many ways this compared favourably with the previous situation, where the weapon was a torpedo, shell or bomb, whose flight could not be arrested and effective defence was predicated on the destruction of the weapon platforms (submarine, surface ship or aircraft) prior to weapon launch, a very demanding requirement. The weakness of these systems was their inaccuracy, but in the case of bombs and shells, this can now be overcome by the use of precision guided munitions

(PGM), which home on the designated target. Of course, the terminally guided cruise missile remains a serious threat, and later generations are supersonic, harder to detect and more difficult to decoy or shoot down.

So far, only strike systems have been referred to, but there have also been considerable advances in counter-strike or 'protect' systems. These include electronic counter-measures (ECM), image masking and so forth, as well as weapons designed primarily for shipboard self-defence. We have here the classic contest between attack and defence, and up to now it has been fairly evenly matched. But the advent of the tactical ballistic missile and the prospect that it may be mounted in surface ship, submarine and ashore for use against maritime targets, raises the requirements for ship-board self-protection to new levels which will be hard to achieve. These ballistic strike-systems will be expensive and therefore reserved for high-value targets, but it does prompt the question of whether traditional surface warships will be able, in the future, to survive in a hostile maritime environment.

These high technology developments relate mainly to confrontations between the two super-powers in the context of general war. But since 1955, the industrialised powers have provided a steady supply of sophisticated weapons to emerging nations. Whatever the motives behind this supply, the effect has been to increase the ability of these nations to defend themselves against external intervention and, in several cases, to prevent the use of their coastal seas. As an indicator of the latter capability, about 23 non-industrialised states have been supplied with missile-armed surface units (or missile systems for retrofitting), ten by the Soviet Union and

thirteen by the West; fourteen such states have been supplied with submarines, four by the Soviet Union and ten by the West, six of the 7 latter being in South America. These are by no means the only type of weapon which can be used to prevent the use of the sea, and besides other naval forces like torpedo boats and gun-armed surface units, there are a whole range of shore-based systems such as aircraft, missiles and coastal batteries, and fixed obstructions such as mines. And all these weapons are being progressively upgraded. In the case of supplies from the West, this is largely for commercial reasons. In the case of Russia, this is a byproduct of her economic system, which allocates a fixed share of resources to weapons procurement, resulting in the periodic replacement of all equipment by improved versions. In this context, the Soviet SS-N-3 300-mile surface-to-surface anti-shipping cruise missile is now being superceded, and may become available for selective supply to client states for coast defence purposes.

The supply of weapons is one thing, their effective use is another, and this is why maritime geography plays such an important role in determining a coastal state's ability to prevent the use of its waters. It requires an experienced submarine commander to bring a diesel boat within torpedo range of a target in open waters. And while range is not so great a problem to missile-armed patrol craft, they are very exposed to counter attack when away from the cover of land, and the state of the sea affects their operational performance. Mines are a cheap and simple way of preventing use, but they can only be laid in relatively shallow depths, and are only effective if they can not be circumvented or swept, factors which depend largely on the breadth of the waters.

There is also the complex matter of what is needed for a nation to maintain and operate the weapons it possesses. We have the example of the build-up and decline of Indonesia's navy, and the limited effectiveness of the Egyptian force, both nations with a sea-faring tradition. The rapid deterioration of the Indonesian Navy was mainly a failure of maintenance, the lack of spare parts being a subsequent cause, and this underlines the problems of keeping complex equipment operational, particularly in hot and humid climates. When this is coupled with such evidence as the apparent superiority of Israeli pilots over their Egyptian opponents, one begins to ask whether a country requires some minimal technological base in order to make effective use of the latest weapons. On the other hand, North Vietnamese air defence units inflicted heavy casualties on the latest American aircraft, which suggests that perhaps it is as much a matter of priorities and commitment, as of inate capability. Meanwhile. the trend in weapon design appears to be towards increasing internal sophistication, matched by a greater simplicity in operation and maintenance, and this may come to compensate for the technological constraints.

The third major development has been the Soviet Navy's shift to forward deployment. Although this has received the most publicity, in practical terms it seems to have had little real effect on either the capability or the villingness of the West to use their navies in support of military intervention overseas. If anything, the last ten years has seen an increase in such activity. The presence of Soviet naval units in distant sea areas must obviously introduce a complicating factor to U.S. plans and impose costs in terms of higher states of readiness and increased surveillance requirements. But it has certainly not prevented America from active

naval intervention, as we saw in the Jordanian crisis in 1970, the Indian Ocean deployments in 1971 and 1973, both Arab/Israeli conflicts and throughout the war in Vietnam. Commentators who insist to the contrary tend to disregard the rise of nationalism, the Western withdrawal from empire, and the diminishing utility of coercive intervention, and they ascribe the results of these historical trends to the presence of a few Soviet warships. Given the opportunities, Soviet gains have been remarkably few.

It is now generally accepted that the primary determinant of the Soviet decision that their navy should shift to forward deployment, was the sharp acceleration in strategic weapons' procurement, ordered by President Kennedy on taking office, and the marked increase in the emphasis on sea-based systems. This generated a Soviet requirement to deploy a counter against this threat to Russia from the 'maritime axes', and resulted in the radical restructuring of the Soviet Navy.

The carrier threat, which had been the Soviet Navy's primary concern since 1955, yielded precedence to the threat from Polaris, and since 1961, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) has received top priority in research and development and in warship design. Between 1957-1967, naval new-construction entering service was heavily oriented towards the anti-surface role, with SSM as the primary weapon. Since 1967, the emphasis has swung sharply to ASW, with additional priority being given to self-protection weapon systems on the larger surface ships. Except for one class of four ships (the rump of a cancelled programme), all new-construction major surface units which have entered service since 1962 are now designated by the Russians as large anti-submarine ships, the Moskva and Kiev classes being called anti-submarine cruisers. Two older classes of SSM-armed

surface ship have undergone major conversion and been re-designated as large anti-submarine ships. U.S. officials now refer to both Moskva and Kiev as 'ASW Carriers", and they have also acknowledged that the missile launcher tubes in Kara (called a cruiser in the West) carry anti-submarine weapons and not SSM, as had previously been thought. I assess that this also applies to the other three classes of new-construction large anti-submarine ships, which have entered service since 1966.

Despite the shift to forward deployment, the Soviets are still building a navy for a narrowly defined, defensive mission, tailored for general war. If anything, this tendency is likely to increase as they continue striving to develop an effective counter to Polaris, Poseidon and then Trident. The construction of distant-water surface warships proceeds at a modest pace ... about two cruiser-size and two destroyer-size large anti-submarine ships a year, and an ASW carrier every two ... and one has the impression of an interim expedient, while the final answer to the problem is being developed. Submarines are a different matter and muclear construction proceeds remorselessly at ten units a year, while a new diesel programme is also underway. The submarine force now comprises the primary anti-surface capability and SSM-armed submarines operate in company with Soviet surface forces. This makes a powerful team, but its capabilities lie at the high end of the spectrum of force and it lacks any projection capability.

Although the presence of Soviet naval forces in distant sea areas increases the possibility of their use to hamper Western military intervention, the past ten years provide evidence of Soviet caution on this score. Of greater significance is the future role of the new global weapon systems, and their potential as a deterrent to such operations.

The overall effect of these developments in law of the sea, advances in weapon technology and proliferation of sophisticated weapon systems, is to make the sea a much more complex and potentially hostile operating environment. Attempts to prevent use are now more likely, and the capability to do so is much more widespread. The near monopoly of naval power enjoyed by the West during the first two post-war decades has been steadily eroded. The reach of coastal states is being progressively extended and regional navies are beginning to energe in such areas as the Arabian and China Seas, and the Western South Atlantic. These developments do not imply that the U.S. navy will lack the capability to project military power in distant parts of the world, or to secure the use of the sea for such purposes. Its ships were designed for war with Russia and should be able to operate in the face of Soviet hand-me-downs and suboptimal Western systems. But it does mean that the deployment of naval forces will need to be less of a knee-jerk reaction and will have to take more factors into account, including the possibility of losses. It also means that self-protection systems will need to be given higher priority in each ship's weapons cutfit.

* * * * * *

Military intervention can be coercive or supportive. The distinction is not entirely clear cut, since in the case of supportive intervention, the other party can claim he is being coerced (eg. North Vietnam), and in a coercive intervention, a third party may be supported indirectly (eg. Pakistan in the 1971 Bangladesh war). The distinction is however useful, because

of the different levels of capability required for the different types, both on land and at sea.

The proximate aim of maritime intervention is either to secure the use of the sea, or to prevent its use. The latter is a relatively simple concept and we have as examples the U.S. blockade of Cuba in 1962, the mining of Hanoi in 1972, and Britain's Beira patrol aimed at Rhodesia.

These were all coercive. A supportive intervention of this type is the Guinea Patrol, established by the Soviet Navy in November 1970, to discourage further seaborne attacks on Conakry. Except for the Cuban blockade, all these interventions were by external powers.

The concept of securing the use of the sea is more complex, raising the question of 'use for what?' and sending us back to the categories in our box diagram. Focusing on the projection of force ashore in the terminal area, we need to distinguish between coercive and supportive intervention. and to know whether or not ground forces are involved. In the case of coercive intervention, the maritime environment will be hostile and where troops have to be landed and kept supplied by sea, it will be necessary for the navy to secure command of the offshore zone and to be responsible for air superiority, until airfields are established ashore. In constricted waters, the need to cauterise possible threats and forestall a surprise attack would inevitably incur additional political costs, particularly if other states are close-set, as for example in the Persian Gulf. However. if occroive intervention is limited to 'punishment' by strikes from ships lying offshore, effective force defence systems may be all that is necessary, unless faced by a strong opponent and unfavourable geography. Supportive intervention is a very different matter, involving much lower risks and costs, even when ground forces are engaged. The presence of a friendly

systems and air support are important assets. When ground forces are not involved, the navy's role is to bring pre-packaged fire-power to bear on the area of conflict. At the present time, this mainly involves airborne systems which can be used in various ways ranging from air defence to reconnaissance and close ground support, with the carrier serving as an offshore airfield. But the advent of PGM and rocket-aided shells, may mean that gunfire support from surface ships will gain a new lease of life.

Involvement by third or more parties in the terminal area is becoming increasingly likely. When support is being given to one side, the temptation for the other side to attack the intervenor is very strong. Whether it is kept in check will depend on their capability for effective action, their fear of the consequences, and any external political constraints which may exist. Western 'sanctuary' theory has never been very persuasive and the spread of potent weapons, the existence of leaders like Gdaffi and Amin, and, where submarines and missiles are concerned, the difficulties of pinning down responsibility, all combine to make it unwise for major powers to assume that smaller nations whose interests are threatened, will not dare to bite back. Cutside powers who are not parties to the local dispute may also become involved. For example, the emerging regional powers, reacting against external intrusion into an area where they themselves are competing for influence. But the more interesting case is involvement by other super-powers, and the prospects for this type of confrontation and its consequences, are discussed in the following section.

So much for the terminal area. But to intervene, one must first get there, in time to achieve one's purpose, and sustain the operation by sea if necessary. This brings us to the question of securing passage.

Narrow waters or straits offer the best opportunities for obstructing passage, and ignoring the question of plausibility for the moment, we can consider what ought to be done to secure use, should that happen. The answer should stem from a comparison of the political costs and benefits of the possible courses of action. We start with the political gains that are supposed to accrue from the main military intervention in the terminal area. Against this we set the political costs of insisting on passage through the narrow waterway against the wishes of the littoral state(s), which may involve a subsiduary military intervention. And if there is an alternative way of getting to the terminal area, we assess the political and economic costs of accepting diversion.

The political costs of forcing passage must depend on the particular circumstances, but to some extent it will reflect the bloodiness of the battle. This will stem from military factors such as relative capabilities, distance from land, length of time within range of attack, capacity for point defence, depth of water, the likelihood of third-party intervention and the type of land-based weapons available to the littoral state. There is also the type of use. It is one thing to burst through deep water straits with a carrier group; it is another to laboriously sweep a passage through mined waters within artillery range of land; and to secure a continuous flow of shipping through hostile narrow waters is very hard to achieve, and probably requires that key points on the coast be occupied. One can postulate a general relationship between the costs of forcing a passage in peacetime, and the depth and width of the waterway and the time-in-transit.

To force a long passage through narrow, shallow waters is likely to have high political costs, which stem mainly from the need to take action against the national territory of the littoral states.

Setting aside questions of 'prestige' and 'precedent', the costs of accepting diversion will depend on the extra distances involved. This can be expressed in time and money, and will translate into economic and political costs. In most cases, the costs will be predominantly economic (although these may have domestic implications), but external political costs will be incurred in a time-urgent situation. Russia would be faced with such a situation in the event of war with China, since she would almost certainly have to supply her Far Eastern front by sea. The length of the delay before the regular flow of supplies began to arrive in the Far East would be directly related to the length of passage, and Russia has a vital interest in ensuring that the shortest route (Suez Canal and Malacca Straits) is not obstructed. The next shortest route (via Panama) is half as long again. In the case of the U.S.A., it is more likely to involve the reactive deployment of a carrier force from the Pacific into the Indian Ocean, in circumstances where the fate of a client regime depends on support arriving within a limited period of time. But in this example, the political costs can be translated into economic costs in the longer run. If it is essential to be able to intervene in both the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific, extra carriers can be procured and deployed on both sides of the archipelagic barrier.

In all other circumstances, time and distance can usually be translated into dollars and cents straight away. In pre-planned

military interventions, the extra distance can be covered by looking ahead and sailing earlier. Cyclical deployments like Polaris patrols can be handled by increasing the number of units, reducing time in rest and maintenance, or changing crews in the forward area. Continuous flow operations like logistic support and military supply can be met by placing additional bottoms in the shipping pipeline.

We cannot rule on the comparative cost-benefit balance without knowing the particular circumstances. But it would seem that when timeliness is not a problem and when an alternative route exists, even if it is twice as long, the costs of accepting a diversion while negotiating the use of a waterway, are likely to be considerably less than those incurred in forcing passage. Even when time is critical the costs must be weighed carefully against the benefits to be achieved at the far end.

For the same general reasons, the denial of passage to commercial shipping will rarely justify the costs of military intervention. Not only can the merchant ships usually be diverted, but it is also possible to send the goods by other means such as pipeline, rail or road. Where shipping continues to be used, it is the relative increase in distance which is important and its effect on shipping costs as a share of the final price of the product. It is hard to generalise about this, because although there is a direct relationship between the length of passage and the cost of providing shipping services, the extent to which the price of shipping actually reflects these costs varies between trades. However, shipping represents a comparatively small proportion of the total cost of imports, and as a general rule, the effects of making a major diversion is likely to be no greater than the effect of normal fluctuations in commodity prices and charter rates. For example, if we postulate that all

the straits through the Indonesian Archipelago are closed, and all shipping from the Indian Ocean has to pass south about Australia, and then make the worst case assumptions about freight rates, this would only raise the 10 cost of living in Japan by under 1%. And yet 40% of Japan's imports normally pass through these straits, including 80% of her oil. There would of course be some dislocation of supplies while the first ships steamed the longer routes, but there are numerous examples of how rapidly international trade adapts to new circumstances and dislocations are likely to be temporary.

How likely is it that littoral states would seek to prevent the use of narrow waterways? In most cases, they have a vested interest in the continuous flow of trade and shipping through these waters, and their economies would be damaged by a prolongued diversion. The closest precedent is the blocking of the Suez Canal by Egypt in 1956. But this was in response to an Anglo-French assault, whose stated purpose was to secure the canal's use for the international community, and there may be a lesson in there somewhere. Littoral states may wish to use their monopoly power to extract rent from a geographical asset, and might threaten various restrictions if their demands were not met. But so far their position in this regard has been moderate, reflecting reasonable concerns for the dangers inherent in the passage of very large crude carriers and comparable ships through narrow waters, and the devastation it could cause to their shores. In this they can expect a fair amount of international support; but there would be little for a general toll on all types of cargo, because most countries now have a vested interest in lower shipping costs. An unprovoked attempt to hold the international community to

ransom by preventing use of such waterways would be bound to leave the littoral states worse off than they started, and undoubtedly they appreciate this.

Provocation is another matter. National sovereignty is such a sensitive attribute among newly emergent nations that its infringement would be accepted as due cause by many of the Group of 77, even if the consequential action damaged their immediate interests. For this reason, the passage of warships, amphibious forces and military supplies falls into a different category to normal trade, particularly when the forces are intended for use against some friend of the littoral state, or in support of some enemy. We have seen the use of the oil weapon to bring pressure on Western nations during the Arab/Israeli war, which had tactical as well as strategic consequences. Denial of passage through strategic waterways could be used in the same way. Whether it would, is another matter. Turning off the oil did no damage to the supplying countries; rather the reverse. But a littoral state which sought to prevent the passage of U.S. forces would have to assume that its territory would be attacked. While it is true that not all states speak the language of interest, and that when international passions are roused, reactions tend to be unpredictable, that would still be a heavy price to pay in support of a distant state and the diffuse aims of a loose ideological bloc.

The degree of political commitment is central to the use of force, which is why attempts to prevent the passage of military supplies are more likely in the terminal area. The absence of such attempts

in the past probably reflects a lack of capability rather than the will to make the attempt. And in the case of Vietnam, it seems likely that the Soviet Union did not wish to jeopardise her maritime supply line to Haiphong, lest Hanoi be forced to rely on overland support from China. However, the U.S. mining of Haiphong has now 'legitimised' a whole new range of actions in the terminal area, and in future conflicts the client state may be provided with the means to interfere with the shipment of military supplies.

This leads to the question of whether military intervention is likely against the ocean waterways. To start with the more general case of international trade, it is sometimes argued that because the West is so dependent on the shipment of oil from the Middle East, therefore the Soviet Union will be tempted to attack the line of supply; this is a modern variant of the more venerable bogey that because Europe depends heavily on imports, therefore it would be in Russia's interests to initiate submarine commerce war in the North Atlantic. This is a classic example of the fallacy that what hurts oneself must help one's enemy, and can be shown to be nonsense for a whole range of reasons. I have found it impossible to construct a scenario, outside the circumstances of world war, where it would be in the Soviet Union's interests to initiate commerce war, least of all in the Arabian Sea. The reasons range from comparative military capability to political and economic costs, and alternative instruments of policy, but probably the most compelling reason is Russia's own interest in maritime stability and freedom of the seas. which still remain largely within the gift of the West. In general, the diffuse nature of international seaborne trade is its own best protection,

since most nations have an interest in the principle of safe passage for merchant ships in peacetime. Meanwhile, as the number of national merchant fleets grows, so too does the extent to which all ships are in hostage to each other.

The shipment of military supplies is a different matter. So far, the convention has been observed that attacks on the lines of supply have been limited to the territory and coastal waters of the primary belligerents or client states. With the growing number of states possessing submarines, it is not certain that this convention will hold. The U.S.A. went close to breaching it during the Cuban Missile crisis, but this could be justified on the grounds that Cuba was within the American national security zone. But the same justification can be claimed by China in its adjacent sea areas, and it now has a force of more than 70 submarines. While the mid-ocean interdiction of military supply lines remains unlikely, the probability is therefore increasing that they will be liable to attack or other forms of interference as they near the terminal areas. Indeed, during the Angolan affair, there were many in America who advocated using U.S. naval forces to block the seaborne supply of the Soviet-backed MPLA. This would have been another dangerous precedent.

* * * * * *

Russia and America have somewhat different approaches to overseas intervention, both in their historical experience and in their current assessments. I will not dwell on the American case except to note that she was both the offspring and the inheritor of Western attitudes, exper-

ience and tradition in this area, to which she then added her own.

Since the end of the nineteenth century, the U.S. Navy has been an important instrument of policy, an instrument whose potential was vastly increased by its development during World War II. America ended the war as the world's paramount power, with a navy second to none and soon found herself at the head of a Western maritime coalition which had a virtual monopoly of sea power, which was used to some effect in the following decades. The U.S. Navy includes an organic airforce which for a long time was the third largest in the world (after the USAF and Soviet force), and a marine corps which is larger and better armed than most national armies. The 'peacetime' employment of naval forces has been a dominant consideration and has generated its own substantial force requirements. During the past thirty years there has probably been a greater use of navies in this way than at any comparable period.

Russian naval history goes back to before America gained her independence. But traditionally, the navy has been seen as an expensive necessity, rather than as an instrument of world-wide policy. From the first half of the nineteenth century, Russia's naval policy was increasingly dominated by the requirement to defend four widely separated fleet areas against maritime powers who could concentrate their forces at will. This same attitude persists in the present-day Soviet Union, where the defence establishment is dominated by Ground Force officers and where there appear to be considerable doubts about the value of military intervention overseas. This is reflected in the shape of the Soviet Navy, which lacks a distant-water intervention capability and is structured for the war-

related task of posing a permanent counter to the West's seaborne strategic delivery systems. The primary maritime instrument of foreign policy is the Merchant Fleet, which carries trade, aid and arms supplies to client states and other countries, and whose well-disciplined crews project the Soviet presence ashore.

It would however seem that between 1969 and 1973, there was a sustained debate within the Soviet Union concerning the use of armed forces in support of international goals. The causes and the results are still obscure, but it appears that in 1969, under pressure of the rapidly deteriorating situation in Egypt and after a finely balanced debate, the political leadership agreed to commit Soviet armed forces overseas, thus taking the first step down the road of a traditional Western-style policy towards the projection of military power. This major policy decision was followed by the deployment of Soviet air defence systems to Egypt in the spring of 1970. It would appear that, as events unfolded and as the costs and implications of such involvement became clearer, the arguments of those who opposed the shift in policy were strengthened. until they were able to reverse the deployment decision. However, the final policy on the role of a "Soviet military presence" had yet to be decided. and it seems that the decate continued for a further 12-15 months until a compromise was reached. By May 1973, it had been decided that direct Soviet involvement overseas would be limited to the provision of advisors, weapons and strategic logistic support, the combat role being delegated to the Soviet-equipped forces of "revolutionary" states such as North Korea, Vietnam and Cuba.

The outcome appears to be a policy which ensures the Soviet Union the best of both worlds; namely, being able to affect the outcome of an

overseas conflict with direct battlefield support, while ensuring that political commitment and liability remain strictly limited. This is achieved by (a) facilitating the arrangements and providing the lift to bring co-belligerent forces to the zone of conflict; (b) ensuring that the client state or regime receives adequate military supplies in the course of the battle; and (c) remaining silent about Soviet involvement. Of course, a corollary of such a policy is that it only allows the supportive use of Soviet military force; the coercive use must be achieved through proxies.

Interms of force projection, the major instruments of this policy appear to be the merchant fleet and the military and civil air transport fleets. The Soviet Navy has made some contribution, as for example the sealift of Mo roccan troops by landing ship to Syria in April and July 1973, the use of landing ships to ferry military supplies from the Black Sea to Syria during the October 1973 war, and the use of the landing ship based on Berbera to move supporters of the Dhofari rebellion to Cman. This is of course marginal by comparison with other types of shipment, but the Soviet Navy is active in other ways as well.

The 1967 Arab/Israeli war, which gave the navy its much-needed access to Egyptian shore facilities, also marked the start of the second and more distant phase of the shift to forward deployment, as Soviet naval forces moved out into the Caribbean, off the West Coast of Africa and into the north-west quadrant of the Indian Coean. Thereafter, political exploitation of the presence of Soviet warships in distant sea areas steadily increased. In 1970 there was a marked change in the trend, with naval detachments being deployed specifically for peacetime (as opposed to war-related) tasks, but

this activity levelled off in 1972/73. Soviet pronouncements refer to the navy's peacetime role in general terms as "defending (or securing) state interests", a nebulous formulation, whose scope has yet to be systematically researched. While not losing sight of the all-encompassing scope of this term, it is useful to discuss Soviet naval activity in terms of four major categories: establishing a strategic infrastructure; countering imperialist aggression; increasing prestige and influence; and protecting Soviet lives and property.

The first and (in my opinion) most important category, covers the task of establishing the physical, political and operational infrastructure required to support two quite distinct war-related tasks, namely: posing a permanent counter in peacetime to Western sea-based strategic delivery systems; and securing the safe and timely arrival of military supplies to 14 the Far Eastern Front, in the event of war with China.

The geographical extent of the first requirement can be seen by drawing 1500 n.m. and 2500 n.m. circles centred on Moscow, which show the arcs of threat from the Polaris A-2 and A-3 missiles. The smaller circle takes in the South Norwegian Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean and explains the heavy pressure brought on Egypt from 1961 onwards, to provide base facilities to support the Soviet Navy's forward deployment. The larger circle takes in the eastern half of the Atlantic and much of the Arabian Sea, running from the tip of Greenland to cut the west coast of Africa abreast the Cape Verde Islands, and crossing the Indian Ocean between the Horn of Africa and Bombay. This explains the Soviet Union's persistant interest in the politically insignificant West African states, and her initial move into Somalia in 1969, despite the latter's talent for acquiring political enemies both in

16

Africa and on the Arabian peninsula. Meanwhile, Cuba gives access to the departure ports on the East Coast of the U.S.A., and (with West Africa) covers the sea lines of communication with the Mediterranean.

The second strategic requirement, to secure the sea lines of communication with the Far East Front, explains the increased involvement in Somalia which followed after Marshal Grechko's visit in February 1972. Concern about the Chinese threat in the Far East began to crystalise after the 9th Congress of the Chinese C.P. in April 1969; this saw the emergence of what the Soviets perceived as a military-bureaucratic elite which was basically antagonistic to Russia. Following the series of incidents on the Ussuri River, the Soviet Union began the build up of its forces in the border region of China, and presumably this would have prompted a review of the arrangements for logistic support in the event of war. Reliance could not be placed on the Trans-Siberian Pailway and supplies would have to be shipped by sea. The reasons for shifting the Soviet focus from Egypt to Somalia are likely to be similar to those which prompted the British to start constructing a major base in Kenya in the late 1940's, as an alternative to the existing one in the Canal Zone. The decision to build up the Somalian facilities was taken at least six months before the withdrawal from Egypt, and it seems likely that the Soviets engineered Sadat's request to suit their own purposes.

Turning to the second category of 'countering imperialist aggression', we should note that in the Soviet lexicon 'imperialist aggression' includes the deployment of U.S. sea-based systems within range of Russia. Because of the very different type of political commitment involved, it is important to distinguish between the war-related task of posing a permanent counter

to such systems, and the peacetime task of opposing/challenging Western military intervention against 'progressive states' and 'national liberation movements. In areas such as the Eastern Mediterranean, where additional naval forces were deployed during the 1967, 1970 and 1973 crises, this peacetime task is upstaged by the more important war-related task of countering the U.S. carriers' nuclear strike potential, and Soviet naval units have unmistakably had this as their only priority until the danger of escalation was past. The first clear example of the peacetime task was the establishment of the 'Guinea Patrol' in December 1970, apparently to deter further Fortuguese supported seaborne attacks on Conakry. The next example was the dispatch of Soviet naval detachments to the Indian Ocean in December 1971, in reaction to the deployment of British and U.S. carrier task forces prior to and during the Indo-Pakistan war. The most recent example was during the Angolan affair, when a Kresta class large antisubmarine ship was deployed south of Guinea and on past practice, one would assume that it had SSM-armed submarines in company. This placed the detachment in a blocking position between Angola and U.S. naval forces in the Morth Atlantic.

The other two categories are of lesser interest to this discussion. The task of 'increasing Soviet prestige and influence' assumed a new dimension in 1972, when the Soviet Navy undertook port clearing operations in Bangladesh, and it was also used to sweep the southern approaches to Suez in 1974. The navy's role in 'protecting Soviet lives and property overseas' is best exemplified by the landing ships which take up station off Syria and Egypt when war breaks out with Israel, and off Angola in the recent conflict, and it appears that their task is to evacuate Soviet

personnel if defeat is imminent. The only other example is the deployment of three warships to Chanaian waters in 1969, which may have helped effect the release of two Soviet trawlers that had been held for over four months on conspiracy charges.

Any particular operation may further the objectives of more than one of these four peacetime tasks. The continuation of the Guinea Patrol after the Portuguese threat evaporated in 1974, suggests that its primary justification may in fact have been to 'establish the geo-strategic infrastructure' by securing access to base facilities on the West Coast of Africa. The same general objective may also have prompted the Ghanaian episode in 1969 and the politically-timed visit to Sierre Leone in 1971.

It can be seen that the Soviet Navy's war-related task and its three main peacetime tasks are all intended to promote the two primary objectives of Soviet foreign policy. In order of priority, these are (1) to ensure the security of the Soviet Union, and (2) to increase the Soviet Union's share of world power and influence. The second objective can be achieved both by building-up Soviet power and influence, and by diminishing that of her opponents, particularly the U.S.A. and China. It is useful to dichotomise the peacetime employment of Soviet naval forces in this manner, because it clarifies the level of political commitment behind different types of interest and operation.

It is quite evident from their pronouncements, from the output of their defence production programmes, and from the pattern of naval operations, that the Soviet Union gives high priority to the task of countering Western sea-based strategic delivery systems. To support this task they have been willing in the past to accept new political costs and commitments. Many

of the paradoxes in the Soviet/Egyptian relationship since 1961 can be explained by allowing that the Soviet Union had a near vital interest in gaining access to shore facilities whereby to support her counter-force naval deployment in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is possible that there may now be somewhat less willingness to accept large political costs on this score: partly because of SALT-generated changes in Soviet perceptions of the threat of nuclear war; partly because war with China is now the more likely contingency; and perhaps partly because the new global all-arms weapon systems will soon be entering service and will relieve the dependence on shore support in the forward operating areas. But the task still stands, and since it contributes to the security of the Soviet Union, the level of political commitment to securing the necessary geo-strategic infrastructure will be of a different order to other types of overseas involvement.

'Countering imperialist aggression' is a different matter, and the level of political commitment to this task has never been very clear. Certainly it is not worth risking war with America, which would violate the first priority objective of ensuring the security of the Soviet Union. And this brings us back to the possibility and risks of involvement by the second superpower, in a military intervention initiated by the first. The later stages of the Angolan affair provide an example of one kind of situation. This was an overt, supportive intervention, initiated by the Soviet Union using proxy forces and shipping a large volume of military supplies by sea. The U.S. Navy certainly had the capability to impose a stop-and-search blockaie on Angola, to prevent this flow of supplies, but

in fact took no action. . Presumably to discourage such interference, the Soviets deployed a Kresta and one or more cruise-missile-armed submarines in a blocking position. Certain points can be made. First, the nature of Soviet interests in Angola were not such as to justify the sinking of a U.S. warship on the high seas, particularly not a carrier, and a blockading force could have steamed through the Soviet patrol line with impunity. Second, the long term political costs to the U.S.A. of imposing such a blockade would have been very high. It would have demonstrated to the Soviet leadership that Gorshkov was right when he argued that a powerful general purpose fleet was the essential foundation of an independent overseas policy; it would have encouraged a shift in the allocation of resources in favour of increased naval building programmes, and the construction of a large, balanced surface fleet, including aircraft carriers. Such costs could hardly be justified by the U.S. interests at stake. And third, in order to shape the Soviet Union's future expectations, what the U.S.A. should have done was to deliberately sail a force of ships through the Soviet patrol line, and then reverse its course to steam back through the patrol line, and so on home. As it happens, the Atlantic Fleet was busy doing other things and so ignored the Soviet deployment; this was the next best thing, but still a long way short of optimal.

But besides political commitment, there is also the question ...
of effective military capability. The deployment of a U.S. carrier task force
to the Indian Ocean in December 1971 during the Indo/Pakistan war may have
been counter-productive in political terms, but at least the force had a
demonstrable military capability, which could be used if so wished. Not
so in the Soviet case, despite the missile armament of their surface

ships and submarines. Under what circumstances would these units have been ordered to attack the carrier? As soon as it readied its aircraft for take-off ... to an unknown destination with an unknown weapon load? Or perhaps only after the aircraft had struck home target ashore? Perhaps the Soviet Union could claim they got some political mileage out of this operation, although they certainly risked being exposed as paper tigers. But their next deployment, in response to the mining of Haiphong was both militarily and politically pointless; a fairly substantial force of surface ships and submarines sailed to the South China Sea, hung around for a few days, and then returned home. There was nothing effective that they could do.

Both because of the different levels of naval capability, and because of the very different interests and type of commitments which are involved, I am not fully persuaded by the "rules of the game" as propounded 19 by James McConnell, although much of what he says makes good sense.

Special account must be taken of Soviet interests in these areas of geostrategic importance to the security of the Russian homeland. But in most other circumstances, I consider that Soviet action at sea is largely conditioned by their estimate of U.S. reactions, and as a general rule, the low level of commitment to 'countering imperialist aggression' does not justify risking confrontation.

The Soviet impulse to 'counter imperialist aggression' is a long-standing one, as can be seen by the pattern of Soviet arms supply in the logo's and 60's. So too is the Western impulse to react against the emergence of left wing resimes. And for many years, the situation could be described crudely in terms of the West conducting a dogged rear-guard

action against change, while the Soviet Union was the natural ally of historical trends. But we are thirty years down the road now, there are few colonial territories left, and whatever their political complexion, the newly independent states have national interests and wills of their own. The old ideological reasons for military intervention by the two super-powers have largely evaporated, and it is now a question of picking sides in a traditional civil or interstate war. Given the transitory nature of political alignments, this would seem hardly worth the risks and costs involved. In the future, we may find that the main role of super-power intervention is to protect smaller states from the hegemonial tendencies of the emerging regional powers.

* * * * *

The maritime aspects of military intervention is too difuse a subject to draw together in a few well chosen words, and to have discussed the problem without having addressed the prior question of the utility of military force, is like describing the mechanics of a religion without referring to its God. There are however certain points to bring out.

The most obvious is that we now have a situation which is infinitely more complex than that facing Palmerston in the heyday of gunboat diplomacy. For a start, the maritime environment is much more complex. We have the diffusion of sophisticated weapon systems; the increased 'reach' of coastal states; a change in international attitudes towards the rights of passage and the ownership of the sea; and the appearance of new 'global' weapons for tactical use.

The political environment is also much more complex. We have just passed through 30 years of radical change, which saw the dismantling of the Western colonial empires and an ideological competition for the favour of the newly

emerging nations. We are now faced with an international system whose structure is hard to discern, with a change in the nature of usable power and its distribution, and with a range of threats to human survival which are altering national and international priorities and goals. Attitudes towards the use of coercive force by Great Powers have altered fundamentally, and new states don't 'respond' to the threat of violence in the formerly accepted fashion.

Missiles don't know their mums, and the proliferation of modern weapons means that an increasing number of coastal states have some capability to prevent the use of their seas, narrow, shallow waterways being particularly vulnerable. The change in political attitudes means that maritime powers can no longer count on being able to use the seas unhindered for maritime intervention, and the terminal leg of the sea lines of supply are now liable to attack. Meanwhile the political costs of forcing a passage through narrow waterways are likely to be so high that it is usually better to take an alternative route, where one exists, except when major interests are engaged and timeliness an issue. The economic costs of such diversion are generally less than would be expected.

The utility of coercive intervention is increasingly in doubt, except for short, sharp, small-scale, rectifying operations, and possibly at the other end of the spectrum of violence, where the scale of operations changes 'intervention' into 'overseas war'. Supportive intervention has a better record, but the increasing costs and risks, raises the question of whether navies are necessarily the most effective instrument for such purposes. Aircraft carriers have an unmatched capability for bringing flexible fire-power to bear in distant areas, but the Russians have shown what can be done with merchant ships and airlift, making use of facilities in the host country.

Many of the attributes which in former times were the monopoly of naval forces, and gave them their special value as instruments of foreign policy, have

media and satellite surveillance means that knowledge of warship movements is no longer in the flag state's control, to be released (or not) as circumstances dictate. Naval units can no longer deploy the graduated range of violence that used to be at their disposal, and the level of force needed to achieve comparable results is very much higher. Violence (punishment) at the high end of the spectrum can now be inflicted on non-adjacent areas by aircraft and missiles, as well as by ship. In fact the air is often a viable, alternative means of gaining access to distant areas, and the response time is of quite a different order. Modern communications allow heads of state and other ministers to communicate their concerns, interests and intentions to their opponents in carefully chosen language, which compares favourably with the crude signalling of naval deployments. And this explicit language can still be backed by latent force emplaced ashore.

The latter is perhaps one of the more interesting possibilities which lie ahead. The advent of global systems which can deliver tactical weapons, opens up new ways of preventing the use of the sea or of providing direct support in distant parts of the world. In practical terms, there is not much difference between sinking a carrier with a salve of torpedoes, a 300 mile SSM or a 3000 mile terminally guided ballistic missile. Perhaps none are very likely . . . but it is illogical to be concerned about two of these possibilities and to ignore the third. The difficulty of countering the ballistic missile makes it the much more potent threat.

- 1. The difficulties are immense, as can be seen from A. Rubinstein, Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World (Praegers 1975), which represents a concerted attempt to address the problem of political influence-building. See particularly Rubinstein's "Assessing Influence as a Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis". See also his "The Soviet-Egyptian Relationship Since the June 1967 War" in MccGwire et al. (Ed.), Soviet Maval Policy: objectives and constraints.
- 2. What seems likely to be the most substantial work in this field for some time to come is Ken Booth's <u>Navies and Foreign Policy</u> (Croom-Helm, forthcoming). Edward Luttwak addresses the question in <u>The Political Uses of Seapower</u> (Johns Hopkins, 1974), although the context is rather restricted. For a pioneering, but not entirely successful attempt, see James Cable's <u>Gunboat Diplomacy</u> (Chatto and Windus, 1971).
- 3. G. S. Graham, The Politics of Naval Supremacy (Cambridge University Press, 1975). This is the Title of the final Chapter IV, pp. 96-125. This compact book, subtitled "Studies in British Maritime Ascendancy", contains much wisdom about the role and influence of navies.
- 4. Ibid. p.119.
- 5. A. A. Grechko, "A Socialist, Multinational Army", Krasnava zvezda, 17 December 1972.
- 6. SS-NX-13 .. a submarine launched ballistic missile with a range of 750 km. with mid-course guidance and terminal homing. N. Polmar, "Thinking about Soviet Naval ASW", U.S.N. Institute Proceedings, May 1976, p.126. For a full discussion of current Soviet naval weapon developments, see "Soviet Naval Programmes" in MccGwire & McDonnell (Eds.), Soviet Naval Influence: domestic and foreign dimensions (Praegers, forthcoming).
- 7. These figures are extracted from the tables in "Non-Superpower Sea Denial Capability", a paper prepared by H. S. Eldredge for the Conference on "Implications of the Military Build-up in Non-Industrial States", Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 6-9 May 1976. Eldredge concentrated on presenting a global picture of the distribution of submarine torpedces and surface-to-surface missiles fitted in surface ships.
- 8. "Soviet Naval Programmes", Ibid.
- 9. There could also be a third category, "intermediary", but this is subsumed under "supportive".

- 10. For a summary description of the factors underlying these assertions see "The Geopolitical Importance of the Strategic Waterways of the Asian-Pacific Region", Orbis, Fall 1975, pp. 1058-1077.
- ll. For a summary statement of this argument see "The Submarine Threat to Western Europe" in J.L.Moulton, <u>British Maritime Strategy in the 1970s</u>, Royal United Service Institution, London, 1963, which was based on a longer unpublished study.
- 12. For a discussion of the various maritime instruments of foreign policy, see "The Navy and Soviet Oceans Policy" in Soviet Naval Influence, (op.cit.)
- 13. See "The Overseas Role of a 'Soviet Military Presence", ibid.
- 14. See "The Soviet Navy in the Seventies", ibid.
- 15. See G.S.Dragnich "The Soviet Union's Quest for Access to Naval Facilities in Egypt prior to the June War of 1967", <u>Soviet Naval Policy (op.cit)</u> pp.237-277. After gaining access to these facilities, year round deployment was achieved for the first time, the number of combattants on station rose by a factor of 2-3, and air support became available.
- 16. For the evidence underlying this geo-strategic argument, see Annex A of "The Soviet Navy in the Seventies", op.cit.
- 17. See "The Overseas Role of a 'Soviet Military Presence", op.cit.
- 18. See "The Evolution of Soviet Naval Policy" in Soviet Naval Policy (op.cit.) pp. 525, 528 and notes 55, 63-66.
- 19. J.McConnell and A.Kelly, "Superpower Naval Diplomacy in the Indo-Pakistan Crisis", Soviet Naval Developments: Context and Capability, Praegers 1973, pp. 449-451.

MANPOWER POTENTIALS AND RESERVES WITH THE

ALL VOLUNTEER FORCE

Thomas A. Fabyanic

Oral Disclaimer (read at conference):

"I am presenting these ideas as an individual. They have not been endorsed by any agency of the Department of Defense or the United States. These concepts are speculative and are only intended to serve as a basis for academic discussion."

Although the term military intervention is open to a number of definitions, this paper restricts its interpretation to the long established meaning of armed interference by a superior nation in the internal affairs of a less powerful state. Usually, the ostensible objective of such intervention is the "defense of some concept of ideal political order as conceived by the intervener," for which he is prepared to use limited military force. ¹

Throughout much of its history, the U.S. has found it necessary to intervene militarily in countries as geographically close as Mexico and as distant as China and Russia. This trend has continued into the last half of the 20th Century with military interventions occurring in the Dominican Republic and Indochina. However, future intervention capabilities need to be assessed in terms of the impact of the recent U.S. decision to rely upon an All-Volunteer Force (AVF), for that force possesses vastly different characteristics and potential than the forces which intervened in the Dominican Republic and Indochina.

Any decision to intervene militarily reflects, to a large measure, certain quantitative and qualitative dimensions of the intervening military force structure, and in this respect the evolving size and composition of the AVF are noticeably different from the preceding conscript force. A second characteristic of the AVF is the heavy reliance it places on reserve force utilization, a dependency which raises additional questions concerning military intervention capabilities. One could postulate, for

example, numerous situations wherein military intervention would hinge on the utilization or non-utilization of selective reserve forces which are essential to the existing AVF. But perhaps the most important characteristic of the AVF which affects its intervention potential is the changed perception of its capability as seen by the U. S. public, government officials, and military leaders.

Now that the AVF has been in existence for slightly more than three years, it is most appropriate to assess the trend of its intervention potential. Indeed, the greatly reduced size of the AVF, its extensive reliance on reserve forces, and the perceptions of its capability demand no less.

Conceptions and Dimensions: Force Size

During the U. S. presidential campaign of 1968, Richard M. Nixon promised, if elected, to end military conscription and establish an AVF in the United States. Shortly after his election he appointed an advisory commission on the AVF under the chairmanship of Thomas S. Gates, a former Secretary of Defense. The President's Commission (hereafter referred to as the Gates Commission) considered the feasibility of obtaining various voluntary force levels that ranged from 2.0 million to 3.0 million military personnel. It concluded that active duty force levels within this range were possible if certain improvements were made in military pay, conditions of military service life, and recruiting

capability. But despite implementation of these recommendations, the Commission's optimistic estimates have not materialized and events thus far suggest that even its minimal figure may soon be unattainable.

Although the Gates Commission did not suggest a specific military manpower force level, a careful reading of the report indicates that a tentative objective was a volunteer force level between 2.25 and 2.5 million. Indeed, a force level within this range subsequently was recommended by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird when he requested, in February, 1972, a force level at just under 2.4 million for FY 73.2 The force was not obtained and a series of reductions in force level requests began. The shortfall at the end of FY 73 was approximately 144,000, whereupon the Secretary of Defense lowered the manpower request to 2.23 million for FY 74. Despite the reduction in the total force objective, a further shortfall of 72,000 occurred, for a combined shortage of over 200,000 for FY 73 and FY 74. Only a modest reduction in total force objectives was set for FY 75 force levels, and since then recruitment has been sufficient to stabilize the force at approximately 2.1 million. Table I demonstrates this downward trend in active duty manpower levels under the AVF concept.

(TABLE I ABOUT HERE)

As can be seen from Table I, the decrease from the FY 73 objective to FY 76 end strength was 12.3 percent. Moreover, the FY 74 request of 2.233 million was described as a ". . . base line force—the minimum force that the President and Secretary of Defense consider necessary to carry out national security objectives. "4 Yet a 5.9 percent reduction of that minimum force occurred between FY 74 and FY 76.

Within DOD this downward quantitative trend has had a most serious impact on the U.S. Army. In FY 73 the Army established a force objective of 841,000, but ended the year with slightly less than 801,000. In the following year the requirement was lowered to 804,000, but Army strength fell to 783,000, its lowest strength since 1950. Since then the strength has stabilized at about 785,000.

This quantitative trend is of utmost importance for it demonstrates military manpower accession capabilities under both difficult and optimum circumstances and thus raises a most serious question about future manpower potential. For almost one and one-half years after transition to the AVF, the Army consistently failed to achieve its stated enlisted accession goals despite increased pay, a more relaxed military environment, and a doubling of its recruiting force. Increasingly it turned to what proved to be the most lucrative accession groups, blacks and females, in an attempt to avert drastic recruiting shortfalls.

Emphasis on black recruitment quickly spiraled their enlistment rate to 30 percent, increased their total representation in the Army to

22 percent, and their representation in some combat units approached 35 percent. Since blacks represented but 11.0 percent of the general population in the 17-44 age group, steps were taken by the Secretary of the Army which eventually lowered the black enlistment rate to about 22 percent of all accessions. 5

By contrast, emphasis on female accessions was increased by almost 60 percent between 1973 and 1974 and is scheduled to increase another 75 percent by 1978. Dramatic as this may appear, the net effect of this effort will be to increase female representation among all the Services from 1.6 percent to 6.2 percent. Nevertheless, within the Army more significant increases are possible since the Army has concluded that between 20 and 35 percent of its positions could be filled by females. At present, 93 percent of the Army's enlisted Military Occupation Skills are now open to qualified female applicants. Only combat related and otherwise hazardous positions are restricted to males, and female officers are eligible to command all units except combat or combat support.

The foregoing is significant first because it demonstrates the Army's willingness to exploit all possible accession sources to meet its manpower requirements. Secondly, it is important because the effort failed to achieve stated accession objectives, despite the heavy reliance on blacks and females. Failure to recruit and the corresponding decrease in the force structure continued until mid-1974 when the national economic downturn and resulting high unemployment appeared to resolve the

between unemployment and accession rates. This suggests, of course, that a return to a more normal unemployment rate seriously questions the ability of the services to recruit adequate manpower to support a force level of approximately 2.0 million. Moreover, if the correlation is valid, the question then becomes one of degree, namely, to what extent can a post-industrial, western democracy, with strong anti-military traditions, recruit a voluntary force?

(TABLE II ABOUT HERE)

Perhaps one indication of possible force levels can be obtained by comparing the United States with another very similar nation, Great Britain. Both share a cultural heritage, are industrially advanced, and possess voluntary forces which compete with the civilian sector for its manpower resources by offering comparable wages for military service.

Since 1957 the British have maintained a voluntary force but steady reductions in force levels amounting to approximately 30 percent have occurred despite pay increases and recruiting innovations. At present, male enlisted personnel in the British forces represent approximately 2.9 percent of total men in Great Britain between the ages of 18 and 45. Planned reductions now underway will drop the figure to approximately 2.6 percent by 1979.

By contrast, the U. S. has been attempting to maintain an enlisted force level of approximately 1.8 million, which represents about 4.6 percent of its male population between the ages of 18 and 45. Should the U. S. eventually discover that the British effort represents a pattern inherent in western, industrialized societies, then the U. S. will find itself with an enlisted force structure of about 1.0 million. By including the officer corps the total force would amount to 1.2 million, about one-half of the current force size.

Lest one think that the relationships between the U. S. and Great Britain are not sufficiently similar to support such a force size postulation, one should consider that by most standards of measurement the two countries are more alike than they are dis-similar. Moreover, the factors affecting the recruitment of a volunteer force primarily are reflective of institutional perceptions and the role of that institution in society. It is in this regard that the two societies share a fear of large standing armies, a common legacy from Oliver Cromwell.

But in addition to the quantitative problem, the AVF has faced another difficulty of equally serious dimensions. It is the issue of quality, a factor that is less quantifiable from the standpoint of what is required and what is obtained. Although the degree of necessary quality in the Armed Forces may be an open question, it appears that the AVF is recruiting less quality than its predecessor, the conscript force.

Conceptions and Dimensions: Quality

The Armed Forces measure quality through the use of criteria such as moral, physical, and mental standards. Since the advent of the AVF, however, there has been a tendency to expand the general meaning of quality to include other factors such as social, economic, and racial representativeness of the Armed Forces. Indeed, the issue of representativeness has been argued for years by professional scholars such as Samuel P. Huntington, Morris Janowitz, and others, but it did not become a major item of professional or academic interest as long as conscription remained in effect. The peacetime draft, in all probability, did provide a reasonably balanced cross section of American youth for military service. Additionally, the selectivity of conscription enabled the services to maintain a reasonably high level of quality as measured by aptitude and educational achievement. But termination of the draft raised serious questions about the availability and extent of quality in an AVF. For example, during the first meeting of a newly organized Senate Sub-Committee on Manpower and Personnel, its chairman. Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, stated that the issue of quality in the AVF

. . . does not simply go to the question of IQ, or the educational level of the new soldiers. Quality includes the whole spectrum of questions on the representative(ness), the motivation, and the patriotism, as well as the skill of our armed force personnel. ⁶

Most of the issues raised by Senator Nunn are complex and proper evaluation would require extensive testing and substantial analysis. But

the degree of aptitude and educational achievement found in the AVF are quantifiable and easily compared to earlier periods of the draft. Until recently the most commonly used standard test has been the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), which basically is an aptitude test that measures arithmetic reasoning, word and tool knowledge and pattern analysis. On the basis of test results, individuals are placed in Categories I through V, as indicated in Table III.

(TABLE III ABOUT HERE)

Categories I and II are considered to be above average; III average, and IV and V below average. Category V personnel are exempt from military service by law.

During the first two years of the AVF, measured aptitude of Army enlistees changed significantly. The trends indicate large decreases in the above average and increases in the average category, as shown in Table IV.

(TABLE IV ABOUT HERE)

More recently, however, the Army has improved accession quality as measured by AFQT by decreasing Category IV personnel from 16.1 percent to 10 percent for FY 75, with a further decrease to 7 percent for the first half of FY 76. Yet, it is not at all clear that small percentages of Category IV personnel are wholly desirable, for it is the view of DOD that

. . . The learning capacity of new entries is adequate in meeting job requirements when the proportion of Mental Group IV personnel does not exceed about 22 percent. Conversely, when the overall proportions of Mental Group IV personnel falls below 15 percent, there is a tendency toward many people being under-challenged by their job assignment. T

Another qualitative measurement factor used by the Services is the high school degree. As one might expect, the decrease in AFQT standings, which occurred after transition to the AVF, paralleled a decline in high school graduates among AVF accessions. During FY 64, for example, 67 percent of Army accessions were high school graduates, but by FY 74 the figure had dropped to 56 percent. And although the number of high school graduates increased to 66 percent in FY 75, preliminary data for FY 76 high school graduates indicates a reversion to lower levels.

The current qualitative measurements of the AVF, therefore, do not appear to equal the preceding conscript force, despite the fortuitous circumstance of extremely high unemployment, which theoretically enables the Services to select the best qualified applicants. This suggests, of course, that improved economic conditions may adversely affect both the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of the AVF and tempt some of the Services to lower standards as they did during the early days of the AVF.

The Army, for example, lowered its quality objectives when it failed to achieve its recruiting goals during the first six months of the AVF. The Army had set a 70 percent high school graduate accession

objective during this period but found that such qualitative goals led to shortages of about 2,000 recruits per month. Reluctantly, the Army eased the high school graduate requirement and admitted the necessity of trade-offs between quality and quantity. 8

With lower standards in effect, the percentage of high school graduates entering the Army fell throughout the last half of 1973. The average for the period was 54 percent, but dropped to 43 percent and 41 percent in November and December respectively. In the following month, Congress established limitations that required a minimum of 55 percent high school graduates among accessions.

The attempt by Congress to raise the high school graduate percentage to a minimum of 55 percent was well intentioned, but it had the adverse effect of creating recruiting shortfalls. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee during March, 1974, the United States Marine Corps stated that the high school qualitative restrictions would limit Marine recruiting to the extent that a shortfall of 5.7 to 8.6 percent would occur in the enlisted force by June, 1974. In the previous year the Marine Corps had anticipated problems with qualitative requirements and took action to make the best of the situation. It was their view that a high school degree was primarily a measurement of motivation, the lack of which could be overcome by Marine Corps training. No lower limit for high school graduates was established and in FY 75 only 59 percent of USMC accessions were so qualified.

The belief by the USMC that its training could compensate for the lack of a high school degree proved incorrect. The Marine Corps acknowledged a quality problem in late 1975, at which time it admitted that possession of a high school degree was "the most reliable preenlistment predictor that an individual will perform successfully from recruit training through expiration of active service." Moreover, it concluded that passing a General Education Development (GED) test was not an adequate substitute for a high school degree. In assessing its qualitative problems, the Marine Corps stated that ". . . it was erroneously assumed that the advent of an All Volunteer Force would not substantially alter recruiting prospects since the great majority of past accessions had been volunteers." 10

This indirect criticism of the Gates Commission highlights a fundamental problem for the AVF, since the Commission did argue that the composition of the AVF would not differ significantly from the conscript force, a conclusion still accepted as valid by some. But the main arguments appear to be that the ground combat forces of the United States have been obtaining less measured quality under a voluntary system, and at present a bona-fide high school education appears to be the key determinate of necessary quality. The Marine Corps is so convinced of the utility of a degree that it has set an accession goal of 67 percent for FY 76 and 75 percent for FY 77. Since it is doubtful that the Army can

afford to attempt less, the demands for high school graduates by the Services may go beyond practical limits in the near future.

But more significantly, one needs to ask if the high school degree is good enough as a primary measuring device. Clearly it is the best means of identifying those most likely to complete an initial tour of duty with least problems in matters such as desertion, unauthorized absence, and drug abuse, but that is not to say that it properly measures needed quality. Given the increased sophistication of current and projected battlefield weapon technology, such as lasers, imaging infra-red, and data link systems, it is axiomatic that the qualitative demands of the Services will increase. Yet, it is difficult to comprehend how adequate qualitative accession levels can be obtained through voluntary means when the Services must compete for manpower quality in the civilian market place.

This increased demand for quality accessions is occurring at precisely the same time that technology is making similar demands in the civilian sector. Of necessity, the services will compete for these resources, but the functions of supply and demand will impose quantitative limits. For example, despite national unemployment in excess of 7 percent, the United States Navy argues that competition in civilian industry for men trained in complex technical fields makes it difficult to retain them in the Navy. As a result, fleet manning shortages between 20 and 30 percent exist in primary ratings, such as fire control

technicians and electronic warfare technicians, which are critical to fleet readiness. Significantly, the Navy reported similar shortages at the end of 1973 when unemployment stood at 4.9 percent. This further suggests that the relationship between unemployment and force quality may be far less than that between unemployment and quantity.

This particular problem in the Navy, and similar problems with highly skilled personnel in the other Services, appears to be a problem of retention--another area in which the Gates Commission may have overstated the case for the AVF. Prior to FY 66, between 75 and 78 percent of Armed Forces' recruits served a single tour of duty. But despite high unemployment and improved conditions in the military, the current figure is nearly 80 percent and thus shows a regression of first term reelinstment rates. Indeed, the figure may be higher for those whose skills are in demand by a civilian market that is becoming more technologically intensive.

Unfortunately, there does not appear to be a solution to the qualitative problem. Nevertheless, it may resolve itself if there is any validity to the earlier postulation that social, political, and economic forces within the United States will eventually bring about a major reduction in force levels. For indeed the quantitative and qualitative trends of the AVF appear reasonably clear. It is a force almost one-half million smaller than originally sought and decreasing in size, while the quality of its ground forces seems less than expectations and perhaps is much

lower than what is required. To these two formidable problems one must add another, the cost of the AVF.

Conceptions and Dimensions: The Cost Factor

Some have estimated that the volunteer force costs about \$3.5 billion a year, but I know that at hearing after hearing we come up with one small item after another which really is part of the volunteer force, . . . (yet) not considered in this overall computation of costs. Therefore I am not sure we have a very good fixation on . . . the total cost. . . .

The above statement, made by U. S. Senator Sam Nunn as he chaired the Senate Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel in August, 1974, highlights the problem of defining the cost of the AVF. There exists little problem, however, in determining the total cost of manpower and its relationship to total military spending. Table V presents the trend of manpower costs and its percentage of the DOD budget.

(TABLE V ABOUT HERE)

From Table V one clearly can see the tremendous increase in personnel costs, but less obvious is the degree to which the AVF has contributed to the increase. The official assessment of AVF costs has varied. In early 1974 the Secretary of Defense provided a cost range from approximately \$750 million to \$3.7 billion, but chose the lower figure as the most realistic estimate of AVF cost. ¹¹ A few months later an Assistant Secretary of Defense placed the cost at about \$300 million,

a negligible sum indeed, which was computed using the methodology shown at Table VI. 12

(TABLE VI ABOUT HERE)

As one can see from the computations in Table VI, the preponderant cost factor is basic pay and allowances which amount to almost \$3 billion. The reason given by DOD for not costing them against the AVF is that legislative enactments directed these pay increases prior to the initiation of the AVF. Essentially the pay increases were designed to achieve a degree of comparability between military and civilian pay. The first step in the process was to match the pay of federal civil servants with pay levels of civilians in the private sector of the economy. Military pay, in turn, was then increased to match that of civilians within DOD. The second step was a compensatory increase, approved by Congress in 1971, primarily to provide a catch up pay raise for junior officers and enlisted personnel. For the lower ranking enlisted personnel, the increase was absolutely essential since many at that time were paid at the so-called poverty level. ¹³

Collectively, these two increases substantially raised military pay and thus accounted for much of the increase in personnel costs between FY 64 and FY 75 previously shown in Table V. On an individual basis, the increase for the average military member is best understood by comparing the growth in Regular Military Compensation (RMC), which

consists of basic pay, subsistence, quarters allowance and the tax advantage gained by military personnel since the last two items are non-taxable income. In absolute terms the RMC increased from \$4,380 in FY 64 to \$9,380 in FY 75. After discounting for a Consumer Price Index of 59 percent, the net RMC increase for FY 75 amounts to 55 percent.

The key issue upon which the question of AVF costs hinges, therefore, is whether the military pay increases, legislated prior to the establishment of the AVF, should be charged against it. DOD thinks not. Its view is that pay and allowances granted prior to establishment of the AVF were required as a matter of equity and thus were necessary and desirable.

Notwithstanding the offered justification, one must admit that the DOD view tends to draw a neat line between the end of conscription on 31 December 1972 and the effective start of the AVF on 1 January 1973. Such cannot be done, since efforts toward the establishment of the AVF pre-dated 1973 by several years. For example, an extensive DOD study on a voluntary force was conducted as early as 1966 and it concluded that an AVF was possible at substantially increased financial costs. 15 Additionally, President Nixon promised to end conscription while campaigning in 1968 and later directed the Gates Commission to develop a comprehensive plan for eliminating conscription. In 1970 the Commission recommended adoption of an AVF and that steps be taken promptly toward that end. Moreover, according to the Commission, the first step

was ". . . to remove the . . . (existing) inequity in the pay of men serving their first term in the Armed Forces." 16

Thus, no clear break existed between the AVF and its predecessor. Instead there was a gradual movement toward the establishment of an AVF for the better part of the decade before it was adopted. And although some pay improvements were both necessary and desirable, it should be abundantly clear that without the significant pay increases granted prior to the AVF, there would be no AVF today. Indeed, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird highlighted this fact in 1971, two years before the AVF, by stating that "(t) he most serious obstacle to achieving zero draft is pay." The pay increases subsequently granted must, therefore, be placed on the debit side of the AVF ledger. Once this is accomplished, the question then becomes one of degree, about which reasonable men can differ.

The highest DOD cost estimate for the AVF is \$3.7 billion, a figure that includes pay comparability, recruiting and advertising, enlistment, bonuses, education entitlements, and costs necessary to improve living and working conditions of service personnel. ¹⁸ But even this estimate may be too conservative, for it can be shown that the cost of the AVF is much higher.

Table VII compares personnel costs for FY 64 and FY 75 and shows a gross increase of \$13.1 billion. After adjusting for inflation and deducting certain savings attributed to the AVF (see Table VIII), the net

cost of the AVF amounts to \$5.3 billion, or 43.2 percent more than the maximum cost estimated thus far.

(TABLE VI ABOUT HERE)

(TABLE WII ABOUT HERE)

The primary contributing factor to AVF costs is the attainment of pay comparability, a scheme which may be of dubious validity when applied to a nation's Armed Forces. Pay comparability suggests that under a voluntary military system, the Armed Forces continually must compete, in terms of pay and benefits, with the private sector for manpower and funds, both of which are finite resources. This resulting competition, however, quickly establishes an inverse ratio between manpower levels and personnel costs. At present U. S. force levels are 18.6 percent below FY 64 strengths while personnel costs necessary to maintain the reduced force is up, in real terms by 27 percent as previously shown in Table VIII.

Aside from this incongruous trend of decreasing manpower levels and increasing costs, the remuneration policies adopted to support the AVF have created a fixed relationship between costs and force size, a relationship which effectively eliminates force planning flexibility. Moreover, an inflationary economy exerts upward pressure on costs even when a stable force structure exists. This leads to some difficult choices for

those who must provide for an adequate military posture. At present, the aim is to slow the growth of manpower costs, primarily by limiting pay increases and by adjusting other items of compensation such as housing, commissary stores, and retirement. Notwithstanding the practicality of these initiatives, the most optimistic projections would save only \$4.7 billion in the FY 77 budget. ¹⁹ This would reduce manpower costs from 58 percent to 53 percent, which compares to 48 percent for FY 64. Moreover, planned alterations of compensation elements should be undertaken with full recognition of long term consequences, since they surely will have some impact on recruitment and reenlistment trends. Perhaps more significantly, alternations of compensation or benefits may offer incentives to those who view the military as one of the last mass groups of employees who have yet to be unionized.

Indeed, pay comparability in the AVF has placed the military in a dilemma. Currently, 85 percent of active duty military manpower costs are strength related, which means that they are directly related to the size of the force. ²⁰ Thus any meaningful reductions in manpower costs can only be accomplished by reductions in force size or major reductions in compensation. At present the emphasis appears to be on the latter.

The most significant aspect of the existing manpower cost and force level relationship, however, is the restriction it places on force level expansion. A draft DOD analysis indicates, for example, that if the U.S. returned to the enlisted force level of the Vietnam peak, the

amount necessary to maintain the AVF instead of a conscript force would be \$29.0 billion. In order for the AVF to sustain military operations at that level, it would be necessary to increase FY 75 defense spending of approximately \$84 billion by an additional \$73.5 billion.²¹

The Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Manpower Issues addressed this issue by asking then Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger what would happen if it were necessary for the United States to increase manpower in the AVF to the level of the Vietnam period. "I do not believe we could obtain a sufficient force at acceptable budget levels," said Mr. Schlesinger, "and we would have to return to the draft." 22

Perhaps the full impact of manpower constraints under an AVF is summed up best by Senator Nunn:

It is very disturbing to me... that if we... (revert) to any wartime footing, we will immediately have to go back to the draft... it (further) disturbs me that we have a whole group of young people who would be shocked if all of a sudden we got into a war and the (concept of) the Volunteer Force evaporate(d). 23

Few can doubt the assessments by Senator Nunn and Mr. Schlesinger that force levels of the Vietnam period are unrealistic under the AVF concept. What also must be remembered, however, is that the principle of pay comparability precludes attainment of high force levels regardless of how they are raised. In other words, it matters not if the forces are raised by the AVF, the draft, or mobilization of the reserves, because

it does not appear that the nation can afford the payroll of large force levels. And to those who might suggest that military pay should be reduced under such circumstances, the Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army has replied: "It is inconceivable to me that we would pay men who were called upon to fight for this country less in wartime than they were receiving in peacetime." 24

Thus it appears that the United States had put itself in a most undesirable position by creating an AVF. Such a force was feasible only by making it a competitor in the manpower market place. The net result has been the creation of a terribly expensive force with practical limits on its expansion capability should the need occur. But there is yet a worse dimension to the AVF. If it provides too small a force, or if it lacks credibility, then the force will be incapable of projecting real or perceived power to militarily intervene. Should that occur then it will be but a matter of time before a major military challenge is offered and the real cost of the AVF becomes manifest.

Conceptions and Dimensions: Representativeness

In addition to the dimensions of quantity, quality, and cost, additional emerging trends in the AVF are the drift toward racial and regional imbalance and some movement toward the development of a military ethos. These trends may result, a few years hence, in an AVF which finds itself in conflict with public attitudes as reflected in legislative assertiveness

in matters of foreign policy and military intervention. For despite

Congressional restrictions, an unrepresentative force which is relatively
small, highly capable, and eager to demonstrate its capabilities, might
offer powerful temptations to some elements of future political leadership. Thus, in contrast to the previously discussed dimensions of the

AVF, its lack of representativeness might suggest more rather than less
intervention.

It is axiomatic that a representative force must reflect, in microcosm, the salient features of the society which it serves. And in a society such as the United States, where ethnic pluralism is strained by racial divisiveness, the racial composition of its Armed Forces is of major importance because it questions the legitimacy of the force. Key scholars in the field have described the racial changes occurring in the AVF and also have offered logical alternatives to insure the formulation of a politically legitimate force. Moreover, they have recognized that an unrepresentative force may indeed call into question the legitimacy of the government which directs it. 25

A generally less understood but nonetheless equally significant aspect of representativeness is the regionalism which might characterize the Armed Forces, and in this respect the emerging trends of the AVF should sound a note of caution.

The draft, despite its many inequities, did provide a reasonably balanced geographical cross section of American youth, and in so doing

it served the dual purpose of satisfying part of the representativeness equation, while simultaneously providing a continuous cadre of military veterans to the more anti-military areas of the country. By contrast, the AVF appears to be drawing increasing numbers from the more traditionally authoritarian areas of the country, such as the south and southwest. For example, during FY 74 and FY 75 Army accessions from southern states averaged 35 percent of total accessions, while those states represented only 27.6 percent of the population at large. More significantly, the Army oversubscribed blacks in the deep south region during FY 74 by ratios of 2:1, when comparison is made of accession percentages and percentages of black males of military age within those states. ²⁶ In all probability, this regional overemphasis was tempered somewhat, starting in FY 75, when widespread unemployment served to improve general recruiting conditions.

A more important regional trend in the AVF is the increased number of officers coming from southern and western states. For example, Table VIII shows that while total Air Force ROTC production declined approximately 20 percent between FY 70 and FY 75, ROTC officer production dropped 35 percent in the Ohio Valley region and 46 percent in the northeast. By contrast, as overall ROTC graduates fell by 20 percent, the southeast maintained its production in absolute terms and the south central and western regions actually increased their production of officers.

(TABLE IX ABOUT HERE)

In addition to this increased representativeness from the south and west, the percentage of officers being provided by the USAF Academy is increasing, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of accessions.

While ROTC production between FY 72 and FY 76 (forecast figure for FY 76) continued at a relatively steady rate of about 35 percent of Air Force officer accessions, USAF Academy graduates more than doubled as a percentage of total officer accessions, going from 6.8 percent to 15.6 percent. 27

It should be quite clear that if the foregoing trends are indicative of broader movements within the AVF, then the entire issue of force representativeness and legitimacy is one of major significance. These trends suggest a narrowing of the socio-political base among both the officer corps and the enlisted force within the AVF. The implications are enormous, for the net result can be a separate and distinct military force with extremely parochial views about itself and its mission.

Currently the U. S. is experiencing a period of legislative assertiveness, which, among other things, eschews military intervention as an instrument of foreign policy. Ample evidence of this Congressional attitude can be found in the War Powers Act, the denial of military appropriations for Vietnam and Angola, and other actions too numerous to mention. Indeed, this assertiveness and its consequences appear to

reflect the mood of the public and, moreover, seem to find additional support from at least the TV portion of the national news media. 28

Concurrently, however, it appears that the emerging AVF may be attracting those individuals who, by tradition and environment, wish to move in the opposite direction. Such individuals would tend to reinforce the elite corps of career officers whose "can do" attitude and professionalism demand that they provide the capability for maximum military responsiveness at all times, irrespective of existing attitudes by Congress or the public pertaining to its use or non-use. This narrow-based professionalism could lead to the development of both the necessary force structure and strategy of employment for military intervention, despite the constraints of force size and influence of the civilian leadership. Given the apparent trends in the dimension of representativeness and legitimacy, therefore, the AVF may tend to increase rather than limit the possibility for military intervention.

On balance, however, greatly reduced force levels and the paradox of apparent decreases in quality in what clearly is a more technologically intensive force, probably will be sufficient to restrain the development of intervention strategies. Moreover, another factor which will tend to limit the intervention capability of the force is its extensive dependency on reserve forces, a dependency that differs considerably from previous reserve and active duty force relationships.

Total Force

Prior to the advent of the AVF, the primary means for expanding the force structure was through the use of conscription. Only selective activation of reserve units occurred during crisis situations such as those which developed over Berlin, Cuba, and Tet, and in those cases the intent of the mobilizations were perhaps more political than military. Reserve forces, which stood at well over 2.0 million, were not mobilized for the war in Indochina, despite its duration and intensity which appeared to suggest mobilization as an obvious course of action. Instead the United States perferred to conscript and did so at an annual average of about 267,000.

The AVF, of course, has ended this luxury of maintaining large reserve forces whose wartime mission would be accomplished by conscripts. More importantly, the reduction of active force levels which has accompanied the AVF has forced the Army, for example, to rely upon reserve force augmentation in order to achieve its desired force structure. Between 1970 and 1973, as the United States moved toward the AVF, the Army reduced its divisions from 17 1/3 to 13 and cut its personnel strength by one-half million. By 1975, the Secretary of Defense admitted that those reductions of active duty ground forces had been too severe, and plans were made to redress the force cuts by innovations with reserve forces. ²⁹

After it was agreed that a force structure of 16 Army divisions represented a prudent risk force, the Army adopted a plan wherein it would create three additional divisions while only adding about 5000 personnel to its active force of 785,000. Part of the plan called for a reduction of the combat-support ratio by converting tactical support units to combat units and assigning reserve forces the tactical support mission. It was assumed, of course, that the reserve tactical support units would be maintained in a high state of readiness and deployed early in any conflict.

The second dimension to the Army plan called for even greater reliance on reserve forces. Within each of the new divisions, a full brigade, or one-third of its strength, would be provided by a reserve component brigade. As the plan developed, a fourth division was restructured to accommodate a reserve brigade.

As should be obvious, therefore, the 16 division Army force exists only if the combined elements of active and reserve forces are manned, equipped, and trained for combat. But despite official intent and action to maintain the readiness of these affiliated components, one must seriously question the degree and level of training that realistically can be accomplished by non-active duty Army forces. The task of accomplishing meaningful training, which requires joint maneuvers and total integration with the parent division, is a major undertaking due to limited time available to reservists, and increasing their training availability time is

extremely difficult since most are fully employed in civilian life. Moreover, the equipment of the reserve components must match that of the
active force if total force training is to be effective. Given limited equipment resource availability, however, the establishment of priorities
between the reserve components and active forces might only be resolved
to the detriment of both.

A more important question, however, is whether the reserves will be utilized. Fundamentally, this is a question of political will and, as evidenced by the Indochina experience, a step not easily taken by politicians. The necessity of activating the reserves under certain circumstances may be quite clear, but perhaps less obvious will be the political courage to do so. In recognition of this problem, a DOD request to Congress in late 1974 asked for legislation that would permit activation of up to 50,000 reservists for a 90-day period without the declaration of a national emergency. The measure was signed into law on May 14, 1976.

Although in terms of numbers this projected call-up authority appears to be relatively limited, passage of the measure is of enormous significance. First, it grants to the President what appears to be unprecedented authority over non-active duty forces. Most surprisingly, this authority comes from Congress at a time when its record is replete with the exercise of Congressional prerogatives, which,

subsequent to passage of the measure, was protected in this matter primarily by the 90-day limitation and restrictions of the War Powers Act.

More importantly, however, the measure would suggest a greater awareness of the emergent dependency of active duty forces on the reserve elements. But a far deeper meaning of the measure might possibly be the realization that the force structure, as constituted under the inherent limitations of the AVF, is inadequate to meet contingency operations. By inference, therefore, it would suggest that the intervention capability of the AVF, without augmentation from reserve forces, is far less than the preceding conscript force.

Implications for Military Strategy

Conventional military wisdom holds that military strategy and force structure are the results of sequential events that begin with the formulation of national policy objectives. The policy, in turn, leads to a conceptualization of military, political, economic, and diplomatic strategies which are then forged into instruments capable of achieving the articulated policy objectives. From a realistic standpoint, however, such a formalized and structured methodology could never function due to the existence of numerous components in the national security system which continually exert modifying pressures on national policy objectives and the means to fulfill them.

In a democratic society which is attempting to cope with the vicissitudes of a post industrial period, it is unlikely that all of the elements of national power can be simultaneously orchestrated into a coherent strategy. For example, our security interests dictate that we must establish, along what may be called horizontal lines, a geographical area of security which may be at odds with economic interests structured along vertical lines. The result is an apparent dichotomy, for on the one hand the U. S. would expend huge sums of money on defense to deter a potential adversary, while simultaneously engaging in trade relationships with the same potential adversary that are not too far removed from "most favored nation status." This complicates the determination of what constitutes a "vital interest" and thus adds uncertainty to the formulation of foreign policy and, consequently, a military strategy to support that policy. Moreover, it is becoming increasingly clear that there are limits to the effectiveness of military power and that realization, in turn, constrains foreign policy objectives. Thus, the relationship between our foreign policy and military capability is not support of the former by the latter, but a relationship that is inherently reciprocal. 30

Usually, there exists basic compatibility between foreign policy objectives and the military capability necessary to secure those objectives, by intervention if necessary. At times, however, capabilities and objectives may get out of phase. This presently may be occurring in the United States where a traditionally manpower-intensive force finds itself

confronted with substantial military commitments, while manpower is denied as the transition is made to a capital-intensive force of unparalleled technological sophistication.

At present there is little reason to suspect that the United States can alter the equation by increasing military manpower levels, which further suggests that military commitments and contingency plans requiring intervention forces may need to be revised downward. On the other hand, a selective increase in capability of existing forces, augmented by reserves, might offset decreased manpower levels evident in the AVF. But if force level reductions occurring thus far are reflective of an inexorable trend inherent in politically advanced and technologically oriented societies that rely upon voluntary forces, then profound alterations of our entire military system are inevitable.

In the meantime, military planners need to consider the military intervention capabilities of the emerging AVF, for even now its force level, force structure, readiness, and its manpower costs, have altered its intervention capability.

It appears that the inability to recruit adequate numbers of ground combat personnel in the early days of the AVF resulted in successive reductions in force size, which gradually led to force structure changes such as alteration of the combat-support ratio and extensive reliance on reserves. Despite the decreased manpower, however, the cost of military manpower continued to increase and, together with inflationary

pressure, contributed to lowered military readiness of AVF. Similarly, the reserve components essentially have remained not operationally ready due to equipment shortages. 31 What must be recognized is that while some of these problems may be transitory, the crucial element is the availability of adequate numbers of qualified manpower. But in this regard, the trend factors of the AVF are not sanguine.

Notwithstanding current force capability trends, however, innovations are underway to overcome what appears to be decreased military intervention capability. The Army, for example, has created an elite force of "quick strike" ranger units which have a capability of rapid deployment from the United States to any accessible area of the world where a U. S. presence might be desired. It is likely that their capability would enable them to intervene quickly by reliance on speed and mobility. Uncertain at this point, however, is their employment doctrine.

A new initiative by the USAF is the airlift enhancement program, which calls for increased airlift deployment capability and includes plans for a large aerial tanker to reduce reliance on foreign bases during force deployments.

The combination of "quick strike" ranger units and increased airlift deployment capability, together with acceptance of the hypothesis that force capability affects its use or non-use, might conflict with emerging non-intervention attitudes by U. S. society and proscriptions against the use of force by Congress. Whether military officers will develop such a

doctrine of employment is uncertain, but it is clear that they are faced with a new set of challenges that require a changed response doctrine for military intervention. Such a doctrine would call for rapid deployment of highly specialized forces; swift and decisive employment to achieve clearly stated and obtainable objectives; and immediate withdrawal to comply with legal proscriptions and to prevent formulation of domestic opposition.

It is not assumed that the existence of a particular type of military capability and a supporting doctrine would lead to involvement by virtue of their existence (although the opposite can be argued³²). What must be realized, however, is that we live in an era of political, social, and economic upheaval in which the requirement for conventional military intervention capability may greatly exceed that of the Cold War era. Moreover, we must also realize that some of our current interests and presumed commitments may be beyond the capability of the emerging force, despite the innovations. ³³

The most serious miscalculation that could be made by military planners is to overestimate the political will of the U.S. in the ensuing decade. It should be obvious that the innovations currently underway are not being made as necessary and desirable modifications of a basically sound strategy, but rather they are a mechanistic means to obviate the results of a changed national will concerning the utility of military force. Indeed, the creation of the AVF is an indirect result of, and a testimonial

to, the changed perception by U. S. citizens of their international responsibilities and perceived capabilities.

Equally significant for military planners is the impact of the AVF on the Clausewitzian concept of appeasement and escalation as tools of mutual reciprocation in the conduct of military intervention. ³⁴ Crisis situations in which military intervention is an option usually erupt with suddenness and allow little time for rigorous analysis. Action and issues are often clouded by inadequate intelligence, rabidly changing military conditions, complex political considerations, and a host of other variables. This explains, in part, the propensity for military leaders to plan for a worst case scenario.

By grossly oversimplifying the Clausewitzian construct of reciprocity of appeasement and escalation, and by postulating that measurably less intervention capability exists within the AVF vis-a-vis its predecssor, one can then conceptualize a vast range of results from possible interventions supported by the AVF. Prior to the AVF, the perceived capability of the United States to escalate military intervention to extremes tended to ignore basic asymmetries between fundamentals such as offense and defense. Aided by what can be characterized as a hubris of technology, the U. S. tended to construct military force equations (between itself and potential adversaries) in which it controlled the key variables in the equation.

With the advent of the AVF, the U. S. now must reassess its role in similarly constructed equations since it may no longer possess the capability to escalate to extremes technological innovations notwithstanding. What must now be accepted by the United States is the use of deescalation as a tool of reciprocity when an intervention option occurs, for indeed precious little escalatory potential exists.

Recognition of this changed role of the United States in future military intervention equations can lead to the development of a simplistic model which would highlight intervention priorities based on emerging military potential.

The model should be visualized as a group of concentric circles with the U. S. inside the innermost circle. The first concentric circle out from the center is occupied by Western European allies and Japan. The relationship between the center and first circle is characterized by horizontal economic ties, occasionally strained by vertical cleavages representing religion and culture in Japan and socialist tendencies in Western Europe, but the relationships between the center and first circle are reinforced by external threats which cannot be addressed unilaterally by Japan or Western Europe. Due to forward basing by the United States in the first circle, ample military capability exists to consider military intervention should a vertical cleavage increase beyond acceptable limits. Obviously, the capability for successful intervention by the U. S. would

decrease in proportion to the strength of the country in which the intervention is contemplated.

In the second concentric circle we find Cuba, Mexico, and Canada. Cuba is in opposition but offset by Canada which is in mutual alignment with U. S. military capability. Mexico is neutral but can effectively oppose by gaining political and moral support from nations in the outer concentric circles. The capability for intervention by the U. S. is high because of the adjacent locations which would permit application of preponderant mass by the U. S. This is not to say that such intervention would be successful, but rather that U. S. capability to intervene is of a high order.

The third concentric circle contains the remaining countries of Central America, Latin America, and the Middle East. It is bounded by the last concentric circle which contains Korea, the Persian Gulf area, Africa, and others which constitute nations of less significance to the U. S. such as major powers against whom intervention is impossible (USSR, PRC, etc.), and countries over which they exercise hegemony. The capability of intervention in these last two circles is quite low, for the operative factors are time, distance, space, and the key variable of available manpower.

In the not too distant past, the United States may have possessed the capability to intervene, for example, in an area such as the Persian Gulf.

A large standing army, availability of reserve manpower, and a functioning

conscript authority, could have provided the perception of adequate forces to properly manipulate the intervention equation. At present, however, the AVF may have ended, or at least tempered, such beliefs.

Conclusion

The United States has embarked upon an unchartered course by its reliance on volunteers and has done so at precisely the time that the industrial revolution, which is responsible for extending the life of the mass army well into the 20th Century, has itself been overcome by a new technetronic era in which a mass army may be an anachronism. Simultaneously, socio-political forces are at work which question basic assumptions concerning the role of the military as an institution and its utility as an instrument of national power.

Collectively, these changes may exert a restraining influence on the quantitative dimension of the AVF, an influence that perhaps cannot be obviated by the manipulation of variables such as military pay, reliance upon selective groupings of American society for manpower, or some complex calculus for the use of reserve forces. The trends appear to suggest that a reinforcement of basic antimilitarism is occurring in the U. S. Should these conclusions withstand the test of rigorous analysis, then it would appear that the AVF merely is fulfilling a need in a transitional period.

NOTES

- Urs Schwarz, "Great Power Intervention in the Modern World," <u>Problems of Modern Strategy</u> (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1970), pp. 176-177.
- 2. National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence, Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1973, p. 155. (Hereafter all such reports will be referred to as Annual Defense Department Report with appropriate years.)
- 3. It is necessary to recognize that Congress may not approve requested force levels for various reasons, such as its estimate of the recruiting capabilities of the Services. For example, the FY 73 request of 2.40 billion was reduced by Congressional authorization to 2.33, but the Services ended the year with 2.25. Nevertheless, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Army requested Congress not base its authorization on Congressional "... estimates of the Army's capability to recruit toward an end strength. " United States Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings ("Fiscal Year 1975 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths"), 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, Part 4 ("Manpower"), March 21, 22, and 26, 1974, p. 1627. (Hereafter referred to as SASC, FY 75.)
- 4. United States Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings ("Fiscal Year 1974 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths"), 93rd Congress, 1st Session, Part 8 ("Manpower"), June 11, 12, 13, 27; July 13, 14 27; August 3, 1973, pp. 5201, 5222.
- New York Times, February 21, 1974; Washington Star News, October 29, 1974.
- 6. United States Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Hearings ("Military Manpower Issues of the Past and Future"), 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, August, 1974, p. 3. (Hereafter referred to as Nunn Committee.)

- 7. Annual Defense Department Report FY 1974, p. 100.
- 8. New York Times, July 29, 1973.
- 9. SASC FY 1975, pp. 1481, 1595.
- Report on Marine Corps Manpower Quality and Force Structure submitted to Senate Armed Services Committee on December 31, 1975, p. 2 of Executive Summary.
- 11. Annual Defense Department Report FY 1975, p. 179.
- 12. SASC FY 1975, p. 1620.
- 13. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 1500; <u>Manpower Requirements Report for FY 1975</u>, p. XI-20.
- Annual Defense Department Report FY 1975, p. 179; SASC FY 1975, p. 1619.
- U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings ("Review of the Administration of the Selective Service System"), June, 1966, pp. 9, 999-10, 174.
- 16. Letter of Transmittal, President's Commission on An All-Volunteer Force, February 20, 1970.
- 17. Annual Defense Department Report FY 1972, p. 134.
- 18. Annual Defense Department Report FY 1975, pp. 179-180.
- 19. Annual Defense Department Report FY 1977, pp. 219-225.
- 20. Manpower Requirements Report for FY 1975, p. XI-3.
- 21. Andrew Uscher and Daniel Huck, "Is the AVF a Peacetime Concept?" (unpublished draft of Cost Analysis for Alternative Force Sizes, October, 1974).
- 22. Nunn Committee, p. 26.
- 23. Ibid., p. 36.
- 24. Ibid., p. 1527.

- 25. Morris Janowitz and Charles Moskos, Jr., "Racial Composition in the All-Volunteer Force: Policy Alternatives," <u>Armed Forces and Society</u>, Vol. I, No. 1 (Fall 1974), pp. 109-123.
- 26. Defense Manpower Statistics: OASD, M&RA.
- 27. Air University, USAF ROTC, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.
- 28. See, e.g., James A. Johnson, "The New Generation of Isolationists," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 1, October, 1970, pp. 136-146; Bruce Russett, "The Americans' Retreat from World Power," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 1, Spring, 1975, pp. 1-21; Ernest W. LeFever, TV and National Defense: An Analysis of CBS News, 1972-73, Institute for American Strategy, 1974.
- 29. Annual Defense Department Report FY 1976 and 197T, p. III-15.
- 30. Bernard Brodie, "Vital Interests: By Whom and How Determined,"

 National Security and American Society, ed. Frank N. Trager and
 Philip S. Kronenberg (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of
 Kansas, 1973), pp. 63-78.
- 31. Annual Defense Department Report FY 1977, pp. 200-205.
- 32. Graham T. Allison, "The Military and American Society," The Annals, March, 1973, pp. 17-37.
- 33. See, e.g., James R. Schlesinger, <u>Annual Defense Department Report FY 1976 & 197T</u>, p. III-32. Secretary Schlesinger argues that in the absence of increased airlift it would make more sense to reduce some of our more distant and informal commitments.
- 34. See Raymond Aron, "Clausewitz's Conceptual Systems," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. I, No. 1 (Fall 1974), pp. 49-59, for a related discussion on Clausewitz's method of analysis.

TABLE I

DOD ACTIVE DUTY FORCE

FY	Stated Objective 3	FY End Strength	Shortfall
1973	2,396,517	2, 252, 810	143, 707
1974	2,233,000	2, 161, 000	72,000
1975	2, 152, 000	2,129,000	23,000
1976	2, 100, 000	2,100,000*	
1977	2, 126, 651		

^{*}Estimated

(Source: Annual Defense Department Reports; DOD Selected Manpower Statistics.)

TABLE II

UNEMPLOYMENT AND ENLISTMENT RELATIONSHIPS, 1973-74

Time Period	Unemployment Rate: Male and Females Aged 16 and Over	Percent Achieved Of Army Enlisted Accessions
1973 Jan-Dec	4.9	87. 8
1974 Jan	5. 2	89.8
Feb	5. 2	88. 7
Mar	5. 1	94.4
Apr	5.0	91: 0
May	5, 2	103.3
Jun	5.2	122.0
Jul	5.3	96.7
Aug	5. 4	106.9
Sep	5, 8	103.3
Oct	6. 0	105.3
Nov	6, 6	100.3
Dec	7. 2	100.4

(Source: U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Statistics; OASD, M&RA.)

TABLE III

AFQT CATEGORY DETERMINATION

Mental Category	Percentile Score
I	93-100
II	65-92
III (a)	50-64
III (b)	31-49
IV	10-30
V	less than 10

(Note: The Services have moved away from AFQT; new aptitude test scores are converted to AFQT groupings for purposes of comparison.)

AFQT COMPARISONS: CONSCRIPT FORCE AND AVF
(IN PERCENTAGES)

TABLE IV

	1965	1974	Percent Change
I	8. 1	2.0	75.3 decrease
П	33.5	23.0	31.3 decrease
Ш	41.7	58.9	41.2 increase
IV	16.7	16.1	N/A
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	

(Source: OASD, M&RA.)

TABLE V

MANPOWER COSTS a/
(\$ Billions)

	FY 64	FY 74	President's FY 77 Budget Request
DEFENSE OUTLAYS	50. 8	78.4	100.1
PAYROLL OUTLAYS			
Total Military Total Civilians Retired Military Total Payroll	13. 5 7. 7 1. 2 22. 4	24.4 14.2 5.1 43.8	27.4 17.1 8.4 52.9
PERSONNEL SUPPORT OUTLAYS <u>b</u> /	1. 8	3.9	4.6
PERCENT OF DEFENSE OUT	LAYS		
Payroll Personnel Total	44 4 48	56 5 61	53 <u>5</u> 58
End Strengths (000s) REGULAR EMPLOYEES			
Active Military Civilians Total	2,685 1,176 3,861	2, 161 1, 109 3, 270	2,101 1,036 3,137

a/Data excludes civil functions.

(Source: Manpower Requirements Report for FY 1977, pp. xv-4)

b/Personnel support includes all nonpayroll costs of individual training, medical support (including CHAMPUS), overseas dependents education, and recruiting and examining, plus half of base operations.

TABLE VI

AVF COST ESTIMATES

(In \$Millions) FY 1975

All Volunteer Force Package	Budget Cost	Cost Avoidance
Admin Program (ROTC/ADV Travel, Other)	\$ 496	
Enacted Legislation (Pay Raise, ROTC, Scholarship, Bonus)	2,468	
Bonuses (Proposed)	78	
Total	\$3,042	
Base Costs		
Basic Pay/Allowances	\$2,299	
Adjusted Total	743	
Additional Training Costs Avoided with Reduced Turnover		\$400
Additional Selective Service Costs Avoided with Discontinuation of Draft		40
Estimated Range of Net AVF Costs with Reduction for Cost Avoidance		300

(Source: U. S. Senate Hearings, Armed Services Committee, FY 75, p. 1619.)

TABLE VII
SELECTED MILITARY PERSONNEL COSTS

(Outlays in \$ Billions)

	FY 64	FY 75
DOD Budget Total (Outlay)	50.8	85.8
Personnel Costs		
Military Basic Pay	8. 5	19.0
Military Special Pay and Allowances	4.5	6. 7
Family Housing	0.5	0.9
Total Pay and Allowances	13. 5	26.6

(Source: Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1975.)

TABLE VIII

AVF COST ESTIMATE (IN \$ BILLIONS)

FY 64 Military Personnel Costs Consumer Price Index Inflation Factor: 54.8%	13.5 (From Table VI) 7.4
FY 64 Military Personnel Costs	
(Adjusted for Inflation)	20.9
FY 75 Military Personnel Costs	26.6 (From Table VI)
Real Increase: FY 64-FY 75	5.7 (27% increase)
Less Turnover and Selective Service Savings	. 4
AVF Cost Estimate	5.3

(Source: SASC FY 75, pp. 1500-1501; 1619-1620.)

TABLE IX

USAF ROTC PRODUCTION TRENDS

GEOGRAPHIC AREAS	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74	FY 75	% Change
North East	769	899	537	404	378	413	-46.2
Ohio Valley	721	672	603	556	200	467	-35.2
North Central	715	773	665	518	478	482	-32.5
Middle Atlantic	551	516	484	485	420	443	-19.6
South East	538	552	541	516	452	534	r
South Central	583	617	667	069	644	603	+ 3,4
Western	647	615	648	716	617	672	+ 3.8
TOTALS	4524	4413	4145	3885	3489	3614	-20.1

Source: Air University, ROTC, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

TRENDS IN MILITARY SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

by Charles C. Moskos, Jr.

Underlying much of social theory are developmental constructs which are implicit predictions of an emerging social order. Most simply, developmental constructs are modes of analyses which entail historical reconstruction, trend specification, and, most especially, a model of a future state of affairs toward which actual events are heading. Developmental analysis, that is, emphasizes the "from here to there" sequence of present and hypothetical events. Put in a slightly different way, a developmental construct is an "ideal" or "pure" type placed at some future point by which we may ascertain and order the emergent reality of contemporary social phenomena. Models derived from developmental analysis bridge the empirical world of today and the social forms of the future.

It follows that readings of current reality will vary depending upon which developmental model is constructed. Our purpose here is to apply developmental analysis to the emergent military establishment in American society. Put plainly, what is the likely shape of the armed forces in the foreseeable future? Or more formally, what is the range of structures through which the functions of armed force will be carried out? Initially, a comprehensive developmental construct will be presented which seems best to fit current empirical indicators. This is the proposition that the American military is moving from a predominantly institutional format to one more resembling that of an occupation. Secondly, there will be a specification of some logical organizational outcomes in the military system resulting from the shift to an occupational model.

^{*}This paper in part draws on research supported by the US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, for which the author is grateful. All findings and interpretations are the sole respon ibility of the author.

THE MILITARY: OCCUPATION, PROFESSION, OR CALLING?

Terms like occupation, profession, or calling suffer from imprecision both in popular and scholarly discussion. Nevertheless, they each contain core connotations which serve to distinguish them from one another. For present purposes these distinctions can be described as follows.

An <u>occupation</u> is legitimated in terms of the <u>marketplace</u>, i.e. what are prevailing monetary rewards for equivalent skills. In a modern industrial society employees usually enjoy some voice in the determination of appropriate salary and work conditions. Such rights are counterbalanced by responsibilities to meet contractual obligations. The occupational model implies first priority inhere in self-interest rather than in the task itself or in the employing organization. A common form of advancement of group interest is the trade union.

A <u>profession</u> is legitimated in terms of <u>specialized expertise</u>, i.e. a skill level achieved after long, intensive, and formal training. The perogatives of a profession center around conditions supportive of maintenance of professional skills, career achievement, and intrinsic satisfaction with one's work. The obligations of the professional are responsibility to one's clientele or constituency. The modal form of advancement of group interest is the professional association.

A <u>calling</u> is legitimated in terms of <u>institutional values</u>, i.e. a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favor of a presumed higher good. A calling usually enjoys high esteem in the larger community because it is associated with notions of self-sacrifice and complete dedication to one's role. A calling does not command monetary reward comparable to what one might expect in

the general economy. But this is often compensated for by an array of social benefits which simultaneously signals the institution's intent to take care of its own, and which sets the institution apart from the general society. Members of an institution do not organize into self-interest groups. If redress is sought, it takes the form of "one-on-one" recourse to superiors or a trust in the paternalism of the organization.

Cf course, the above specified models of an occupation, profession, or calling/institution are as much caricatures as they are descriptions of reality. In the case of the armed forces, moreover, the situation is complicated in that the military has elements of all three models. But the overarching and clearly dominant trend in contemporary military social organization is the decline of the institutional format and the corresponding ascendancy of the occupational model. (The state of military professionalism is more problematic, but seems also to be giving way to the occupational model. In any event, the concept of professionalism in any meaningful sense is limited solely to the officer corps, a group which constitutes less than fifteen percent of all military personnel.)

Although antecedents predated the appearance of the all-volunteer force in early 1973, it was the end of the draft which served as the major thrust to move the military away from an institutional format. In contrast to the all-volunteer force, the selective service system was premised on the notion of citizenship obligation — with concomitant low salaries for draftees — and the ideal of a broadly representative enlisted force (though this ideal was not always realized in practise). In point of fact, it was the occupational model which clearly underpinned the philosophic rationale of the 1970 Report of the President's Commis-

sion on an All-Volunteer Armed Force ("Gates Commission Report"). Instead of a military system anchored in the normative values of a calling — captured in words like Duty, Honor, Country — the Gates Commission explicitly argued that primary reliance to recruit an armed force be based on monetary incentives determined by marketplace standards. Perhaps the ultimate in monetary inducements has been reached in the "bonus" used to recruit young men into the combat arms since the end of the draft.

While the termination of the selective service system is the most dramatic change in the contemporary military system, other indicators of the trend away from the institutional format toward the occupational model can also be noted:

(1) the significant salary increases given the armed forces since 1971 in an effort to make military salaries competitive with civilian rates; (2) proposals to make civilian-military pay "comparable," e.g. doing away with the allotment system by which service remuneration is partly determined by the service member's marital and family status; (3) proposals to eliminate or reduce a host of military benefits, e.g. subsidies to commisaries and exchanges, the G.I. Bill, health care for dependents, the pension system; (4) the separation of work and residence locales accompanying the growing proportion of enlisted men residing off the military base; and (5) the increasing aversion of many military wives at officer and noncom levels to take part in customary social functions. The sum of these and related changes is to confirm the ascendancy of the occupational model in emergent military social organization.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCUPATIONAL MODEL

A shift in the rationale of military service from an institution to an occupation implies organizational consequences in the structure and perhaps function of the armed forces. The discussion which follows is not to be construed as advocacy of such organizational consequences nor even of their inevitability. But it is to argue that if the industrialization of the military continues then certain outcomes are to be anticipated. If any of these outcomes are deemed undesirable, attention should be directed at their root cause—

the transformation of the military system into an occupation— and not simply to the outcomes themselves.

Three changes in particular are presently apparent in military social organization: (1) the growing likelihood of unionization in the armed services,

(2) the appearance of elite units which differ markedly from other units in social membership and military commitment, and (3) the increasing reliance on contract civilians to perform tasks hitherto the province of uniformed personnel. Even though seemingly unrelated, all three such organizational changes derive from the ascendant occupational model. Each deserves a little elaboration.

Trade Unionism. That trade unionism might take place within the armed forces of the United States was barely more than a remote thought just a few years ago. But today there are signs that such an eventuality could come to pass. The growing labor militancy of previously quiescent public employees at municipal, state, and federal levels may be a precursor of like activity within a future military. Union membership has been long standing within the military systems of several Western European countries. But it was to be the advent of the all-volun-

teer force which made unionization of the armed forces a live possibility. The reliance on monetary incentives to recruit an armed force is quite consistent with the notion of trade unionism.

In July, 1975, the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) of the AFL—CIO announced it was planning an organizing campaign within the military services and that it intended to ask the delegates at its 1976 convention to approve the campaign. In December, 1975, the National Maritime Union (NMU) also of the AFL—CIO reported that it was considering organizing sailors. The independent Association of Civilian Technicians (ACT) has for some time been a union for civilians who work for the reserve and Guard (almost all of whom are also members of the unit employing them). In the spring of 1976 the ACT began to recruit directly from reserve and Guard personnel with the announced target of 100,000 out of the 700,000 so—called "weekend warriors." Not to let a good thing go by, an official of the Teamsters was reported saying his union too might consider organizing the military.

It is important to stress that groups like the AFGE, NMU, ACT, and the Teamsters are staunchly patriotic, conservative in their approach to social change, and self-professedly bread—and—butter unions. There is no connection between these unions and the radicalized and self—styled serviceman's unions which appeared during the Vietnam War (though GI movement sympathizers claim that such groups laid the groundwork for the more established unions.) Also indicative of the changing scene are those cases in which groups of military technicans whose special enlistment bonuses were canceled have demonstrated and filed suit for either payment of their bonuses or immediate discharge.

Legal obstacles do exist in the way of military unions. Current Defense Department directives allow service members to join unions, but forbid commanders from negotiating with unions. Additionally, legislation was introduced in both the House and Senate in early 1976 to prohibit unionization of the armed forces (including reserve/Guard as well as active—duty personnel). Passage of the bill appeared uncertain and even if it became law, its constitutionality would certainly be tested. Military commanders, however, are allowed and have already negotiated with unionized civilian employees on military installations. Since 1975, moreover, military commanders have been delegated authority to sign local labor agreements with civilian personnel.

It goes without saying that military unions are anethema to almost all senior officers and many civilians. Yet throughout the ranks of career personnel there is a widespread view — and a quite accurate one at that — that the institutional qualities of military life are being undermined. Currently this dissatisfaction centers around the perceived erosion of military benefits, and the job insecurities resulting from periodic reductions in force. Not so well understood is that the institutional features of the military system have been traded off for the relatively good salaries enjoyed by military personnel in the all-volunteer force. The potential for unionization is great precisely because military social organization has moved in the direction of the occupational model while much of its membership harkens to the social supports of the older institutional format. It is also possible that unionized military would not be accorded the favor it presently enjoys from the public (which is prone to view the military in institutional terms). Indeed, it is likely that a military union might be looked

upon in more crass terms than would be anticipated owing to the burgeoning reaction against public employee unions in general.

Elite Units. Proponents of elite units have typically been accorded a mixed reception in American military circles. Because elite units could be regarded as an institution within an institution, specialized fighting units often found themselves at the margin or even at odds with the regular command structure. But if the armed forces continue to move toward an occupational model, the status of elite units in military social organization will be fundamentally different from past experience. In reaction to the occupational model, that is, certain numbers of servicemen — largely through self-selection — will gravitate toward units where the traditional qualities of the military are maintained and valued.

Preliminary evidence indicative of the new circumstances of elite units is found in a study of four combat battalions conducted in the spring of 1975.

These battalions, all stationed in the southeastern part of the United States, covered the gamut of combat units. Ther were, in ascending order of "eliteness," an infantry battalion, a tank or armored battalion, an airborne infantry battalion, and a ranger battalion. A representative sample — between 85 and 90 lower ranking soldiers (pay grades E-3 and E-4) from each battalion — were surveyed with regard to social background characteristics and attitudinal items measuring military commitment.

Looking at the social background of the battalions, there was wide variation in their racial composition. The proportion black was 53.3% in the infantry, 51.7% in the armored, 22.0% in the airborne, and 9.3% in the rangers. Correspondingly, the white ratios were the inverse of the black figures. For the same

pay grades, the Army-wide figure was 23.7% black in 1975. Certainly the southeastern regional basis of the recruitment pool contributed to the disproportionate number of blacks in the armored and infantry battalions. But this only puts into sharper contrast the fact of the nearly all-white composition of the ranger battalion.

Parallel comparisons can be made with regard to educational levels. The proportion of soldiers who had at least some college was 10.9% in the infantry, 11.8% in the armored, 17.2% in the airborne, and 30.2% in the rangers. Important to note, however, is that even when race was held constant, the educational differences between the units persisted although somewhat less pronounced. Contrary to much conventional wisdom, the most elite combat units in the all-volunteer Army are largely made up of middle-class white youth. At the same time, the non-elite units which make up the large bulk of the ground combat arms are overproportionately representative of lower educated and minority groups — though not nearly to the extent of the armored and infantry battalions described here.

Turning to the attitudinal data, the soldiers were queried as to their willingness to serve in hypothetical combat situations. Minature scenarios were presented for six hypothetical situations: (1) an invasion of the U.S.A. by a foreign enemy. (2) fighting revolutionaries in America, (3) defense of a U.S. ally in Western Europe — say, Germany; (4) defense of a U.S. ally in the Par East — say, Korea, (5) defense of a U.S. friend in the Middle East — say, Israel, and (6) an overseas civil war in which the government asks for American help. Of course, it is extremely risky to extrapolate from attitudes toward hypothetical situations to predictions of actual behavior in a real combat cir-

cumstance. Nevertheless, these items do offer themselves as least primitive indicators of level of military commitment.

[Table 1 About Here]

Given in Table 1 are the percentages of soldiers who stated they would either volunteer or willingly follow orders to serve in each of the hypothetical combat situations. Two patterns of response appear in these data. First, willingness to serve is highest — as one would anticipate — in defense of the United States from a foreign invasion. Not so expected, however, is the finding that combat willingness varies hardly at all regardless of which U.S. ally may be invaded. Second, and most important for our purposes, the more elite units — especially the rangers — consistently indicated a greater willingness to go into combat, while the non-elite units — especially the infantry battalion — just as consistently indicated the greatest reluctance to go into combat.

Additional data dealt directly with the salience of the institutional versus occupational model of military social organization. For purposes of contrast, we focus our attention on the two polar units — the ranger battalion and the infantry battalion. A series of items probed for reasons why the soldier joined the service. Among the infantrymen 61.1%, compared to 28.2% of the rangers, stated they had difficulty in finding a decent civilian job; 50.6% of the infantrymen, compared to 37.7% of the rangers, said the combat enlistment bonus was an important factor; and 59.4% of the infantry battalion, compared to 83.5% of the ranger battalion, reported serving the country was an important consideration. Finally, only 34.4% of the infantrymen compared to 58.1% of the rangers

Table 1. PERCENTAGE OF TROOPS WHO WOULD VOLUNTEER OR WILLINGLY FOLLOW ORDERS TO GO INTO COMBAT IN HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS, BY TYPE OF UNIT

ombat Situation	Rangers	Airborne	Armored	Infantry
S.A. invaded by foreign	97.8	93.4	88.5	81.4
ght revolutionaries in erica	96.4	77.6	71.1	59.2
fend Western European ly — Germany	92.9	77.8	75.8	59.4
Fend Far Eastern ally Korea	92.9	75.5	75.6	60.4
end Middle Eastern end — Israel	90.5	76.4	73.6	58.3
rseas civil war in which ernment asks for Ameri- help	. 84.5	72.2	64.3	52.8
modal number of cases)	(86)	(90)	(87)	(90)

agreed with the statement that the "Army should try to maintain traditions which make it different from civilian life."

To sum up, the finding is evident that soldiers who were most compatible with the institutional format of the military were also the soldiers most likely to indicate the most willingness to serve in combat. Conversely, for those soldiers most in accord with the occupational model, the level of military commitment is markedly lower. Yet because of the ascendant occupational model, a small number of young men — overportionately white and middle class — are being self-selected into the most traditional of combat groups — the elite units of the all-volunteer Army. In terms of military social organization we are witnessing a differentiation — both in social composition and military commitment — within the ground combat arms and not just between the combat arms and the technical support branches.

Civilian Technicans. Where trends toward military unionization and new forms of elite units are organizational developments which can be incorporated into the structure of the armed forces, another consequence of the ascendant occupational model departs entirely from formal military social organization. This is the use of civilians to perform tasks which by any conventional measure would be seen as military in content. The private armies of the Central Intelligence Agency have long been an object of concern within the regular military command. But what is anomalous in the emerging order is that, rather than assigning its own military personnel, the U.S. government increasingly gives contracts directly to civilian firms — with salary levels much higher than comparable military rates — to perform difficult military jobs. The very structure of the

military system, that is, no longer encompasses the range of military functions.

It is hard to overstate the degree to which the operational side of the military system is now reliant on civilian technicans. The large warships of the U.S. Navy are combat ineffective without the technical skills of the contract civilians who permanently serve aboard those ships. Major Army ordnance centers, including those in the combat theater, require the skills of contract civilians to perform necessary repairs and assembly. Missile warming systems in Greenland are in effect civilian—manned military installations run by firms who are responsible to the U.S. Air Force. In Southeast Asia and Saudi Arabia, private companies such as Air America and Vinnel Corporation are given U.S. government contracts to recruits civilians who carry out military activities. Bell Helicopter and Grumman established a quasi-military base in Isfahan, Iran, staffed by former American military personnel who train Iranian pilots. The American monitoring force in the Sinai is contracted out to private industry with the government retaining only policy control.

External political considerations certainly impinge upon the decisions to use civilian contracts for military tasks. But if task efficiency is the issue, a more nagging implication also suggests itself. Namely, military personnel cannot or will not perform arduous long-term duty with the efficacy of contract civilians. If this were to become the accepted norm, beliefs conducive to organizational and societal respect — the whole notion of military legitimacy — become untenable. The trend toward the employment of contract civilians to carry out military tasks could well be the final culmination of the industrialization of the military purpose.

CONCLUSION

Developmental analysis applied to military social organization reveals the impetus and probable outcomes of present trends. Seemingly unrelated developments can be subsumed into a coherent framework. The concept of the ascendant occupational model in the military system alerts one to and makes sense out of organizational changes in the form and function of armed force. The logical outcome of an industrial ethic in the armed services is military trade unionism. Concurrently, because of the appeal of the institutional qualities of military life for small numbers of volunteer soldiers, there will be internal differentiation in new forms of elite units in certain of the combat arms. Still other military functions, particularly of a highly technical nature, will be performed through civilian structures.

Developmental analysis does not imply, however, the observed trends are inexorable. Indeed, by its focus on the root causes of organizational transformation, developmental analysis allows for more directed social control toward desirable ends.

NOTES

- 1. Heinz Eulau, "H.D. Lasswell's Developmental Analysis," Western Political Quarterly, 11 (June, 1958), 229-242.
- President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force, Report (Washington, G.P.O., 1970).
- 3. A summary of public employee unions in the United States and military unions in Western Europe is Ezra S. Krendel and William Gomberg, The Implications of Industrial Democracy for the United States Navy (Washington, D.C.: Office of Naval Rsearch, 1975).
- 4. Roger A. Beaumont, <u>Military Elites</u> (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974), pp. 171-184.
- 5. For a full explication od the methodology utilized in the study of the four combat battalions as well as additional findings, see Charles W. Brown and Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "The Volunteer Soldier Will He Fight?", Military Review (1976, in press).
- 6. The original argument that the military was being segmented into a civilianized technical component and a traditional combat element is found in Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "The Emergent Military," Pacific Sociological Review (April, 1973), 255-279. Extensions of the "plural military" thesis are Zeb B. Bradford, Jr. and Frederic J. Brown, The United States Army in Transition (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1973), pp. 189-202; William L. Hauser, America's Army in Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 207-218; and David R. Segal, et al., "Convergence, Isomorphism, and Interdependence at the Civil-Military Interface," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 2 (fall, 1974), 157-171.

PROFESSIONAL DILEMMAS IN MILITARY INTERVENTION

Ъу

Sam C. Sarkesian

PROFESSIONAL DILEMMAS IN MILITARY INTERVENTION

Ъу

Sam C. Sarkesian Loyola University of Chicago

Since the end of World War II, the utility of conventional military power has declined. At the same time there has been a general increase in political confrontations and the expansion of diplomatic maneuverability. Within the context of general inter-state tension, this has created a vastly different environment for the resolution of conflicts. Domestically, the legacy of Vietnam remains a crucial conditioning factor in U.S. military posture, while the issues raised by a volunteer military system compound the problems of adjustment to the changed environment.

As a result, the U.S. military profession is faced with a series of difficult dilemmas. Dilemmas which have a direct bearing on the character of professionalism and the ability of the military to successfully engage in foreign operations.

The purpose of this paper is to examine professional dilemmas stemming from the new dimensions of military purpose—those specifically related to military intervention. In examining these issues we will explore the relationships between international constraints, domestic values and military purpose. Attention will also be given to institutional and professional considerations with respect to military purpose. Additionally, involvement in limited wars raise important questions regarding concepts of war,

institutional orientation, and professional ethics.

A fundamental dilemma exists in the proposition that military professionalism in providing the necessary guidelines for ethical behavior, combat proficiency, and individual commitment must also provide the institutional and professional rationale to conduct military operations ranging from nuclear war to all forms of limited war. Moreover, traditional professional perspectives appear increasingly sterile in their ability to respond to the demands of an enlightened society and a contentious international environment whose susceptibility to application of military power is considerably diminished (Ravenal, 1973). If the professional ethos rests on legitimate service to the society, responsiveness to social values, and the uniqueness of being "military," then significant shifts in professional perspective must occur if the gap between professionalism, military purpose, and society is to be reduced to acceptable proportions. The dilemmas arising from these contradictions are not easily discernible, and even at the best of times, may not even be acknowledged. Yet, it is the contention here that the dilemmas stemming from limited war operations are at the roots of erosion of the total quality of professional life and the increasing inability of the military to respond to the demands of limited war.

There are five premises basic to this study. First, the presumption is that military intervention means the commitment of U.S. military forces to a foreign operation. Second, the least likely limited war is direct confrontation between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. or the U.S. and China. If it does occur, it is likely to involve the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. Third, deployment of tactical nuclear weapons is likely to

escalate the confrontation and may be viewed by the "enemy" as a strategic factor crossing the threshold into general war. Fourth, the focus of professional issues are primarily, but not exclusively, concerned with professionalism within the ground forces. Given the nature of sea and air warfare, professional dilemmas are more likely to be strongly associated with ground troop commitment. Fifth, limited wars are most likely to occur in non-developed regions, i.e., the third world.1 Finally, strategies of limited war remain elusive. The experience of Vietnam did not necessarily establish a policy of "no more Vietnams." Indeed, the acceptance of either these perspectives would hamper the development of a flexible and prudent approach to the prospects of limited war.2

LIMITED WAR - AN OVERVIEW

Although limited wars are conditioned by their own special characteristics, realistically they cannot be separated from considerations of overall military capability and nuclear deterrence. Limited war and nuclear deterrence are part of an integrated military continuum. The ability to deter means the ability to maintain an effective limited war readiness in all arms, and to maintain such readiness in the absence of actual hostilities. Thus, the U.S. military is faced with problems of combat readiness in a series of contingencies ranging from general nuclear war to indirect confrontation. Equally important, the strength and weaknesses in any major contingency has an impact on other capabilities.

There are nevertheless, special features of limited war that distinguish it from other categories of warfare. The fundamental character is that of

restraint. "What distinguishes limited war from total war? The answer is that limited war involves an important kind and degree of restraint—deliberate restraint...The restraint must also be massive...the restraint necessary to keep wars limited is primarily a restraint on means, not ends." (Brodie, 1973: 127-128).

The "ends" do have an important conditioning function, however.

If complete annihilation of the enemy is a goal, for example, it is unlikely that other restraints will have any real meaning. Thus political goals must be realistic in terms of the ultimate outcome of limited war—that is military strategy must be effectively linked to the political purpose.

More importantly, political purpose must be identified and articulated so as to insure legitimate military purpose. This question will be addressed in more detail later.

More specifically, wars are limited by geography, degree of force applied, and purpose. These factors have been assessed by a number of authors and we need not dwell on them at length (Knorr, 1966; Schwarz, 1966; Brodie, 1973; Osgood, 1973). Wars can be limited by agreement, explict or implict, that the hostilities are to be confined to a specific land area. In Korea for example, the parties "agreed" implicitly not to extend the hostilities beyond the Korean peninsula. Thus, American air power limited itself generally to the area south of the Yalu river. At the same time naval activity was limited directly to the coastal areas. Similarly in Vietnam, the United States attempted to confine its activities to the immediate Southeast Asia complex, while avoiding specific areas within North Vietnam itself.

Wars can also be limited by restraint on the use of force, to include the type of weapons deployed. The presumption is that weapons of a strategic nature—those that have a high propensity for escalating the conflict—and those weapons that are indiscriminate in their targets will either not be used or very carefully restrained in their application.

In such circumstances, the nation with a major strategic capability may well find that it is severely limited in its ability to bring to bear its military power. Brodie (358) for example, observes that,

Among the military lessons we have learned is that restraint in the application of force—in order to keep that application compatible with its purpose—may make the force applied ineffective for its purpose. Thus to grant sanctuary and to withhold tactical nuclear weapons may be utterly correct policy, but such restraints have to be recognized as being costly, possibly very costly, in military effectiveness. For the future, this is bound to mean, and should mean, not fewer limitations upon the use of force, but rather fewer occasions for applying force under circumstances requiring such restraints.

The nature of the force applied and the type of weapons deployed is also contingent upon the character of the limited war. Until the last decade, this has generally been associated with a Korean type conflict. Essentially, this rested on the premise that the war would be reminiscent of a "World War II" type setting, with its identifiable front line, conventionally organized enemy, employing generally conventional military tactics within specified geographical boundaries. Since the late 1950's however, the nature of the international system with its highly nationalistic content has significantly influenced the character of limited wars. It is more likely that limited wars will now include a mix of conventional as well as unconventional ingredients. For example, it is unlikely that an intervening power will be able to gain a foothold and maintain itself in foreign

countries without first defeating a conventional force, but more important successfully defeating a hostile population conducting a "people's war."

Indeed, one can reasonably argue that the defeat of the enemy's conventional forces may be the less difficult part of the operation.

There is little need to analyze insurgency or people's wars. There is a great amount of literature on the subject; analytical, descriptive, and case studies (see for example, Giap, 1962; Truong Chinh, 1963; Elliot-Bateman, 1970; Sarkesian, 1975). In brief, to succeed, insurgency must develop an alternative political system, alienate the masses from the established regime, and provide a nationalistic cause to rally the people. The fundamental character of insurgency or people's war is that it must link directly to the political and social system of the people in such a way as to increasingly "delegitimatize" the established regime. The "political" character of the struggle is clear--military actions are subordinated to political goals. 5

Limited wars are also characterized by the use of surrogate forces or wars by proxy (Knorr: 108). Beginning in Greece (1947), the United States adopted a policy using advisory teams to assist and in many respects supervise the indigenous forces in combatting opposing forces. As we learned in South Vietnam, however, the use of surrogate forces can lead directly to the use of foreign combat troops to support and eventually supplant forces.

Finally, military intervention (employing ground troops) must ultimately face the problem of disengagement. South Vietnam provides an example of the chaos and trauma associated with disengagement during an impending defeat. South Korea on the other hand is an example of the quicksand quality of

intervention--even after 20 years, U.S. troops are still deemed necessary to prevent recurrence of a Korean type war. Indeed, disengagement may trigger political as well as military events that may well erode the very purpose of the intervention in the first place.

POLICY AND DILEMMAS

These characteristics raise four salient features for U.S. policy. First, there is an inherent asymmetry. That is under a number of circumstances it is conceivable that the limited war involvement of U.S. may be met by total war of the "enemy." Second, limited war is highly political in character. In light of the nationalistic sentiments, the delicate balance of terror between super powers, the general antagonism against any action that hints of imperialism, and the general North-South tensions in the world, U.S. military intervention may create political pressures and responses beyond the boundaries of conventional military capability. Third, military intervention may have limited utility and be politically counter-productive. Moreover, to succeed, the application of force may require subtle and low visibility operations rather than military intervention in conventional terms. Fourth, in any case, the rules of the game of limited war must be clearly articulated and generally accepted by the protagonists. In light of the first three features, it appears highly unlikely that rules regarding limited war that are directly connected with political and nationalistic issues will be accepted if they limit the ability to achieve political goals. This may well destroy the very purpose of the intervention in the first place. It is within these general policy considerations that professional military dilemmas are addressed.

MILITARY PURPOSE AND SOCIETY

The contradictions between military purpose and values of society create one of the most complex dilemmas, since it involves questions of values, attitudes, and linkages between the military and political systems. Additionally, questions regarding legitimacy, civil-military relations, institutional norms, and individual behavior patterns are inherent parts of the issues. Thus, military professionalism and military purpose cannot realistically be studied outside the context of the values and attitudes of society. Military legitimacy is bestowed by society. Consequently, the ability of the military to conduct limited wars is not solely a function of combat effectiveness, but is a combination of this factor and legitimacy--specifically the legitimacy of purpose.

Professional ethics and institutional purpose are the cornerstones of military legitimacy. These are linked in explicit and at times subtle ways. Presuming that there is a high degree of interpenetration between the military and society (as likely to be in modern democratic societies), the military is sensitive and responsive to the values and perceptions of society. More specifically, military purpose must be congruent with social values while at the same time correspond to professional military perspectives. In sum, society bestows legitimacy on the military through its acceptance of the military's purpose and the perception that social norms are closely linked to professional ethics and behavior.

Military legitimacy alone does not necessarily lead to successful application of military power; however, military posture is an essential factor. (As used here legitimacy is not a question of the legitimacy of the profession in the wider context of the political system. Rather it is a question of professional esteem, prestige, and credibility -- a legitimacy of purpose and professional ethics.) There must be a supportive balance between these two major factors. It is difficult to be precise concerning the degree of legitimacy and the kind of military posture required in any given period or combat situation. The post Vietnam era demands one particular intermix, while the Korean war demanded another. One can reasonably argue that Vietnam involvement never achieved an effective intermix. Military power to be effective, must not only have a military institution capable of engaging in combat, but it must also have the material and political support of, as well as psychological linkage with society. In simple terms, the military can be only as effective as society will allow, and conversely, if society supports the military's involvement in conflict, the military must have the proper posture to effectively apply military power. This is the basic premise behind the concept of "management of violence in the service of the state." It is the state that identifies the enemy, and society that provides the politicalpsychological succor to carry out necessary policies, and the military which implements the will of the state. Each of these elements are inter-related and must reinforce each other if successful military policy is to be followed.

Where military legitimacy rests primarily upon image, values, prestige, and purpose; military posture rests on organization, training, technology,

and leadership. In other words, military legitimacy is primarily a psychological dimension or subjective: military posture, on the other hand, is primarily organizational with emphasis on quantitative standards, i.e., objective.

To insure an effective degree of military power, therefore, there must be symmetry between military legitimacy (subjective) and military posture (objective). There is always the danger of asymmetry—where subjective factors, for example may become increasingly dominant while objective factors become less able to achieve minimum influence on application of military power. This situation can lead to the politicization of the military and a high degree of civilianization, eroding the professional basis of the military institution. Similarly, it is possible for objective factors to become dominant, subduing the influence of subjective factors to such a degree that the military perspective dominates the political institutions—a garrison state condition.

In a democratic society, asymmetry is most likely to develop as a result of contradictions between subjective and objective factors. Thus, the perceptions of society regarding military purpose and behavior may not be in accord with professional military perceptions, and indeed absolutely opposed to them. The military in a democratic society cannot remain in this kind of asymmetric relationship with society without destroying its institutional purpose and cohesion. Given the relationships between society and the military in a democratic system, political and social forces will generate pressures for the restoration of symmetry—even at the expense of the military institution. This is particularly relevant in the conduct of limited wars.

Ravenal (513) writes,

The...condition that will complicate the enforcement of international order is the lack of consensus in domestic support—not when our system is free from external pressure, but precisely when it most needs steady support. Few societies—especially one such as the United States—will hold together in foreign exercises that are ill-defined or, conversely, dedicated to the maintenance of a balance of power...The lack of public support might not prevent intervention, but it might critically inhibit its prosecution.

Equally important, policies followed by the government committing ground troops and other military forces to limited war situations create tension between professional purpose, ethics and society. Professional propensities to use military force to its maximum to achieve quick and decisive victory are mitigated by the tendency of society to demand proper behavior in the conduct of war, and clearly articulated military purposes within a context of acceptable political goals.

Moreover, while many military men see "military intervention as potentially necessary (Bachman and Blair, 1975: 62)," the attitude of society questions the need for such action.

...the popular disaffection with the Vietnamese war does not indicate a reversion to pre-Korean attitudes toward limited war. Rather it indicates serious questioning of the premises about the utility of limited war as an instrument of American policy, the premises that originally moved the proponents of limited-war strategy and that underlay the original confidence of the Kennedy Administration in America's power to cope with local Communist incursions of all kinds. (Osgood: 466)

In such circumstances, the military establishment and the profession become particularly susceptible to divisiveness and lack of credibility created by the contradictory demands between society and military purpose. Democratic society, moreover, presumes that there is a high moral quality to its value system. In this regard, one of the more important elements affecting society's perceptions of the military (and thus military legitimacy) is the correlation between individual behavior and the norms of society. On a more mundane level, the individual actions of a soldier on the battlefield must meet some minimum societal norms while also conforming to certain professional expectations. Thus, the military effectiveness of the professional rests in no small measure on the correspondence of professional behavior with the moral quality of the social values in his society.

The issue of military purpose and moral quality, according to one scholar (Barnes, 1972: 8) is crucial in determining the legitimacy of military purpose.

How then, are we to assess the vast powers that the military has come to hold over millions of American citizens? Simply, the military's powers are legitimate to the extent—and only to the extent—that they are in the first instance, consonant with contemporary standards of justice and humanity, and then only when the foreign policy which the military carries out is both (1) directly related to the defense of the nation or its closest democratic allies, and (2) by elected officials whose decisions are guided by the will of the people as expressed through the political process.

Most civilians would accept this premise, yet a soldier-scholar (Hauser: 88) writes "One would be hard pressed to find a mature professional soldier who would accept Barnes' premise." The problem seems relatively clear, while the professional views his mission through operational lens, the civilian views it through political lens. More specifically, purposes

of the political system are the boundaries within which military purpose operates. Political purposes must be congruent therefore, to the general will of society if military purpose is to succeed. Yet there is some contradiction between these concepts and professional perceptions.

The problem is equally complex in contingencies involving the use of tactical nuclear weapons. The threshold between tactical nuclear war and general war is thin--even if such distinctions were to be accepted. To accept the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, society must perceive the crisis as clear and threatening to the national security. Equally important, decision makers will be placed in a quandary in trying to distinguish between actions that require a tactical nuclear response and those in the general war category. The reluctance to use nuclear weapons in less than general wars remains imbedded in the institutional decision making process. Yet, there remain rational arguments regarding the substitution of nuclear weapons for military manpower. How this can be accomplished while maintaining restraint and within limited political goals remains a mystery and indeed a dilemma. As Knorr (99-100) observes, "...the uncertainty about whether escalation can be avoided looms very large. And this uncertainty itself is therefore apt to deter these (nuclear) powers from lightly initiating even the most limited application of military force against each other."

The issues and relationships between military purpose and society are best summed up by a noted military historian (Weigley, 1967: 556) who writes,

To use--and restrain--its immense social, economic, and political influence wisely and effectively, the Army obviously must hold itself in close rapport with the people. To secure military success in so complex and difficult a war as the one

in Vietnam, it must also depend upon its rapport with the people. Unless the people decide that the war in Vietnam is in truth their war, the Army must finally fall.

PROFESSIONALISM AND MILITARY PURPOSE

The demands of professionalism and the requirements of military purpose create another significant dilemma. There is a close relationship between professionalism, military purpose and society. While the dilemmas arising out of military purpose and society are directly linked to professionalism, there are nevertheless, major dilemmas specifically associated with professionalism. Much of this can be traced to characteristics that are generally associated with the "military mind."

There is of course, considerable doubt regarding the existence of a "military mind" and the notion of a monolithic professional perspective.

Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest the existence of commonly held professional attitudes regarding the nature of professionalism and military purpose (Abrahamsson, 1973; Krieger, 1971; Huntington; 1957, Janowitz, 1971).

The first of these is problem perspective. Problems tend to be viewed incrementally—categorized into their essential elements and solutions sought within this perspective. Thus it is difficult to develop conceptual and analytical perspectives in terms of inter-relationships and linkages between problems and total impact.

Closely related to this problem fragmentation is the spirit of mission: the idea that the prepared and efficient unit can overcome any obstacle to achieve its mission. This is further reinforced by the professional ethos which glorifies the "can do" attitude—the officer who accepts responsibility without question, accepts his mission, and enthusiastically

focuses on its accomplishment regardless of obstacles--both physical and psychological.

Equally important the institutional criteria for success rests heavily on mission accomplishment. Indeed, Officers Efficiency Reports invariably note the ability of the officer to accept responsibility and to carry out his mission.

The will to win is another important ingredient of both the profession and the institution. We need not pursue this matter very far. It is acknowledged by scholars and military men alike that "winning" is a basic tenent of the professional ethos. Brodie (220) writes, "General Douglas MacArthur's remark following his dismissal—'There is no substitute for victory'—reflects an attitude endemic in all the armed services, one which works strongly against any restraint upon the use of force during wartime."

In commenting on the "will to win," General Alexander Haig, stated (Ellis and Moore: 275),

Politics and soldiering are very very close. It's only a soldier who can respect and admire a politician. It's a field where a man lays everything on the line to win or lose. Athletics are the same. There's a comaraderie among men who lay it all out. They're tested by the vote or they're tested in battle. When one doesn't win, the results are fatal, and in the case of the military, quite fatal. So I have a great deal of respect for politicians.

An important part of this assertiveness to successfully complete the mission and to "win," rests on proper utilization of military means. Throughout the technical training of officers, bringing to bear effective firepower, maximum utility of force, and superiority over the enemy, are constant themes. Moreover, at higher levels of technical training, officers are

constantly exposed to problems of inter-service cooperation and the use of sophisticated weapons and maximum firepower. Indeed, this was quite visible in Vietnam where under many circumstances, firepower was substituted for manpower. This is a proper military maxim, but in limited wars, it may well lead to undesirable political results.

Once the United States becomes involved in any local war with its own troops, it will tend to use its modern military logistics, organization, and technology (short of nuclear war) to whatever extent is needed to achieve the desired political and military objectives, as long as its military operations are consistent with the localization of the war. For every military establishment fights with the capabilities best suited to its national forces (and the large non-fighting contingents that accompany them), when engaged in a protracted revolutionary war on the scale of the Vietnamese war, tend to saturate and overwhelm the country they are defending (Osgood: 462-463).

On the surface, such characteristics are an acknowledged part of the military profession. But as one soldier-scholar has noted, it does not allow for failure. Indeed, there is a deep pre-occupation with fear of failure. Moreover, it limits opportunity for dissent, narrows the boundaries of intellectual assessment, and provides a parochial perspective towards the outside world. "A blissful obliviousness underlies much of what passes for success in modern America. West Point has merely systematized a process for producing industrious professionals whose success has little connection with either a sociological good or an ethical imperative (Ellis and Moore: 197)."

The professional ethic thus fosters a drive to "win", unquestioning loyalty to the organization, problem and mission orientation, limited understanding for the subtleties and nuances of politics, and limited appreciation for the use of the military instrument as a political device. 6

While the traditional role of military services may remain clear in terms of defense of the country against attack and strategic deterrence, it is less clear regarding military intervention and the conduct of limited wars.

The general professional attitude seems to be that preparation for combat equally prepares units for missions ranging from general nuclear war to unconventional operations. Vietnam provided numerous examples where local combat was viewed simply as small unit actions on the battlefield—tactical operations which differed little from training missions in the United States and in past conventional operations.

In the context of the first dilemma, the profession is faced with the difficult dilemma of how to develop professional perspectives which accept as legitimate, the political and social necessities inherent in the conduct of limited wars. Equally important, given the orientation of the military institution and its organizational base, how can the profession reconcile individual professional socialization to institutional demands for military purposes associated with limited war?

INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTER AND CONSTRAINTS

The character of the military institution creates another professional dilemma. The nature of the volunteer force, problems of combat readiness and demands of institutional loyalty impose operational definitions upon the environment limiting the professional's ability to develop flexible and realistic responses to limited war.

The volunteer military places manpower and budgetary constraints on the ability of the U.S. military to undertake external operations (Bradford and Brown, 1973: 38-42). Put simply, volunteer forces have limited manpower. To conduct sustained operations in any given limited war situation requires a reservoir of replacements and the ability to expand force levels. This may mean involvement of National Guard, Reserves, or both, as well. as the possibility of reinstituting the selective service system. In light of the attitudes of American people and the nature and character of limited war, it is unlikely that such policies will gain support of Congress or the American people. On the other hand, the nature of volunteer forces may isolate the military from society to an extent where even if they were committed to external operations, they would receive little support from the American people.

Budgetary restraints prohibit significant expansion of the military establishment during peace to meet sustained limited war contingencies. While the defense budget may increase to meet the perceived Soviet advances in nuclear missilery and military capability, it is unlikely that much financial support will be provided for additional manpower and limited war capabilities that are not directed at the Soviet Union or major war contingencies.

Many professionals lack faith in the capability of the volunteer forces and see as a result, a general weakening of the American military purpose (Margiotta, 1976). Indeed, there seems to be a latent fear that the American forces would find it difficult to conduct limited wars, not only in terms of quantity, but quality of forces. Moreover, professional concern with such matters are reflected in institutional preoccupation with raising the general quality of the military for the purposes of pre-training for combat. Thus general education, remedial training, recruiting incentives, and administrative techniques may become institutional programs and goals at the expenses of serious combat training.

Aside from constraints imposed by the volunteer system, there are those associated with combat readiness. This is a term used to signify the degree to which the military forces are capable of conducting successful military operations. In light of the international environment, combat elements of the military must remain in a state of perpetual readiness. This is perhaps one of the most important training problems facing the military. It is clear that maintaining a high level of combat readiness during times of relative peace is a difficult matter—it is even more difficult when it is not clear who is the enemy. Moreover, maintaining combat readiness over long periods of time presumes a general consensus that there is

indeed a threat. In light of the current environment and the inclination of American society to oppose foreign adventures, it is not clear how the institution will be able to maintain combat readiness over an extended period.

Force structure is generally based on conventional concepts associated with general war. The concept of "forces-in-being" that is the basis for U.S. force structures presumes a capability to conduct wars with current manpower levels. Moreover, this approach rests on the premise that the most likely future wars will be fought and ended quickly with little or no time for mobilization. Thus, the "forces-in-being" gives only secondary consideration to cadre or mobilization posture and to force structures for conducting limited war operations.

In light of these considerations, the U.S. military appears to be developing into a single contingency orientation—the use of nuclear weapons in support of ground operations. Yet, the new dimensions of military purpose demand a multi-dimensional military posture.

Finally the institution, in any case, demands loyalty. Since the military institution and the profession rests on time honored concepts, "Duty, Honor, Country" and the demand for institutional loyalty and obedience, there is little room for resistance against institutional demands. This is also true in terms of orders from above. The demand for prompt and unquestioning response is so engrained in the professional ethos that it is inconceivable that many officers would question either institutional policies or orders from superiors. Under such conditions, critical inquiry from within the profession is reduced to almost meaningless rhetoric while institutional orientation precludes flexibility and adaptability.

The dilemmas with respect to institutional considerations seem clear—institutional demands and requirements do not foster a military purpose responsive to the new environment, nor do they respond to the broader demands of professionalism. Equally important, there does not appear to be a political perspective that is realistically tied to the capabilities of the military institution. Given the close relationship between deterrence capability and a range of contingencies from general nuclear war to indirect confrontation, the U.S. military appears to be hard pressed to successfully engage in limited war operations.

ETHICAL DILEMMAS

The dilemmas arising out of relationships and requirements between professionalism, society, and the institution are in the broader sense questions of professional ethics. The fundamental ethical problem facing the military profession is how to accommodate itself to its growing volunteer character while reinforcing its links to society, yet maintain its uniqueness as a profession and be able to respond to the new environment. In the words of a soldier-scholar (Gard, 1971: 707),

Solutions to the dilemma facing the military profession fall somewhere between two unacceptable extremes: returning to traditional professionalism, involving withdrawal from society; or discarding traditional values and severely impairing cohesiveness and discipline. Obviously the two should be reconciled, but the prescription of preserving essential military values while maintaining a close relationship with civilian society is inordinately difficult.

Answers to these questions will not be found in more elaborate technology, increased military discipline, isolation, or alcofness from society, but in understanding the role the military plays in society and appreciating the "politics" of democratic systems. This requires a commitment to the idea that

the military professional is part of the American political system and civilian value structure. The military must understand the political "rules of the game" not only of their own institution but those prevailing in the broader political system.

Using this approach, professional ethics takes on a wider meaning and is particularly sensitive to individual attitudes and behavior. More specifically, ethical questions become linked with the purpose and utility of military force; the degree of political influence of the military within the political system or nature of civil-military relations; the extent to which individual military officers can become involved in the "politics" of the political system; and the conflict between individual conscience and institutional demands.

Questions, for example, about the utility and purpose of military force require basic rethinking of professional purposes. Should military force serve society in other ways aside from preparation for and waging of war? There are a number of advocates of the peaceful uses of military force to include involvement in civic-action, educational programs, social-welfare roles. Indeed, some would argue that waging war is not sufficient to sustain professional purpose. A system of ethics, they would argue, cannot be based solely on a concept of "management of violence."

Concern over civil-military relations focuses on such problems as the influence of military men over political decisions. Equally important is the question of national priorities. Should military men include in their military calculus a concern over domestic priorities? Or should there be a purely military perspective based on the assumption that other branches of

the government provide executive and legislative monitoring? To what degree should the military reinforce civilian value systems?

Much of the debate regarding these questions draws its content from the values of the larger society. This is clearly articulated in the recent literature. Hauser (186), for example, writes,

It seems almost simplistic to conclude that a disjuncture between the Army and society has brought about this long litany of troubles, but that is what the evidence suggests. The Army has been unable to isolate itself from society sufficiently to maintain its authoritarian discipline or to prevent the intrusion of such social ills as racial discord and drug abuse...

Thayer (1973: 558), on the other hand, notes that,

The concept of professionalism seems to demand that professionals themselves be constantly aware of the delicate balance they must maintain in their own behavior between autonomy and fusion. They cannot be so totally separated as to become the proverbial "society within a society", but neither can they afford total integration within the civilian overhead.

From the individual point of view, military professionalism raises a number of questions regarding individual-institutional relations. For example, to what extent can military men express dissent without jeopardizing their careers? What are the boundaries of individual civil rights and liberties? Should military men be allowed to engage in political activity such as standing for elections? The recent furor over trade unionism in the military adds another dimension to questions about individual rights and liberties.

Within the profession there is also concern over the relationship between individual behavior and institutional norms. One of the most illuminating views comes from a study on military professionalism, conducted at the U.S. Army War College (1970: 28-29). This states in part,

...It is impossible to forecast future institutional climates with any degree of reliability. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to state as consequences of the present climate: it is conducive to self-deception because it fosters the production of inaccurate information; it impacts on the long term ability of the Army to fight and win because it frustrates young, idealistic, energetic officers who leave the service and are replaced by those who will tolerate if not condone ethical imperfection; it is corrosive of the Army's image because it falls short of the traditional idealistic code of the soldier--a code which is the key to the soldier's acceptance by a modern free society; it lowers the credibility of our top military leaders because it often shields them from essential bad news; it stifles initiative, innovation, and humility because it demands perfection or the pose of perfection at every turn; it downgrades technical competence by rewarding instead trivial, measureable, quotafilling accomplishments; and it eventually squeezes much of the inner satisfaction and personal enjoyment out of being an officer.

This conclusion by a group of military professionals looking at their own profession has serious ramifications for the meaning of professional ethics. If such conditions are generally prevalent, what alternatives are available to rectify the problems? To what degree will the profession respond to—or allow—internal dissent? Can professionals refuse to carry out illegal orders? Are there institutionalized processes which foster reasoned dissent without implicit institutional retaliation against the dissenting officer?

Equally important, this conclusion points to an erosion of performance quality, as well as ethical imperfection. It also suggests the existence of a particular kind of professional working at the highest levels of military hierarchy symbolizing the profession to the community, and dictating the nature of the military value system and civil-military relations. What ethical standards are likely to prevail if those who consider career success the dominant norm become the professional elite?

Professional dilemmas associated with limited war, therefore, raise a number of broader issues regarding military purpose, civil-military relations, and the boundaries of professionalism in general. Yet existing interpretations of professional ethics are likely to obscure the fundamental meaning and study of issues raised here, while perpetuating what McWilliams (1972: 28) labels "bureaucratic tendencies."

All the bureaucratic tendencies visible in the Army are characteristic of all organized power in America. But the Army accentuates and exaggerates bureaucracy because it is a bureaucracy without competitors; conformity, careerism, cultivation of the right attitudes and the safe style become almost necessary obsessions, difficult for any but a very few to resist.

Thus the traditional perspectives regarding the use of military force, institutional loyalty and mission orientation reinforced by situational ethics rationalizes narrow professional perspectives as the key to institutional and individual success.

This characteristic of the profession is best summed up by Gray (1967: 183) who writes

Not all certain whether they will later be considered by their own people as heroes or as scoundrels, great numbers find it simpler to ignore the moral problems by thinking of them as little as possible. Better to let the conscience sleep, to do as the others are doing and as one is told to do and the future will bring what it will. Who knows what the future will bring anyway? Most soldiers in wartime feel caught in the present so completely that they surrender their wills to their superiors and exist in the comforting anonymity of the crowd.

PROFESSIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTABILITY

The military cannot by itself provide the necessary adaptability to rectify or reduce the dilemmas suggested here. One essential precondition is the correlation of political purposes and military power. Clearly, political purposes must be tied to national will, resources, and military capabilities. This perspective was well expressed by George Ball (1973: 13) who writes,

Before we engage our military power in a foreign land we should make quite certain that we comprehend the nature of the struggle and the play of forces it represents. Moreover, we should appraise our actions not only as we see them but also as they are likely to be viewed by other nations—and particularly our friends and allies.

In this context, the profession and the institution need to seriously review some basic premises held by the military system. The first of these is the need to develop a greater understanding in the intelligent and restrained application of force—with particular sensitivity to the "politics" involved. This requires that military men be politically aware and knowledgeable about the subtleties of politics and military force.

As one observer notes (Brodie: 358),

Among the military lessons we have learned is that restraint in the application of force—in order to keep that application compatible with its purpose—may make the force applied ineffective for its purpose. Thus to grant sanctuary and to withhold tactical nuclear weapons may be utterly correct policy, but such restraints have to be recognized as being costly, possibly very costly, in military effectiveness. For the future, this is bound to mean, and should mean, not fewer limitations upon the use of force, but rather fewer occasions for applying force under circumstances requiring such restraints.

The issue goes much deeper however--if indeed the profession claims to be prepared for limited wars, then it must accept the proposition that professionalism rests partly on knowledge and understanding of political and

social phenomenon. This requires more than a few hours of classroom experience or the reading of articles and publications of various sorts. It requires a commitment to the idea that military officers are indeed political men and that politics like the military requires continuing and consistent study and experience. This does not in any fashion mean partisan politics, political party and interest group involvement, or even involvement in internal politics. What it does require is study and experience in external politics with an understanding of the realities of domestic politics.

We must understand that nowadays the armed forces of a nation are instruments of external politics and must be trained for such activities. In this sense, I say yes to political activity by our military commanders; they must be highly trained in external politics, otherwise they will carry their political naivety into highly sophisticated political arenas, seeing communists under every bush, and, worse still, supporting political losers purely because they seem affluent and respectable on the surface. Military commanders must be trained in armed diplomacy, a training that must start in their early years. Most important, they must be trained in political and social science which is as important as technological education in the armed services (Bateman, 1970: 147).

Second, the profession must become more flexible in terms of legitimate dissent. (On this point, see Mack, 1976). One of the continuing complaints particularly of younger officers is that their opinions and comments, particularly if they are not in accord with acceptable patterns, are either discounted, or subdued under professional ethics. Those younger officers who feel compelled to follow through on criticism and dissent, in most cases find themselves branded as rebels and professionally chastized for their efforts.

Legitimate dissent is an essential part of the political dimension of professionalism required for the conduct of modern limited war, among other things. Additionally, legitimate dissent allows a close linkage between the

junior and subordinate levels of the military establishment and the senior levels—something that was lacking in the conduct of the Vietnam war. Indeed, this inadequacy had much to do with the difference between the realities of the war in the field and that perceived in Saigon. In limited wars, with the military instrument directly involved in a "Vietnam" type environment, responsiveness and appreciation of the senior elements regarding the lower elements is a necessity. The political and social interwining is most apparent at the lower unit operational levels. These must be translated into the military instrument at all levels. In the long run, legitimate dissent will provide a new dimension to the professional ethos that will make it more responsive to the necessities of policies requiring military intervention. It will provide the impetus to clearly articulate the military position; it will allow a variety of views to be assessed broadening the generally monolithic view of the professional's perspective on military purpose.

In the words of a former officer (Kemble: 202-203),

Through its government, the United States has told its soldiers for two centuries what it wants them to do, but it has seldom, if ever, told them what it wants them to be. As a result, the officers corps has largely depended on its own traditional assumptions. And if the old assumptions are wrong, they ask, what takes their place? It would seem that any philosophical redirection of the military must come from open, reasoned, and multi-sided public dialogue.

Any profession must be able to withstand criticism and dissent from within its own ranks. Moreover, any profession must have open channels for the expression of dissent while stimulating the intellectual content of the profession. This cannot be done by presuming that institutional loyalty and obedience to orders by necessity prevents legitimate criticism from within. Equally important, procedures must be established to allow for reasonable

response to criticism, even if it means revisions in professional boundaries and perspectives.

Third, the force structure and training goals must be reviewed. A number of civilian and military scholars have posed alternatives to the present force structure (Hauser, 1973; Bradford and Brown, 1973; Moskos, 1973). Essentially what has been suggested is a "dual" army--one for fighting and one for logistics and administration. Perhaps such suggestions do not go far enough. The fundamental concern should be to develop a multiple force structure--one that is based on specialization not on generalization. Specialization has been carried on successfully for individual professions. What is required now is specialization of force structures. Thus it may be more logical to develop force structures and fashion training for the conduct of specific types of operations. For example, it may be useful to develop a "force-in-being" for nuclear wars; a cadre force for fighting and mobilization purposes in wars of a protracted nature; and a special force for unconventional wars and those involving low visibility operations.

Morris Janowitz has dealt with this issue in great length in The Professional
Soldier (1971) and subsequent writings. It is interesting to note that the
U.S. Army did indeed develop some experience in the constabulary function at
the end of World War II. Elements of various armored units were transformed
into a Constabulary Regiment for the specific purpose of "policing" much of
the rural countryside in Germany. Such duties included not only mundane
activities such as traffic control, but liaison with German Burgermeisters,
law and order in Displaced Persons Camps, and other duties similar to State

Police in the United States. Interesting enough this period in the history of the United States Army has been given little attention. What the Constabulary function suggests is that the military be trained and employed for a number of political-civic duties.

It may also be time to seriously question the roles of Airborne and Ranger units and the Marine Corps. Obviously, this is not the appropriate place to delve into details, nevertheless, it may be useful to identify several important issues. With the development of helicopters and highly sophisticated mobile transportation, serious questions are raised regarding the utility of parachute troops. The special training and equipment required for mass parachute drops as well as the utility of mass parachute operations may be a "nostalgic" perspective that is a luxury the U.S. can ill afford. Similarly, the duplication of missions between the Marine Corps and army units need to be assessed—indeed, the very missions of the Marine Corps may also be part of the "nostalgic" syndrome.

It may be more useful to combine all special units, whether they be Marine Corps or army units, into a "Light Infantry" structure. The organization and mission of the Light Infantry could be focused on non-nuclear special operations. The major purposes of such forces might be to cadre surrogate forces and provide a nucleus for highly mobile strike forces, and also provide a nucleus around which indigenous forces could coalesce. Thus traditional military forces could prepare for nuclear wars, while the Light Infantry would train for unconventional operations and other contingencies associated with limited war. In any case, there is significant duplication of effort and even obsolence of missions and force structures. And at the

minimum we ought to follow the suggestions of Bateman (1970) for an uninhibited analysis of our defense structure.

Fourth, the profession needs to develop a new rationale in which the military is seen as more than unconditional servants or simply paid employees of the state. This rationale would require that the military acquire political understanding and expertise, a sense of realistic and enlightened self-interest, and professional perspectives transcending boundaries that we have traditionally associated with duty, honor, and country. The profession must accept political—not partisan—politics; it must be capable of dealing with environments that are not purely military, and recognize the professional military man's right to engage in politics within a domestic system, as long as he adheres to the rules of the game. In this perspective, the profession would see itself as a political interest group trying to reach the civilian leadership and the public to explain its case and develop a consensus for its objectives. To implement this option requires a military leadership and profession which has specific, but limited political posture.

We are not suggesting that military professionals should make political decisions regarding the goals of the political system, whether in peace or war. But surely they must be equipped to look beyond immediate exigencies and develop the intellectual tools and insights to appreciate the interdependence between war and politics. Such a perspective is not acquired in professional military schools—at least not in the present curriculum. In order to present the "military" point of view in a judicious and well—articulated manner, military professionals must understand the total concern of

the political system. They must go beyond the simple loyalty of "managers of violence in the service of the state." Moreover, war itself raises questions of morality which require more than a "military" solution.

This approach also provides a wider range of activity, mainly consultative, for the professional officer. Indeed, it requires an active, responsible self-interest and a non-partisan involvement in the policy process and politics in general. The American political system is partially based on the assumption that groups and interests must have access to policy-makers; articulation and aggregation of interests on a wide scale, unencumbered by government restrictions, are basic premises of democratic society. Even the military ought to be given the opportunity to argue its case within the accepted "rules of the game."

From the individual point of view, this approach requires that the profession recognize the limits to military institutional demands and individual subservience including combat situations. The institutionalization of healthy skepticism, reasonable inquiry, and legitimate dissent would do much to reinforce the worth of the "individual" while providing a momentum to innovation, imagination, self-examination. Obviously, this perspective requires substantive changes in professional ethics, and a broader view of military professionalism.

CONCLUSIONS

In retrospect, it is clear that solutions to the problems associated with professional dilemmas and military intervention are at best reflections of the problem. That is to say, the solutions themselves tend to be ambiguous. It would, of course, be in the traditional mode to answer that the

military requires better training, leadership, motivation, management, and tactics. Yet the answer may not lie in "better" everything, but in recognizing the limits of intervention. It seems unlikely that the U.S. will be able to intervene in limited situations with hopes for a "neat surgical" operation. On the contrary, it is more likely that military intervention will increase the politicization of the conflict and stimulate a nationalistic reaction, while exposing the United States to internal tensions and conflict. Increasingly, this will erode "professionalism" while decreasing the legitimacy of the military institution at home.

The dilemma is clear. Military intervention causes serious problems of military purpose. Not only is there major linkages between society and military purpose, but also between professionalism, society and military purpose. Without relatively clear goals and unambiguous roles and purpose for the military in modern limited war, it is unlikely that military professionalism will be able to maint in an ethical and purposeful posture so necessary for maintaining its linkage with and legitimacy of society. Equally important, the political-psychological dimensions of modern limited war may quickly involve the intervening power in the political-social systems of an alien culture. The professional ethos and traditional perspective do not provide the professional dimensions for sustained operations in such an environment. Thus a dilemma is created not only with respect to pursuing the policy with respect to modern limited war but also with respect to its actual conduct.

Finally, when viewed from the policy level, it is clear that there are political-psychological limits to the application of military power.

These limits when translated into strategic terms, militate against a policy committing troops into an ambiguous, multi-dimensional environment, associated with modern limited war. For any hope of a successful military policy, there must be symmetry between military legitimacy and military purpose. Inherent in modern limited war is asymmetry between the military posture of the intervening power and its military legitimacy. Any society that prides itself on democratic values will find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to creat symmetry in such a situation.

 Commenting about the doubts raised by the Vietnam experience, Osgood (468-469) concludes,

...these doubts seem likely to lead to a marked differentation of interests in the application of containment—a downgrading of interests in the Third World and a greater distinction between these interests, and those pertaining to the security of the advanced democratic countries...What they seem to preclude, at least for a while, is any renewed effort to strengthen military deterrence and resistance in the Third World by actively developing and projecting United States' capacity to fight local wars.

2. Osgood (470) writes,

What we are almost certain not to witness is the perfection of limited-war conceptions and practice in accordance with some predictable, rational calculus and reliable, universal rules of the game. The conditions and modalities of international conflict are too varied, dynamic, and subjective for limited war to be that determinate.

According to Tillema (1973), the United States has been involved in four overt military interventions since World War II; Korea, 1950; Lebanon, 1958; Vietnam, 1961; and the Dominican Republic, 1965. These are considered overt military interventions because of the commitment of ground troops. Thus in thirty years since the end of World War II, the United States has been involved in 4 limited war situations requiring U.S. ground troops. Although in two instances, Dominican Republic and Lebanon, casualties were few and numbers of troops small, the total casualties of the four interventions is over 80,000 killed and thousands more wounded and disabled. Tillema discusses these interventions and what he perceives as the basis for U.S. policy. Equally interesting

is his discussion of why the US did not intervene more frequently, given the nature of the international environment over the past 30 years.

3. According to Osgood, (471),

A limited war is generally conceived to be a war fought for ends far short of the complete subordination of one state's will to another's and by means involving far less than the total military resources of the belligerente, leaving the civilian life and the armed forces of the belligerente largely intact and leading to a bargaining termination...the term local war is not often reserved for the great number of local conventional wars in which neither of the super-powers is directly or indirectly involved. The difficulty of defining limited war arises partly because the relevant limits are matters of degree and partly because they are a matter of perspective, since a war that is limited on one side might be virtually total from the standpoint of the other, on whose territory the war is fought. Furthermore, a limited war may be carefully restricted in some respects (e.g., geographically) and much less in others (e.g., in weapons, targets, or political objectives).

- 4. The Chinese Communist victory in 1949 provided a modern demonstration effect for the remainder of the world regarding the effectiveness of a "people's war." Regardless of the number of failures, the disagreement over tactics, and the sacrifices required, "people's war" became a symbol and a model not only for use against colonial powers, but against established regimes and their supporters.
- 5. There is some confusion over comparisons between various types of counterinsurgency operations. The French operations in Algeria was for the
 prime purpose of retaining colonial control. The British activities in
 Malaya, although representing the last vestiges of a colonial empire,
 were conducted with a policy based on independence for Malaya. Indeed,
 independence was granted before the insurgency was ended. In IndoChina, the French policy was based on colonial control, while the

involvement of the United States in Vietnam was considerably less. It is difficult for many to identify such distinctions, although they are essential for the understanding of what can or cannot be done in counter-insurgency war. Osgood (463) makes important distinctions not only in comparing Malaya and Vietnam, but in United States involvement in limited wars.

If the war were principally an American operation, as the long counter-insurgency war in Malaya was a British operation, the elephant might nevertheless prevail over the mosquitoes in time, even if it had to stamp out in the crudest way every infected spot and occupy the country. But the war in Vietnam, like every other local war in which the United States has or will become engaged, has been fought for the independence of the country under siege...

- drive for individual success in Vietnam, Ellis and Moore (212-213)

 observe that, "They have less a sense of rage than of tragedy, a sense
 that they were and will be again the prisoners of self-serving superiors
 and absurd forces beyond their or anyone else's control."
- 7. For example, at the height of the Vietnam War, there were approximately 500,000 US military men in Vietnam. To prosecute the war and still maintain some semblance of a world wide military posture, there were over 1.3 million men drafted into the Army over the period 1965-1969. Additionally, there were close to 1 million enlistments and re-enlistments. Thus for the Army alone, over 2 million men were either inducted or enlisted over a 5 year period. For the same period of time, over 5 million personnel were either drafted or enlisted in all of the services.

REFERENCES

- Abrahamsson, Bengt. <u>Military Professionalization and Political</u>
 <u>Power</u>, Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage Publications, 1973.
- Ball, George W. "The Lessons of Vietnam; Have We Learned, or Only Failed?" New York Times Magazine, April 1, 1973.
- 3. Barnes, Peter. <u>Pawns: The Plight of the Citizen-Soldier</u>, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972.
- 4. Bletz, Donald. The Role of the Military Professional in U.S. Foreign

 Policy, New York: Praeger, 1972.
- 5. Bradford, Zeb B., and Brown, Frederic J. <u>The United States Army in Transition</u>, Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage Publications, 1973.
- Brodie, Bernard. <u>War and Politics</u>, New York: Macmillan Publishing
 Co., Inc., 1973.
- 7. Elliot-Bateman, Michael. "The form of People's War" in Michael
 Elliot-Bateman (ed.) The Fourth Dimension of Warfare, Volume I,
 New York: Praeger, 1970.
- 8. Ellis, Joseph and Moore, Robert. School for Soldiers, New York:
 Oxford University Press, 1974.
- 9. Gard, Robert G., Jr. "The Military and American Society," Foreign
 Affairs, July, 1971, Volume 49, No. 4.
- 10. Giap, General Vo Nguyen. <u>People's War, People's Army</u>, New York: Praeger, 1962.
- 11. Gray, Glenn, J. The Warriors, New York: Harper, 1967.

- 12. Hauser, William L. America's Army in Crisis. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973.
- 13. Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State, New York: Vintage Books, 1964.
- 14. Janowitz, Morris. The Professional Soldier, New York, The Free Press, 1971.
- 15. Kemble, Robert C. <u>The Image of the Army Officer in America</u>, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973.
- 16. Knorr, Klaus. On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age,
 Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.
- 17. Krieger, David. "A Development Model of Military Man," Schmidt, Steffen W. and Dorfman, Gerald A., (eds.), <u>Soldiers in Politics</u>, Los Altos, Calif.: Geron-X, Inc., 1974.
- 18. Mack, William P. (USN-Ret). "The Need for Dissent," <u>The Times Magazine</u>,
 Jan. 12, 1976.
- 19. Margiotta, Frank. "A Military Elite in Transition: Air Force Leaders in the 1980s," <u>Armed Forces and Society</u>, Volume 2, No. 2, Winter, 1976.
- 20. McWilliams, Wilson C. Military Honor after Mylai, New York: The Council on Religion and International Affairs, 1972.
- 21. Moskos, Charles C., Jr. "The Emergent Military; Civil, Traditional, or Plural?" Pacific Sociological Review, April, 1973, Volume 16, No. 2.
- 22. Osgood, Robert E. "The Reappraisal of Limited War" in Eugene J. Rosi, American Defense and Detente; Readings in National Security Policy, New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1973.

- 23. Ravenal, Earl C. "The Case for Strategic Disengagement," <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, April, 1973.
- 24. Sarkesian, Sam C. <u>Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare</u>, Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc., 1975.
- 25. Schwarz, Uris. American Strategy: A New Perspective, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1966.
- 26. Thayer, Frederick C. "Professionalism: The Hard Choice," Trager, Frank M. and Kronenberg, Philip S. (eds.), <u>National Security and American</u> <u>Society</u>, Lawrence: The University of Kansas Press, 1973.
- 27. Tillema, Herbert K. Appeal to Force: American Military Intervention in the Era of Containment, New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1973.
- 28. Truong Chinh. Primer for Revolt, New York: Praeger, 1963.
- 29. U.S. Army War College, <u>Study on Professionalism</u>, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: USAWC, June 30, 1070.
- 30. Weigley, Russell F. History of the United States Army, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1967.

MILITARY DEMONSTRATIONS: INTERVENTION AND THE FLAG

M. D. Feld

"Captain," said the squire, "the house is quite invisible from the ship. It must be the flag they are aiming at. Would it not be wiser to take it in?"

"Strike my colors!" cried the captain. "No, sir, not I." And, as soon as he had said the words, I think we all agreed with him. For it was not only a piece of stout, seamanly good feeling, it was good policy besides, and showed our enemies that we despised their cannonade.1

The act and concept of showing the flag is an original European contribution to the procedures of international relations. It emerges as a conventional practice sometimes towards the end of the 15th century as a ceremonial component of the process of exploration and conquest culminating in the recently ended European global hegemony. As a symbol both of cultural isolation and imperial expansion, it epitomizes the attitudes and impulses which led to the conquest by Christian societies of virtually every part of the planet.

At the end of the Middle Ages, Western Europe was in a virtual state of siege, hemmed in on the south and east by its traditional Islamic rivals and on the north and west by inhospitable and apparently limitless seas. The discovery of new routes and new worlds was the result of an effort to break this blockade, to acquire fresh resources and new allies. Given the fact that the Ottoman state was the greatest military power of the age, an attempt to breakout along the line of the Mediterranean or of the Russian steppes was impractical. The most promising theatre of action lay along the seas barriers where new tactics and techniques of navigation and shipbuilding held

out some promise of success.²

The lead in this process or indeed campaign was taken by Spain and Portugal. Students of this period have noted the coincidence that these two pioneer exploring states were also the two most successful and persistent crusading ones. In an era of virtually ininterrupted Islamic victories and conquests, the Christians of the Iberian peninsula had progressively defeated Muslim armies, destroyed Muslim kingdoms, and even crossed the Mediterranean and established a foothold in North Africa. The awareness of the unique nature of their achievement, accomplished at a time when Constantinople had fallen, the Balkans had been lost, and when the Turks had gained a foothold in southern Italy, led the Spaniards and the Portuguese to regard themselves as the militant and singularly successful champions of Christianity and European culture. It also endowed them with an unusual degree of aggressiveness and self-confidence.

These facts are not simply historical background. They are essential to an understanding of the social and ideological factors that gave a new dimension to sea power and made it for the first time a creator of international systems. The Atlantic fleets of the Spanish and Portuguese had a dual mission: to break the ring of the European blockade, and to establish a new and more rewarding system of interstate relations. The ships involved also represent one of the earliest cases of that application of technological processes to political ends that was to become one of the salient characteristics of Western ascendency. The combination of the compass, the adjustible mast

and the large metal gun resulted in the earliest model of that unique European contribution to international and even interplanetary communication, the self-guiding, self-propelling missile platform. It was a device whereby the vehicle of contact carried with it an inherent but highly visible claim of cultural superiority.

The nature of the relations to be established with the newly reached or discovered nations was likewise determined by the crusader consciousness of the exploring states. It was their religious faith that had inspired them to pierce the barriers of the unknown. That same faith would guide them in dealing with the mysteries they now encountered. Two distinct possibilities were recognized: the people approached had already been exposed to a knowledge of Christianity, or they had not. the first case it was reasonable to expect them to accede to revealed truths and to present themselves as fellow believers and natural allies of the Europeans. Their failure to do so could only be interpreted as the reaction of wilful sinners, subject to the full penalities of lawful war. If they could not be presumed to have had any prior knowledge of Christianity, they were by virtue of that fact natural wards of the respective crowns of Spain and Portugal and their commissioned representatives. The latter had the duty of preparing and administering their peaceful conversion.3

The seriousness with which these possibilities were taken and the effect they had on the approach tactics of the explorers can best be illustrated by quotations taken from first hand

accounts of two of the earliest confrontations: one with the presumably ignorant Indians of Mexico, the other with the presumably knowledgeable Indians of Asia.

The flagship hoisted her royal standards and pennants, and within half an hour of anchoring, two large canoes came out to us, full of Mexican Indians. Seeing the big ship with the standards flying they knew that it was there they must go speak with the captain; so they went direct to the flagship and going on board asked who was the Tatuan which in their language means the chief.⁴

On the following morning, which was Monday, 28th May, the captain-general set out to speak to the king, and took with him thirteen men of whom I was one. We put on our best attire, placed bombards in our boats, and took with us trumpets and many flags. 5

The passive approach of Cortez stands in contrast to the aggressive landing of da Gama. Cortez did not yet know what to expect. Indeed as Diaz del Castillo makes clear he had hopes that the impact of Christian revelation would smooth his path to a peaceful process of establishing a protectorate. Da Gama, on the other hand, came equipped with a formal protocol for dealing with informed rulers, insofar as they were not Moslem. Both of them, incidentally, left open avenues of alternative behavior. The Spaniards, upon landing in Mexico, erected a cross and an altar. After that the local Indians were obliged to acknowledge the sovereignty of Spain. The Portuguese in India interpreted Brahmin practices as those of a primitive Christian sect. After that they were justified in maintaining peaceful relations.

Even at this early stage, the cultural aggessiveness of the European powers is remarkable. Sailing into foreign waters and showing the flag was not in their eyes a hostile act, rather it was quite the reverse, a declaration of sovereign responsibility. It provided a standard of law and authority under which the newly contacted societies could enter the community of nations. It was the rejection of these standards on the latter's part that constituted the act of war.⁶

In their very beginnings, acts of flag-showing were representative of the asymmetrical relationship that Europeans assumed to govern their contacts with non-European societies.

It was accepted without question that/successful voyage would result not in an exchange of trading fleets with the new found land, but rather in the establishment of a one-way European monopoly. A Spanish ship showing its flag on the coast of Mexico, a Portuguese ship doing so on the coast of India took that very fact as a sign of its inimitable cultural superiority and divine protection. It further assumed that the societies to whom the flag was shown, even though they were obviously complex and presumably very wealthy, were incapable of reciprocal behavior.

The asymmetrical nature of flag-showing operations affected the political status of the flag-shower. He was more of an entrepreneur than an official. Until his mission succeeded, he had few if any claims in his state. Success, in effect, ratified his privilege of sharing the ensuing profits with his sponsoring sovereign. If he failed he was acting strictly on his own.

The whole exploratory venture was a series of one-way contracts. The entrepreneur gained the privilege of being the exclusive representative of the sovereign wherever he successfully

penetrated. The native populations assumed the responsibility of being the property of the European who happened to be the first to set eyes upon him. But the sovereign was in no way responsible for the behavior of the entrepreneur, and the entrepreneur in no way responsible for the welfare of the natives. Thus Spanish adventurers could destroy empires in Mexico and Peru and their King know about it only when his share of the spoils began to arrive.

From its very beginnings, therefore, the act of flag-showing intervention was defined by the action of conventional boundaries. It took place when agents of the sovereign moved out of the areas where conventions of international behavior were in force and displayed the flag in areas where no such conventions existed. The absence of such conventions had a two-fold effect. It left the status of the intervenors purposely undefined. It also gave them an unusually broad mandate of action. Because the sovereign authority had little or no significance in the areas in question, the position of his agents was something less than official. The early explorers were bound by loosely defined instructions. They were not so much regular employees of the state as agents working on a commission basis. The regularization of their position depended entirely upon the success of their enterprise. If they succeeded in firmly establishing the authority of their sovereign in the new areas, they became regular officials with clearly defined responsibilities and rewards. If they failed, the enterprise was written off.

By the same token, these flag-showers had a much greater latitude of action than regular public servants. Operating beyond the bounds of conventional international relations, they were in a position to procede according to their own judgement of the situation. The absence of conventional relations meant that the consequence of their acts would have no direct impact on established official policy and would in no way threaten and impair the authority of the sovereign. Acts of intervention were accordingly carried out by individuals whose official status was somewhat more shadowy but whose heroic stature was somewhat greater than that of ordinary public servants.

From the very beginning a sharp line was drawn between the concept of intervention and that of influence. Intervention could only take place in areas where the symbolic presence of the agent state was not recognized. Flag showing had meaning only in those areas where an official representative of the state carried no authority. The flag was raised in areas where it had no symbolic significance and where its meaning depended entirely on what the flag-showers were able to accomplish. An example of intervention in its purest form would be the "discovery" of the North and South Poles: cases where the conquest of distance was the great achievement, the raising of the flag the expedition's culmination, and the political and social conditions of the area of no importance whatsoever. Influence, on the other hand, was the outcome of expeditions to states whose kindred structure was already recognized and where the renewed contact had the mission of reestablishing formal relations along the lines of acknowledged common interests. As a model for this, we have the prolonged

record of Western-Russian relations, beginning perhaps in the 16th century.

A simple definition of flag-showing enterprises would be that they are expeditions undertaken in circumstances of uncertain communication and that they are carried out by para-military forces. The nature of the uncertainty of communication can vary according to historical era and the definition of paramilitary may shift according to changes in the concept of "regular forces," but the basic elements of this act remain the same. It takes place in the context of asymmetrical political relations, i. e. where the impulse for contacts is largely one-sided and where the sovereign entity does not assume full responsibility for the forces involved.

II.

Three stages can be discerned in the evolution of flag-showing intervention: the eighteenth century era of the chartered company, the nineteenth century era of the colonial army and the twentieth century era of the comprehensive alliance structure. While it is the last that is of real interest to us, a brief examination of the preceding two will be useful for bringing into sharper relief the motivations and reasoning this concept entails.

Francisco de Vittoria, the 16th century Spanish founder of modern international law asserted that every nation had the right to trade peacefully with every other nation. This doctrine proclaimed at a time when Spain was actively engaged in

its monumental conquest of the western hemisphere and formulated as a direct consequence of the legal problems arising therefrom set the tone for the whole body of international law presumed to guide the behavior of Europeans in these novel circumstances. The impulse to trade was, however, entirely one-sided. It was self-evident to Europeans, but almost entirely absent among the inhabitants of the new found territores. We still read with amazement the complacent ceremonies in which Spanish representatives gave glass beads and small copper bells in exchange for gold ornament. One wonders what it meant to the parties involved. It certainly played a part in the contempt Europeans felt for their trading partners.

The initial instruments of European contact with unfamiliar societies were usually trading companies with the chartered mission of establishing national trade monopolies over the newly discovered routes. But the flag went with trade. The newly established commercial relation were expected to combine profits for the merchant with glory for his sovereign and to extend the exclusive authority of the state. Trade, even if in theory sanctioned by the justification of international law, was in practice impelled by an aggressive nationalism. The legitimacy of the enterprise rested on the fact that its commanders were accredited representatives of their sovereign. Hence the showing of the flag.

This combination established the precedent of the ambiguous character of seaborne interventions. The justifications were general, but the motives were particular. The forces in question operated as agents of particular states. The reasons they gave for their actions referred to the rights of mankind. Yet

the acts in question took place in areas where there was no tradition of sustained international contact. The rules cited were entirely of European conception and comprehensible to the invaders alone. Flag showing was like a legal contest in which the prosecutor also serves as judge.

What was held to be legitimate commerce by the Europeans was in non-Western eyes little better than armed robbery. is worth noting that loot was one of the first Hindu words to gain currency in the English language. 9 The flimsiness of these pretentions to international law is revealed by the fact that European behavior in the new areas was directly governed by the strength and weakness of the states confronting them. In the Americas and India, they more or less had their own way. In better organized societies such as China or Japan they adhered to local laws. The refusal of these last two states, however, to recognize Western nations as equals, i. e. to grant them that influence which comes from regular diplomatic contacts, served as a justification of direct armed intervention. Europeans were at length able to impose their own terms. did it with a forceful showing of the flag and with the declared intent of opening those countries to regular intercourse and peaceful commerce. 10

From the mid-nineteenth century on, this asymmetry of contact entered a new phase. The creation of major nation states in Germany and Italy and the emergence of the U. S. as a world power increased the competition. At the same time, improvements in the technology of communication and transportation removed the likelihood of any Western power being the sole discoverer

of a savage area. The whole globe became an extension of European frontiers. Rival exploratory expeditions stumbled over one another in their anxiety to be the first to plant the flag. 11 The problem of regular colonial contact between European powers produced its self regulating mechanism of peaceful arbitration. Great care was taken to stress the paramilitary nature of colonial units, lest their contact and conflict cause a more serious disturbance back home. The covering rationale of international law was replaced by a simple and open declaration of Western hegemony. The European powers -- the United States here included -- no longer acted through the detached agency of trading missions seeking a natural outlet for their society's products. Rather, they employed surveying parties to demarcate uncertain frontiers. The Western powers were, in effect, a restricted club, organized to divide the rest of the world among themselves. "The concert of Europe" and the "Munroe Doctrine" were conventions granting imperial status to states that satisfied European political criteria. States and territories that did not, were parcelled out among them.

non-European world were so great that it took an act of deliberate agression to overwhelm them. Imperial intervention of the post-Napoleonic era was justified by cultural distance. The intellectual attainments of Europe were so far above the rest of the world that communication of equals was out of the question. It was unreasonable to expect natives to understand the norms of European civilization. The could only be imposed by forceful means.

This distinction was institutionalized in the composition of European armies. Regular national forces were designed solely for service on the continent. Special and distinct colonial units were formed for service abroad. It is noteworthy that Great Britain, the dominant imperial power, was among Western states the one most reluctant to adopt national service. On the other hand, Germany, the European power with the fewest colonial committments, had the most comprehensive system of universal military service. For the United States, the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine as well as its interests in China was the almost exclusive province of the Marines, a military organization whose civic status was markedly more marginal than that of the regular army. Be that as it may, the notion of showing the flag entailed the use of concepts and instruments designed to emphasize the normative and psychological distance between the imperial power and the territories it controlled.

III

The post World War II era has witnessed an inversion of this practice. Where flag demonstrations were once designed for

4

distant areas, they are now reserved for the territory of one's closest allies. Pre-World War II allies kept their regular armies at home. The United States and the Soviet Union today maintain large regular forces on the respective territories of NATO and Warsaw Pact members. The presence of foreign troops is now a token of mutual interest rather than an act of asymmetrical aggression.

More significantly, international community has replaced perceived distance as a justification for aggressive overseas acts. Cuba, for example, recently felt free to send its armed forces to Angola in support of the PMLA, legitimatizing that act with a declaration of anti-colonial revolutionary solidarity. The United States and the other Western powers, lacking any such patently common tie, were obliged to respond in a covert and ineffectual fashion.

What we are obviously dealing with here is a new notion of military intervention, similar in effect but different in content from the traditional one. The original notion of showing the flag, as outlined above, was based on a state-of-siege mentality that drew a sharp boundary between the encircled European and the world that lay outside. This picture of the world, originally rooted in a sense of physical isolation was transformed by success into one of cultural superiority. The concept of physical distance was replaced by that of cultural distance. The rationale of forcible intervention changed from the assertion that the areas in question were too far from Europe to have any notion of its conventions to the assertion that the areas in question were

too benighted to have any understanding of its norms. Now we have the notion of a natural international community whose fulfillment is impeded by a barrier of reactionary exploition. The new concept of military intervention evokes the claim of ideological distance, of a scattered international underground, separated from one another by the agents of their oppression and reaching out hands in mutual aid.

Military intervention today cannot be treated as a casual imposition on some remote society. Ideological orientations divide and unite areas in patterns of their own. Albania is closer to China than it is to Greece. By outright declaration, we intervene to preserve or create a society similar to our own and the distance is perceived in terms of such kinship. As public acceptance of the claim of South Vietnam to be a representative democracy diminished, the percieved distance between Saigon and Washington grew greater and greater. Eventually it became so great that the presence of American forces could no longer be presented as an assertion of "free world" influence, but was almost universally regarded as an art of asymmetrical intervention. The same shift in perception caused a rift in the armed forces between those elements who considered themselves to be part of a citizen army and those who considered themselves to be professional fighting men. 12 The culturally based inability of the United States to draw a dividing line between colonial and metropolitan armies undermined the effectiveness of its fighting forces.

European political developments over the past century have contributed to the elimination of the factors of geographical

and cultural distance. The claim of national self-determination has become the paramount factor of legitimate sovereignty. A social system that claims independence on such terms, establishes by that very act a significant bond of political community with established Western states. For influential groups of the latter, it becomes a state similar in structure and related in motivation to the nations of the West. With this, cultural distance is eliminated and with it support for acts of intervention. A threat to the principle of national self-determination in one particular area is presented as a threat to the greater community of nations.

In this matter, the West labors under the handicap of having criteria of influence and intervention that are much less refined than those employed by the Communist bloc. In terms of the liberal ideology, any assertion of popularist national selfdetermination is an affirmation of legitimate sovereignty. A society has achieved independence when it has a government staffed, more or less, by indigenous personnel. In Communist terms, national self-determination can take place only in the context of a reaction against the West. National movements against particular instances of Western colonialism thus create a heightened sense of community between the areas in question and the general NATO bloc. Recognition and concrete offers of assistance follow almost immediately. Reactions against Soviet imperialism, as in the case of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, immediately increase the sense of ideological distance between the Soviet Union and the areas in question, and armed intervention

quickly takes place. 13

It is ironic and perhaps salutary that the cultural triumph of the West has turned its weapons against it. The political rhetoric of nineteenth century Europe has become an international lingua franca. The European nation-state has, as a result, become a sort of ideological patron from every state emerging from colonial tutelage, as for example the case of Great Britain supporting Mozambique against Rhodesia; an act that would have been inconceivable one hundred years ago. For the West, anti-colonial reaction has become the hallmark of legitimacy for the governments of their former possessions.

The irony is made even more striking if we dwell on the coincidence that the Soviet Union breaking out of what it conciders to be a Western imposed blockade and encirclement should first establish new contacts in Cuba, Angola and Mozambique, almost exactly the same areas where Spain and Portugal almost five hundred years ago established way-stations in the process of shattering the Islamic siege of Europe. This striking historic parallel provides us with some clues as to why the Communist bloc appears to have so much more flexibility and so much more success than the West in flag-showing intervention projects. The Soviet Union and its allies have conditioned themselves to a state-of-siege mentality. They are surrounded by ideological enemies. Any penetration beyond the sphere of Western oriented states represents, so to speak, a great leap forward, a bursting of hostile barrier and the attainment of a non-alligned and exploitable political terrain. The consciousness of this image

creates the conditions of physical and psychological distance that make flag-showing interventions ideologically convincing.

The West, on the other hand, with its self-assumed role of universal mentor and quide lacks the ideological motivation for open intervention in contested areas. The assertion of omnipresent goodwill towards every society and of special tutelary responsibilities towards those less advanced industrial states leads to clumsy efforts of paramilitary subversion. The recent CIA efforts in Chile and Angola are striking examples of the limitations and costs of an interventionist attitude deprived of the sense of psychological distance and therefore incapable of proceding in a rational and coherent fashion. Equally striking were the abortive arguments in 1974-75 for American armed intervention in the Arab oil producing areas. In an effort to create the necessary preconditions for such an act, its advocates postulated an extreme degree of estrangement and distance between the Arab sheikdoms and the United States. The imaginary nature of this argument was one among many reasons why their proposals could not be taken seriously.

IV

Naval forces, as is self-evident, have been the traditional vehicles of flag-showing intervention. Command of the sea has been the historical prerequisite of asserting a national presence in an alien environment. Throughout history, the seas have been the great physical barrier. The fifteenth century European shattering of the Islamic blockade was brought about by a clear-cut

naval superiority at a time when their land forces were markedly inferior to those of the Ottoman Empire.

This tradition is still in force. Current strategic discussions place naval policy in the context of maintaining effective instruments of intervention. The presence of naval units, backed up by local base structure is regarded in many quarters as the fundamental requisite of national influence in distant areas. But the seas are no longer regarded as a barrier but rather as a vital medium of communication. A strong navy, it is thus argued, is essential if we are to maintain our influence in areas of critical strategic importance.

The argument of this paper notwithstanding, historical analogies can be dangerously misleading. Influence and intervention may not be adjacent terms on a spectrum of strategic reaction, but rather polar opposites. With the seas regarded as an avenue of communication rather than a barrier to it, the function of naval units is transformed. They are no longer employed to impose the national presence in unexplored areas; they are rather an instrument for maintaining normal traffic along regular channels of communication. The scope of naval strategy is then determined by the allied states with whom regular nautical communication must be maintained. Alliances are cemented by the provision of port facilities for the maintenance of fleets. The existence of such bases is both a token of and an argument for the necessity of maintenance of reciprocal arrangements. Naval hegemony thus runs counter to the asymmetry that is the basic condition of showing the flag.

It can be argued that the stationing of naval forces in distant waters narrows rather than expands a nation's range of options. It becomes more closely bound to the ally controlling its terminal port. The existence of a naval base at the Piraeus, for example, was the most common argument for American support /in Greece./

of the patently disastrous Colonel's regime / Similar considerations now color the relations of the United States with Turkey and its official perception of the Cypress issue. On the Russian side, it can be argued that they lost the necessary leverage in Egypt, the moment they established a naval base at Alexandria. The appearance of Soviet naval units off Africa and in the Arabian sea have an impact out of proportion to their combat capabilities, largely because they are a free floating factor, with no existing commitments to respect.

This development was foreshadowed in the late nineteenth century. British naval supremacy transferred the oceans into domestic waterways. The Royal Navy had the mission of maintaining British influence throughout the globe. Its acts of intervention were almost accidental, forced upon it, as in the case of the Boer war, by the irrational behavior of some minor state. The emergence of the Imperial Germany Navy was accordingly perceived as an act of aggressive intervention, not so much by reason of its capability as because its very existence meant that Great Britain's control of the waves was no longer absolute. Sovereignty which is indivisible had been lost. Germany had declared itself ready to assert its influence abroad. 14

A surface navy of the modern kind is, therefore, not an

instrument of intervention but an instrument of suasion. It operates in terms of official alliances rather than those of perceived barriers. It is most effective in stiffening the back of supporting the policies of friendly powers. It can, of course, be transformed into an instrument of intervention and be used as a covering force for landing troops. But this is tantamount to the assertion that the area in which we choose to operate is one where we have no formal commitments and no alliance structure in jeopardy. Our actual experience appears to be the reverse. In Western Europe and Southeast Asia, American base privilege are curtailed at any hint that they may be used for direct military operations.

The fact that the Soviet naval forces are regarded as expansionist is testimony to the perceptual basis of intervention. It is the novelty of the instrument rather than its apparent capability that colors our appreciation of its significance. An impressive Soviet surface naval force is an act of intervention because merely by existing it shatters a host of strategic presuppositions. It turns monopolies/communication into competitive areas. It brings to our attention the existance of factors our naval units cannot control.

Though it observed in horror, the West could assess with equanimity the brutal Soviet repression of popular movement in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. It reacted with alarm to vastly more ambiguous Soviet penetrations in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. Yet in a literal sense, the Russians were intervening in Central Europe, i. e. asymmetrical interfering. In the non-European areas, the Soviet Union was behaving in a notably more

legitimate manner, i. e. responding to the invitation of a recognizable authority. Moreover, the Politburo knew it was intervening in Central Europe and treated that act as an extreme reaction forced upon it by circumstances beyond its control. Its behavior in the non-European parts of the globe is equally in its eyes the calculated and conventional behavior of a recognized super-power. It is asserting its influence over friendly areas. Yet the West can accept with minimal adjustment aggressive Soviet acts in Central Europe yet perceive its strategic pillars as shaken by the emergence of a Soviet surface fleet and by the assertion of Soviet interests in non-European parts of the globe. 15

This surrealistic perception can perhaps be attributed to the physical contours of NATO military deployment, and particularly of its American components. The forward positions of American units in Western Germany define a barrier frontier. But it is a barrier created in symmetrical fashion. The product of mutual agreement. The psychological justification, therefore, does not exist. The Mediterranean base structure of the Sixth Fleet defines a naval preserve. It is a zone of friendly ports of call. In terms of such parameters, Soviet behavior on the farther side of the Iron Curtain was legitimate, whereas their appearance within a patrolled area is a quasi-aggressive act. Central Europe becomes peripheral to Western interests and Egypt and Angola part of its heartland.

These divergences can perhaps be explained in terms of different perceptions of the manner in which distances and boundaries are drawn. The Western style is essentially linear. It demarcates

opposing styles of political culture. There are frontiers, on one side of which lies the Soviet Union and on the other the non-Communist world. Within those frontiers, the Soviet Union is free to act as it wishes. Beyond them it is intervening. The Soviet perception is essentially global. There are essentially two kinds of societies, popular and capitalistic. Between popular societies there are no real boundaries, only varying degrees of submersion under capitalist oppression. The boundary pierced by communist intervening forces is, therefore, neither cultural nor geographic. It is the superimposed capitalist system that prevents the popular forces from achieving true self-expression. Communist forces when sent abroad are not agents of particular national policies but are instruments of "moral, political, diplomatic and other kinds of support." 16 The target of their intervention is not the area where their forces are dispatched, but the social and political system that, in their point of view, divides the world into communist and non-communist blocs.

The dominant Western point-of-view, on the other hand remains cultural. To be sure, they no longer regard the absence of indigenous, bureaucratic systems in a given area as justification for intervention. By an ironic twist this factor has become a justification for Western withdrawal. The members of the Western alliance have taken on the global mission of establishing a network of societies governed by university educated local politicians. Governments of this kind are considered kindred systems, and by virtue of this criteria, colonial regimes are alien to the spirit of Western culture. Intervention was

originally a gesture of parochial contempt. It treated non-European institutions as unnatural in terms of their perceived divergence from Western modes. Now we are intellectually committed to regarding indigenous participation as a guarantee of national self-determination.

This difference of perception leaves the Western bloc with the form and the Soviet bloc with the substance of a global strategy. The forms of Western intervention as in Chile or Angola are now invariably covert. They do not show the flag. They operate behind the scenes. They do not claim to assist popular forces, which are by Western definition sacred and self-sustaining, but rather to influence the composition of elites, the latter being a category of which the West considers itself to be the cultural touchstone. The United States can provide facilities to train bureaucrats and military officers, with its emphasis on expertise and not on ideology. It can exert a minimum of influence on how such functionaries employ the social resources at their disposal.

It is therefore pointless, at the present moment, to speak of American military or naval forces as potential instruments of intervention. Whatever their overseas station may be, their primary mission is that of defending themselves, of placing, in effect, the onus of intervention on non-Western powers. They also have the symbolic mission of representing Western influence and its alliance structure. The existence of freely granted overseas bases is a token of some kind of partnership. Whether this partnership is a form of privilege or one of inhibition is a matter open to debate. 17

It seems safe to predict that during the next decade the Soviet Union will broaden the scope of its non-European interventions and that the Western powers will progressively constrict the range of its military demonstrations. This is not an altogether disastrous course. The embarassments and frustrations of the Atlantic powers may force them to reconsider the relationship between their strategic posture and their cultural and political pretentions. Some stock taking of this sort may lead them to an awareness of what is unique in their values and of their incompatibility with their present role of universal model and mentor. With some conscious notion of the distance between themselves and other kinds of societies, they will perhaps be in a better position to assess the rationale and costs of military intervention.

Footnotes

- 1. Stevenson, Robert Louis, Treasure Island, Chapter XVIII.
- Parry, J. H., <u>The Age of Reconnaissance</u>: <u>Discovery</u>, <u>Exploration and Settlement 1450-1650</u>, Praeger Publishers, pp. 19-127.
- 3. ibid., p. 303 ff.
- 4. Diaz del Castillo, Bernal, <u>The Discovery and Conquest of Mexico</u>, trans. by A. P. Maudslay, Ferrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1956, p. 69.
- 5. Velho, Alvaro, Vasco da Gama's First Voyage, trans. by
 E. G. Ravenstein, Hakluyt Society, 1898, p. 29.
- 6. Hamilton, Bernice, Political Thought in Sixteenth Century

 Spain, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 102.
- 7. Fletcher, Giles, Of the Russe Commonwealth, Harvard University
 Press, 1966. Introduction by Richard Pipes, p. 3 ff.
- 8. Hamilton, op. cit., p. 101 ff.
- Parry, J. H., <u>Trade and Dominion: The European Overseas</u>
 <u>Empires in the Eighteenth Century</u>, <u>Praeger Publishers</u>, 1971,
 p. 275.
- 10. Collis, Maurice, Foreign Mud: Being an Account of the Opium Imbroglio at Canton & the Anglo-Chinese War that Followed, Alfred A. Knopf, 1947; Neumann, William L., America Encounters Japan: From Perry to MacArthur, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963, p. 30 ff.
- 11. Wright, Patricia, Conflict on the Nile: The Fashoda Incident of 1898, Heinemann, 1972; Barlow, Ima Christina, The Agadir Crisis, The University of North Carolina Press, 1940.

- 12. Helmer, John, <u>Bringing the War Home</u>, Free Press, 1974, p. 170 ff.
- 13. Remington, Robin Alison, <u>The Warsaw Pact: Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution</u>, The MIT Press, 1971, p. 109 ff.
- 14. Art, Robert, The Influence of Foreign Policy on Sea Power:

 New Weapons and Welt-Politik in Wilhelminian Germany, Sage

 Publications, 1973.
- 15. State Department Summary of Remarks by Sonnenfeldt, New York Times, April 6, 1976, p. 4:4 ff.
- 16. Soviet in U. N. Defends its Angola Intervention, New York
 Times, March 31, 1976, p. 3:7.
- 17. Pertinent recent discussions of U.S. naval strategy upon which these remarks are based are to be found in the following books: Blechman, Barry M., The Control of Naval Armaments:

 Prospects and Possibilities, Brookings Institution, 1975;
 Luttwak, Edward N., The Political Uses of Sea Power, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974; Quester, George H., ed., Sea Power in the 1970's, Dunellen, 1975.

COUNTERINSURGENCY AND MILITARY INTERVENTION Lawrence E. Grinter

I. The Looming Challenge

In a speech given on February 3, 1976, at San Francisco, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger argued that it is the continuing responsibility of the United States "to contain Soviet power." Citing recent Soviet and Cuban gains in Angola, and noting that Angola was the first time that the United States "has failed to respond to Soviet military moves outside the immediate Soviet orbit," the Secretary implied that if the United States wavered again in the face of new Soviet or Cuban intervention it could encourage repeated communist expansion and might eventually tip the global balance of power. In response to Kissinger, Professor George Kannan of Princeton called the Secretary's speech thoughtful and statesmanlike, but posed a series of qualifications and reservations. "First of all," wrote Kennan, "it is important to recognize that not all places and regions are of equal importance" to the major powers. Secondly Kennan pointed out that not all gains a superpower may achieve far from its shores are necessarily greatly advantageous - there being many variations of the colonial and neocolonial relationship. Third, and particularly relevant to our interest in future American military intervention, Kennan cautioned that "most careful attention has to be given to the nature of the tools or the allies we have to work with... The limits of the quality of [a local] faction as a military and political competitor within the territory affected becomes the limits of the effectiveness of our own action."

This last observation tells us more about the prospects of future U.S. counterinsurgency operations than almost anything else (and, incidentally, explains a great deal about why we failed in Vietnam). The success or failure of future American stability operations in the Third World will hinge greatly on the character and capabilities of the regimes or factions that we elect to asist—the instruments through which we will work. This was always the case in Vietnam even though, in our rush to apply resources and find solutions, we almost completely eclipsed the Saigon governments and their efforts.

It is impossible to determine to what extent this fact, that the limitations of the local regimes we support will be the final determinants of our success at intervention, is understood within the American Government. Most of the architects of our Vietnam policies, and our counterinsurgency doctrine of the 1960s, have left government service. U.S. Army field manuals do not throw much light on the subject. Since 1969 there have been few Army manuals published which reflected anything other than the early 1960s criteria concerning U.S. military intervention. Mentally the Army is finished with counterinsurgency although, as Secretary Kissinger's statements imply, the mission lingers as a potential responsibility. How,

therefore, do we try and diagnose how the next American-assisted, possibly directed, counterinsurgency operations will progress? What precedents should we rely on?

It is risky to assume that our next intervention will resemble Vietnam. Vietnam was unique: a revolutionary war where nationalism and communism often become indistinguishable; am insurgency which gradually had imposed upon it quasi-conventional warfare; a conflict with asymmetries on both sides (the communist use of sanctuaries, our use of airpower); a long war - 15 years of important American involvement peaking at 550,000 men; a televised war where the conventional military operations of ome side were shown nightly, and nothing of the other side's activities, political or military, were screened. These factors made Viennam special. Nevertheless, even allowing for its special characteristics, Vietnam is instructive because it reveals a great deal about how our government agencies performed, and how they may be expected to perform again. We must not take Professor Huntington's advice: that "our prolicymakers may best meet future crises and dilemmas if they samply blot out of their minds any recollection of this one."3 One of the worst disasters of the Vietnam experience would be to put our heads in the sand--an inevitable tendency anyway.

The Vietnam war, a major proving ground for American counterinsurgency and conventional warfare doctrine and operations, is an appropriate laboratory for study of future U.S. intervention, direct or indirect, in the Third World.

In Vietnam we saw:

- a bourgeoise, oligarchical regime under attack

 by a ruthless communist opponent.
- both government and insurgents critically dependent
 on outside support.
- significant casualities among noncombatants.
- the world imputing stakes to the conflict which transcended the geopolitical confines in which the war was fought.

These characteristics apply to numerous revolutionary situations across the world.

American attempts at counterrevolutionary war will be successful only to the degree that they address the actual nature of the challenge on the ground. And understanding the dynamics, causes and grievances upon which insurgent liberation movements progress is very difficult—as Vietnam proved. Moreover, since we will be assisting, or fighting along-side, an established regime, it is imperative that we coldly evaluate that regime's strengths and weaknesses—and its underlying motives.

"Progress reports," that inevitable bureaucratic symtom, practically killed high-level understanding of what was actually occurring in Vietnam. To be effective our next counterinsurgemmy effort will have to operate first and foremost from the principle of applying pressure on the host regime as well as supporting fit. It must be made clear to the local authorities that continuation of our support will hinge, in part, on their attacking their problems to our satisfaction. The underestimation of the need for leverage, of the requirement to systematically press the Saigon regimes to do our bidding in return for our support, was another cause of our failure in Vietnam. 4

Vietnam also shows how blinders, constraints, and inertia can constantly interfere with our ability to accurately assess our adversaries strengths, our clients' capabilities and, indeed, the very relevance of our own efforts. Indeed the success of future U.S. counterinsurgency effforts will be significantly influenced by which agency (or agencies) obtain custody of the operation. Give the armed særvices, or any agency of government, a mission, and if their prestige gems involved in the outcome they will insist they are doing well. All agencies tend to equate effectiveness with effort. Institutional smokesmen can be expected to argue that because capabilities or programs exist within their inventory they are automatically relevant to the problem. Career

pressures operate. We will show tendencies to view local regime, or its armed forces (or both), from our own perspective ("mirror-imaging"). All of these blinders and incentives will work to disturb our comprehension and our decision-making on whether we are winning or losing. More importantly: of whether we can win.

Only a highly realistic and tough-minded management of our counter-insurgency effort can have a hope of working. A "business as usual" approach will guarantee failure.

II. Counterinsurgency Performance in Vietnam: How Bureaucracy Shaped Strategy

In a RAND Corporation memorandum published in August 1972, as the North Vietnamese were taking major American retaliation for their invasion of South Vietnam, Robert Komer, the retired U.S. Deputy Ambassador to South Vietnam, asked why was it that with a cummilatively enormous U.S. input over the years--550,000 troops at peak, thousands of aircraft and ground forces operations and \$150 billion of expenditures on top of South Vietnam's own great effort -- the war continued on such an intractable course with such ambiguous results. Komer's study is an enlightened, shrewd analysis of numerous motives, weaknesses and constraints of U.S. decision making on Vietnam and the performance of our agencies. From his perspective as a senior operator, Komer shows how conventional American (and Vietnamese) thinking and agency performance failed to adapt well to the challenge in Vietnam, and how the agencies often became entrapped in their own institutional tradition, inertia and constraints. What I propose to do is to specifically delineate same of the end results of those institutional constraints by examining and comparing the actual strategies and programs which American (and Vietnamese) agencies and spokesmen implemented in Vietnam. Then we will analyze their validity or lack of it in meeting Hanoi's challenge. The paper closes with a prognosis for the future.

Of the myriad of competing political-military doctrines and strategies which appeared in the Vietnam war, six were particularly prominent.⁶ They were:

- A. The Social Mobilization and Organization-Building Approach (The Communist strategy; later advocated by the CIA);
- B. The Power Concentration and Authoritarian Social Control Approach (Ngo Dinh Diem's style of government, later adopted but modified by Nguyen Van Thieu);
- C. The Power Limitation and Democratic Institution-Building Approach (The liberal American prescription; publically advocated by the State Department and USIA);
- D. The Stability Operations plus Economic Development Approach (The Rostow Doctrine);
- E. The Military Occupation/Search and Destroy Approach (The U.S. Army's strategy; but with French roots);
- F. The Administrative Approach (The British concept).

A. The Communist Challenge in Vietnam: Social Mobilization and Organization-Building

Viet Minh and subsequent North Vietnamese strategy in South Vietnam built on Lenin's organizational weapon and Mao's approach to guerilla warfare. Adopted and refined by Ho Chi Minh, this strategy employed a small, clandestine, highly-trained revolutionary party apparatus. The party began with a comprehensive view of revolution as a stage-by-stage social process aimed at preempting the government's contact with the people and motivating roughly ten times more manpower at the local level through indoctrination, social control and the redistribution of power, status and wealth. Strategically it was a multidimensional Marxian approach; revolution was seen as an unfolding process of social and class conflict. Victory would come when a decisive superiority in the overall balance of forces, achieved through actions which dramatized and partially rectified grievances, had been achieved. Beginning in 1928, when he founded the Indochina Communist Party, Ho was to employ this strategy against Vietnamese nationalist groups, the Japanese, the French, and then against Saigon and the Americans. In the countryside the communists concentrated on the political penetration of the villages as the party gradually reached into every locality in South Vietnam. Carefully adapting to and then becoming the champion of local grievances and issues,

the insurgent organization threw a net of social, political, economic, and military associations around the people. The use 8/ of terror was controlled, selective, and prevalent. Until 1971 the communists never varied from this basic approach except to add more military pressure. But in the summer of 1971, as Hanoi prepared its Soviet equipped-invasion for the following spring, the North Vietnamese dropped most of their guerilla warfare emphasis and moved into conventional high-technology warfare.

It remains the subject of sharp debate whether it was their organizational capabilities, their comprehensive approach to revolution, the causes they championed, or all of these which gave the Vietnamese communist insurrection such momentum. But the sheer effectiveness of their approach was abovious. As Professor Samuel Huntington commented:

...only the communists have consistently demonstrated the ability to organize and structure [political] participation and thus to create new institutions of political order. Not revolution and the destruction of established institutions, but organization and the creation of new political institutions are the peculiar contributions of communist movements to modern politics. The political function of communism is not to overthrow authority but to fill the vacuum of authority.

Huntington continued:

North Korea and North Vietnæm early achieved a level of political development and political stability which was long absent from South Vietnam...The difference between north and south in both countries was not the difference between dictatorship and democracy but rather the difference between well organized, broadly based, complex

political systems, on the one hand, and unstable, fractured, narrowly based personalistic regimes, on the other. 9/

In late 1964 American CIA officials concluded that if Saigon was ever going to win it would have to employ a socio-organizational approach similar to the communists. CIA doctrine in Vietnam advocated a counter-organizational pacification strategy. By 1966 CIA influence on GVN/US pacification doctrine and programs was apparent in the Revolutionary Development Cadre program. To the CIA:

Successful pacification is essentially a problem of counter-organization. Current Pacification/Development strategy, with its emphasis on the revival of strong village communities, is aimed toward that end. The overriding objective of the village development effort is to confront and supplant the enemy's political/military organization in every village with a deadly rival - a "friendly infrastructure." 11/

While the CIA had an important influence on the Revolutionary Development program.

we should recall that the resources going into the pacification effort

were miniscule compared to those allocated to conventional air

and ground operations. Nor did the CIA influence overall American

decision-making--and therefore the allocation of priorities and resources

--on anything like the scale that was done by the Army and the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, and that tells us something about why the US/GVN responses

to the communist challenge proved so inefficient and costly.

B. The Saigon Government's Preferred Response: Power Concentration and Authoritarian Social Control

With CIA influence on strategy low compared to the Army's, the Saigon governments did not seek to counter communist revolutionary warfare by counter-organization of the people. Instead, with their army molded, shaped and equipped in the American image, the Saigon regimes generally operated from a doctrine of political authority, best typified by the Ngo Dinh Diem regime, rooted in traditional Vietnamese and Chinese concepts of government. Power Concentration advocates saw the purpose of government to be the maximization of the central authorities' influence. Power was concentrated at, and protected by, an elite strata. At the mass level it was thought that the key to success lay in maintaining stable behavior through techniques of social control. The myth of the power concentration approach was that the central authorities would enjoy a "Mandate of Heaven" if they set a superior moral example. This Ngo Dinh Diem's formula and, with some important modifications by Nguyen Van Thieu, it was the favored approach of every Saigon government that followed Diem. In actual practice, however, the Vietnamese employing this strategy knew that the key to power lay in manipulating rivals, not in morality. Competitors were neutralized or eliminated. Deception was the mark of effectiveness. The use of force was expected. Douglas Pike described it:

The world of organizational infighting is fluid and dynamic, in constant flux. One must keep running simply to hold his own...The world should never know precisely where one stands...The best leader is paternalistic, sly, skilled at intrigue, master of the deceptive move, possesser of untold layers of duplicity, highly effective in the world in which he moves. Sagacity in the follower consists in knowing whom to join and when, for timing is all important. It is no accident that the Vietnamese hold the professional magician in particular awe. 12/

Toward the masses the Ngos approach was designed to "keep people from endless scheming about life and calculations about how to improve one's lot. Good government should train people to keep their stations and to accept the structure of society." 13/ Ngo Dinh Diem's application of Power Concentration and Authoritarian Social Control drew on the trappings of communist ideology and technique. But it had little substance to it and collapsed overnight when the Ngos fell in November of 1963. After mid-1968 the governments under Nguyen Van Thieu operated a more flexible approach to power concentration, combining it (albeit belatedly) with more relevant measures remained such as a decentralization of power and more local security and economic welfare measures. But Thieu was not able to link the center to the population in a mutually reinforcing and beneficial way: he failed to fashion a political community. 14/

C. Power Limitation and Democratic Institution-Building

Conventional thinking about the Vietnamese communist insurrection was not restricted to the Saigon regimes or the U.S. Army. It was also evident in State Department, White House and Congressional prescriptions about South Vietnam's need for a western style constitutional democratic government. This doctrine of political authority im South Vietnam equated effective government with restrictions on government. Unlike Hanoi, Saigon, and CIA officials, power limitation proponents believed that the purpose of government should be to maximize personal freedom, not centralize authority. In their view governments which were dictatorial of resistent to reform invited rebellion. A social contract existed between the people and the authorities. Because the people had granted power and legitimacy to the government, if the officials acted arbitrarily the people had the right to withdraw their grant of power. Government became the political equivalent of the marketplace, and competitive pluralism was its dynamic. As Theodore Lowi explained it:

...the system is not fragmented and decentralizing. It is fragmented and self-correcting. It represents classical economics applied to the political system. Bargaining among directly conflicting interests is the basic pattern of politics, and the "power structure" is dynamic as well as rational... But there is no center of the system, no elite, no meaningful order below the order of the system itself. 15/

Democratic advocates saw the cause of the Vietnamese rebellion in popular grievances. To head off the insurgency Saigon had to reform and share its power. President Kennedy argued in May 1961:

No amount of arms and armies can help stabilize those governments which are unable or unwilling to achieve social reform and economic development. Military pacts cannot help nations whose social injustices and economic chaos invite insurgency and penetration and subversion. 16/

The American Department of State and its affiliate the U.S. Information Agency publicly equated political development in South Vietnam with democratic structures and limitations on power. As a 1968 State Department publication argued:

The vast majority of the people of South Vietnam are determined to build their own future under institutions and leaders of their own free choice...[They want] to formulate a democratic constitution...including an electoral law...and to create, on the basis of elections rooted in that constitution, an elected government. 17/

The democratic approach to politics and pacification, always apparent in our public justifications of the purpose in Vietnam, became operationally prominent in the summer of 1965 when Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and Major General Edward G. Lansdale were reappointed to Saigon. The formula was

emphasized at the February 1966 Honolulu Conference and the next year at the Manila Conference. During this time the Saigon government, under the military directorate of Generals Thieu and Ky, held ostensibly contested elections and published an American-style constitution. But the Power Limitation and Democratic Institution—

Building approach to politics was never taken seriously by Vietnamese authorities—in either Saigon or Hanoi.

D. The Rostow Doctrine: Stability Operations plus Economic Development

In the early 1960s, theoreticians in the Kennedy Administration, including in particular the economist Walt W. Rostow, argued that insurgency was a manifestation of the modernization process—and a challenge to which American economic, social and military technology could be applied. "Bringing the Third World through the modernization process" was spoken of. Under Rostow's guidance this far-ranging theory of modernization and the American role in chaperoning it, what I call the "Rostow Doctrine", became the primary tenet of American policy toward the developing areas and the principal rationale for U.S. intervention in Vietnam. The Rostow Doctrine combined Cold War toughness with Western-style economic development.

Rostowians saw the world locked in a communist-campitalist struggle whose outcome would be decided in the developing areas $\frac{18}{}$ South Vietnam was the "test case" in this struggle.

The road to modernization was strewn with risks, particularly communist supported guerilla warfare. As Rostow told the officers at Fort Bragg:

It is on the weaker nations - facing their most difficult transitional moments - that the Communists concentrate their attention. They are the scavengers of the modernization process...Communism is best understood as a disease of the transition to modernization...We are determined to help destroy this international disease. 19/

To guide the developing areas, Rostow and other interventionprone technologists recommended a wide range of American programs-economic, militlary, psychological and social. Mor surprisingly,
State, Defense, AID, USIA, and CIA all found something in the Doctrine.
But it was the armed services, the most technical element of the
American bureaucracy, that became the principal advocates of the Rostow
Doctrine. As Lieutenant General Arthur Trudeau told an audience in
March 1962:

...our whole civilization is on trial today. Forces are loose in the world that would destroy all we hold dear. These forces stem from a malignant organism that grows and thrives on human misery - which reaches out its long tendrils in every field of human endeavor, seeking to strangle and destroy. 20/

And as General William Westmoreland, the American commander in South Vietnam from 1964 until 1968, said in 1967: "... if we had not met [the communist challenge in Vietnam] squarely it could well have been the precedent for countless future wars of similar nature."

The most forceful advocates of unrelenting military pressure on Hanoi and the Viet Cong were Dr. Rostow, who became President Johnson's national security advisor, and General Maxwell Taylor, the retired Army Chief of Staff, later Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, whom Johnson appointed Ambassador to South Vietnam.

E. The Military Occupation/Search and Destroy Approach

As the Rostow Doctrine was applied in South Vietnam, its principle operational formulae were executed by the Armed Services in particular the U.S. Army. But French and Vietnamese influences were also apparent. Originally employed by France in their colonies, the military occupation approach relied on taking physical control of an area and then expanding control outward. Early French pacification campaigns in Indochina and Africa were military affairs. French soldiers, "colons", and small businessmen went out to the colonies, and, after taking up a more or less permanent residence, directly administered

local areas. At the core the French pacification methods was the "oil stain" (tache d'huile) technique first developed between 1892 and 1896 in the Tonkin region of Vietnam under Colonel Joseph Simon $\frac{22}{}$ Gallieni.

Despite early successes, later French pacification campaigns failed. From 1957 to 1962 in Algeria the French Army's Special Action Squads applied the oil-stain and other techniques, but politically France could not hold Algeria. During the 1947-1954 Indochina war the French had neither the resources nor the patience to counter Viet Minh organization efforts. In South Vietnam from 1954 to 1956 Prime Minister Diem, with Brigadier General Edward Lansdale advising, launched a series of "oil-stain" type pacification campaigns, but they failed. During 1962 and 1963 the Diem regime had the resources to carry out a population protection campaign, but Diem and his brother Nhu were completely insensitive to the political and administrative requirements. In the summer of 1964 the Khanh government began a clearing operation around Saigon ("Hop Tac"). It failed to pacify the area but probably prevented the communists from taking the city that year.

Beginning in mid-1965 the Military-Occupation approach became transformed under the U.S. Army's impact. Following the appearance-

in South Vietnam of regular North Vietnamese infantry elements in late 1964, and the near collapse of the Saigon government, American armed forces occupied the RVN en masse. Escalation begat escalation until by 1968 over 1,300,000 allied forces, principally American, South Vietnamese and South Korean, were arrayed against approximately 250,000 communist forces, mostly North Vietnamese. The Army's strategy. under General William Westmoreland's direction and significantly influenced in design by his Deputy, General William De Puy, sought to exploit the inherently superior U.S. mobility, firepower and technology so as to wear down the NVA and the VC through attrition of their base Whereas "clear camps and numbers, and by preempting their operations. and hold" or oil spot approaches were less in accord with Army doctrine of seizing the initiative, "Search and Destroy" became the "preferred military doctrine [which] dictated the strategy and the strategy determined While the strategy did succeed in spoiling many of the the policy." communist offensives (except Tet 1968 and Easter 1972), and did provide something of a shield for protection of paramilitary efforts in the villages, it did not break the enemy effort. Moreover the attrition strategy proved enormously costly - both in dollars and in adverse side effects. Ammunition, fuel, logistic and equipment expendures incombent to the strategy may have constituted the majority of the \$150 billion the U.S. spent on the war.

And massive American and ARVN air and ground fire power also brought great damage to the society, seriously jeopardizing civilian socio26/
economic rehabilitation efforts.

F. The Administrative Approach

This last approach to doctrine and strategy in South Vietnam was British in origin although it was later adopted by American elements. Administrative proponents argued that political development was essentially a problem of efficient government: The "administrative capacity to maintain law and order efficiently and effectively and to perform governmental output functionally, rationally and neutrally." Ideology and politics were deemphasized; when insurgencies occurred this was due to a breakdown in rural administration.

In their colonies the British relied on the indirect approach to government; the army played a less prominent role than in French operations. Effective government was seen as a problem of devising more efficient public administration rather than conciliating interest groups or mobilizing the masses. Richard Clutterbuck described Sir Gerald Templer's formula in Malaya during the 1948-1958 Emergency:

Templer was...impatient with the idea of "independence before breakfast". He realized that, for the people in the villages, self-government was less important than good government. He was determined to bring self-government to Malaya, but not until the independent government could be strong enough to prevent racial violance (as had occurred in India) and the people were no longer in a state of insecurity and powerty. 28/

Above all, this doctrine assumes that it is the restoration of governmental authority, administrative control and "law and order" that count. Sir Robert Thompson, the ex-Malayan Defense Minister and head of the British Advisory Mission to South Vietnam during 1961-1965 states:

No Communist insurrection has got off the ground where the rural administration hadn't broken down beforehand... Perfore you can get all the aspects of democraty or whatever [the] forms of political government may be - economy, etc. - you must have an administrative machine that works right down to the village. 29/

Following the efforts of American public administrative advisors in Saigon from 1955 to 1961 (principally the Michigan State University Advisory Group), British specialists under Thompson reemphasized the administrative formula. In 1962 the Diem government began a massive new population regroupment and internal security program ("Strategic 30/ Hamlets") with American material support and British advice. The scheme failed due to conceptual weaknesses and disastrous implementation.

Through subsequent years American public administration advisors continued to argue for an administrative strategy. The Administrative approach had one thing in common with the communist Social Mobilization and Organization-Building approach: a belief in organizational skills. But the British saw bureaucracy as a politically neutral mechanism for transmitting policies to the villages. The communists saw bureaucracy as an organizational weapon by which to cut the villages away from the government in order to build an alternative power structure.

III. Analysis: How Vietnam was Lost

The communist approach to revolutionary warfare in Vietnam was a stage-by-stage preemptive social strategy braced by military action, what we have described as Social Mobilization and Organization-Building. Given this challenge, two GVN/US doctrines and strategies proved generally irrelevant or counter-productive: the Power Limitation and Democratic Institution Building and the Military Occupation/Search and Destroy approaches. Two other allied responses contained both relevant and wasteful elements: the Power Concentration and Social Control Approach and the Rostow Doctrine. By contrast, the Administrative strategy and the CIA's version of Social Mobilization and Organization-Building were highly relevant to combatting communist revolutionary warfare in Vietnam. It was the misfortune of the allied effort in Vietnam that until the 1968 communist Tet offensive Saigon and Washington emphasized combinations of these six approaches which were totally or largely irrelevant to the communist challenge and meaningless or damaging to the society. The trend was reversed after the Tet attacks and a more relevant strategy devised. This later effort put an emphasis on population protection, local organization building, political participation and economic reform. It provided more security for the people, decentralized power to reorganized villages, laid emphasis on attacking the Viet Cong infrastructure, and set forth a broad-based land reform program. Hanoi's invasion of South Vietnam in April 1972 skewed the GVN/US strategy back toward high technology military warfare. But when the invasion was beaten back, the Thieu regime returned to elements of its earlier strategy, continuing them with mixed success until the long slide began in mid-1974.

The Power Limitation and Democratic Institution-Building approach was irrelevant to the problems of South Vietnam for several reasons. Moreover it has little relevance for any Third World country where a traditional regime is challenged by a revo-Iutionary insurgent movement. First, successful political development and counterinsurgency require that power must be created, concentrated and stabilized before it can be shared. Second, Western democratic institutions and procedures at the national level were not salient for the Vietnamese, nor do they apply to most developing countries. The Military Occupation/Search and Destroy strategy in Vietnam, while an appropriate response to some of the conventional aspects of the war, was an outgrowth of the U.S. Army's conventional military doctrine. Relying on massive firepower, it proved greatly damaging to the society and irrelevant to communist infrastructure activities in the villages and cities. Despite its many valiant sacrifices, discrimination in its operations was not something at which the U.S. Army excelled. The size, clumsiness and firepower of regular American and South Vietnamese units often proved significantly counterproductive. Hanoi and the Viet Cong regularly exploited this, goading American and ARVN forces into overreactions. The effect was to multiply popular grievances against the Saigon governments. Not until 1968 were more resources allocated to South Vietnamese territorial militia units, the people's self-defense forces, and American combat operations decentralized under General Abrams' direction.

Ho Chi Minh's use of a judicious mixture of Power Concentration at the elite level, Social Mobilization and Organization Building at the mass level, coordinated with the careful application of military pressure, was responsible for much of the communists' successes. When the Ngo Dinh Diem regime applied Power Concentration and Social Control from 1954 to 1963, it became a charade of elite manipulation and attempts at mass indoctrination. The military cliques which followed the Ngos had, essentially, no concept of government at all. 31 In mid-1967 Nguyen Van Thieu moved to finalize control in the army and National Assembly. But pressures from the 1968 Tet offensive drove Thieu to modify his overall political-military approach, and he took some resources and power away from the army and the bureaucracy and redistributed them to the villages. Like the Power Concentration approach, the Rostow Doctrine had both useful and counterproductive elements. Its advocates were right in believing that a combination of efforts was needed to combat the Vietnamese communist challenge. But it was the fundamental error of the Rostowians to assume that the ultimate source of South Vietnam's problems lay not in the South but in the North. By concentrating massive resources and effort against infiltration from the North rather than focusing on the political and administrative decay in the South, and Saigon's reluctance to address it, the Rostowians—and their principal agents in Saigon, MACV and the 7th/13th Air Force-missed the actual processes and dynamics by which the revolution endured.

The Administrative approach to strategy was a necessary

(although not sufficient) precondition to combating revolutionary

warfare in Vietnam. The Diem regime inherited and then perpetuated

an administrative and political vacuum in South Vietnam which no

number of French, Vietnamese or American soldiers and advisors

could fill. Power vacuums invite insurgent organizational efforts

at the grass roots. When a developing country is being subverted

from within, invariably the rebels emerge out-administering the

government, not outfighting it. Diem, the generals who followed

him, and the United States all made the mistake of assuming that

a large army and military occupation operations could be substitutes

for effective organization of the rural population. Unlimited

injections of economic aid and military resources were seen as re
placing indigenous sources of participation and support, admini
strative talent and organizational skill.

The Social Mobilization and Organizational Building approach was an effective insurrection strategy for the communists and would have been a potent counter strategy for the government—if it had been given enough priority. Executed with sophistication by the communists, it went to the heart of the matter: penetrating villages; adapting the organization to local conditions; mobilizing people, and giving, or forcing them to take, a part in the revolution. During 1966 and 1967, and in the dramatic fashion after the Tet offensive of January-February 1968, Saigna adopted some elements of the communist strategy: in the Revolutionary Development

program (1966-1967), during the Accelerated Pacification campaigns (1968-1970), 32 and then later in the Community Defense and Local Development plans (1970-1972). 33 The GVN never executed Social Mobilization and Organization-Building with the skill of the communists. But by 1971 the new government strategy had contributed to such a smothering of local insurgent activities 34 that Hanoi, acknowledging the GVN breakthrough, was forced to launch a new military invasion. The invasion was beaten back. But Hanoi kept up enough pressure so that with the decline in U.S. aid Saigon could not extend its new strategy.

IV. Prognosis

Vietnam showed that the United States has distinct liabilities in trying to counter revolutionary liberation movements. Democracies cannot combat "wars of national liberation" unless they have the overriding support of their people and can sustain the effort for as long as it takes. Television on the battlefield is one sure way of eroding that public support. The pluralistic, democratic nature of American society produces wide variations in beliefs about political authority. We have no overarching doctrine of government. By contrast, communist dictatorships and radical revolutionary movements have distinct advantages. Being authoritarian, they suppress dissent and control information. Their monocausal doctrines of politics lend themselves to the ruthless exploitation of changing situations.

In Vietnam our pluralistic traditions were a distinct liability in our search for strategy. Our government, even in war, must work in the open. Our foreign policy must reconcile separate interests and factions. When we attempted to advise, eventually direct, a counterinsurgency and them a major land war in Asia, we found that our pluralism (typified by our fragmented bureaucracy) shaped our strategy. By spreading custody of the war's direction across a series of competitive, largely uncoordinated agencies, we institutionalized our comfusion. In neither Saigon nor Washington did we subject our agencies to effective control: There never was an American "proconsul" in

the Vietnam war. The Army's recommendations were not what USAID or the CIA favored. State and USIS saw it still differently.

Saigon's limitations were equally fatal to the design of strategy. Inheriting the wreckage of France's colonial war, the governments of South Vietnam perpetuated a system of class, wealth and tradition. Controlled by a bourgeois elite sitting atop a peasant base and held together by a garrison state, the power structure sought to restrict or prevent political participation by the masses. For the price of supporting Thieu, the urban-rural oligarchy fought reform of the system. Nor did it even have to try as long as the Americans paid the bills and did so much of the fighting. By trying to do so much ourselves, we diluted the leverage which we needed to bring to bear on the Saigon regimes.

What, then, in the light of our experience in Vietnam, have we got to work with the next time? Not the CIA--not as long as Congressional committees and the media's cameras are poring over the Agency's every move. And this is unfortunate because U.S. operations in Vietnam (and particularly in Laos) show that the CIA was the most hard-nosed agency in its assessments, and realistic and cost-effective in its operations. As for the Army, the Vietnam experience does not foster much confidence that the Army can tailor its capabilities to an unconventional warfare environment should it get the task. The Army never wanted a counterinsurgency/stability operations mission in the first place—witness what happened to the Special Forces in the early 1960s.

The Army's central mission remains the defense of Western Europe and, secondly, to fight in South Korea. In both instances the Army is prepared to go all out in a slam-bang, conventional, high-technology contest. The other armed services—the Air Force and the Navy—have no capability in counterinsurgency. The Marines showed realism in their Vietnam operations, but they must take their cues from the Navy when it comes to doctrine, resources and budgets. The Agency for International Development does not have the capabilities to operate well in a revolutionary warfare environment. And the size of AID monies and programs continue to decline. But more importantly, communist liberation movements are seldom countered with economic development schemes. The Department of State's and USIA's predilection for democratic approaches to insurgent challenges are equally irrelevant.

In summary we have found that conventional bureaucraticmilitary responses to revolutionary warfare do not work. They
miss the relevance of culture, social forces, and above all
politics. They perceive socioeconomic problems and political
dilemmas through technological and administrative filters. They
graft favored programs and resources onto foreign problems. They
recreate reality in their own image, justifying progress by documenting effort. Conventional liberal-democratic responses to
revolutionary warfare do not work either. They underestimate the
role of force and violence. They miss the salience of power, the
necessity of creating, centralizing and institutionalizing power

before it can be shared. They transplant western values to nonwestern problems. Since the collapse of Indochina we have seen
no attempt in the American government to develop new counterinsurgency doctrine, or specially tailored, realistic programs. No
specially adapted machinery geared to cut across agency lines is
in existence. These realities, and the legacy of irrelevance
and waste which characterized so much of our Vietnam effort,
means the United States is not yet ready to meet the new challenge.

V. FOOTNOTES

- 1/ See Henry A. Kissinger, "The Permanent Challenge of Peace: U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union", 3 February 1976, San Francisco. The Secretary expanded on these remarks in a speech at Dallas on 22 March. At Dallas Kissinger said, "The United States cannot acquiesce indefinitely in the presence of Cuban expeditionary forces in distant lands for the purpose of pressure and to determine the political evolution by force of arms." He added, ... "An unopposed superpower may draw dangerous conclusions when the next opportunity for intervention beckons." New York Times 23 March, 1976, p. 2.
 - 2/ Kennan's reply to Kissinger is in The Washington Post, 16 February 1976, p. A15.
 - 3/ Huntington is cited in Bernard Brodie, <u>War and Politics</u> (New York: MacMillan, 1973) pp. 113-114.
 - 4/ See Lawrence E. Grinter, "Bargaining Between Saigon and Washington: Dilemmas of Linkage Politics During War ORBIS, XVIII, No. 3 (Fall 1974).
 - 5/ R.W. Komer, "Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on US-GVN Performance in Vietnam," RAND Corporation Memorandum R-967-ARPA, August 1972.
 - 6/ This section draws principally upon my "How They Lost:
 Doctrines and Outcomes of the Vietnam War," Asian Survey
 XV:12 (December 1975)
 - 7/ This is Jeffrey Race's thesis. See especially Chapter IV of his War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province (Berkeley, Los Angeles. London: University of California Press, 1972)
 - 8/ See Douglas Pike, Viet Cong, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1966)
 - 9/ Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 335, 343.

- By early 1966 about 20,000 cadres were operating throughout the RVN. The number grew to 39,000 one year later and topped out at about 48,000 cadres in 1969. They were never supposed to be "revolutionaries"; thus the GVN called them Rural Construction (Xay-Dung Dong-Tham) avoiding, in public, the American term Revolutionary (Cach Mang).
- Rural Development Division, Community Development Directorate, "The Vietnamese Village," (Saigon: Hq. MACCORDS, May 2, 1979), p. 4.
- 12/ Pike, Viet Cong, pp. 9-10.
- Lucien Pye, "The Roots of Insurgency and the Commencement of Rebellions," in Harry Eckstein (ed.), Internal War: Problems and Approaches, (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 161.
- The concept of "political community" in South Vietnam used here derives from Allan E. Goodman's excellent treatment of the problem in his Politics in War: The Bases of Political Community in South Vietnam (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1973).
- Theodore J. Lowi, "Making Democracy Safe for the World:
 National Politics and Foreign Policy," in James N. Rosenau
 (ed.), <u>Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy</u>, (New York:
 The Free Press, 1967), p. 296.
- 16/ New York Times, May 26, 1961, p. 12.
- U.S. Department of State. Political Development in South Vietnam, Viet-Nam Information Notes, No. 5, Pubn. 8231, (January 1968), pp. 1-8. The problem of divergent views between State and Defense, and for that matter among all U.S. agencies in Vietnam, goes back into the early 1950s. Whereas State Department spokesmen almost always argued that U.S. policy should take the form of pressures on the GVN to reform and to liberalize its handling of dissent, the press and the population so as to command popular support, Defense Department officials consistently regarded the GVN's difficulties as almost always proceeding from military, not political or administrative, inadequacies.

- Three of Rostows essays are relevant. The first was Max Millikan and W.W. Rostow, A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy (New York: Harper, 1957). The second was W.W. Rostow, The States of Economic Growth:

 A Mon-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1960). The third was Rostow's widely circulated speech at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in June of 1961: "Guerrilla Warfare in the Underdeveloped Areas," (speech given at the U.S. Army Special Warfare School Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, June 28, 1961).
- 19/ Rostow, "Guerrilla Warfare," op. cit.
- Lieutenant General Arthur G. Trudeau, Welcoming Address at the U.S. Army's Limited War Mission and Social Science Research Symposium, Proceedings, ed. by William A. Lybrand (Washington, D.C.: SCRO/American University, June, 1962), pp. 11-12.
- 21/ General William C. Westmoreland; "Progress Report on the War in Vietnam," <u>Department of State Bulletin</u>, LVII, No. 1485 (December 11, 1967), p. 785.
- Colonel (later Marshal) Louis Lyautey as quoted in Colonel Mark M. Boatner, III, "The Unheeded History of Counterinsurgency," Army, XVI, No. 9 (September 1966), p. 31. Also see Joseph-Simon Gallieni, Gallieni Au Tonkin 1892-1896 (Paris: Editions Berger-Levrault, 1941), pp. 219-220. See in particular Annexe No. I, "Principes De Pacification Et D'Organisation."
- General Westmoreland's description and defense of his strategy is in General William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc.) 1976, pp. 174-196. ("Evolution of Strategy").
- David McKay Company, Inc.), p. 62. Also see Sir Robert Thompson, No Exit From Vietnam (New York: David McKay Company, Inc.), pp. 129-131, 134-136.
- 25/ Komer, "Bureaucracy Does Its Thing," p. 53.

- 26/ MACV and the ARVN JGS were aware of the damage US/GVN conventional firepower could do to the society. As General Westmoreland wrote: "Their tremendous firepower made it vastly more desirable that they fight in remote, unpopulated areas if the enemy would give battle there." The problem was that Hanoi would not follow script. Admiral U. S. G. Sharp and General W. C. Westmoreland, Report on the War in Viet (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 132. Yet General Westmoreland also indicates that "Although South Vietnamese leaders asked at first that I restrict [the] American presence to remote areas, I declined, unwilling to see my [forces] flexibility fettered and also conscious that American performance would set an example and a challenge to the face-conscious Orientals." Westmoreland. A Soldier Reports, op. cit., pp. 176. By early 1966 the intensification of the war had produced estimates of the numbers of refugees ranging from 700,000 to 1,000,000. Evidence later emerged that in 1965 and 1966, and at later times, the United States Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (MACV) under General Westmoreland either directly or tacitly authorized some deliberate refugee generation. See the February 1270 testimony of William Hitchcock and William Colby before the Senate, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Vietnam: Policy and Prospects, 1970; Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Program, Hearings, before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 91st Congress, 2d session, 1970, pp. 221, 236.
- Robert A. Packenham, "Approaches to the Study of Political Development," World Politics, Vol. XVII, No. 1 (October 1964), p. 113.

 Also see Charles A. Joiner, "The Ubiquity of the Administrative Role in Counterinsurgency," Asian Survey, VII: 7 (July 1967), pp. 540-544, and Charles A. Joiner, The Politics of Massacre:

 Political Processes in South Vietnam (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1974), Chapter IV.
- Brigadier Richard L. Clutterbuck, The Long, Long War: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam (New York and Washington: Praeger, 1966), p. 81.
- Thompson, comments in Special Warfare Panel at U.S. Army Operations Research Symposium, May 25-27, 1964, Rock Island, Illinois, reprinted in Hq. U.S. Army Weapons Command, Proceedings of the U.S. Army Operations Research Symposium (Rock Island, Illinois, May 1964), pp. 175-176.

- 30/ One of the most articulate proponents of the administrative approach, and an acute scholar of Vietnamese history, particularly the Diem regime, is Dennis J. Duncanson. See his Government and Revolution in Vietnam (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1968).
- 31/ "It is an inescapable fact," stated the American Ambassador to South Vietnam, General Maxwell Taylor, in his November 1964 briefings, "that there is no national tendency toward team play or mutual loyalty to be found among many of the leaders and political groups within South Vietnam." Excerpts from briefing by Taylor, "The Current Situation in South Vietnam November 1964", were printed in the New York Times, June 14, 1971.
- The first Accelerated Pacification Campaign of November 1968 January 1969 was generated from GVN and US shock at the communist Tet attacks. The Rural and Popular Forces were expanded to 400,000 men. Self reliant local governments were given priority, and a new attack on the communist infrastructure began. While full of defects the APC proved that the government could operate a relatively controlled and organized civil-military pacification campaign. The take-off for a government breakthrough in the countryside had occurred.
- 33/ The 1969 and 1970 Pacification and Development Plans were followed by the 1971 Community Defense and Local Development Plan which retained Thieu's emphasis on decentralizing the government and giving the villages an increased stake in their own security and development. The 1970 plam emphasized welfare assistance for the urban slums and refugee camps and fighting inflation. By 1971 Land reform and the election process had taken over the central stage. In March 1972 the GVN commenced the 1972-1975 Four Year CD & LD Plan, but it was quickly postponed by Hanoi's April invasion. Overall setbacks were 15 to 20 percent of program goals but very serious losses for the government occurred in Binh Dinh, Quang Tin, Quang Nam, Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces.

"By 1971, most of the population in the countryside was at peace and the amount of security achieved no longer a subject for official debate...the economic and political patterns of life had resumed." Allan E. Goodman, "South Vietnam and the New Security," Asian Survey, XII:2 (February 1972), pp. 121-122.

KUUGH DKAFT: NUL FUK CITATION OR ATTRIBUTION WITHOUT PERMISSION OF AUTHOR

THE NEW STRATEGIC MAP

Geoffrey Kemp

The New Strategic Map

Fundamental changes are occurring in the international system which require that the West reassess its basic concepts of military strategy. The last Apollo mission to the moon in 1974 represented the end of an era of strategic studies which had a distinctly bi-polar US-Soviet perspective and which was influenced primarily by the technology of intercontinental ballistic missiles and the nuclear weapon. The October 1973 Arab-Israel War dramatized the arrival of a new, multi-polar era in which the role of arms transfers and technology diffusion, access to overseas bases, raw material supplies and security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) must be given higher priority.

The overriding argument to be outlined in this paper is that

Western strategists must rediscover the importance of geography in

their thinking and become as familiar with the new meaning of distance,

the nature of the oil-flow cycle, the implications of the Law of the

Sea Conference and the meaning of acronyms such as SLOC and PGM as

they now are with the terminology of the strategic nuclear balance such

as MIRV and MARV.* It will be suggested that in the decade ahead lumps of rock and strategic maritime straits located in diverse areas such as the Arctic Ocean, the South Atlantic, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf will have more immediate strategic value than rocks located on the moon or the planet Mars. In short, our geographical perceptions need to change and become more keenly focused upon the specific features of a diversified and complex earth rather than upon beautiful but blurred visual perceptions of our planet which the early Apollo photographs so vividly portrayed.

^{*}SLOC - Sea Line of Communication; PGM - Precision Guided Munition; MTRV - Multiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicle; MARV - Maneuvering Re-Entry Vehicle.

Changing Geo-Strategic Perspectives

American isolationism was, in part, due to the unique geographical position of the United States. Until the World War II American strategists and politicians generally learned their geography from the traditional "seamans" map, the mercator projection of the world, which usually displays the world on a north-south axis centered either in New York or London. This map dramatically highlights the separation of North America from Asia and Europe and gives special prominence to the North Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

However during World War II, the American people radically altered their basic perception of the map of the world.* This was due to the new importance of air power and the need to make use of the North-pole centered asimuthal projection map which displays a very different world to that found on the mercator projection. The polar projection shows the relative close proximity of the U.S. and Soviet heartlands, an image that is certainly not obvious on the mercator map. It has been argued that this new image of physical relationship between the U.S. and Soviet Union, together with the new technology of air power, helped to break down traditional U.S. concepts of geographic isolation and was an underlying cause of the Cold War.** In addition to the growing importance of the "airmans view" the American public were, on President Roosevelt's instructions, well informed as to the location and importance of specific

^{*}Alan K. Henrikson, "The Map as an Idea: The Role of Cartographic Imagery During the Second World War," The American Cartographer, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1975), pp. 19-53.

^{**} Henrikson, p. 19.

geographic features in the wartime theater of operation.

For about ten years following World War II geography, with special emphasis upon the "airmans" map remained a vital element in Western strategic planning. As a result of nuclear weapons the most important contingency for the United States military establishment was the strategic offensive mission against the Soviet Union. Until the introduction, in the mid 1950s, of the long-range B-52 jet bomber, and an extensive air refueling capability, and later, between 1959-1961, the first generation ICBMs, Atlas, Titan and Minuteman I, the strategic nuclear mission required a number of widely dispersed overseas bases which in effect, ringed the Soviet Union.*

From the mid 1950s to the early 1970s new technology, in conjunction with other important strategic phemonmena, helped to downgrade traditional geographical perspectives and give rise, instead, to a school of thought that talked of the "illusion of distance" in military planning.** The distinctive characteristics of this view of the world, were as follows:-

- US Soviet bi-polar focus. U.S. military superiority in most categories of advanced technology, especially nuclear weapons
- U.S. and Western strategy greatly influenced by the disciplines of mathematics, game theory, physics, economic systems analysis and political science, giving rise to

^{*}It is true that in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the long-range B-36 bomber could reach targets in the Soviet Union from bases in the United States. However the B-36 was slow (Mach 0.7) and therefore more vulnerable than the B-47 and was never considered as anything more than an interim bomber.

^{**} For a lucid exposition of this thesis, see Albert Wohlstetter "Illusions of Distance," Foreign Affairs, January 1968.

the prominance of the quantifiable strategic nuclear model.

- Western access to overseas bases not a serious problem
- U.S. natural resources, especially oil, relatively abundant and secure

More specifically by the early 1960s the ICBM and the B-52 made it possible for planners to disregard the forward base concept in thinking about nuclear strategy. The nuclear powered submarine also liberated the planners from geographical constraints. For although the Polaris submarine system continued to make use of forward bases (Holy Loch, Rota and Guam) this was for reasons of operational effectiveness rather than necessity. There were no technical reasons why the entire Polaris fleet could not have been based on the East and West coasts of the United States.

In the conventional war arena, too, major advances in technology, especially strategic air lift capacity, culminitating with the C-141 and C-5A transport aircraft, and the abundance of forward Western military bases dotted throughout the world downgraded geography as a factor in strategic thinking.

In many respects the Vietnam war represented the climax of this era. Our early experience in the war justified the "illusions of distance," thesis, since how to get to Vietnam was one of the least serious military problems we faced. Furthermore, the revolution in command, control and communications technology made it possible for the President of the United States and his political advisors in Washington, D.C. to oversee bombing missions over North Vietnam and

thereby the authority normally vested in local commanders. What began as a bi-polar orientated conflict to which game theory was applied, ended as a very traditional war in which geography, climate and asymetric kill ratios were the ingredients of North Vietman's victory.

During the period of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam the Soviet Union systematically increased its defense posture especially in terms of strategic nuclear weapons, ground forces and maritime forces. By the time the war was over, the Soviet Union had achieved, to all intent and purposes, strategic parity with the West.

The New Strategic Map

It is suggested that as a result of the Vietnam experience, the 1973 Arab-Israel conflict and the growth in Soviet military capabilities we would be well advised to regain our "geographic sense" and appreciate some of the very real contraints which geography, and the diffusion of power now impose upon our military relationship with the Soviet Union which must remain the corner store of Western security policy.

For what we see emerging is nothing less than a remarkable new strategic map. Many of the features of the new map are closely interrelated and are derivatives of changes that occurred in the 1950s and 1960s but have not yet been fully appreciated in bi-polar strategic circles. First, break-throughs in new weapons technology together with the widespread

diffusion of arms and wealth to increasing regions of the world will impose greater constraints on the freedom of the major maritime powers, including the Soviet Union, to deploy and use military force in the southern hemisphere. Given the West's dependency upon sea lines of communication this trend is of less concern to the Soviet Union. However a further spread of nuclear weapons and the eventual diffusion of "threshold" technologies such as the long range cruise missile will pose particular geo-strategic problems for the Soviet Union who may find its heartland and maritime egress routes encircled by well armed adversaries. Second, here has been a steady erosion of Western base rights in important areas of the world including South East Asia, the Middle East and Africa south of the Sahara; there has been a parallel, though not symetric growth in Soviet overseas maritime facilities. Third, partly as a result of sustained economic growth, the Western industrial countries are becoming increasingly dependent upon the transshipment of scarce raw materials, especially oil, located in, and moving through, volatile conflict areas. With the very important exception of food, the Soviet Union is self-sufficient in most natural resources. Fourth, the creeping closure of the world's oceans due to unilateral extensions of sovereignty and a possible new law of the seas is eroding traditional freedom of maritime transit through areas of critical strategic and economic importance to both the West and the Soviet Union.

A remaissance of the geostrategic perspective requires that we avoid some of our more basic geographical prejudices. In particular, we must resist our persistent temptation to look at the map through northern, Anglo-Saxon eyes. In this paper two particular issues will be

mentioned. Given the importance of our relationship with the Soviet.

Union and our dependence upon sea lines of communication, we need to look carefully at two sets of non-traditional maps: in order to better appreciate Soviet perspectives we need to see how the emerging geostrategic map looks from Moscow because of the importance of our oil supplies we should look at the strategic world from the perspective of the southern hemisphere including both the Indian and South Atlantic Oceans.

Soviet Perspectives

(a) Nuclear Proliferation

An examination of strategic targets in the Soviet Union reveals that its urban-industrial complexes are relatively small in area and are

MAP 1 NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION CIRCA 1985: A SOVIET PERSPECTIVE



(Asimuthal Equidistant Projection centered on Moscow)



Nuclear or potential nuclear powers 1985



Soviet urban-industrial ageas.

tightly clustered.*

At the present, it can be assumed that, of the five confirmed nuclear powers, four targets the U.S.S.R.:

Nuclear Power	Primary Target
U.S.	U.S.S.R.
U.S.S.R.	U.S.
U.K.	U.S.S.R.
France	U.S.S.R.
China	U.S.S.R.

In addition to these countries, India and Israel are generally assumed to be near nuclear or, in the case of Israel, even a nuclear power, depending upon definitions. Other high-ranking candidates for eventual nuclear membership include South Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan, South Africa, Brazil, and possbily Iran and Argentina. Important countries not expected under present circumstances to go nuclear but who easily could, include most West European and some East European countries, Japan, Canada and Australia.

What concerns us here about these lists of candidates is their geographical location and likely trends in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles over the next 10-15 years. From the Soviet perspective, the spectre of a multi-nuclear world including a sample of these candidates poses problems as suggested by Map 1. Of the high-ranking candidate, the following, by dint of geography and technology, will probably not be able to threaten the United States but could reach targets in the Soviet

^{*}Geoffrey Kemp, Nuclear Forces for Medium Powers, Parts I, II, and III. Adelphi Papers No. 106 and 197 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn 1974).

Union: Israel, India, South Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan, Iran. (Although the other three candidates, South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina, are more contrained geographically they are presently more likely to regard the U.S.S.R. as an adversary, than the United States).

Potential Regional Nuclear Powers*	Primary Strategic Target	Secondary Target Capabilities
Israel	U.S.S.R.	Arab World
India	Pakistan/China	U.S.S.R.
South Korea	North Korea	U.S.S.R./China/Japan
South Africa	Black Africa	
Taiwan	China	U.S.S.R./Japan
Pakistan	India	U.S.S.R.
Iran	U.S.S.R./India	Arab World/Turkey
Brazil	Argentina	Venezuela
Argentina	Brazil	

*Assumes IRBM/ACLM/SLCM or Deep Interdiction air capability with range of between 1,500-2,000 sm.

If we add to this list the secondary countries such as West Germany and Japan, the picture from the Soviet perspective becomes even gloomier:

Possible Nuclear Power	Nearest Superpower
Canada	U.S.
West Germany	U.S.S.R.
Sweden	U.S.S.R.
Norway	U.S.S.R.

Possible Nuclear Po	wer	Nearest Superpower
Netherlands		U.S.S.R.
Italy		U.S.S.R.
Japan	,	U.S.S.R.
Egypt		U.S.S.R.
Indonesia		U.S.S.R.
Mexico		v.s.
Venezuela		v.s.

While the listing of each of these candidates can be individually challenged, the overall pattern that emerges is clear; namely, that over the next 10 to 15 years, in the absence of a technological breakthrough that provides anti-Western countries with very long-range ballistic, cruise missiles or aircraft, the United States is in a more secure position from traditional forms of nuclear proliferation which includes the spread of "threshold" technologies such as advanced cruise missiles than the Soviet Union.

(b) Soviet Navy and Problems of Egress

Although there is some debate among students of the Soviet military policy concerning the roles and missions of the Soviet Navy, there is general agreement that in event of a protracted war at sea the Soviet fleets are at a grave disadvantage due, in large part, to their geography. The Northern Fleet, based at Murmansk and Pechanga in the Barents Sea would not find it easy to

move into the North Atlantic and attack the vital sea lane from North America to Europe. To the North of the Barents Sea the polar ice pack prevents movement. Proceeding west the fleet has to pass through the Greenland—Iceland—UK gap (G-I-UK Gap) before it can enter the North Atlantic. So long as Greenland and Iceland remain part of NATO, the West has a decisive advantage at this choke point. If the Northern Fleet attempts to move south around the coast of Norway it has to negotiate the spawning North Sea oil fields and proceed through the Straits of Dover, which are only 20 miles wide.

The Western threat to the Soviet northern fleet would be compounded if Norway were to develop the potentially rich off-shore oil fields located north of the 62 parallel including the area of the continental shelf between the North Cape and the Svalbard (Spitzbergen).

The Baltic Fleet would have to proceed through the Danish

Straits (the Skagerrak and Kattegat) before reaching the North Sea
and would then face the same choke points as the Northern Fleet.

The Black Sea Fleet is constrained by the Turkish Straits and the
Mediterranean Fleet by the Gibralter Strait and the Suez Canal.

Important elements of the Pacific Fleet are constrained by the
Korean and Japanese Straits. The Pacific Fleet can pass through
the Tartar Strait which is in Soviet hands, but this strait can be
easily mined from Western bases in Japan. The Pacific Fleet can
also use the major base at Petropanlovsk which is on the Kamchatka
Peninsular on the Pacific coast. However Petropanlovsk is thousands
of miles from the nearest major urban areas and is isolated from
the rest of the Soviet Union in terms of land logistics.

These constraints lend credence to the argument that the primary missions of the new Soviet Navy presently relate to strategic defense and political presence rather than sea control and the projection of military power. Equally, though, the same constraints provide great incentives for the Soviet Union to establish a major naval and air base outside its local waters.

Taken all round the new map may well reinforce traditional Soviet fears of encirclement and help to explain Soviet support for strategic arms limitations, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the position of the Western maritime powers at the Law of the Sea Conference and, most important, continued stress upon its one major asset, it's expanding conventional military capabilities and its achievement of approximate nuclear parity in the context of the bilateral US-Soviet strategic balance.

If we add to these factors the growing Soviet need for Western technology to develop its backward economy and extra protein supplies to feed its population over a period when bad harvests and bad management may continue it can be argued that Soviet aggressiveness in the international arena stems in part from new strength, especially military strength but, in part, from weakness and the need to use its one asset, military power, to offset its many deficiencies. In the absence or diminution of a detente-type relationship with the West, "worse-case" military analysts in the Soviet Union must surely be thinking of strategic global countermoves to check, what from their point of view, is a worrying trend. If they, too, look at the new map, they may see that, the West's achilles heel is oil.

The Western Perspective

From the point of view of the Western industrial world the most disturbing features for the next decade of the new map are the growing dependency upon Persian Gulf oil, the parallel expansion of Soviet military capabilities and the diffusion of arms to non-industrial countries located on, or near, the oil-flow cycle.

No matter what the political ramifications of the West's current close relationship with the King of Saudi Arabia, the Shah of Iran and the detente with the USSR and China, the fact remains that the West's ability to control its oil supplies has diminished while the potential threats to the oil have increased. It is little consolation to argue that none of the oil producing countries or the USSR want to cut off the oil.

First, their leadership may change and different values may pertain.

Second, and more important, the mere fact of the growing vulnerability justifies a close examination of the problem. We assume that strategic nuclear war or a Warsaw Pact attack in Central Europe has always been a rather remote contingency, none the less we have taken these threats seriously and have built forces to deter against them happening. Similarly, then, from a military point of view, threats to oil cannot be dismissed as unrealistic. Oil threats, like nuclear threats, may also be function of perceived strengths and weaknesses as well as actual capabilities.

In the following paragraphs the growing dependency on Gulf oil and possible military threats to the oil flow will be considered, then three maps will be examined to suggest some of the political implications over the next decade.

The Nature of the Oil Dependency

Unless the Western industrial world radically changes its life style, oil supplies from the Persian Gulf will contimue to be essential. Given the technology and economics of oil transportation, most Persian Gulf oil will be shipped to the three major destinations (Europe, Japan and North America) by supertankers. The most important sea line of communication (SLOC) will be around the Cape of Good Hope.

In 1965 447,000 barrels of oil per day (b/d) were transshipped to Europe via the Cape route.* By 1976 the figure had jumped to 16,000,000 b/d.

The future size of the sea lines around the Cape and to the Far East will depend upon the demand for oil in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. Demand for foreign oil will be dependent on the ability to conserve oil, by both using less total energy and using greater amounts of other energy sources, and the ability to increase domestic production.

Western Europe presently accounts for the largest portion of the oil traffic around the Cape. By 1985 exploration of the North Sea oil reserves could yield from 3,000,000-4,000,000 b/d.

^{*}In 1965 the bulk of the oil was transshipped through the Suez Canal, which, as the 1967 Arab-Israel war showed, was extremely vulverable. For this reason, together with the economics of supertankers, it is unlikely that Suez will be an important oil route in the future.

But this would still leave Europe's import needs at between 16,000,000 to 23,500,000 b/d as compared with 14,000,000 b/d in 1974. The Middle East, which has the potential to fulfill all of Western Europe's import needs in 1985, will probably supply at least as much of Europe's needs in 1985 as it did in 1974 when it provided about 70%. Alternative sources of supply for Europe could come from Western Africa and possibly Asia (Indonesia and China). Nigerian output should rise from about 1,900,000 b/d in 1974 to 2,800,000 b/d in 1985. Claims by the Angolan government maintain that that country should be producing up to 2,000,000 b/d in 1985 although they give no basis for this claim. Southern African reserves are believed to be between 2-4 billion tons. Taken together Southern and West Africa could, if the claims and estimates are correct, produce about 3,500,000 to 4,000,000 b/d in 1985. Large purchases of Western African oil by Western Europe could reduce but not relieve—their demand upon Indian Ocean portion of the Middle East - Cape of Good Hope SLOC. Oil could be purchased from Asia but it would still have to be transported around the Cape.

In 1985 the U.S. will probably be importing from 8,000,000 to 14,500,000 b/d of oil as compared to 6,000,000 b/d in 1974. In 1974, 20% of this total, or approximately 1,200,000 b/d, came via the Persian Gulf - Cape SLOC. A large part of the 2,000,000 to 8,000,000 b/d expected increase in oil imports will probably

have to come from the Persian Gulf. There are possible alternative sources: Venezuela, presently the United States biggest supplier of imported oil does not plan to increase production in the period up to 1985 and therefore would probably not contribute much to fulfilling the increased demand. Asia has been discussed as an alternative. Production in the Far East, which is running now at approximately 2,000,000 b/d could increase to 7,000,000 b/d in 1985. If China and India are included the possible supply could reach 11,500,000 b/d. But rising demand by these countries as well as by Japan makes it unlikely that they can fulfill the U.S. needs. West African oil could supply a portion of U.S. needs but no matter how one looks at it it is likely that a large part of the increased demand for imported oil will come from the Gulf making the present SLOC of even greater importance.

By 1985 Japan will probably have increased its demand for imported oil by 4,000,000 to 5,000,000 b/d. Much of the increase could come from China and Indonesia. However, the quantity of oil flowing from the Persian Gulf to Japan is likely to remain at about the present level, although there is a remote possibility it might drop somewhat.

In view of projected world demand and supply it appears that by 1985 the Persian Gulf - Cape of Good Hope oil SLOC will be accommodating a greater quantity of oil. This increase will probably be somewhat smaller than the increase in world demand

because of alternative sources of oil. A conservative estimate is that the quantity of oil flowing around the Cape SLOC will increase by 10-20% by 1985. The quantity of oil along the Cape - Western Europe portion of the SLOC could increase by a greater percentage.

Military Threats to the Persian Gulf


Three categories of military threat will be considered: threats posed by the Soviet Union; threats posed by local countries located along or near the SLOC; threats posed by non-state actors such as terrorist groups.

The oil-flow cycle can be broken into at least five discreet target systems against which threats can be made as displayed in Figure I.

Different levels of force would be required to capture or destroy or disrupt oil supplies at each phase of the oil-flow cycle. For instance the vulnerability of the production facilities—the oil fields themselves—will vary dependent upon the type of extraction equipment used and the location of the equipment. In the United States most oil fields are dotted with hundreds of small extraction pumps which produce an average, 18 barrels a day as opposed to Saudi wells which pump on average 12,000 barrels a day* (some pump between 45,000-60,000 barrels a day). As a

^{*} Oil Fields as Military Objectives: A Feasibility Study Prepared by Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress for the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, August 1975, p. 44.

Figure 1.
011 Flow Cycle



consequence the destruction of one U.S. well would be of minimal consequence whereas the destruction of a major Saudi pump would be more serious. The geography of the wells can also be significant: Iran's oil fields are located in more rugged terrain than Saudi Arabia's; off-show oil wells are more secure from land threats but more susceptible to maritime threats and more difficult to repair if seriously damaged.

Once the oil has been extracted from the ground it has to be moved to a central location for storage and distribution and, depending upon its quality, processing. The "collecting system" has many targets for an attacker. The energy system which provides the power to pump the oil and operate the gas—oil separators (GOSPs) would be especially vulnerable.

At the local terminal facilities are to be found, depending upon the oil field, refineries, stabilization plants which remove corrosive hydrogen sulfide from "sour" crude oil before it is transshipped, storage facilities, and loading facilities.*

When crude or refined petroleum leaves the terminal facilities it does so in one of two ways: by pipeline or by ship. Most Persian Gulf oil leaves by sea. The two largest terminal facilities are Ras Tanura in Saudi Arabia and Kharg Island off the coast of Iran. Once loaded the tankers proceed down the Gulf and leave via the Straits of Hormuz. Although these straits are much

^{*} Ibid., p. 45.

wider and deeper (25 miles) than the Straits of Tiran leading into the Gulf of Eilat, the Bab el Mandeb Straits leading into the Red Sea or Indonesian Straits (Malacca, Sunda and Lombok), this stretch of water could be easily mined but not physically blocked.

Once through Hormuz, the majority of the tankers proceed to Europe and North America via the Cape route and to Japan via the Indonesian Straits. At no juncture on these voyages are the tankers subjected to the same constraints as those posed by the Hormuz choke point, however there are opportunities for hostile forces to threaten the tankers at various places on their journey. Finally the oil has to be distributed at its destination. In the case of supertankers this requires deepwater terminal facilities from which the oil can either be piped ashore for direct distribution or for storage or off loaded into small tankers for delivery to terminals not equipped to handle them.

Soviet Threats

The expansion of Soviet military forces over the past ten years has become a subject for increasing scrutiny. It is not intended to repeat the numerous statistics of military balance since this has been ably done elsewhere.* Instead a few remarks

^{*}See, in particular, United States/Soviet Military Balance
A Frame of Reference for Congress. A study by John M. Collins and
John Steven Chwat, Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service
(over)

will be made concerning the Soviet ability to project ground forces overseas, especially into the Persian Gulf, Middle East region. There are several hypotheses as to why the Soviet Union began in the 1960s to deploy limited maritime forces in the Indian Ocean area and, later, in the South and Mid Atlantic region. The most usual ones refer to Soviet concern about the possible deployment of Polaris SSBNs and CVAs in the Arabian sea, the need to protect Soviet shipping lanes for both commercial and strategic reasons, the desire to use seapower as a means of extending Soviet influence and presence upon local Asian and African countries, and historical contingency reasons based upon Soviet fear of Western non-nuclear forces near to its heartland. Less discussed in the Western literature on the Soviet Navy is their need to exploit rich, untapped fish resources in the Southern Seas. Lastly, but perhaps most important is the hypothesis that the Soviet Navy is deploying in areas which, in event of a major conflict with the West, would increase their ability to threaten oil supplies from the Persian Gulf, Nigeria, Indonesia and Venezuela. If one looks at a map of Soviet maritime activity in the Southern Seas it has an uncanny knack of following the major SLOC from the Persian Gulf to the North Atlantic.

Only the Soviet Union has the capacity to threaten all stages of the oil cycle with military force. Aside from attack against

^{*(}cont.) for the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate. January 1976.

the terminal off-loading facilities in Europe, North America and Japan, the Soviet Union could use force to secure or destroy the oil fields, collecting system and local terminal facilities in the Persian Gulf or attack or threaten the SLOCs.

(a) Capturing the Gulf Oil Fields

Given the overall growth of Soviet military power in the past decade and in particular, improvements in Soviet maritime and air and sea lift capacity, it is no longer unrealistic to envisage direct Soviet military intervention thousands of miles from the Soviet mainland. Whether or not the Soviet Union is presently capable of capturing, as distinct from destroying or disrupting, the Persian Gulf oil fields is debatable.

Some experts have argued that it would be very difficult for the Soviet Union to mount an invasion of the Persian Gulf given their difficult access routes and the need to sustain a major logistic capability. A direct attack with ground forces would have to come through Turkey or Iran. Both routes are presently hazardous from a military and political standpoint.*

A combined airborne and amphibious attack would pose equally severe physical constraints but given the overall improvement in Soviet forces, their capability to at least think about this

^{*} Barry M. Blechman and Arnold M. Kuzmack, "Oil and National Security," Naval War College Review. May-June 1976.

option is growing. A third general military option would be to make use of proxy powers such as Iraq and Afghanistan prior to launching and attack.

(b) Destroying or Disrupting Oil Supplies

The Soviet capacity to destroy or disrupt the oil cycle whether in the Gulf or in transit is much greater, though as Blechman and Kuzmack point out, "most oil fields in the Gulf area are beyond the range of Soviet fighter aircraft based in the USSR."* This means that a direct Soviet air attack against the oil fields, which had to take into account opposition from the Iranian or Iraqi air forces, might be a difficult operation, and unless nuclear amunitions were used, the resultant damage to the oil fields might be manageable.

The two most ominous threats to the oil flow would be either if the Soviet Union were "invited in" by one the local countries e.g., Iraq or; at some future date, Iran or Saudi Arabia, or if the Soviet Union used its maritime forces to disrupt the oil tanker traffic.

The Soviet maritime forces can threaten the oil tankers using three basic weapons platforms: naval aircraft based outside the Soviet union e.g., Berbera; surface ships; submarines.

The submarine threat is probably the most important.

^{*}Ibid.

Submarines can perform two tasks very well: they can sink ships with torpedos or missiles and they can lay mines. The Soviet Union has been increasing the size of its nuclear powered submarine force by leaps and bounds. Since 1965 it has tripled the number of nuclear attack submarines from 12 to 35 and has added 40 new nuclear powered cruise missile submarines to its inventory. The latter can carry torpedoes as well as cruise missiles.*

Other Threats

There are various ways that the local countries in the Gulf area could threaten oil. Direct invasion of one country by smother is possible as Iraq's periodic war of nerves against Kuwait has shown. Conceivably Iran, at sometime in the future, could invade Saudi Arabia or Kuwait. More likely would be outbreaks of violence between Gulf states which could spill over and effect oil supplies. For instance a resumption of hostilities between Iraq and Iran over disputed boundaries could escalate to the point when oil facilities might be threatened. Or, a take over by a radical group in Saudi Arabia could, under certain circumstances, increase the risks of an Israeli attack if the Saudis' more actively participated in the military dimension of

^{*} United States/Soviet Military Balance. Op. cit., p. 23.

the Arab-Israel conflict.

Guerrilla groups operating along the Arabian peninsular could disrupt oil traffic, sabotage oil production facilities and might even be able to close the Straits of Hormuz for periods of time. To prevent contingencies such as this, Iran and Saudi Arabia have been cooperating in operations in Oman with Iran providing most of the military input. Other threats could come from countries or guerrilla groups located within striking range of the SLOCs. A conflict involving Iranian, Pakistani and Indian maritime operations in the South Arabian Sea could pose a threat to the SLOC and the Straits of Hormuz. Conflict in the Horn of Africa or Southern Africa could provide a catalyst from a greater external power involvement, which in time, might increase the liklihood of direct Soviet threats to the SLOC.

In short, the sea lines which the super tankers have to follow pass near areas of the world which, in some respects, are strategic vacuums and which have great potential for future instability. It may be that the probability that any one local conflict will threaten the oil and require counter measures is small but since many instances of conflict can be anticipated, the probability of at least one event threatening oil may be considered high.*


^{*} I have covered some aspects of the threats to Western maritime interests in more detail elsewhere. Geoffrey Kemp "Threats from the Sea: Sources for Asian Maritime Conflict," ORBIS. Fall 1975.


Strategic and Political Implications

Maps 2 and 3 have been drawn to show the southern hemisphere as seen from a southern perspective, in this case centered on Cape Town. The topographical image portrays, among other things, the pivotal role of Southern Africa in connecting the Indian and Atlantic Oceans, and the relative positions of Australia and Brazil, two countries not usually associated with Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean and Southern African problems.

Map 2 depicts the area as it was in 1965 and displays four sets of data; the relative size of the Western oil SLOCs to Japan and Europe, "friendly" countries which the West could have probably relied upon for base rights in time of war, Soviet maritime activity and the diffusion of advanced technology to local states. In 1965 the bulk of oil from the Persian Gulf passed through the Suez Canal to Europe with a fairly large amount going to Japan via the Indonesian Straits. In 1965 the West could probably have used military bases in the following countries: Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Arab littoral protectorate (then under British control), Ethiopia, Djibouti, Mozambique, South Africa, Angola, Rhodesia, Portugueses Guinea, possible Spanish Sahara, and the countries of South America. Soviet maritime activity in the area in 1965 was minimal with the

In terms of the diffusion of arms, very few of the countries had modern weapons in any quantities. Using an index of at least fifty





modern jet combat aircraft as an indicator of the sophistication of a country's military establishment in 1965 the following littoral countries met the test:- Egypt, Israel, Iraq, and Cuba.

Map 3 displays the same data for 1976. It will be seen that some major changes have taken place. The growth of the oil SLOC from the Persian Gulf around the Cape of Good Hope is the most dramatic change. This has been due to three factors: the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967, the economics and technology of supertankers which makes it relatively cheap for them to use the Cape route and impossible for them to use the Suez Canal (because of size), and the growing demand for oil in the West.

In contrast to 1965 the West now has far fewer countries it could rely on to provide base rights in time of war. Depending upon the circumstances Iran and Saudi Arabia could probably be relied upon but Bahrein and Aden, two important British bases in 1965, are no longer available. In Africa only South Africa remains viable. However Australia and the South American countries, especially Brazil could probably still be considered allies.

The Soviet presence has grown considerably. The Soviet navy has access to facilities in Iraq, India, Somalia, Maldives, Guinea and Cuba and, may soon have the use of facilities in Mozambique and Angola. It also has mooring stations in the Chagos Archipelago and the in Mozambique channel. In short, no matter what interpretation is put upon the expansion of the Soviet maritime presence the fact remains that they are now in a stronger position to threaten the oil SLOC than

in 1965. Furthermore their activities in Afghanistan, especially the construction of a good road system, cannot be isolated from the overall improvements in their ability to deploy and support forces overseas, especially in areas in close proximity to their heartland.

With regard to the diffusion of arms, the list of countries possessing high technology capabilities has increased, especially in the areas around the Eurasian land mass. By 1976 the following littoral countries had over 50 modern combat aircraft in their inventories:—
Egypt, Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, India, Pakistan,
Cuba. Notably absent from this list are most of the countries of
Africa south of the Sahara and Latin America. If we count, instead,
those countries with military technologies capable of threatening sea
lines (submarines, patrol boats, cruise missiles and maritime aircraft) nearly all the South American countries must be added to the
list plus Ghana, Malaysia and Indonesia.*

The increasing availability of relatively low-cost, naval systems with the apparent increased tendency of non-industrial states to invest in maritime

sea and air power is bound to have an effect upon the maritime environment over the next decade or two, particularly if coupled with the probable result of the current Law of the Sea Conference, i.e.: the adoption of a 200 mile exclusive economic zone.

That conference has drawn attention to the actual and potential wealth that can be derived from the sea, the most obvious examples being fish and oil. Many small states may in the future feel the need for more naval and air capabilities simply to enforce their

^{*}More details on this point can be found in Howard Eldredge,
Non-Super Power Sea Denial Capability: The Implication for Superpower
Navies Engaged in Presence Operations. Paper prepared for Conference
on Implication of the Military Build-Up in Non-Industrial States, (over)

200 mile economic zone. The increased jurisdiction over the sea may thus result not only in diminishing the size of the maritime milieu (thereby restricting freedom of movement), but also in the increased ability of non-industrial states to influence maritime operations through the use or threat to use force.

If we look to the future, what can be said about the trends on these maps? Three of the four trends seem likely to persist. The West will become more dependent upon Persian Gulf oil over this time frame; the diffusion of arms will continue and probably accelerate in present strategic vacuums such as Africa and South America; Soviet maritime capabilities will improve. What remains uncertain and therefore flexible is Western military behavior. Over the next ten years the Western powers have the capacity to either increase their vulnerability or take steps to improve their posture.

From a geostrategic perspective Map 3 points to the importance of the following countries for Western security:

Iran, India, South Africa, Australia, Brazil and the British and French islands in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans.

^{* (}cont.) Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, May 1976. (To be published late this year).

India and Iran

Iran and India are potential military rivals. Iran is one of the richest countries in the world; India is one of the poorest. India's military capabilities far exceed those of Iran's, though, over time, Indian defense planners must increasingly take into account Iran's growing sophisticated inventory and the possibility that Iran might help Pakistan in a future war with India.

A conflict involving Iranian, Pakistani and Indian maritime operations in the South Arabian Sea could pose a threat to the SLOC and the Straits of Hormuz. Evidence to date indicates that both Iran and India are devoting more funds to maritime forces. If India ever discovers major oil deposits off its Western littoral the maritime build-up might increase. Presently Iran's relations with the West are excellent and India's are poor. It is clearly not in the long run Western interest to remain at both odds with India. In geopolitical terms its importance may come to approch that of China. For this reason a rapproachment with India should receive higher priority in the United States than has recently been the case. However in seeking such a rapprochment the U.S. should not compromise on the issue of the Western maritime presence in the Southern Seas, which will be essential so long as the Gulf oil remains vital.

Australia

Australia is important because of its pro Western stance, its geography and its industrial facilities. A major allied maritime base on the west coast of Australia—possibly Perth—would have considerable benefits for

U.S. and Western strategy in the Pacific and Southern hemisphere. It would be much closer to the oil SLOC than the VII Fleet but could, if necessary, be used as a "swing" base to reinforce the North West Pacific region. Furthermore the political advantages of a base in Australia would be considerable and might be useful in achieving greater cooperation with the West Europeans, who more than anyone else need to protect their oil supplies.

South Africa, Brazil and the South Atlantic

The South Atlantic region, includes South Africa, the west coast of Africa as far north as Dakar and the east coast of South America.

Until the intervention of the Soviet Union and Cuba in the Angolan Civil war, the Southern African area received scant attention in terms of United States foreign policy. South America has always been given more status but even as late as the 1960s the United States government tended to treat all Latin American countires as part of an isolated hemispheric back-yard.*

It is argued here that this attitude can no longer be maintained in view of the increasing importance of the South Atlantic as a strategic and economic region. It is extremely rich in raw materials and natural resources. Materials important to the West include oil, bauxite, magnanese, chromite and uranium.

^{*}It should be recalled that in the late 1960s the U.S. banned the transfer of supersonic jets to all Latin American countries, thereby treating Brazil as a co-equal with Nicaragua!

At present there is little economic interdependence between and among the South Atlantic region. Although the volume of intra-regional trade has risen over the past ten years and the number of state-tostate trading relationships has increased, the importance of regional trade to any of the local economies remains low. The only notable trading relationships are those involving Brazil and Argentina and, secondly, Brazil and South Africa. Nigerian exports to Ghana are also quite large. Similarly transportation links between the South American and African land masses have been minimal. In 1965, the only trans-Atlantic air routes linking the two continents were those running between Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires on the one hand and Dakar on the other. By and large, intercontinental flights originating within this region have major European cities as their ultimate destinations. By 1976 a greater number of major European airlines had established facilities at a greater number of South American and African airports and an air route tying Johannesburg and Rio de Janeiro had been introduced. Most significant, though, the first route chosen for Air France's Concorde supersonic transport was Paris - Dakar - Rio, highlighting the relatively short distance between Africa and Brazil.

South Africa -- A geographical pivot?

South African's military importance to the West is undeniable.

It's military forces are the best equipped and trained in the continent, it's ports, and ship repair facilities are unequalled on the continent, and it's tommunication facilities and maritime reconnaissance capabilities are of great significance to Western intelligence.

The question is to what extent greater articulation of these strengths will make matters worse for the West in the long run. First, it can be argued that any overt improvement in the West's defense relations with South Africa will increase the chances of Soviet involvement in Angola, Mozambique and possibly Rhodesia when it achieves black rule. Second, in event of Soviet-Western hostilities the white South African's are bound to side with the West anyway and would, therefore, make their important facilities available. On the other hand it can be argued that South Africa only remains important so long as the SLOC is important. Ten or fifteen years from now alternative oil and energy sources may be available. In which case the preferred Western strategy should be to buy time on all fronts on the assumption that it will take years before South Africa; can be seriously threatened by black Africa or even the Soviet Union. In the short run this means continuing but low-keyed defense cooperation with South Africa; low-keyed support for the principle of "majority rule;" and serious study on what eventually to do about South Africa given that a multi-racial state is probably an impossibility and that the white, colored and Asiatic South Africans have no where to go.

Brazil

Map 4 shows a Brazilian perspective of the world, which, as one might expect, is somewhat different from the traditional Anglo-Saxon or Soviet view.

Brazil's geography highlights the importance of the South Atlantic.

Not only does it have an enormous coastline, but Brazil protrudes far out into the ocean; the port of Recife is nearly 500 miles to the east of Buenos Aires. The distance from Recife to West Africa is only

1,900 miles which is shorter than the distances from

Recife to the Brazilian-Peru border over(2,000 miles); Brazil has naval bases at Natal and Recife on the very point of the cape. Shipping traffic steaming from the Cape to destinations in Europe or North America may (depending on the exact location of sea routes) already fall within the range of Brazil's ability to project power.


Brazil is not only important strategically. It is emerging as an important power in its own right. It is fifth largest country in the world in area, its population is in excess of 100 million and most of it is located along the Atlantic coastline. It has an abundance of natural resources, and has experienced high rates of ecoromic growth over the last decade. Furthermore Brazilians think of themselves and their country in global rather than hemispheric terms. They look to Europe and North America for their ideas and are increasingly looking towards Africa for economic and political relationships. Their attempts to settle the interior (Brasilia and the Amazon Road) have not been startling successes.

While Brazil's military expenditure has not kept pace with economic growth, it more than doubled in real terms between 1955 and 1973. Brazil's defense budget of 1,283 million dollars in 1975 placed it among the top handful of Third World states in terms of defense spending. Though this figure represented only 1.42% of its GNP, Brazil could probably sustain much higher levels of defense spending without undue burden if it chose to do so.

Brazil has historically shown great interest in the maritime environment. Recently it has unilaterally extended its territorial waters to two-hundred miles. The state-owned oil company, Petrobras, has been searching for oil on its extensive continental shelf. Brazil is procuring new, advanced equipment which will strengthen its Navy. It currently has on order two submarines, six frigates, and two coastal mine sweepers. The frigates are not, as has often been the case with the transfer of naval vessels. World War II cast-offs. Rather, they are modern ships of British design which are currently being built (at a cost estimated in 1973 to be at 283 million dollars) and which will be delivered over the next several years. Four of the six frigates will be in the ASW mode; two will be general purpose vessels. They will be armed with French "Exocet" SSMs, British "Seacats" Naval SAMs, and Australian Ikara anti-submarine missiles. Janes Fighting Ships 1974-75, reports that progsed new construction under consideration includes a helicopter carrier, three frigates, and four coastal patrol crafts. The Stateman's Yearbook, 1974-1975 describes (p. 781) a new construction program of ever larger scope, including three submarines, ten guided missile

While Brazil's military expenditure has not kept pace with economic growth, it more than doubled in real terms between 1955 and 1973. Brazil's defense budget of 1,283 million dollars in 1975 placed it among the top handful of Third World states in terms of defense spending. Though this figure represented only 1.42% of its GNP, Brazil could probably sustain much higher levels of defense spending without undue burden if it chose to do so.

Brazil has historically shown great interest in the maritime environment. Recently it has unilaterally extended its territorial waters to two-hundred miles. The state-owned oil company, Petrobras, has been searching for oil on its extensive continental shelf. Brazil is procuring new, advanced equipment which will strengthen its Navy. It currently has on order two submarines, six frigates, and two coastal mine sweepers. The frigates are not, as has often been the case with the transfer of naval vessels, World War II cast-offs. Rather, they are modern ships of British design which are currently being built (at a cost estimated in 1973 to be at 283 million dollars) and which will be delivered over the next several years. Four of the six frigates will be in the ASW mode; two will be general purpose vessels. They will be armed with French "Exocet" SSMs, British "Seacats" Naval SAMs, and Australian Ikara anti-submarine missiles. Janes Fighting Ships 1974-75, reports that progsed new construction under consideration includes a helicopter carrier, three frigates, and four coastal patrol crafts. The Stateman's Yearbook, 1974-1975 describes (p. 781) a new construction program of ever larger scope, including three submarines, ten guided missile



destroyer leaders, ten destroyer escorts, fourteen coastal minesweepers, twenty-five fast patrol vessels, and several support ships. Whichever version one accepts, it seems clear that Brazil is moving toward significant improvements in naval capability.

In addition, Brazil is in the process of purchasing new helicopters for the Naval Air Force (which has only helicopters in its inventory; the Brazilian Air Force controls all fixed wing craft).

Currently on order for the Brazilian Navy are 18 Bell 206 B utility helicopters, 9 Anglo-French Lynx helicopters - which have advanced ASW capabilities, 30 Anglo-French Gazelle all-purpose helicopters - which are capable of carrying small numbers of guided missile armaments (see MB, 1975-1976).

Even without this new equipment, Brazil is the largest local maritime power in the South Atlantic basin. Only Argentina comes close to possessing a naval capability as great as Brazil's. On the African side of the South Atlantic, only Nigeria and South Africa devote levels of resources for defense on a level with Brazil, but neither possesses a comparable Navy.

One major strategic asset for West is the large number of islands, islets, and rocks still owned by Britain and France in the Indian and South Atlantic Oceans. During World War II these island bases were an important component of allied maritime strategy in the Southern Seas.

Over the past ten years there has been considerable debate on the strategic importance of several of the British owned Indian Ocean islands especially Diego García, and Aldabra. More recently attention has focused on the French islands and France's presence in Djibouti and its base rights in Malagasay (Diego Suarez). If France leaves Djibouti and was denied access to Diego Suarez it could still retail an important presence by using islands such as Reunion, about 400 miles due east of Malagasy or Mayotte, which is one of the Comoros islands located in the Mozambique channel. Although both islands have good facilities they also have large populations which has advantages (labor force) and disadvantages (socio-political).

Less has been written about the islands of the South Atlantic.

Although the potentialities of Brazil are not such as to completely rule out the need for an island installation in that sea, it must be admitted that availability of Brazil substantially reduces the degree of services required of South Atlantic islands. Furthermore those islands which are politically available to the West are only capable of supporting

the rudimentory kinds of services (we could not rely on the use of the Cape Verde group, which is independent, Sao Tome, and Principe, which are independent and Fernand Po, a possession of Equatorial Guinea.

All the other islands in the area are mainly possessions of Britain, but are dot-like in size, sparsely inhabited and contain no major air or port facilities.

The best choice is Ascension Island. During World War II, Ascension served as a staging point for planes on their way between the United States and Africa and eventually played a part in anti-submarine warfare. Ascension has a port of sorts, as do St. Helena and Tristan de Cunha, but it is the only one of this group to have air facilities as well. The U.S. maintains an air base there which, in addition, contains a docking station and facilities for tracking manned space flights conducting research into outerspace.

Conclusion

For the past two decades Western strategists have been preoccupied with two basic military contingencies: the possibility of a general nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union and the possibility of a Warsaw Pact attack against Western Europe. As a result of growing Soviet military capabilities and the more stable political balance along the central front, the prospects for a war arising out of military imbalances and asymmetries in the strategic nuclear arena and in the Central European theater seem less credible than in the past. However, the West faces new contingencies, as potentially important as the first two, but which have not received the careful attention they deserve.

The importance of the Persian Gulf oil supplies requires that Western defense planners examine very carefully the possible military threats to these rescurces over the next decade. Two defense concepts are called for; one to deal with the Persian Gulf area and the second to protect the sea lines of communication. While it can be expected and hoped that the local Gulf countries, especially Iran and Saudi Arabia will increase their capacity to protect the local oil cycle, there are major limitations on their capacity to do so. Furthermore there is a possibility—significant enough to worry about—that the present pro-

the United States must therefore have contingency plans for checking any Soviet or other hostile offensives against the oil facilities. Hopefully this can be done in the closest cooperation with the local powers but in the last resort a unilateral Western operation might be necessary.

It should be stressed that this would have to be a <u>Western</u> operation. Without the active support of West Europe, the United States should not go it alone. French and British military participation would be welcome given their knowledge of the area and their real estate in the form of strategic island bases. Since all the Western powers would suffer if the Persian Gulf were embroiled in a major conflict, greater cooperation among the Western allies over their respective arms sales to the area would

be a useful initiative. Its purpose would be coordination rather than arms control.

To protect the SLOCs requires that the Western powers have the ability to counter Soviet maritime power and deal with threats from local actors. In the Southern seas it means that access to friendly ports and bases be maintained and, equally important, that major bases not be established by the Soviet Union. In this context the geo-strategic importance of India, Australia, South Africa and Brazil and certain islands in the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic such as Diego Garcia, Reunion and Ascension must be better appreciated.

Most important, we must appreciate the political and psychological and economic impact upon the West if the oil supplies are threatened by hostile powers. Just as we have learned to understand the subtle political-military nuances of muclear strategy and the role of force in the Nato-Pact balance, so we must realize that the relationship between the security of oil supplies and military power is equally complex. The Soviet Union or any other major power for that matter, does not have to capture or destroy the Saudi Arabian oil fields in order to create a potential crisis for the Western powers. The threat of force against the oil might be a more divisive instrument of Soviet policy than military action itself. Equally, though, if the Soviet Union were to occupy the Saudi oil fields it could exercise great control over the world economic system by selling oil rather than by destroying or withholding it. For example it is doubtful whether the West would be prepared to initiate World War III because the Soviet Union had captured Saudi oil and was selling it at \$8 a barrel! Thus precisely because we are not necessarily dealing with an apocalyptic conflict scenario, such as general nuclear war, the response of the West to such Soviet action cannot be anticipated with any certainty. This ambiguity, itself, makes the threat to the oil all the more serious.

NOTE: This paper is the latest in a series of drafts prepared by the author for a Fletcher School International Security Studies Program project on Scarce Resources and International Conflict funded, in part, by the Rockefeller Foundation. The paper draws on material presented in two earlier papers: "The New Strategic Map: Geography, Arms Diffusion and the Southern Seas" presented at Conference on "Implications of the Military Build-Up in the Third World," Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, May 6-8,1976; and "The Diffusion of Arms and the Security of Oil" paper presented at Senior Conference on Arms Transfers U.S. Military Academy, West Point, June 11-15, 1976. I would like to thank Steven Schulman, Steven Miller and Jack Moore for their assistance.

Crises are not a new phenomenon in world politics. As long as there have been nations there have been periods of unanticipated threat to critical national values, with limited time for decision makers to act and react. Many crises have been resolved diplomatically, with no threatened use of force. Some have been resolved by threats or bluffs; others have ended in conflict. War is an unfortunate end to any crisis, but in the nuclear age international conflict carries a threat of unparalleled horror.

Nuclear weapons magnify the risks involved in poor crisis management. The sheer level of destruction that a nuclear war might entail imposes a special obligation on the major actors in a crisis to act with wisdom, restraint, and foresight.

The United States and Soviet Union now possess nuclear missiles capable of reaching each other within thirty minutes. In any confrontation with even a faint hint of escalation to nuclear war, both sides must manage their diplomatic moves and countermoves with utmost caution. Each nation must design and execute its diplomatic signals with great care; each must evaluate its adversary's moves with imagination and sensitivity.

So long as the two nuclear superpowers disagree over world goals and over methods for achieving those goals, crises of varying intensity can be expected to erupt in the future.

Mobilization and Alerts

Diplomatic crises frequently entail precautionary
military measures by one or more of the involved parties. Such
measures may include the mobilization of key reserve units,
cancellation of leaves for military personnel, redeployment
of forces, or the ordering of a military alert to enhance overall
readiness for combat.

Mobilizations and alerts serve two functions. First, they bring military forces to a higher state of combat readiness. Since it is physically and economically impossible to maintain troops and equipment in a constant state of readiness for war, every military establishment has developed a series of systematic stages for bringing peacetime forces up to a wartime footing. Military alerts may also be used for a political purpose: alerts can be employed to convey diplomatic signals. An improved military posture can often serve notice to other nations that military action is possible if a crisis cannot be resolved through peaceful means. 3

The use of military alerts to convey diplomatic signals is by its very nature a risky business. An alert transmits an ambiguous signal to other nations. If a state wants to reinforce its diplomacy with a military threat, it might consider putting

its forces on alert. Often there is no way to tell whether an alert is a last step in an effort to bring about a peaceful settlement or a first step toward war.

This ambiguity poses a difficult dilemma for decision-makers attempting to evaluate another nation's alert. Is an adversary's alert simply a prudent precaution in a crisis? Is it a military threat designed to induce a peaceful resolution of differences? Or is it a prelude to inevitable armed conflict? Whatever its true purpose, a military alert may trigger similar precautionary actions by other states. Paradoxically, an escalation of alerts may lead to precisely the sort of military conflict which the original mobilizations were designed to prevent. The outbreak of World War I can be explained at least in part as the result of competitive mobilizations by the major European powers. 4

Military alerts and mobilizations are the continuation of diplomacy by other means. They fall into a gray area between war and politics. Because they are steps beyond the normal limits of diplomacy yet short of the normal limits of military action, alerts are inherently difficult to manage. Soldiers and statesmen may find themselves equally ill-equipped to direct a military alert for maximum diplomatic effect. Diplomats may not understand the complexities and implications of military alert procedures, and military men may be reluctant to accept artificial constraints on military forces imposed by

the requirements of diplomacy. Perhaps the most dramatic example of military reluctance occurred during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

When President Kennedy ordered a blockade of Cuba,
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara went to the Navy operations center to ensure that the President's instructions
were being followed to the letter. McNamara asked Navy Chief
Admiral George Anderson a series of detailed questions about
the conduct of the blockade. Exasperated by questions which
he felt civilians should not be concerned with, Anderson
finally told McNamara, "Now, Mr. Secretary, if you will go
back to your office, the Navy will run the blockade." 5

If war is too important to be left to generals, and diplomacy is too important to be left to diplomats, then surely actions between war and diplomacy are too important to be left to either group. The use of military alerts for diplomatic effect deserves careful study and reflection by all national decision-makers before a crisis erupts.

Decision-Making in Crisis Situations



"All those in favor of overreacting

It is a cruel paradox of human behavior that decision-makers seem to function worst when it matters most. In situations of great stress people are less likely to forge innovative responses to new problems, to perceive nuances and shades of meaning, and to examine problems from different frames of reference. 6

Decision-makers are more likely to react to a crisis by focusing on immediate rather than long-term consequences, by filtering out dissonant information, and by adopting comfortable routines and standard procedures which may be inappropriate to new circumstances. Ole Holsti has suggested an additional consideration about crisis decision-making: as stress continues, decision-makers tend to perceive their range of alternatives as narrowing, and their adversary's range of alternatives as expanding. 7

Little can be done to eliminate these psychological tendencies. Stress is after all a natural response to crisis situations. It would be useful for decision-makers to be aware of these psychic phenomena and on guard against them, but we could hardly ask public officials to avoid situations of stress. Some stress may actually be a good thing. As much as we might want political leaders to keep their cool in a crisis, we would probably prefer them to endure stress than to face their problems with a Valium-induced serenity.

If little can be done to eliminate stress in crisis decision-

making, something can be done to reduce as much as possible the other impediments to proper crisis management. A number of procedural and organizational factors influence crisis decision-making in ways that are inconsistent with rational purposive policymaking. Several factors involve the selection, formulation, and execution of military alerts as a means of conveying diplomatic signals.

The first factor concerns the role of military advisors in crisis decision-making. The advice of senior military officials invariably assumes a great importance during international crises. As a crisis intensifies, military advice tends to become increasingly dominant. This is an understandable but unfortunate phenomenon in crisis decision-making. It is understandable because as the threat of war increases, civilian leaders must necessarily give more thought to possible military alternatives. It is unfortunate not because military men are uncontrollable war-mongers, but because they simply may not appreciate the subtleties of diplomacy or the process of achieving diplomatic objectives. Even if military officials are aware of diplomatic considerations, they are likely to underestimate their importance.

The basic responsibility of a professional soldier is to be prepared if war should break out. When a crisis occurs, military officials above all else will want to maximize the combat readiness of their forces. They will be attracted to

policy options which ensure that objective. But such precautionary measures may be counterproductive in a diplomatic sense: it is not inconceivable that statesmen might in some situations prefer a diplomatic initiative which actually reduced military preparedness. Military advisors will almost always prefer initiatives which improve military readiness, even at the expense of diplomatic flexibility.

A second problem may occur if a military alert or other show of strength is decided upon as a means of conveying a diplomatic signal. Every military establishment has devised procedures for alerting its military forces. Such plans usually specify a limited number of steps between a peacetime and a wartime footing, and a limited range of contingency plans for meeting various types of threats. Plans for military alerts are designed with one basic objective in mind -- to enhance the combat readiness of military forces. Few contingency plans consider the diplomatic impact of military mobilization. Thus, political leaders may find themselves confronted with a limited array of options, none of which are designed with diplomatic objectives in mind. A military alert or show of force may easily convey an imcomplete signal: the action may be a credible "stick," but unless it is accompanied by a diplomatic "carrot," the alert may be misinterpreted.

A third difficulty involves the psychological effect a military alert may exert on decision-makers and the general

public. A crisis atmosphere in which the danger of war is perceived to be high may function as a self-fulfilling phenomenon. Military forces may be put on alert initially in order to avoid war, but with forces on alert national leaders may be tempted to give more weight to military alternatives than they might otherwise have done. The inflated attractiveness of military solutions is an unpleasant but probably unavoidable fact of crisis diplomacy.

A final problem concerns the implementation of an alert. As every student of bureaucratic politics knows, deciding on a policy option is only a small step in the policymaking process. Serious problems are apt to arise in implementing a policy for a number of reasons. The executors of a policy may misunderstand their orders; they may understand the guidance perfectly but refuse to carry it out; or the details of execution may be unclear to decision-makers and operatives alike. In a crisis, the first two possibilities are unlikely; the broad directions of policy are usually clearly spelled out, and outright insubordination is extremely rare.

What does occur frequently is a failure of subordinates to understand or a failure of senior officials to supervise the details of implementation. In many government decisions it is probably wise for high-level decision-makers to refrain from issuing minutely detailed instructions, but in an international crisis a failure to supervise the details of an alert may have disastrous consequences.

During the most critical moments of the Cuban missile crisis an American U-2 reconnaissance plane flew a routine mission unrelated to the crisis. The aircraft took its bearings on the wrong star and strayed over the Soviet Union. The overflight occurred despite the fact that President Kennedy had ordered such flights suspended for the duration of the missile crisis. Khrushchev pointed out to Kennedy the frightful implications of the U-2 incident: "The question is, Mr. President: How should we regard this? What is this, a provocation? One of your planes violates our frontier during this anxious time we are both experiencing, when everything has been put into combat readiness. Is it not a fact that an intruding American plane could easily be taken for a nuclear bomber?" 8

Khrushchev's point was well taken. When informed of the U-2 overflight, Kennedy muttered to his advisors, "There is always some son-of-a-bitch who doesn't get the word." That painful truth is a bureaucratic fact of life. It suggests that great caution should be used in employing military alerts or shows of force, and that during a crisis decision-makers should supervise the details of implementation to the maximum extent possible.

U.S. and Soviet Military Readiness

The proper use and evaluation of military alerts depends on a number of factors. First of all, national leaders need

to understand their own military forces. They must be familiar with the standard level of military readiness, the process by which forces are alerted, and the various types of alerts which can be implemented. It is equally important that decision—makers have a similar knowledge of an opponent's military forces. Without an understanding of opposing forces and their procedures, alerts by other nations cannot be properly interpreted.

For the United States and the Soviet Union an understanding of each other's military forces and alerting procedures is particularly important. The normal risks involved in alerts are compounded by the fact that the two nations take very different attitudes toward military readiness. The general preparedness of forces during non-crisis conditions has a critical impact on the types of alerts which each side can implement once a crisis does occur. Flexibility in fashioning an alert has important consequences for the use of alerts as diplomatic signals. The most dramatic difference in U.S. and Soviet standard military readiness is in the area of strategic forces.

The United States generally maintains all of its strategic forces in a very high state of readiness. Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are in a constant ready-to-fire condition, and virtually the entire force can be launched within minutes of receiving an authenticated order to fire. In the submarine force, more than half of the U.S. submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) are "on-station" at sea

within range of their assigned targets at any given time.

A substantial portion of the B-52 bomber force is on alert,

armed and on the runway, with crews standing by and ready to

go. B-52s on alert can be airborne within a matter of three

or four minutes.

The Soviet Union has adopted a radically different approach to military readiness in its strategic forces. In general, Soviet forces are at a far lower level of readiness than their American counterparts. Soviet ICBMs may take up to an hour to prepare for launch; some American intelligence analysts believe that actual preparation may take even longer. Only a small fraction of the Soviet SLBM force is ever on station at any given time. Often no more than one or two submarines will be within range of American targets.

This is a marked contrast to the American practice. The U.S. Navy, for example, goes to great effort to keep no more than a few SLBM submarines in port at any given time; the Soviet Navy keeps most of its missile-carrying submarines in port most of the time. Russian long-range bomber aircraft are never kept on a standby alert status like American B-52s. Aside from practice alerts and annual Arctic staging exercises, Soviet Bear and Bison aircraft are maintained in a fairly relaxed status.

This basic difference in American and Soviet alert practices appears to be the result of various historical, strategic, and economic considerations. Three possible explanations can

be offered for the high level of American readiness. The first is the American preoccupation with the danger of surprise attack. A major concern in the development of American strategic forces has traditionally been to reduce or eliminate the possibility of surprise attack. One means of doing so is to maintain forces in a high state of readiness: one Pearl Harbor in a nation's history is enough.

A second explanation for the American practice stems from the dictates of deterrence theory. American nuclear strategists have long argued that stability in the nuclear age is enhanced by reducing the incentives for either side to strike first in a crisis situation. The smaller the advantage in preemption, the more stable a crisis will be. Forces at a high state of readiness therefore make for greater stability. A nation would have little incentive to launch a preemptive attack against an opponent's submarine base if there were only one submarine in port; with 20 or 30 submarines in port the incentive would be much greater. Similarly, bombers which can be airborne in three or four minutes provide less temptation to an attacker than bombers which require a half-hour or more of warning time and can be caught on the ground. The United States has long considered the improved strategic stability which results from a high state of readiness to be well worth the cost.

The third reason for the American practice may be a response to the nature of Soviet society. A closed society inherently

affords greater opportunities for secrecy than does an open society, and there is some concern within the U.S. government that the Soviet Union could disguise its preparations for war. If the Soviets did plan a preemptive attack, the critical deliberations in the Kremlin would involve a relatively small group of officials, and there would probably be no press reporting or public debate to indicate the possibility of a major policy decision. It is conceivable, although highly unlikely, that the United States could be denied any general strategic warning of an impending nuclear war.

In contrast to the Soviet system, the nature of American society virtually guarantees the Soviet Union a good deal of warning time. This social asymmetry has led the United States to develop and maintain a far more elaborate system than the Soviet Union and to keep its strategic forces at a higher state of readiness.

The more relaxed Soviet attitude can be linked to three different concerns. The first is cost. The Soviet method is a far less expensive way to maintain strategic forces. Keeping submarines in port, for example, is certainly cheaper than keeping them on station. To maintain most of its submarine missile force at sea and ready to fire, the United States is required to keep two fully manned crews for each sub. That fact alone doubles the manpower costs of the American SLBM fleet. In addition to manpower, the costs of maintenance, fuel, and

supplies are substantially greater under the American system than the Soviet. Similar expenses are evident in the ICBM and heavy bomber components of strategic forces. Maintaining strategic forces on the American model costs a great deal of money. It is a cost which the Soviet Union has thus far shown no interest in assuming.

The second explanation for the Soviet practice may be a greater concern on their part with problems of command and control. Reliable means of maintaining command and control of strategic forces is necessary in order to minimize the risk of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear attack. As the readiness of strategic forces increases, the importance of command and control also increases. Something is far more likely to go wrong when forces are spring-loaded for action than when they are at rest. An unauthorized or accidental launching of nuclear weapons à la <u>Dr. Strangelove</u> is more likely in a force at high readiness than it is in a force at low readiness.

To minimize the possibility of such a nightmare ever occurring, the United States has invested a great deal of money in the development of a sophisticated, reliable, and survivable network of communication, command, and control. The Soviet network is not so technically advanced as the American, and that may be one reason for the relatively low state of Soviet strategic readiness. In recent years the USSR has embarked on a major effort to improve command and control, but whether that

will lead to a higher readiness level remains to be seen.

Even with a command and control network as good as the American system, a case could still be made for keeping forces in a more relaxed day-to-day posture in order to reduce even further the danger of an accidental or unauthorized attack.

Another possible explanation of the relaxed Soviet defense condition is that the Kremlin appears to be genuinely unconcerned about a nuclear attack out of the blue. Soviet leaders anticipate that any nuclear exchange will be preceded by days and perhaps weeks of international tension. That period will provide them with more than enough time to generate a strategic alert. It goes without saying that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union takes the prospect of a surprise attack very seriously; the difference is that the United States is willing to take expensive precautionary steps to minimize the possibility, however slight; the Soviet Union is not. The Kremlin is literally betting most of its SLBM fleet, most of its bombers, and some of its ICBMs on the prospect of receiving at least several hours advance warning of an impending nuclear attack.

These two models of readiness for strategic forces provide an interesting and significant contrast. Neither the American nor the Soviet system is inherently better than the other. Each has its pros and cons. The American practice is more expensive, less susceptible to surprise attack and strategically more stable; at the same time it is somewhat more prone to

accident. The Soviet system is relatively inexpensive and a bit safer, but it also presents a more tempting array of targets for surprise attack. In addition to these contrasts, the two systems also provide quite different opportunities for conveying diplomatic signals through the use of alerts.

Before turning to the diplomatic implications of military alerts, a word must be said about the general readiness of conventional forces. In contrast to strategic forces, U.S. and Soviet readiness procedures for conventional military units are rather similar. Both sides maintain several divisions of troops at full strength, ostensibly in a permanent condition of combat readiness. An alert of these forces generally involves only final preparations for deployment. It may include a cancellation of military exercises, the recall of furloughed personnel, and even a forward deployment of troops to a position nearer the area of conflict.

Both sides may also employ supplementary alert procedures for conventional forces. In the United States such actions could involve calling up National Guard units or the mobilization of reserve forces. In general such forces would be used to augment second-line units and would not be used in combat. Ancillary alert measures such as these may be useful in conveying an alert to a nation's own citizenry as well as to another nation. President Kennedy well appreciated the domestic value of military alerts when he asked Congress to call up a quarter

of a million men in the Reserves and National Guard during the Berlin crisis of 1961. Kennedy's action was intended to be an alert of the American people as much as a warning to the Soviet Union.

Types of Alerts

Military alerts cover a wide variety of possible military activities, and there are two important ways in which alerts may differ. The first is the level of readiness which the alert entails. Second is the number and type of forces involved in the alert.

American military forces have for some time maintained five discrete conditions of defense readiness, covering the entire spectrum from tranquility to hostility. ¹⁰ The conditions are summarized in the following chart:

CONDITIONS OF U.S. DEFENSE READINESS

DEFCON 5	Forces not in any state of readiness. Recruits			
DEFCON 4	Normal peacetime position as troops undergo training.			
DEFCON 3	Troops placed on stand-by and awaiting further orders.			
DEFCON 2	Troops are ready for combat.			
DEFCON 1	Troops are deployed for combat.			

The United States has remained at DEFCON 4 for the past several years, with the notable exception of a period during the October 1973 Middle East war when forces were moved to DEFCON 3. Little is publicly known about the various stages of Soviet defense readiness, but it is reasonable to assume that Soviet forces operate under a similar system.

For purposes of signalling, the breadth of an alert may be as important as the level of defense readiness. Most alerts are selective and affect only specifically identified military units. During the 1970 civil war in Jordan, for example, the United States put on alert an airborne division in the United States and two airborne battalions stationed in West Germany. Selective alerts are fairly common occurrences. Since 1960 the United States has used them on several occasions. The 1961 Berlin crisis, the seizure of the Pueblo in 1968, and the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia all prompted selective alerts of American military forces. Soviet armed forces have gone on selective alerts in response to most of the same crises; in addition the Soviet Union called selective alerts during several border disputes with China and during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971.

The alternative to a selective alert is a universal alert involving a nation's entire military establishment. A world-wide alert has been used by the United States only on rare occasions since World War II. Once was during the Cuban missile

crisis of 1962; another was in October,1973 to counter the alleged Soviet threat to send forces into the Middle East.

In a universal alert, all of a nation's military force -- land, sea, and air; conventional and nuclear -- are directed to stand by and await further orders.

It may be instructive to examine one particular crisis in greater detail as a case study of the dangers involved in implementing and interpreting alerts. During the Yom Kippur War of 1973 both the United States and the Soviet Union employed military alerts for diplomatic effect.

The Yom Kippur War

During the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the worldwide alert of U.S. forces was generally accepted as a wise precautionary step. Soviet ships were on their way to Cuba carrying nuclear missiles, and Kennedy had ordered a quarantine of the island. In Dean Rusk's memorable phrase, the two superpowers were "eyeball to eyeball", and one side or the other would have to blink. President Kennedy is said to have figured the chance of nuclear war as greater than one in three. In such a context of inevitable confrontation, a worldwide alert of American forces was almost preordained.

That was not the case in 1973 during the Yom Kippur War.

There was little visible evidence of crisis outside the Middle

East, and no sign of an inevitable confrontation looming between

the United States and the Soviet Union. Many American citizens openly wondered whether President Nixon's decision to alert U.S. troops was an effort to divert attention from his Watergate difficulties at home.

As the Yom Kippur War entered its third week, it became clear that Israel had gained the military offensive on the Egyptian front. Israeli forces had crossed the Suez Canal and advanced within 60 miles of Cairo. Israeli army units had also encircled the Egyptian III Corps, which included some of the best units in the entire Egyptian Army. The fragile cease-fire approved by the U.N. Security Council on October 22 had not held; Egypt accured Israel of continued violations and demanded a return to the original cease-fire lines.

The Soviet Union viewed these military developments with great dismay. Egypt had accepted a cease-fire on the basis of assurances from the Soviet Union; when the cease-fire failed to hold, the Egyptians felt betrayed by their Soviet ally. To ensure their own credibility, and to deter further Israeli advances, the Soviets felt compelled to take firm and decisive action to enforce the cease-fire. 11

In the afternoon of October 24, Egyptian President Sadat proposed for the first time that the United States and the Soviet Union provide troops for a joint Middle East peacekeeping force. The United States responded with a firm but low-key rejection of the idea. About 2:00 PM that evening

(Washington time), Secretary Kissinger received a note from Brezhnev which also suggested the possibility of a joint expeditionary force. Again the idea was politely rejected.

Three hours later another Brezhnev note was delivered to Kissinger. This was the communication which Senator Henry Jackson was later to characterize as "brutal and rough."

In effect, the note declared, "We strongly urge that we both send forces to enforce the cease-fire and, if you do not, we may be obliged to consider acting alone."

12

This escalation of Soviet diplomatic language was matched by an escalation of Kremlin military preparations. American communications intelligence revealed the presence of seven landing craft and two ships with troop helicopters in the eastern Mediterranean. About 6,000 Soviet naval infantrymen were thought to be stationed in the Mediterranean, and U.S. officials were concerned that some of them might easily be moved into Egypt. In addition, American intelligence had observed an alert order to seven Soviet airborne divisions numbering well over 40,000 troops. On October 24 one division had been moved to a higher readiness condition, making it ready to move out on call.

Other more ambiguous signals were also detected. During the early stages of the war large Soviet transport aircraft had been used to ferry supplies from Hungary to the Arab states; now suddenly they were redeployed to bases in the Soviet Union.

American officials suspected that such aircraft could be used to airlift Soviet troops to the Middle East. Another disconcerting bit of intelligence revealed that the Soviets might have begun transporting nuclear weapons into Egypt. Some fragmentary intelligence data suggested that Soviet merchant ships might be carrying nuclear weapons to Alexandria. The possibility was taken seriously only be a few military intelligence experts; nonetheless, it was another element to consider in assessing Soviet intentions.

The combination of diplomatic notes and military activity deeply troubled U.S. officials. The Soviet notes themselves were forthright and contained hints of unilateral action, but they were hardly brutal or provocative. The military actions were noteworthy, but in themselves were not particularly alarming. The Soviet military had called other alerts during the Yom Kippur War, and the naval activity in the eastern Mediterranean had not shown an alarming increase. In the week before October 26, the Soviets had added ten ships to their Mediterranean squadron. This brought the total number of Soviet ships in the Mediterranean to 80, a significant but not astonishing rise from the average number of 60. 13

The Soviet words and actions caused Kissinger and Defense Secretary Schlesinger to consider for the first time that the Soviet threat might indeed be serious. The two officials moved quickly to develop an appropriate American response. First,

the Soviet note was answered in the strongest possible terms.

Kissinger flatly rejected the suggestion of a joint Soviet
American expeditionary force in the Middle East. He went on

to say that the United States was even more opposed to the

unilateral introduction of any military forces into the Middle

East. Second, the Soviet alert was countered by placing all

U.S. military forces around the world on a "precautionary

alert" or DEFCON 3. About 3:00 AM when these actions were

accomplished, Kissinger called the President and informed him

of the situation. Nixon approved Kissinger's actions, and

the Secretary went home for a few hours' sleep.

None of the top decision-makers -- not Kissinger, Schlesinger, or Nixon -- anticipated the firestorm of domestic reaction which the alert created. Kissinger is said to have been astonished the next morning at the extent to which the alert totally dominated the news.

American officials saw the alert as an appropriate and measured response to prior Soviet actions, but many Americans and a number of allied governments were shocked and dismayed. A worldwide alert of U.S. military forces was reminiscent of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, but this time the threat to the United States seemed vague and indirect. The U.S. government appeared to be engaged in a reckless display of nuclear machismo at a time when negotiation was a more appropriate response than confrontation. The worldwide alert had created

more of a crisis atmosphere than U.S. officials had ever intended. At his press conference the following day,

Secretary Kissinger repeatedly attempted to downplay the importance of the alert. "We do not consider curselves in a confrontation with the Soviet Union," Kissinger said. "We are not talking about a missile crisis-type situation."

The Diplomatic Use of Military Alerts

The military activity of the superpowers during the October War demonstrates the dangers involved in using military alerts to convey diplomatic signals. For the United States, the problem stems from its high state of defense readiness during normal peacetime conditions. Any alert which improves on an already high level of readiness runs the risk of being seen as a preparation for war. A high steady-state of readiness limits a nation's ability to convey diplomatic signals through military alerts. There are simply not very many steps between peacetime preparedness and war.

For the Soviet Union the problem is precisely the reverse, and results from its relatively relaxed state of readiness during peacetime. During a crisis the Kremlin will understandably take precautionary measures to enhance overall military preparedness. Such steps might not even be intended as signals, but because they represent such a radical departure from standard practice, they may well be misinterpreted by the

United States. What would be the American reaction if, for example, three-quarters of the Soviet ballistic missile submarine fleet suddenly left port and went to sea?

Another problem in using an alert as a diplomatic signal is common to both sides. Any alert increases the danger of accidental or unauthorized military action. And the higher the alert, the greater the chance of something going wrong.

A successful military alert cannot help but be an ambiguous affair. In order to be successful, an alert must accomplish two functions simultaneously. It must convey a nation's seriousness of purpose while at the same time demonstrating the nation's restraint. Any alert which fails on either count has failed altogether. If an alert does not convince an opponent of a nation's resolve -- if an opponent fails to take seriously the possibility of military action -- then the alert has accomplished no more than a diplomatic note. The alert may even backfire if it becomes a political embarrassment and liability to the nation which called it.

If an alert does not persuade an opponent that there is still hope for a peaceful resolution of differences, if it convinces an opponent that military action is a certainty rather than a possibility, then the alert has failed. In this case it has served as the functional effect of a declaration of war.

The trick is to fashion a military alert which treads the narrow ground between these two extremes. A properly designed

alert will take the important first steps toward credible military action, but hold out the possibility of a political settlement by avoiding the final steps preparatory to execution.

Evaluated against this criterion, the Soviet alert during the October War should receive much higher marks than the American alert.

By late October, the Soviet Union had a specific policy objective in the Middle East: to see that both sides observed the original cease-fire lines agreed to on October 22. The Israelis had allegedly violated the cease-fire on several occasions. They had isolated the Egyptian III Corps, and they were threatening Cairo. From the Soviet point of view, the ideal solution would be for the United States to persuade the Israelis to return to the original cease-fire lines. A less palatable alternative would be for the United States and the Soviet Union to mount a joint expeditionary force in the Sinai to enforce the cease-fire. Clearly the worst of all possible solutions would be the unilateral introduction of Soviet forces.

The problem for the Soviet Union was to come up with some means of inducing the United States to apply pressure on Israel. This was accomplished by suggesting the less attractive alternatives of joint or unilateral intervention. But something more than a suggestion was needed. If the Kremlin had simply sent a note threatening to send forces into the Sinai, most U.S. officials would not have taken the possibility seriously.

The Soviet Union has never shown any particular appetite for intervention in nations outside the Warsaw Pact, and it is likely that Soviet leaders viewed the prospect of sending troops to the Middle East with almost as much distaste as did the Americans. Brezhnev could not admit it, but he probably had little quarrel with Kissinger's view that the United States and the Soviet Union should not "transplant the great-power rivalry into the Middle East, or...impose a military condominium." In order to bring about a settlement in the Middle East, the Soviet Union had to make the threat of intervention credible, and that was achieved through the use of a military alert.

The ingenuity of the Soviet alert was that the military action which it suggested was credible but at the same time unwelcome by either side. It was obvious to the United States that the Soviets did not want to intervene unilaterally in the Middle East. If they did, it would only be as a final act of desperation. That realization encouraged all of the involved nations to seek a political settlement. Just how serious the Soviets were about carrying out their threat -- just how close they were to deploying forces to Eqypt -- will never be known. That uncertainty is also consistent with the proper use of alerts as signals.

From the Soviet point of view, their alert accomplished its purpose. The next day, the U.N. Security Council voted 14 to 0 to establish a peace-keeping force composed of troops from smaller nations to supervise the Middle East cease-fire.

The American military alert served a somewhat different purpose. It was a response to the Soviet alert, and supported no specific policy objective other than to underscore American opposition to the idea of Soviet intervention in the Middle East. Kissinger and Schlesinger did not appear to give much thought to how a worldwide DEFCON 3 would be interpreted by the Soviet Union. What signal was conveyed to the Kremlin by an alert of all U.S. military forces around the world? What meaning could the Soviets possibly attach to the simultaneous alert of Marine divisions in Ckinawa, army forces in the Canal Zone, and nuclear submarines in the Atlantic?

The threat which the U.S. alert suggested was so extensive and so overwhelming in its potential that it lacked credibility. If the Soviet Union had actually deployed troops to the Middle East, would the U.S. response have involved American military forces around the world? Probably not. Then why were they placed on alert?

A more appropriate American alert would have would have been one which posed a more credible threat. The United States wanted to demonstrate that unilateral Soviet involvement in the Middle East would not be tolerated, and that if such action were attempted, it would be met by some undefined American response. That message could have been conveyed more accurately and less recklessly by moving several divisions of American troops in Europe to a higher state of readiness, perhaps even

to DEFCON 2. 14 Alternatively, airborne divisions in the United States could have been alerted and prepared for overseas deployment. Actions along these lines would have confirmed American opposition but at the same time limited a potential response to the conventional level.

Even if a worldwide alert had been selected as an appropriate response, the United States could have demonstrated its interest in avoiding a strategic confrontation by exempting all strategic forces from the alert. A nation engaged in some future crisis might conceivably find it useful to employ the opposite of a military alert. A relaxation of military readiness under some circumstances might help to defuse a crisis. Or a nation could alert some forces and relax others in order to convey a more precise diplomatic signal. Putting airborne divisions on alert and giving bomber crews the day off, for example, would be a clear signal that the threatened military action was conventional and not strategic.

An alert which involves all military forces, whatever their mission and wherever deployed, is an unwieldy tool of diplomacy. In large part a worldwide alert suffers from the same limitation as the doctrine of massive retaliation. It offers the threat of an overwhelming retaliatory blow as a means of deterring an opponent. As such, a worldwide alert at best lacks credibility and at worst is an irresponsible means of nuclear diplomacy.

The United States gained little from its worldwide alert in October, 1973. The Soviet Union was deterred from sending

troops not so much by the American alert but by the Security Council resolution which authorized a Middle East peace-keeping force.

The Soviets were particularly galled that once the crisis had abated President Nixon took credit for having managed a successful piece of nuclear brinkmanship. Nixon called the aborted confrontation "the most difficult crisis" since the 1962 Cuban missile affair. Brezhnev's note, Nixon said, "left very little to the imagination of how we would react." This bit of braggadocio may have been necessary to justify the alert to the American people, but it infuriated the Soviets. It is an unfortunate precedent to establish in crisis diplomacy.

Recommendations

This analysis of military readiness and alert procedures ends with five recommendations. All of the recommendations are directed to the United States, but most of them have some application to the Soviet Union and other significant military powers.

The first recommendation is a plea for greater understanding of the use of military alerts. Senior government officials must develop a keener appreciation of the alerting process, the various defense conditions, and the likely problems to be encountered in implementation. Too often civilian leaders do not understand the implications of an alert; frequently they

assume the military services will immediately grasp the intended purpose of the alert and fashion an appropriate response.

Unfortunately many alerts look quite different in execution than they did in theory.

During the Big Four summit meeting of 1960, Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates became convinced that the conference was about to collapse. As a precautionary move, Gates ordered a worldwide alert of U.S. military forces. Not being familiar with the military's defense conditions and alerting procedures, the Defense Secretary sent a message ordering the Joint Chiefs of Staff to call a "quiet" alert on a "minimum need to know" basis. Gates did not specify which defense condition he wished to have implemented. The Joint Chiefs, studying Gates' message, decided to go to DEFCON 3; they also followed the Secretary's order about restricting information. As news of the alert spread and became public, Pentagon spokesmen were unable to explain why it had been called. U.S. military preparations sent a diplomatic signal quite different from Gates' simple desire to have a "quiet" alert should the situation at the summit deteriorate. 15

It is unwise to rely solely on military advisors to provide expertise about alerts. As we have seen, military prédominance in the fashioning and executing of military alerts may have unintended diplomatic consequences. It would be advisable to have a specific senior official — the Secretary of Defense or the

President's assistant for national security affairs -- assigned the specific responsibility of understanding alert procedures and acting as the direct supervisor of an alert during a crisis. Robert McNamara's detailed supervision of all aspects of the naval blockade of Cuba during the missile crisis is a useful precedent for future crises.

The second recommendation concerns the general readiness status of American forces under peacetime conditions. The high level of readiness exhibited by U.S. strategic forces does not appear to be justified by current threats to national security. Readiness under non-crisis peacetime conditions can and should be relaxed significantly. Of the billions of dollars a year spent on strategic forces, many hundreds of millions are used to maintain forces at an unnecessarily high state of readiness.

Ten years ago B-52s used to fly continuous airborne alert missions. A number of bombers were actually kept airborne at all times, equipped with nuclear weapons and prepared to proceed to their targets if given the order. That practice was discontinued several years ago when the Defense Department realized it was wasting money on an unnecessary readiness luxury. Now bombers pull alert at the end of the runway and save a substantial sum of money. Similar cost-saving measures in other strategic forces should be investigated.

Is it necessary to maintain such a high percentage of nuclear submarines on station all the time? Do so many bombers

have to be constantly on alert, ready to be launched within a matter of minutes? In an era of fiscal austerity for American defense, questions such as these should be given serious consideration. Significant savings could be realized by some marginal relaxation in strategic readiness, and defense dollars could be spent more productively in other areas.

Another possibility would be to create a strategic reserve force by mothballing some fraction of the American ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber forces. One estimate suggests that maintaining one-third of U.S. strategic forces in an inactive status (from which they could be returned to the operational inventory in a matter of weeks) would save perhaps \$600 million annually. 16

A strategic reserve force would offer other benefits in addition to saving money. It would demonstrate U.S. satisfaction with the existing strategic balance and reflect confidence in the adequacy of the U.S. strategic deterrent. It would also permit more flexibility in designing strategic alerts. In a crisis the United States would then have two options: it could either improve the readiness of its operational forces or take steps to activate portions of the strategic reserve force. In some cases the latter step might convey a more dramatic, but at the same time less threatening, diplomatic signal.

The idea of a reserve force does not need to be limited to strategic nuclear forces. The creation of a conventional reserve force would realize many of the same benefits. One

suggestion involves a change in U.S. naval deployment patterns. Traditionally, American naval policy has been to keep as much naval power as possible as far forward as possible. In the Mediterranean this has meant maintaining a large concentration of naval vessels, including two aircraft carriers, on assignment to the Sixth Fleet. Removing one aircraft carrier from the Mediterranean would reduce support costs somewhat, but more importantly, it would build some slack into the system and provide the United States with a useful means of demonstrating its resolve in a crisis. Maintaining two carriers constantly on station in the Mediterranean might signal American vigilance; keeping one carrier on station and supplementing it with another one when the next Middle East crisis erupts might provide a more dramatic signal of heightened U.S. concern.

A fourth recommendation is that the Defense Department undertake a comprehensive review of military alerting procedures and defense conditions. The number of steps between peacetime status and readiness for war should be expanded. The various defense conditions need to be kept distinct in militarily useful ways, but there is also a need for a variety of defense conditions which can offer greater diplomatic flexibility. Five DEFCONs are not enough, and there should certainly be more than one intermediate step between DEFCON 4 ("normal peacetime position") and DEFCON 2 ("troops ready for combat").

Soviet military forces have recognized the danger of inflexibility and recently revised their own alert procedures. In November, 1975, the Soviet armed forces adopted a new order which would allow for a full mobilization of all Soviet forces except strategic nuclear forces. The military magazine Voenny Vestnik reported that the new defense condition, called "assembly", is specifically designed to permit the mobilization of large bodies of troops for immediate action while avoiding the brinkmanship which a full alert of strategic nuclear forces might entail. 17

A final recommendation concerns the American use of military alerts in any future crisis. The United States is currently improving the accuracy of its strategic missiles; the Pentagon continually urges the development of new limited yield nuclear warheads. The doctrine advanced by former Defense Secretary Schlesinger and the programs proposed to implement it are aimed at developing nuclear war-fighting capabilities short of massive destruction. The effect of the doctrine is to emphasize the utility of nuclear forces, to focus thinking on the actual use of nuclear weapons. It also creates pressures to use alerts of strategic nuclear forces to send diplomatic signals.

This is a serious step in the wrong direction. No country should resort to an alert of its nuclear forces except in cases of vital national importance. For most crises a selective alert

of conventional forces will not only pose a more credible threat to an opponent, but will also minimize the danger of misinterpretation. A worldwide alert is an appropriate military precaution only in the event of an extreme crisis.

So long as the national objectives and interests of the United States and the Soviet Union clash in various areas around the world, there will be crises. And so long as there are crises there will be military alerts and shows of force. Alerts will continue to be an important element of crisis diplomacy and will serve the first step in the continuation of politics by other means. The two nuclear superpowers must recognize their special obligation to understand the process by which alerts are implemented, the means by which they are interpreted, and the dangers they pose for international security.

NOTES

- 1. This definition is adopted from Charles F. Herman, "Some Consequences of Crisis which Limit the Viability of Organization," Administrative Science Quarterly, VIII (1963), pp.61-82. Also see Herman, Crises in Foreign Policy (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969).
- 2. For a thorough historical review of diplomatic crises and crisis diplomacy, see Alfred Vagts, <u>Defense and Diplomacy</u> (New York: King's Crown Press, 1956). Of particular interest are Ch.7, "Armed Demonstrations," and Ch.10, "Mobilization and Diplomacy."
- 3. The use of military alerts as signals has received little scholarly attention. The general subject of diplomatic signalling is analyzed and discussed in Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton: University Press, 1970). The relationship between crisis behavior and the outbreak of war is the subject of Ole R. Holsti, Crisis, Escalation, War (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972).
- 4. See for example Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: Macmillan, 1962) and Ludwig Reiners, The Lamps Went Out in Europe (New York: Pantheon Books, 1955).
- 5. Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippencott Co., 1966), p.156.
- 6. Holsti, op. cit., pp.199-200. This is also the argument of John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).
- 7. Holsti, op. cit., p.145.
- 8. Quoted in Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1971), p.141.
- 9. "I would hope that any serviceman...will recognize that he is...rendering the same kind of service to our country as an airplane standing on a fifteen-minute alert at a SAC base... We call them in order to prevent a war, not to fight a war." President John F. Kennedy, quoted in Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p.628.

- 10. "The 5 Conditions of Defense Readiness," The New York Times, October 26, 1973, p.20.
- 11. Much of the following information on U.S. government decisions during the Yom Kippur War was collected by the author in off-the-record interviews with senior government officials who cannot be identified. Where possible, reference is made to press accounts which corroborate information gained in interviews.
- 12. See David Binder, "An Implied Soviet Threat Spurred U.S. Forces' Alert," The New York Times, November 21, 1973, p.1.
- 13. Drew Middleton, "Soviet Military Abilities Altering Power Balance," The New York Times, October 26, 1973, p.21.
- 14. Many American forces in Europe had been moved to DEFCON 3 very early in the Yom Kippur War.
- 15. David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The U-2 Affair (New York: Random House, 1962), pp.146-7.
- 16. Richard L. Garwin, Testimony prepared for the Senate Armed Services Committee, June 7, 1973.
- 17. Reported in The Washington Star-News, November 26, 1975, p.A-8.

U.S. ARMS FOR SECURITY AND INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD

Caesar D. Sereseres

DRAFT

INTRODUCTION

Security

assistance, the provision by sale or grant of United States' military equipment and services, is portrayed by official Washington as playing a vital role in maintaining national security, the strategic balance, and constructive relations with foreign governments. However, despite the continued belief in some circles that the provision of military hardware and services is crucial as a basic instrument of foreign policy, we have yet to reach consensus on how to evaluate the costs and the benefits, short range and long range, of a specific security assistance relationship or of the security assistance program in general. Part of the problem is that the manner in which one defines "national security," "threat," and "strategic/geographical balance" determines what is considered a "cost" or a "benefit" in a security assistance relationship. In addition, the proliferation of nations and their respective defense needs, usually unrelated to the strategic balance, have become enmeshed in U.S. national security rationales and views about the proper course of events in the Third World.

In one sense, regardless of the merits, the transfer of military equipment, the provision of military training, and engagement in supportive military services can be regarded as a form of military intervention. By the term "intervention" is meant the calculated use of national resources—military, political, or economic—to attempt to influence events and policies in other nations. The specific form of military intervention that we are examining is that of "security assistance" programs of the United States directed to nations in the Third World. Recognized is the fact that other forms of military intervention also exist that are at times extensions of the more formal security assistance programs. Covert military assistance, para-military operations and outright military intervention with U.S. forces, as in Guatemala, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Iran, Iraq, Laos, and Vietnam are not dealt with in this essay.

Past interventions, particularly that of Vietnam, have placed U.S. security assistance policy and programs under great public scrutiny.

The value of military assistance, and for that matter, the value of the Third World to the U.S., in the post-Vietnam period, demands closer analysis if we are to avoid future involvements that are but marginal, if at all, to U.S. security. The quest for a "foreign involvement" policy, pressured by the demand for military equipment and services from throughout the Third World for purposes of insuring internal order or of maintaining the integrity of their national territories, is further complicated by a security assistance assumption that in the present day, the United States cannot isolate itself from major forces and events abroad. It has been a fundamental belief on the part of Washington policy-makers that the risk of war increases when a power imbalance exists. Such a situation can tempt the Soviet Union to take advantage of weaker nations which could markedly alter the strategic relationship between the super-powers. 3

The range of policy and analytical issues that derive from the examination of U.S. security assistance policy to the Third World are innumerable. However, from the foreign policy perspective, fundamental to the discussion is the extent to which security assistance enhances the national security of the United States while contributing to the military self-reliance of the recipient, rather than to increased dependency on the U.S. The bewildering prospects for an analysis are only matched by the multitude of conflicting and contradictory objectives attributed to security assistance programs. The possibility is strong that security assistance programs may in fact do all that both the supporters and critics claim. The uncertainty and ambiguity of military assistance to the Third World is reflective of a larger phenomenon: the uncertainty and ambiguity of events in the Third World and the inability of the U.S. to manage such events. Further, the political benefits of a security assistance relationship can be temporal in nature and its economic, political, and psychological costs unexpected and long-range. Lastly, it is well to remember that security assistance may be only one aspect of a broader relationship consisting of economic and financial assistance, trade, investment, cultural and educational exchanges.

It seems that the most appropriate focus should be on the link between such programs and U.S. national interests in the Third World. More specifically, how do security assistance programs relate to the specific interests of the U.S. in a particular region or country:

Is U.S. security enhanced or influence provided via a particular security assistance program? How much political leverage does military assistance offer the U.S. with a recipient or region of the Third World? Further, if we have the analytical capacity to determine if such arms made a difference, do we have the same capacity to ascertain which U.S. interests were affected by the outcome of the events? In a memorandum prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Geoffrey Kemp warned that "unless and until scholars and statesmen alike are prepared to do justice to the complexities of military assistance programs and their relationship to the strategic milieu in particular areas, the debate as to what effects weapons transfers have upon these areas will continue to be couched primarily in ideological terms." 4

The purpose of this essay is thus to examine security assistance to the Third World, and in the process, question the notion that the United States increases its control of events by supplying arms. The focus will be placed on two issues concerning security assistance: (1) to what extent do such programs enhance the national security of the United States? and (2) to what extent do such programs become instruments of influence for United States foreign policy? In pursuing answers to these questions, the author examines the premises guiding security assistance in the post-Vietnam period, the difficulty of establishing criteria of "success" or "failure" in a security assistance relationship, and the linkages between military dependency, influence, and U.S. security. The current literature lacks a consensus: many generalizations are inconclusive and the defense of particular propositions are often reduced to interpretation of singular cases. The extent to which one succeeds in drawing upon numerous concrete examples which help to illustrate the limits and consequences of security assistance to the Third World, the closer we will get to producing a clearer understanding of the costs and benefits of United States intervention abroad in pursuit of the elusive national interest.

II. THE UNITED STATES-THIRD WORLD SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP: THE NIXON DOCTRINE IN THE POST-VIETNAM PERIOD

One of the chief characteristics of U.S. foreign policy since the end of World War II has been the use of material and technical resources as diplomatic tools. The resources of the American economy and military forces have been used in the foreign policy process to provide decision-makers with options in the pursuit of national objectives. It is in this regard that economic, financial, and military assistance programs have been utilized in the Third World to foster the type of military, economic, and political development that Washington believed to be in the interest of the United States.

The Southeast Asia war forced a reexamination of American global security policy as well as the "Cold War" era belief that radical change in Third World countries constitute a threat to U.S. national interests. We have long accepted the assumption that the United States is the only nation that can stand in the way of countries in the Third World from "falling" into Soviet/Chinese/Cuban spheres of influence. Despite such an assumption, it remains a virtual impossibility to ascertain the value to U.S. security of changes in the status and orientations of a particular country in the Third World. Without this capability it is most difficult to objectively consider the type of commitment in resources and credibility that the U.S. should provide a country. Finding the "worth" of a Third World country vague and uncertain, despite the claims of some policy-makers, the bottom-line in U.S. foreign policy is best characterized as "preventive (or pre-emptive) intervention aimed not simply at restoring or preserving anticommunist authority, but more broadly at maintaining or creating a dependable, advantageous stability."5

The inescapable conclusion is that American reaction to events in the Third World have rested on analogies to the "loss" of China and Cuba and to the perceived "threats" to Greece and Turkey in the 1940s. These cases remain to this day as the basic rationalization for military assistance and as "models" of international Communist behavior. The extent to which the U.S. can avoid the pitfalls of such experiences and

"lessons" of history in the post-Vietnam period may well rest with the manner in which the Nixon Doctrine provides new insights and criteria for security assistance relations in the Third World. As Guy Pauker of The Rand Corporation has pointed out: "The 'loss' of some countries may be cheap compared with the cost of 'holding' them."

THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND SELF-RELIANCE

Under the Nixon Doctrine, Security Assistance programs become a substitute for a direct American military presence in Third World countries. At the core of the Nixon Doctrine is the belief that the U.S. must continue to honor old obligations, continue to support "allies," and at the same time, reduce the possibility of using American (especially ground) forces in Third World areas. Amplification of the Doctrine was provided by President Nixon in an April 1971 message to Congress. The President noted at the time that ". . . we must help to strengthen the defense capabilities and economies of our friends and allies . . . so that they can increasingly shoulder their own responsibilities [and thus] reduce our direct involvement abroad. . ."

One interpretation of the Doctrine suggests that there are three key operational factors to consider: "total force planning," "regionalism," and "self-reliance." With very few exceptions, the concept of total force is virtually meaningless in the Third World. The thought of including the military forces of a Third World nation for the protection of U.S. interests has serious flaws, especially if the operational approach focuses on U.S. air and seapower and Third World ground forces. In the attempt to seek a new division of labor between the U.S. and some of its security assistance "allies," questions are raised about whose blood in whose interest, or better, while the U.S. may be prepared to provide technologically "clean" aspects of air and sea warfare, Third World allies must be prepared to provide the fodder.

Regionalism, the second operational concept of the Doctrine, seeks to place considerably more responsibility upon certain Third World countries to encourage regional security cooperation. Security assistance that contributes to this goal is said to reduce the likelihood of the need for U.S. troops in local or regional conflicts. However, rather than

regional cooperation being a vehicle to manage conflict and repel Communist efforts, the U.S. has defined regionalism more in terms of "regional care-takers" such as Brazil in South America, Zaire in Southern Africa, Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf, and perhaps Indonesia in Southeast Asia.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the Doctrine is its call for the promotion of "self-reliance" as a primary objective of security assistance to the Third World. At the core of this objective is the belief that each nation must provide the manpower for its own defense and only rely on the United States for the necessary military hardware, training, and support services. Analysts who have examined the Doctrine suggest that the underlying concern is to minimize (if not terminate) the client relationship in security assistance. A militarily self-sufficient nation (although still ill-defined) is to be preferred to one that is dependent upon the U.S. for continual resources. In short, the message from Washington is that "political albatrosses" will no longer be acceptable in the aftermath of Vietnam.

Whether in fact the intent of the Nixon Doctrine is actually being implemented can be debated. The extent to which the ideological predispositions of American foreign policy-makers and institutions can accept the principles of self-reliance in development and security, as well as in a reduction of the U.S. presence and involvement in the Third World, remains to be seen. Such an effort would require a radical break with a traditional global view and perception of threat to the national interest.

Aside from the instrumentality of the Nixon Doctrine, it appears that basic to U.S. security interests in the Third World is the necessity to prevent an internal or regional conflict from evolving into a strategic conflict between the U.S. and USSR. *Indirect* military intervention into these internal and regional conflicts via security assistance programs underlines the political and diplomatic importance of transferring arms to the Third World. The diplomatic nature of military assistance, however, will come under increasing manipulation by Third World countries. As the 100-odd nations of the Third World increase their economic and technical capacities, seek national symbols of modernity and prestige

via military weapons, attempt to manage regional balancing, and pursue an independent and flexible foreign policy, U.S. security assistance will increasingly serve purposes other than American national security needs. The extent to which we prove capable of selectivity in our security assistance relationships will largely determine the costs as well as the benefits incurred in the use of arms as an instrument of American foreign policy.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Whether such selectivity is possible--given the political turmoil and uncertainty of events in Third World regions--in the post-Vietnam period remains to be seen. Secretary of State Kissinger offered little hope when he testified this year before the House International Relations Committee:

[The] era of American predominance has given way to strategic parity at a time when nuclear capability proliferates and festering regional conflicts imperil global stability . . . we have no choice but to help contain these disputes . . . no equilibrium can long be maintained without our active participation. And many countries of consequence to us will measure our will and capacity to perpetuate a constructive involvement in [regional] balances of our efforts to help others develop a more self-reliance defense position.

To help foster military self-reliance, the U.S. has extended military assistance to numerous countries in the Third World. Since 1972, the Executive began to present military assistance requests to Congress under the term "security assistance." Under this caption, all security-related assistance coming under the authority of the foreign aid bill was brought together: the Military Assistance Program (MAP), Foreign Military Sales Credit, Excess Defense Articles Security Supporting Assistance (defined as "economic assistance to countries making extraordinary military efforts to meet threats to their security"), and, beginning in 1976, a separate Military Assistance Training Program. Security Assistance thus provides, through grant, credit, and sale, new and used military equipment, parts, ammunition, services, training, and economic support for defense related activities.

Through these military aid programs the U.S. has provided some \$32 billion dollars in military equipment and support during the 1965-1974 period--of this, Third World regions received 78%. (See the Appendix for comparative data on the major suppliers of arms to Third World regions.) The most significant change within Security Assistance has been the shift from a grant to a sales oriented program. Sales averaged about 23% in the 1950s, 68% in the 1960s, and has now gone over 90% in the mid-1970s. For example, of a \$2.2 billion program in 1967, sales accounted for 44%; while in 1975, sales made up 94% of the \$10 billion program.

The U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, the 1973 Israeli-Arab war, the oil embargo, and the lessening of restrictions in the selling of arms to Third World countries all contribute to the most recent trends in Security Assistance. As the following Table indicates, several aspects of the Security Assistance program are heavily concentrated in particular regions (actually a handful of countries worldwide). The so-called "forward defense" countries obtain significant portions of MAP and Excess Defense Articles; while the Persian Gulf and Israel account for 70% of Foreign Military Sales. Israel alone accounted for 55% of all FMS Credit for the 1973-1975 period.

In assessing the magnitude and significance of Security Assistance dollar figures, one should consider the 47% inflation factor since 1967 and the purchases of sophisticated military equipment which contributes to the rapidly rising dollar value of arms transfers. It is also well to remember that 40%-45% of the dollar value of "arms transfers" is for military weapons and ammunition, the remainder is for vehicles, construction, training, and technical assistance. For example, about 80% of Saudi Arabia's arms program with the U.S. is for construction and a variety of defense and non-definese services primarily provided by the Army Corps of Engineers. Further clarifying the situation is that 70% of the \$25 billion in FMS orders for the last three years have been made by four countries: Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.

In 1976, military relations with the Third World reflect a notable pattern. Security assistance relations are largely based on a \$4 billion foreign aid bill and a growing Foreign Military Sales Program. However,

UNITED STATES SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, 1973-1975

	МАР	FMS ORDERS	FMS CREDITS	COMMERCIAL SALES	ARTICLES
Worldwide	\$1,959,188,000	\$24,688,090,000	\$2,694,741,000	\$1,466,076,000	\$539,358,000
Developed ¹	1%	19%	0%	60%	3%
Israel	0%	14%	55% ⁴	15%	0%
Persian Gulf ²		55%	0%	13%	0%
Latin America	2%	2%	12%	4%	3%
Fordef ³	47%	8%	28%	4%	72%
Other	49%	2%	5%	4%	17%

SOURCES: Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts, Data Management Division, Defense Security Assistance Agency, Washington, D.C., 1975; and International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Washington, D.C. 1976.

Less than 1%

¹Includes 23 countries.

²Iran, Kuwait, Saudia Arabia.

³Greece, Indonesia, Jordan, Korea, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey.

⁴Excludes \$1.6 billion of non-reimbursable financing.

half of the Security Assistance Program is accounted for by Israel and four countries (Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait) account for 70% of worldwide FMS. Furthermore, eight countries (Korea, Jordan, Turkey, Greece, Phillipines, Thailand, Indonesia, and Ethiopia) account for 90% of grant military assistance; seven countries (Israel, Greece, Turkey, Korea, Jordan, Taiwan, and Brazil) account for 87% of FMS credits; seven countries (Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Portugal, Greece, and Zaire) account for 99% of Security Supporting Assistance; six countries (Greece, Turkey, Thailand, Korea, Philippines, and Ethiopia) account for 77% of Excess Defense Articles deliveries. Only the Foreign Military Training Program reflects a wider regional distribution of resources: Of the \$30 million programmed for 1976, Latin America receives 38%, East Asia and Pacific 27%, Near East and South Asia 12%, Europe 15%, and Africa 8%.

As has been pointed out, the dollar figures on security assistance can be reasonably "deflated" after one accounts for the special case of Israel and the arms purchasing binge of the Persian Gulf. Aside from these countries, a handful of nations account for a lion's share of all aspects of security assistance. This is not to suggest that smaller amounts of assistance are insignificant; but to illustrate that the reaction of critics to the "arms problem" needs substantial clarification and qualification.

However, the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of security assistance tell us little about the significance of these military goods and services to U.S. national security and diplomatic influence. A squadron of F-5s or a million dollars in support services and training are not easily translated into "influence" and "security." The analytical, as well as the policy, challenge is to link the provision of arms and services to Third World countries to expected results that are based on explicit U.S. security interests. Unfortunately, the likelihood of determining a cause-effect, cost-benefit relationship is clouded by psychological and ideological predispositions which afflict the assessment of American foreign policy activities. Viewing security assistance on the basis of a "success-failure" or "win-lose" syndrome suggests not only the belief in the possibility of the U.S. to manage events in the Third World, but the capability to manage the consequences of transferring arms abroad. The following two sections are thus concerned with the evaluative and conceptual limitations of military assistance to the Third World.

III. THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE CONUMDRUM: JUDGING THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF ARMS TRANSFERS

In examining numerous cases of arms transfers, the most consistent pattern that appears to exist is the temporal nature of a diplomatic benefit and the uncertainty of the consequences of providing the arms. In assessing a security assistance relationship one is struck by the fact that there are aspects of both "failure" and "success". To attempt to create rigid criteria is foolish and to believe that answers may be readily available reflects an under-estimation of events and personalities in the Third World and an over-estimation of the specific nature of American foreign policy. The evaluation of security assistance as a foreign policy instrument, under these circumstances, is most aptly described as a conumdrum--a riddle with no real answer.

As the previous section has indicated, during the last years billions of dollars of American jet fighters, air transports, helicopters, air-to-air, surface-to-air, and TOW anti-tank missiles, armored personnel carriers, naval vessels, electronics, and other military equipment and technical services have been provided these countries on both a sale and grant basis. In examining the "hardware" aspect of security assistance one needs also to ascertain the efficacy of transfering arms and providing military services as an instrument of influence in the pursuit of American security interests. In this regard, few concrete examples of the benefits to U.S. national security and even fewer examples of "influence" derived directly from the transfer of arms have been provided by the available literature. This is not to say that security assistance has not been "successful" in some instances; but, that there exists a kind of conumdrum when it comes to evaluating the "worth" of security assistance programs to the Third World. 10

If assessed in terms of the number of military missions abroad, base rights, security assistance programs, and the increasing dollar value of military equipment and services to the Third World, one might suggest that military assistance efforts of the U.S. have been quite successful. However, if measured in terms of enhancing the national

security and providing for an active instrument of influence, there is some doubt. We have simply not had the ability to provide precise criteria for measuring the political or military returns of security assistance.

With the termination of military action in Indo-China, the Persian Gulf and Middle East regions provide perhaps the best examples of the limitations of security assistance. In the case of Iran, it appears that "dependency" on the U.S. for modernizing the armed forces has meant little in terms of lower oil prices for the U.S. In fact, while the arms transfer relationship is said to contribute to the stability of the area (and thereby permit the continued flow of Gulf oil to the West) in the long run the arms build up could contribute to a conflict which would disrupt oil supplies. There are even some thoughts that initial arms sales to Iran contributed to the decision by OPEC to increase the price of oil. When the Shah of Iran desired to continue both a domestic development plan and a military modernization plan, his only solution was more financial resources -- i.e., increasing oil revenues. While arms sales to Iran may enhance our ability to maintain access to oil and prevent the Shah from seeking assistance elsewhere there is also the possibility that the U.S. could become the unwilling participant to a local conflict. If in fact, as some experts suggest, the Iranian armed forces (at least those utilizing the sophisticated military equipment) could not actively engage in combat without the logistical and maintenance support of the U.S., it could very well become impossible to separate the vital interests of the U.S. from those of Iran.

Likewise, Saudi Arabia (with the highest reserves of oil in the world), has sought a greater responsibility for its own defense. As the U.S. develops the military capabilities of the Saudis, the Israelis may be forced to start considering these Persian Gulf military forces as possible parties to a conflict in the Middle East. The extent to which U.S. security assistance to such Persian Gulf countries as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia affect Israel's perceptions of potential threat, could easily mean additional costs to the U.S. for support of Israel. Unfortunately, we have no real way of ascertaining such a

likelihood. Under such circumstances it has been difficult to assess the "success" or "failure" of arms transfers to the Persian Gulf.

While arms transfers to the Persian Gulf may result in uncertain as well as possibly unsettling consequences, one can point to what appears to be a successful use of arms as a diplomatic instrument. Kissinger's pursuit of a Sinai agreement had hinged on keeping negotiations going; to accomplish this the Secretary of State drew upon "manipulative capabilities" so that the United States could remain in control of the diplomatic process. To this end, American security assistance to Egypt, Syria, and Israel (and the encouragement of West European countries to sell arms to Sadat) played a vital role not only in bringing the contending sides together on a Sinai agreement but also in seeking to pre-empt the Soviet Union as the chief source of military support to Egypt.

The evolution of arms as a diplomatic instrument has come to reflect the changing attitudes regarding the Middle East in Washington. For example, arms transfers to Israel appears to have moved from one of a total support for military superiority vis-a-vis the Arabs to the position of attempting to use arms and support assistance to influence Israel to negotiate. One commentator who has observed Kissinger's Middle East negotiation style has pointed out that the essence of the approach was to utilize every "manipulative capability" available to pursue the dual objectives of the containment of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the promotion of U.S. technology (including military) as a means to buy time to cope with the first objective.

The recent efforts to establish a quasi-military relationship with a symbolic transfer of C-130 transport aircraft is only the beginning of the "manipulative" usage of arms as an effective diplomatic instrument to bring about settlement between Israel and Egypt and the first step toward replacing the U.S.S.R. as the major military supplier for the Egyptians. Despite the warnings of Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz that "a military supply relationship between Washington and Cairo is a dangerous course of action that could lead to a dangerous imbalance in the Middle East," it appears that Washington is prepared to utilize a future security assistance relationship with Egypt as an

inducement to both antagonists to negotiate a peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict. The major danger of this form of "diplomatic" venture is the extent to which the U.S. will be willing (or forced) to assist in the "Westernization" of the Egyptian armed forces as a means of maintaining Sadat and his moderating position in power. If indeed Sadat will require some \$7 billion for a 10-year arms aid program to phase out Egypt's Soviet weapons, then the U.S. must decide both the likelihood as well as the "worth" of such a policy in pursuit of peace in the Middle East. ¹² Congressional action as well as Israeli reaction via American domestic politics will undoubtedly play the major role in determining the possibility of using an arms modernization program for Egypt as a vital diplomatic tool for Middle East negotiations.

If the Kissinger strategy in the Middle East can be considered a qualified, short-range "success" (at least from the perspective of American interests), then the most "unqualified" long term success in security assistance in the region has undoubtedly been the case of Jordan. Over the past two decades Jordan has been able to survive two wars with Israel and three major crises. Security assistance to Jordan has contributed significantly to the maintenance of King Hussein's regime: it has helped to retain the loyalty of the armed forces, it has demonstrated a U.S. commitment to Hussein which has deterred neighboring Arab countries, and it has increased the military self-confidence and required resources for combat operations.

Although American diplomatic actions and shows of force have augmented military assistance to Jordan, the "success" of this security assistance relationship must also be attributed to the political acumen of King Hussein. While military assistance has allowed Jordan to maintain a large standing and well equipped army, much of the credit belongs to King Hussein who has provided effective leadership, benefited from the personal loyalty of Bedouin military combat forces (that recognize the legitimacy of the monarchy), and demonstrated an ability to avoid complete isolation in the Arab world (and at the same time not risk losing the support of the United States).

The Jordanian experience suggests a major theme in most of the

security assistance "successes": namely, that while U.S. military assistance may be necessary for the maintenance of a particular regime or the control of insurgencies, the assistance itself is not sufficient to guarantee such results. To understand the "successes" in security assistance one cannot just count up the number and type of weapons and training provided a country; far more important are the domestic political conditions and institutional arrangements of the society.

A further example of this theme can be found in the region of Latin America. The "successes" of the Latin American armed forces against rural and urban guerrillas is frequently attributed to U.S. security assistance. Success in Guatemala, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Uruguay is protrayed as "military" victories based upon the use of sophisticated intelligence equipment, modern armaments, and large combat forces. However, a case by case examination suggests that this is not the total story. In most Latin American cases there appears to be a lack of a strong correlation between a recipient's military capabilities and the failure of an insurgency.

Military considerations were less important than domestic political conditions in determining the outcome of the conflicts. In Bolivia, the Guevarista insurgency failed primarily because it attracted no popular support from the conservative peasants of the Altiplano; in Colombia, the various guerrilla movements failed primarily because they generated little popular support beyond their traditional enclaves and because government institutions were strong and officials increased communication with the rural areas; in Peru, revolutionary insurgents were denied prospects for peasant support in La Convencion Valley when the government linked the area into the national economy by building a road and instituting a mild land reform program; in Venezuela, the guerrilla groups failed basically because the government institutions were relatively strong and because the political and organizational skills of President Betancourt and his party attracted popular support; and in Guatemala the guerrillas failed because they lacked popular support, because civilian groups formed to act as counterinsurgent forces and because the central government officials began to pay moderate attention to the pressing needs of the rural areas in the

Northeast.

In each case, the insurgents failed not because of military measures alone, but rather because of political conditions and government policies taken in collaboration with the armed forces. Thus, in Latin America, the primary factors in successful counterinsurgency were the domestic political conditions and policies to which American security assistance made little effective contribution. Security assistance to the Latin American region should be seen more in terms of military modernization and the institutional development of the armed forces. There has been little relationship to the outcome of insurgencies, the relative absence of local military conflict, to the continuing military participation in politics, to the resistance to regional military organizations, or to the curtailment of governmental policies (including military governments) directed at the nationalization of American investments and the greater control of American activities. With few exceptions security assistance has provided very little insurance for American interests -- despite the allegations of military dependency.

In focusing on the "success-failure" conumdrum, a significant factor for consideration in Third World security assistance relationships is frequently ignored. A Third World phenomenon which will present a greater challenge to American interests (although not necessarily security) than Soviet involvements is the rise of military intervention and overt military rule. Such activities have contributed significantly to bureaucratization and militarization of government in the Third World. If such a trend is taking place then we must be prepared to assess the consequences for the U.S. since security assistance, regardless of its uncertainties as an instrument of influence, does in fact contribute to the modernization, centralization, and institutional growth of the armed forces. In the case of Latin America, the growth of military regimes has not prevented the takeover of American investments and properties. Indeed, there is an increasing reluctance to accept at face the apparent benefits and to ignore the probable liabilities of "business as usual" with the United States. 14

In the case of the Persian Gulf, as a result of the impact of security assistance programs on the institutional growth and autonomy of the armed forces in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, we may very well see the removal of the monarchical/royalist regimes--something that radical students and Soviet intrigues have failed to bring about. Such developments have already occurred in the Middle East and northern Africa and there is little to suggest that the same could not come to pass in the Persian Gulf as an indirect result of American arms transfers and training.

In summary, there is substantial evidence to suggest that with sufficient time security assistance to Third World countries can result in improving the quality and performance of the recipient's armed forces. However, the provision of security assistance can never be apolitical. With few exceptions, the United States has not been able to exercise much control over what the political consequences of military assistance have been or will be. Furthermore, the influence and security derived from providing such military assistance is seldom commensurate with the assistance provided. (Although it is virtually impossible to determine the costs of not providing security assistance--regardless of the possiblity of gaining influence or enhancing the security of the United States.)

The assessment of on-going and future security assistance relationships must take into account not only a realistic determination of what is attainable, but also an evaluation of the unintended political consequences--including undesirable involvement in domestic and regional politics and unwanted identification with "unsavory" regimes. Whether there is the capacity or the will to attempt this will be largely decided by the ideological and psychological disposition of policy-makers toward the peoples and events of Third World regions. Unfortunately, because of the persistence of the security assistance conumdrum, policy-makers (critics as well as proponents of an American arms program) will tend to regress to positions and solutions largely determined by ideological predispositions.

IV. INFLUENCE, DEPENDENCY, AND SECURITY

As has been suggested in the previous section, the link between the provision of arms and military services and U.S. national security is vague and ambivalent. Unless one assumes that "stability," base rights, access to raw materials, and contact with local militaries is by definition enhancing the national interest and a reflection of influence, then one must be prepared to critically examine much of the conceptual framework of security assistance. We still must be able to raise the question: arms for what? To view it as a diplomatic tool for influence, considerable more knowledge is necessary concerning the decision making processes of recipient countries. The uncertainties and complexities of events in the Third World and the lack of an agreed upon criteria to evaluate the consequences of security assistance makes an assessment of the degree of influence that the U.S. gains from the transfer of arms highly suspect.

Ideally, it would be necessary to know the extent to which a recipient (or potential recipient) country took U.S. security assistance into account in the making of a specific decision that was commensurate with the preferences and interests of the United States. Defining, as well as actually identifying, cases of influence as a direct result of a military assistance relationship is difficult and can often be misleading. For example, the influence of small allies and friends in a security assistance relationship is often overlooked-often to the detriment of U.S. interests. Despite the appearance of influence, crucial limitations exist. In noting the dilemmas facing the U.S. in Vietnam, Robert Komer has stated that:

Perhaps the most acute dilemma was the perennial question of stability vs. potentially destabilizing change. The more we became entangled in Vietnam, the more concerned we were over the risks to our growing investment if the regime we were supporting should collapse. Constantly facing U.S. policymakers was the dilemma of whether, if we pushed too hard, we would end up collapsing the very structure we were trying to shore up.15

The experience of Vietnam suggests two limitations that may be imposed on utilizing influence derived from the transfer of arms: influence may decline as the involvement increases and a recipient's weakness is quite often an effective leverage on the U.S., despite military dependency on the United States. Certainly, U.S. concern for regime maintenance limits American willingness to pressure regimes in such countries as Korea, Turkey, Greece (during the military government), Ethiopia, Brazil, Chile, and numerous other nations where there is said to be national interests at stake.

Although the notion of influence is necessary to the debate, the belief that security assistance can contribute to a dependency relationship is just as important in ascertaining the consequences of arms as a diplomatic instrument. A fundamental premise that needs examination is that sophisticated weapons make the recipient dependent on the U.S. for the needed technical services to maintain and operate the equipment. An arms relationship, it is argued, generally tends to tie the recipient politically to the U.S. because of the need to maintain military effectiveness. In the words of one aviation corporation executive: "When you buy an airplane, you also buy a supplier and a supply line--in other words you buy a political partner." 16 Such comments, however, appear to be directed more at the U.S. government as further justification for arms transfers to the Third World and not a reflection of the likelihood that military dependency will result in accommodating political partners. Both the Soviets as well as the U.S. have often found this dependency to be costly in military and political terms and in many instances not commensurate with the benefits obtained.

The concern for seeking influence via a military dependency relationship raises a further conceptual problem--namely, the debate over the extent to which security assistance should be based on valid military requirement or on the concern for political influence and leverage. One might assume that the debate over criteria is not insignificant--especially if we are concerned with the consequences of the provision of American weapons and support equipment. In many cases the U.S. appears to be considering the psychological needs of

a particular regime and/or military institution, regardless of the merit of the military requirements for such arms. The concern for political good will thus takes on a priority in the provision of arms. In such a situation, there exists the opportunity for a Third World country to influence the U.S. by assuming a posture that argues for arms (or more as the case may be) by saying that either the United States does not understand the importance of the country or does not care enough!

Given the propensities for the need for more foreign assistance in the military development of Third World armed forces, it is difficult not to imagine such countries attempting to play upon the security concerns of the U.S. in order to seek a military assistance relationship--regardless of the military requirements. The U.S., it would thus seem, is constantly caught in the dilemma of wanting to provide arms and military support services to assist in the development of militarily self-sufficient nations (in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine); but at the same time interested in maintaining leverage with the country by making it militarily dependent upon the U.S. for continued arms, spare parts, and maintenance and logistical support. Further complicating the military self-sufficiency and military dependency goals of U.S. foreign policy is the need to link self-sufficiency with the criteria of valid military requirements as the basis for a security assistance relationship. However, a concern to maintain or establish political good will with a regime may be predicated on ignoring so-called valid military requirements. In other words, a pre-emptive arms transfer policy will most likely take precedent over the concern for military self-sufficiency. The extent to which this may adversly affect, in the long rum, U.S. interests or the defense capabilities of the recipient are questions that are generally left unanswered, mainly because of the appearance of a short-term gain.

Irrespective of the justification provided--political stability, regional balance, base rights, raw materials, contact with local militaries--the bottom line (with the few possible exceptions such as Israel) focuses on the pre-emptive concern of the U.S. The

pre-emptive rationale consists of the following assumptions from a Third World country: (1) if the U.S. refuses to respond to a military request, the USSR (or other countries which are not concerned with U.S. interests) will provide the military assistance, (2) the Soviets are more effective than the U.S. in utilizing an arms supply relationship to enhance their interests at the expense of the U.S., and (3) Third World countries are vulnerable to Soviet pressures and intrigue: and are not capable of protecting their own national interests. Defenseless Third World countries, once exposed to Soviet military hardware, training, and advisors are thus seen as somehow adversely affecting U.S. security interests either in a particular region of the Third World or in terms of the strategic relationship with the Soviet Union. However, the experiences of the USSR with such countries as Syria, Iraq, Ghana, Cuba, Indonesia, and others suggest otherwise. In each of these cases, the arms supply relationship produced gains for the Soviet Union that were marginal at best and in areas that were of little consequence to the Third World country. The characteristic that has most stood out is the adaptability of the Soviets to yield to the preferences of the recipients rather than the reverse. 17

The relationship between a pre-emptive policy of military assistance and U.S. influence and security has not been clearly established. The premises that need exploring are that (1) military relationships between Third World countries and arm suppliers such as the Soviet Union and even West European countries adversly affect the general relationship with the United States, (2) the absence of an arms supply relationship between the U.S. and a Third World country lessens potential influence in matters of interest to the U.S. because of the absence of a dependency on maintenance and logistic support, and (3) it would be a diplomatic "failure" for the U.S. if it did not take the opportunity to establish a security assistance relationship with a country at the expense of the Soviets or if the Soviets responded to a request for military assistance after the U.S. had refused to provide such assistance.

Under such a conceptual cloud the link between a pre-emptive policy of arms transfers to Third World countries and the enhancement

of U.S. national security is more clearly seen in terms of the psychological dimensions of the U.S.-USSR strategic relationship. The increasing ability of Third World countries to play upon the strategic concerns of the super-powers means that security assistance relationships are being used less and less for the promotion of U.S. security interests. In a sense, the U.S. security assistance objective has shifted away from defending against shared threats and more toward just protecting U.S. military access as well as possible assets in a particular country. There are, of course, exceptions to this. But, the trend appears clear: the U.S. in most cases is being presented with a "buy-elsewhere" bargaining strategy. As long as the U.S. perception of the strategic worth of many of these Third World countries persists, it will be difficult to argue against the logic of the pre-emptive policy.

How far such a security assistance policy can take the U.S. will largely be determined by the "world view" of the national security managers and by the efforts of the Congress to play a more active role in the making of American foreign policy. The issues raised by such a conceptual approach and the future limitations of the security assistance program are the topics of the next section.

V. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND FOREIGN POLICY: THE LIMITATIONS FOR FUTURE INVOLVEMENTS IN THE THIRD WORLD

The dominant "world view" in Washington today hinges on the apparent relationship between the strategic balance and the geopolitical balance and the need to minimize what Secretary Kissinger calls "targets of opportunity." The vagueness, and perhaps frequent confusion, that links the two types of balances to U.S. national security have one common theme: the need to maintain internal and regional stability. The unsettling effects of instability--"targets of opportunity"--are thus a central concern for U.S. foreign policy in the Third World.

TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY AND INSTABILITY

Since "targets of opportunity" abound throughout the Third World some effort must be made to determine if there is a need to be selective in a security assistance relationship. Dr. Kissinger has noted that a distinction will be made between Soviet efforts to arm a country and efforts to arm a faction in a country. The test by which to measure Soviet intentions in conflict areas is to ask the question: Is the Soviet Union providing arms to maintain an established relationship or is the USSR attempting to establish a new pattern of dominance? Whether this framework can provide the U.S. with some basis for selective involvement in response to efforts by the USSR to exploit "targets of opportunity" is questionable.

Black Africa provides an example of the complexity of the above policy perspectives. The U.S. now has military aid agreements with 10 black African countries while the Soviet Union, China and other Communist countries have agreements with 14 African nations. Border conflicts, civil wars, insurgencies, and coups have all contributed to "regional instability" and the call for arms to such diverse sources as the U.S., China, the Soviet Union, Cuba, Britain, France, Yugoslavia, Spain, Belgium, and Switzerland. At times, however, it is difficult to determine whether in some cases Soviet efforts are more to offset Chinese military assistance efforts rather than just eliminating

"Western influence." Originally, the Soviets had armed Uganda because it appeared a useful base to counter Chinese influence in central Africa.

Perhaps the most important event since the fall of South Vietnam was the Angolan venture. Described as an "outsiders" war, Angola was viewed by many to be the first post-Vietnam "test" of American will. The reaction to what some believed to be a case of Soviet expansionism by the use of a Cuban foreign legion fell prey to American domestic politics. Secretary of State Kissinger, during a press conference in mid-Frebruary 1976, stated that:

It cannot be in the interest of the U.S. to establish the principle that Soviet arms and Cuban expeditionary forces can appear in situations of turmoil. As we look around the world at areas of potential conflict, it cannot be in the interest of the U.S. to create the impression that, in times of crisis, either threats or promises of the U.S. may not mean anything because our divisions may paralyze us. 18

Several factors contributed to the case of Angola which suggest that it not be considered the first "test of American will" after Vietnam. Entering into the evaluation of the outcome of the American involvement was the more general debate between Congress and the Executive over the conduct of foreign policy, the role of the Cuban involvement in improving its relationship with the USSR, the historical role of the Soviets in supplying arms to Angola, and senatorial elections in California. The Angolan affair allowed John Tunney an opportunity to reestablish his "liberal" if not dovish credentials in time for the California primary election. The Senate passage of the amendment to terminate military assistance to Angola provided Tunney with what was thought at the time the means to withstand the strong challenge of antiwar activist Tom Hayden. ¹⁹

If "the Angolan case" offers little guidance, then how should the U.S. view other "targets of opportunity" found throughout the Third World? For example, the key to a future Southern Africa policy--which seeks continued access to resources, regional stability, and the minimal

military presence of the USSR, China, and Cuba--may well rest with the repeal of the Byrd amendment (which permits the importation of Rhodesian chrome) rather than with millions of dollars in security assistance to Zaire, Kenya, and Ethiopia.

Conflicts throughout the Third World continue to contribute to regional instability, the demand for arms by all sides to a conflict, and the proliferation of new states which further complicate the concern for "stability." Illustrative of this situation is the case of Ethiopia where Eritrean independence could affect a strategic area along the Red Sea coast as well as the Kagnew communications station at Asamara. Ethiopia is located next to Somalia where the naval base at Berbera is located for Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf operations. Ethiopia can thus be seen as critical to the "strategic" eastern horn of Africa. At the same time Ethiopia continues to support Sudanese rebels as leverage to get Sudan to cease support for Eritrean guerrillas. To further complicate the matter, one of the guerrilla groups (the ELF) is dominated by Moslems and supported by Arab countries. The U.S. recently made the decision to help modernize the armed forces of the Ethiopian military government, which describes itself as socialist, ostensibly to offset the Russian presence in Somalia. However, if the Eritreans succeed then the Kagnew station is probably lost and an additional section of the Red Sea coastline comes under the control of a regime whose leaders had been battered by arms supplied by the U.S. Under the circumstances, it appears that the U.S. had few, if any, options. What would have been the consequences if the U.S. had not decided to supply arms to the Ethiopian government? Is Kagnew, the Red Sea coastline, and "balancing" the Soviets in Somalis worth the possible costs of an eventual Eritrean victory? 20

REGIONALISM AND STABILITY

The belief in the relationship between the strategic and geopolitical balance and the concern for minimal direct U.S. military involvement in Third World conflicts has led to a shift from a reliance on formal alliance and traditional security relations in the Third World to one of

focusing on "regional powers" such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia (the ninth largest oil producer) Brazil, Zaire, and perhaps even Egypt in the near future. More and more it appears that the U.S. may be willing to rely on close relations with regional powers in the Third World. Politically, most have relatively strong, stable government institutions and economically these countries possess and produce important energy and other raw materials upon which the U.S. and its traditional allies appear increasingly dependent. Militarily, they are developing as the major regional forces as well as the major recipients of U.S. security assistance.

While the advantages of supporting and establishing close security assistance relationships with a handful of regional powers may help reduce U.S. involvement abroad as well as contribute to the stability of a particular region and thus act as a proxy in preventing Soviet, Cuban, or Chinese intervention, the costs may also be high if such relations jeopardize relations with other countries in the region. Such a situation appears to have taken place in the case of Brazil, especially after the signing of a new "formal agreement" which calls for economic and political consultation between the U.S. and Brazil. With half the total population of the continent and an obviously growing economic, political and military potentiality, the future direction of South America, at least in the eyes of the U.S., appears to be heavily influenced by Brazil.

Saudi Arabia can be seen as an active regional power in the Persian Gulf for its efforts in literally attempting to "buy" the Russians out of the area. Saudi Arabia has apparently been successful in both North and South Yemen to reduce Soviet military aid relations in the area with the use of petrodollars to reward regimes that cooperate in this effort. In the case of North Yemen, the Saudis have agreed to finance \$100 million worth of arms from the U.S. The Soviets can ill-afford to get into a bidding war with Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have established a policy of utilizing their petrodollars in combination with American arms to push the Soviets out and induce cooperation from regimes in the Persian Gulf. Such efforts have apparently succeeded in North Yemen and possibly in South Yemen; while it was not attempted in Somalia, despite Saudi efforts to seek U.S. cooperation in the venture.

CONGRESSIONAL RESTRICTIONS

The U.S. Congress has demonstrated a more assertive role in American foreign policy. Most recently, Congress has successfully opposed the President on such security assistance related issues as aid to Angola, the embargo on military aid to Turkey, the suspension of grant and credit assistance to Chile, and the sale of HAWK missiles to Jordan. The future of security assistance is greatly affected by the disillusionment in Congress with foreign assistance and with efforts to gain more control over the making of American foreign policy.

As early as 1966 Congress began to show its displeasure with U.S. security assistance policy, particularly the shift from grants to sales as Third World countries began what Congress described as the "pursuit of illusory prestige." Since that time efforts have been made to examine the financing, control, and implications of arms sales. However, at the base of the debate between Congress and the Executive (at least for some of the more articulate critics) is the extent to which basic American political values should be reflected in American foreign policy. In the words of one observer: "America, once the arsenal of democracy, increasingly has become just the arsenal." The real challenge to Security Assistance may very well rest in the following question: Is there the possibility of a comfortable fit between domestic ideals and values, humanitarian concerns, violence and instability abroad, and U.S. involvement in the affairs of other countries?

The present conflict between Congress and the Executive over foreign policy is no better illustrated than in the 1976 International Security Assistance bill which was vetoed this past May. President Ford stated that the bill contained unprecedented restrictions that would "seriously inhibit his ability to implement a coherent and consistent foreign policy." Congressional restrictions on security assistance programs included: a ceiling of \$9 billion on total military sales in any one fiscal year, the termination over a two year period of grant assistance and military assistance advisory teams, the prohibition of security assistance to a country found in serious violation of human rights or practicing discriminatory policies, and subjects any arms transfer over \$25 million to Congressional approval.

The May 1, 1976 New York Times editorial suggests that the "chief values of [these restrictions] is that they impose some constraints on the Pentagon and thus require choices among arms recipients based on American national interest in place of the policy, aimed primarily at economic gain, of selling as much as possible to almost all comers." However, rather than more selectivity, the actual results of such "legislative vetos" in security assistance relations may very well cause more dislocation and uncertainty. In seeking to gain a measure of control over security assistance relations with some seventy-one nations, the Congress has established unmanageable mechanisms. In subjecting security assistance to Congressional "politics," it will undoubtedly undermine the Executive's ability to utilize weapons and military services as a diplomatic instrument. The uncertainty of Congressional reaction may become a dominant factor in negotiations. In the case of the violation of human rights and discriminatory practices, it will now become easier for ethnic and religious groups in the United States (as well as those affected in the respective countries) to attempt to act through Congress to affect an ongoing or pending security assistance relationship. The example of the Greek-American effort to gain an arms embargo against Turkey in the aftermath of the Cyprus invasion is a case in point. Furthermore, in terms of the practicality of enforcing the legislation on human rights, the Congress may end up penalizing only those regimes that are "inefficient" in their violation of human rights,

Do such Congressional efforts in fact provide the U.S. with a more discriminatory policy in security assistance? While the Nixon Doctrine attempts to provide guidance on who should be provided military assistance, Congressional actions appear to only provide the Executive with guidance on whom not to maintain a security assistance relationship. Perhaps the characteristic that most stands out is the effort by Congress to minimize (if not terminate) military relationships between the U.S. and the Third World. The goal of terminating grant assistance, military assistance advisory teams, gradually limiting military training, and eventually doing away with credit assistance can only be seen as the attempt to disrupt formal relations with military institutions abroad.

Lastly, Congressional concern for human rights abroad is much in keeping with U.S. efforts in the 1960s to suspend assistance and/or recognition for the purpose of influencing a regime to maintain liberal democratic practices. However, these paternalistic measures proved to be relatively ineffective. This experience suggests that the curtailment of arms transfer programs will also have little or no impact on a regime's tendency to violate human rights. In practice most of the restrictions will be easiest to implement against less important countries and most difficult to apply to the large, more important countries such as Brazil, Iran, South Korea, Indonesia, and the like.

The decision to "reevaluate" U.S. support for the modernization of the Ethiopian army because of the use of a "white army" of peasants against Eritrean guerrilla forces, the complications in reestablishing normal military relations with Turkey in the aftermath of the arms embargo, the confusion over the U.S. inability to provide HAWK missile batteries to Jordan, the possibility that such countries as England and Germany could provide "proxy" arms sales for the U.S. (West Germany, for example, has pledged continued aid to Turkey's armed forces), and the recent announcement that the U.S. would be willing to discuss arms sales to China all point to the constant flux and "insecurity" in securing assistance programs for the remainder of the decade. Such examples bring into question the capacity of the U.S. to apply its resources productively and with discrimination. Security assistance programs expose American foreign policy as a somewhat indiscriminate reaction (be it the Executive or the Congress) to perceived threats--be they Soviet expansion, regional instability, or repressive regimes that violate human rights -- which more than often result in the utilization of means in disproportion to the objectives.

THE FUTURE LIMITATIONS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE

It would appear that security assistance programs, while highly effective in some cases as instruments of diplomacy (on a short-term quid pro quo basis) contribute marginally to basic U.S. national security. If all base rights, intelligence facilities, and the like were forced

out of Third World countries, to what extent would U.S. national security be endangered? If such a change meant increased vulnerability for the U.S., then these bases and facilities abroad are a representation not of strength but of weakness. If our national security is so dependent upon the cooperation of weaker allies, then our national defense posture abroad needs a close reexamination.

As we continue to see in such places as Ethiopia, black Africa, Southeast Asia, as well as with many of the military regimes throughout the Third World, security assistance and modernized military institutions are no insurance against the more compelling social processes taking place in much of the developing world. One conclusion is that the issues associated with security assistance policy as well as the costs and benefits of security assistance as an instrument in foreign policy are much more political than military or economic. Another conclusion is that the concern for maintaining U.S. credibility and prestige in the Third World may be questionable. The United States is too large and economically powerful, regardless of the arms it provides, to be ignored by other countries. "Prestige" may be an all together meaningless and costly issue.

The limits of U.S. security assistance to the Third World often go unrecognized because of the failure to realize the extent to which American resources and military presence can be used by local political actors. The American government has often overlooked (if not deliberately ignored) the manipulation of U.S. resources and presence for local ends. Many Third World countries have been able to manipulate American commitments to acquire increased military and economic aid and to develop a U.S. interest in, and ultimate responsibility for the regime's very survival.

Despite the increasing unmanageability of the world, the U.S. has continued to believe in the need for continuity and consistency in world affairs. It is an unsettling fact that countries in the Third World will experiment politically and economically to solve national development problems. Some will choose non-democratic and non-capitalist forms of political and economic systems; however, the U.S. should not consider such events as a threat to national security, nor for that matter, as "defeats" for the West. The U.S. must be prepared to accept, as well

as tolerate, disorder and instability as the experimentation and frequent failure at social change and development continue. A security assistance policy focused on the goal of "stability" in such a world environment is fraught with the seeds of failure.

The security rhetoric utilized to justify military assistance to Third World countries is a major contributor to the weaknesses in policy analysis. Too often we become enmeshed in the necessary public posturing to be able to accurately determine the consequences and significance of security assistance programs to the United States. Too often, military assistance as a lever of influence and the malleability of events and processes in the Third World have been overestimated and the guile of Third World countries to use security assistance as an influence lever vis-à-vis the U.S. underestimated. Quite often Third World countries have had the ability to "create" a U.S. security interest when one need not have existed.

What is called for is a case-by-case evaluation when considering questions of political influence, military dependency, and national security. Generalization will be virtually impossible and dangerous-even if applied to countries in the same region. It is the learning processes of local leaders and the particular character of the institutional growth of government and particularly the armed forces that will have more to do with the outcome of security assistance relationships than most other "military" or "security" type factors. More often than not, military assistance becomes a "placebo," that is, provided for the satisfaction and gratification of the recipient. The danger for the U.S. does not derive from such a practice but from confusing the "gratification" of the recipient with the resolving of the political and economic maladies that are prevelant throughout the Third World.

Once a security assistance relationship is established, the illusion of influence and security becomes more readily apparent. The expectations and hopes of policy-makers and administrators are dimmed (and then usually ignored) as a knowledge of the local conditions and circumstances that limit U.S. efforts become known. The risks involved in a security assistance relationship derive mostly from the absence of a management capability that can control, direct, audit, and modify military assistance

as the effects on the political and social system of the recipient country are determined.

The risks of security assistance also revolve from the frequent emphasis placed on the military aspect of security and stability rather than on the recognition of the dependence of military capabilities on the political institutions and environment of a particular country. One cannot ignore the necessity to inquire into the political premises of security assistance in order to better understand its consequences and limitations.

Lastly, there is an inescapable conclusion that as the U.S. becomes more deeply involved in the military affairs of a Third World country we will find ourselves with a declining ability to manage the security assistance relationship as an instrument of influence--despite the increasing investment in military development and regime stabilization.

NOTES

- 1. Although there are serious short-commings to the concept "Third World," the term will be used in a geographical sense to encompass the regions of Latin America, Africa, the Middle East/Persian Gulf, and all of Asia (excluding Japan). As will be pointed out in the text, the distinctions between regions and between countries in the same Third World region--in terms of historical and institutional development, ideological perceptions of the international environment, and the patterns of civil-military relations--are crucial in assessing the limits and consequences of U.S. security assistance programs.
- 2. For a closer examination of American para-military intervention and covert operations that often are closely associated with the more formally constituted military assistance program see Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, New York, Dell Publishing Company, 1975.
- 3. Such a view is expressed by Thomas Stern, Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, in a Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 18, 1975.
- 4. Geoffrey Kemp, "Conflict in the Third World: The Effects of Military Assistance Programs," Memorandum prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Views on Foreign Assistance Policy*, U.S. Senate, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C., 1973, pp. 197-207.
- 5. Melvin Gurtov, The United States Against the Third World: Antinationalism and Intervention, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1974, pp. 201-202. Gurtov goes on to describe the American complusion that sees an inevitable involvement in the security and stability of the entire world which in effect suggest a responsibility for the affairs of other societies.
- 6. For a critical assessment of the characteristics and significance of the Nixon Doctrine see Stephen P. Gibert, "Implications of the Nixon Doctrine for Military Aid Policy," Orbis, Fall 1972, pp. 660-681; Guy J. Pauker, et. al., In Search of Self Reliance: U.S. Security Assistance to the Third World Under the Nixon Doctrine, Santa Monica, The RAND Corporation, 1973; and Earl D. Ravenal, "The Nixon Doctrine and Our Asian Commitments," Foreign Affairs, January 1971, pp. 201-217. The confusion regarding the significance of the Nixon Doctrine as a policy is suggested by Ravenal when he states that "While pledging to honor all existing commitments, the [U.S.] has placed them all in considerable doubt. While offering promise of avoiding involvement in future [Third World] conflicts, [the Doctrine] has biased the nature of our participation."

- 7. If the belief of the United States is that it will provide air, and if need be, sea power for local conflicts while Third World nations provide group troops, then security assistance programs would of necessity place emphasis on the modernization and build up of ground forces. However, this has not been the case and one might presume that Third World air forces would not appreciate such a policy. The Nixon Doctrine has also contributed to the internal U.S. naval debate regarding the controversy over the need for aircraft carriers. Critics argue that every \$2 billion investment in Nimitz-type carriers detracts from the capabilities of the U.S. navy. Secretary of the Navy Middendorf has noted that ". . . the survival life of a ship will be measured in minutes in high threat areas" in a confrontation with the Soviet Union. In the words of one observer, the U.S. is "building a Navy second to none in its ability to project power ashore against Third World countries. The odds are much better in using the carrier against Third World countries or proxy wars. This is where the Nimitz is most likely to see action." This debate is reported by Michael Krepon, "Navy: Does the U.S. Now Rule the Waves?" Los Angeles Times, May 9, 1976.
- 8. The fact that such views will be difficult to overcome is illustrated in a recent editorial comment by former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, "The Military Balance," Newsweek, May 31, 1976, p. 9. Schlesinger contends that "Given the disappearance of U.S. strategic superiority, the growing significance of conventional forces, and the adverse balance in those forces . . . [the U.S.] military mission is more complex and demanding than that of the Soviet Union. The U.S. must be able to project its own power into the Eastern Hemisphere . . . to support deterrence and defense structures protecting nations on the margins of the main power of the Soviet Union. Everywhere there exist serious vulnerabilities for the coalition of nations led by the U.S."
- 9. The testimony and discussion that followed can be found in International Security Assistance Act of 1976, Hearings of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 94th Congress, Washington, D.C., 1976, pp.1-5.
- 10. Satisfactory conclusions have not been reached regarding Third World military requirements, or the relationship between security assistance programs and regional stability, influence, access to raw materials, keeping the Soviets out, and the protection of American interests. The following are only representative of the on-going debate: Luigi R. Einaudi, et. al., Arms Transfers to Latin America: Toward a Policy of Mutual Respect, Santa Monica, The RAND Corporation, 1973; The Persian Gulf, 1974: Money, Arms, and Power, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C., 1974; United States Arms Sales to the Persian Gulf, Committee on

International Relations, House of Representatives, 94th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C., 1975; Suspension of Prohibitions Against Military Assistance to Turkey, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 94th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C., 1975; Proposed Sales to Jordan of the Hawk and Vulcan Air Defense Systems, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 94th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C., 1975; and U.S. Policy and Request for Sale of Arms to Ethiopia. Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 94th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C., 1975.

- 11. Edward R.F. Sheehan, "How Kissinger Did It: Step by Step in the Middle East," Foreign Policy, No. 22, Spring 1976, pp.3-70.
- 12. Drew Middleton, "Sadat Seen Asking U.S. for 10-Year Arms Aid," New York *Times*, October 22, 1975.
- 13. Stephen S. Kaplan, "United States Aid and Regime Maintenance in Jordan," *Public Policy*, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, Spring 1975, pp. 189-217.
- 14. For an example of this perspective see Irving Louis Horowitz and Ellen Kay Trimberger, "State Power and Military Nationalism in Latin America," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 8, No. 2, January 1976, pp.223-244.
- 15. Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam, Santa Monica, The Rand Corporation, 1972.
- 16. As quoted in Michael T. Klare, "How to Trigger an Arms Race." The Nation, August 30, 1975, pp. 137-142.
- 17. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, ed., Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1975.
- 18. Press Conference, February 12, 1976, Washington, D.C., Transcript from Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services, Department of State, PR 64/87.
- 19. The complexity of the Angolan case is illustrated in the following sources: Colin Legum, "A Letter on Angola to American Liberals," and Roger Morris, "The Proxy War in Angola: Pathology of a Blunder," The New Republic, January 31, 1976, pp. 15-23; Gerald Bender, "Angola: A New Quagmire for U.S.," The Los Angeles Times, December 21, 1975; and Edward Gonzalez, "Castro and Cuba's New Orthodoxy," Problems in Communism, Vol. XXV, January-February 1976, pp. 1-19.
- 20. For a review of U.S. interests in Ethiopia, security assistance relations, and the Eritrean insurgency see J. Bowyer Bell, "Endemic Insurgency and International Order: The Eritrean Experience," Orbis, Summer 1974, and U.S. Policy and Request for Sale of Arms to Ethiopia, Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs, House of Representatives, 94th Congress, 1st Session, 1975.

21. Early concern for the issue is to be found in Arms Sales and Foreign Policy, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 90th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C., 1966. An excellent critique of the conflict between American democratic values foreign policy necessities is presented by Thomas L. Hughes, "Liberals, Populists, and Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy, No. 20, Fall 1975, pp. 98-137.

APPENDIX

TOTAL ARMS TRANSFERS OF MAJOR SUPPLIERS FROM 1965-1974 (Million Current Dollars)

	Total	U.S.	USSR	France	Great Britain	China
WORLD TOTAL	64,404	31,563	18,793	2,826	2,089	2,119
Developed	27.74%	22.40%	28.65%	30.61%	37.63%	.24%
Developing	72.26%	77.60%	71.35%	69.39%	62.37%	99.76%
REGIONS						!
Middle East/ Persian Gulf	20.89%	17.83%	30.51%	16.31%	28.87%	.01%
Latin America	3.74%	2.57%	1.72%	16.38%	12.88%	0%
Africa	3.85%	1.08%	3.78%	23.67%	12.35%	3.82%
Asia	32.42%	46.38%	21.55%	1.42%	6.94%	76.26%
Other Developing	11%	10%	13%	12%	1%	18%

SOURCE: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1965-1974, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976.

NOTE: Arms transfers represent the international transfer under grant, credit, cash or commercial sales terms of military equipment including weapons, parts, ammunition, support equipment, and other commodities considered primarily military in nature. Training and technical services are not included.

TYPES OF EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES OBTAINED VIA SECURITY ASSISTANCE

	Cumulativa			
FMS-MAP-MASF TOTAL	Cumulative FY 1950-1975	FY 1975		
Weapons/Ammunition 1	40%		44%	
Supporting Equipment ²	19%		13%	
Spare Parts	17%		21%	
Supporting Services ³	24%		22%	

- 1. Includes fighter aircraft, bombers, destroyers, submarines, tanks, artillery, machine guns, rifles and missiles and all ammunition.
- Includes trainer and cargo aircraft, tankers, tugs, barges, trucks, trailers, radar and communications equipment and other equipment and supplies.
- Includes construction, supply operations, training, technical and administrative services.

SOURCE: Department of Defense, Defense Security Assistance Agency, Office of the Comptroller, Analysis of Foreign Military Sales Orders, Military Assistance Programs, Military Assistance Service Funded Programs by Types of Defense Articles and Services, July 1975, Washington, D.C.

The collapse of U.S. policy in Vietnam raises fundamental questions on the future role of military force in support of American foreign policy and the processes by which decisions involving resort to force are made. In an era of increasing complexity in the interrelation of politics, economics and security, direct use of military power appears to be of declining utility even though world leaders see armaments as of increasing necessity. The military profession as a consequence finds itself shaken by two revolutions, externally in strategy and policy, internally in technology and organization. Fundamental questions arise on the structure of national decision making. What are proper restraints on military intervention; how does the structure give appropriate weight to perspectives and political, military, economic and social interests in policy making? Congressional influence as a conditioning and limiting factor in the exercise of military power is too often neglected. What are proper criteria by which the national security organization should be both shaped and judged? How does American tradition influence policymaking both affirmatively and negatively? What general tasks are performed by the "Permanent Government" and how can the existing balance of interests and perspectives, vested and weighted in the 1940's to meet problems of a cold war era, be shaped to achieve American purposes in the world of the 1980's?

The American approach to war, and particularly the role of the military in foreign policy, is unique in many respects. American policy makers rarely consider war an instrument of policy as Clausewitz saw it. War it not an integral and unavoidable part of political evolution but a lamentable aberration, a detour in the historical process, a moral evil. Clausewitz claimed that war is merely another kind of writing and language for statesmen; U.S. military leaders isolate war from politics and give the precondition for peace a dialogue of its own -- "clearcut victory in military terms" or "unconditional surrender." Even when the diplomat and warrior seemed to speak in the same tongue in Korea and Vietnam, the dialect was not the same. Lacking a close relationship between war and policy, the U.S. has demonstrated a remarkable ability to defeat the enemy in the field, yet has been unable to prevent war from occurring and unable to achieve a satisfactory peace. War is seen as a necessary evil, something to get over as quickly as possible, a means of punishing an enemy who dares disturb the peace. War, in short, is a crusade. Those American wars fought as crusades were eminently successful in the field: the question lies as to how well the political objectives were served in the process.

The cleavage in American thought in the relation of politics and power, of diplomacy and war, has unfortunate consequences.

Limiting himself to only the military aspects of a problem as

properly his concern, the military participation in the policy process contributes to strategic and doctrinal deficiencies which prevent conceptualizing force in other than military terms. War becomes a contest of logistics rather than of politics, On the civilian side, important political consequences inextricably imbedded in events are traditionally isolated from policy as "purely military matters." The self-imposed isolation of political and military matters generates over-reliance on military considerations and too easily subordinates national goals to military policy. Political leaders have rarely understood fully the role--and limitations -- of military power in seeking the ends of policy. Military leaders through misguided deference to the principle of civilian control of the military, are over-reductant to participate fully in the policy process. The result, therefore, is an enigma of policy devoid of military participation yet dominated by military considerations. In Vietnam, civilian deference to military advice dominated by "purely military considerations" contributed to overmilitarizing an essentially political problem, to pursuit of a guerrilla war with conventional field tactics, and to measurement of success in the field in engineering rather than political terms.

Vietnam marked the climax of two centuries of American experience in which the exercise of power was isolated vertically
from its admixture with policy and horizontally from a cooperative
and unified land, sea and air effort. Historically the Army and

Navy went wholly separate ways in separate worlds. No liaison with State Department acted either to complicate or to enrich planning; until Pearl Harbor, no organization short of the President himself existed to coordinate the Army, Navy and State Departments, nor the output in national policy, strategy, operations and weaponry. Common or joint activities of the military services in peace and war were governed by the principle of "mutual cooperation." Neither was really expected to coordinate with the State Department. Wartime commanders were expected to reach friendly agreement on how best to coordinate forces in battle; the goals both presumably sought were accepted as given. Understandably, joint operations sometimes succeeded but more often failed. 1

Against Charleston in 1865, a joint Army-Navy operation succeeded brilliantly because of the superior strategic grasp of the Army commander, General William T. Sherman. The previous operation against Charleston in September 1863 failed because "mutual cooperation" was insufficient to prevent either commander from preparing separate, independent plans for attack on the fort on the same evening. Sometimes the Army or Navy commander deliberately failed to cooperate. General Ben Butler, an ambitious, self-seeking political appointee of President Lincoln, lost a dozen men wounded in a landing against light opposition on Christmas Day, 1864 at Fort Fisher. Deciding that further assault would be too hazardous, he re-embarked into the transports and notified a

furious Admiral David D. Porter that he was heading back to base. Commodore Isaac Chauncey in 1814 lingered in Sackett's Harbor, Maine because he considered instructions from his Navy superior prevented his sortie to sea in support of land forces with whom he was designated to cooperate. Admiral Porter failed in a campaign to capture Shreveport in 1864 because General Banks, another political appointee, dawdled, holding local elections and gathering in highly profitable supplies of cotton. In Santiago de Cuba in 1898, General Shafter urged Admiral Sampson to "force the [harbor] entrance" in spite of the fact that the main purpose of landing troops was to avoid the necessity for forcing the mined and fortified harbor entrance.

Joint operations sometimes failed to become joint because one commander deliberately avoided a situation requiring assistance of the other service so that the glory would not have to be shared. General Nelson A. Miles avoided an assault on San Juan in 1898 where he would have to accept Navy assistance, choosing instead a conquest of the Puerto Rican interior. And they sometimes proved successful for the opposite reason when Fate made "mutual cooperation" possible by bringing together the right men at the right time. General Grant and Admiral Porter in the Vicksburg campaign on the Mississippi in 1863 gave their fullest support and saved their highest praise each for the other. The Fleet without the Army had failed when Farragut came upstream in 1362; the Army without the Fleet failed when Grant tried the overland route.

But once the operations were coordinated, the force became irresistible and won the war on the western waters. Cooperation of the Army and Navy in Manila in 1899 was satisfactory partly because there was no enemy threat from the sea, partly because Admiral Dewey recognized it to be largely an Army operation.

General Merritt acknowledged Dewey's seniority and dominant position, accepted his advice on military operations and his leadership in negotiations with the Spaniards. Actions and orders were signed by both but clearly Dewey was in control.

Joint operations sometimes failed because of jealousy or rivalry of civilian officials in the two departments. When in February 1863, Rear Admiral Samuel F. DuPont wished for Army cooperation in an attack on Charleston, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy Gustavus Fox tried to dissuade him: "... I beg of you not to take these soldiers too closely into your counsels in a purely naval matter ... nor to let the Army spoil it. The immortal wreath of laurels should cluster around your flag alone."

In the Confederacy, Jefferson Davis and his Cabinet refused to face up to the necessity for a unified military command in the defense of New Orleans in 1862. General Mansfield Lovell, C.S., led the Army forces and Commander John K. Mitchell the Navy, but a "River Defense Fleet" took orders from nobody on land or sea. Had anyone dared to take a firm hand, two of the South's most formidable ironclads, Louisiana and Mississippi, building at New Orleans, might have been completed in time to defend New Orleans

and the mouth of the Mississippi against Admiral David Farragut's outmoded wooden ships.

Joint action in World War I was hardly necessary. The German High Seas Fleet, pinned down by the British Grand Fleet after Jutland, was no threat to the American Navy. The U-boats and surface raiders patrolled the great ocean pathways but the U.S. Navy was able to carry out its mission in isolation both from the remote possibilities of a fleet action with the enemy or of a joint operation with the Army. The Navy's attention was concentrated wholly on escort of convoy operations, antisubmarine warfare and minelaying. Safeguarding the movement of the Army and its supplies overseas became the main and almost only task of naval operations. 2 Once safely deposited on European soil, the Army found no further mission for its maritime brethren. Army commander pursued the war by placing himself directly under a President who largely ignored both the intervening Secretary of the Army and the advice of the General Staff. Primitive air operations, when initiated late in the war, were not sufficient to require coordination with anybody. Air, naval and ground actions were essentially tactical. Under the circumstances, the habit of thought in the military arms could hardly be other than narrow and tactical.

In the cases cited, cooperation would have allowed more effective use of force toward the common objective. But cooperation was a wholly individual action and failure to cooperate,

even deliberate failure at a critical moment, was rarely called to account. Partly the cause was the inherent in human nature but largely the commanders shared no common superior except the President—a condition which was to persist until the Pearl Harbor attack where failure of cooperation both political and military contributed to a national disaster.

Despite its weaknesses, coordination of the military went far beyond that achieved in adapting military means to the aims of foreign policy. In 1898 President McKinley had a War Strategy Board of sorts including the prestigious Captain Mahan, then at the peak of his renown as a naval strategist. Nevertheless Dewey's great victory at Manila Bay, 8,000 miles from the focus of the action in Cuba, involved grave and unforeseen issues of policy which seriously strained relations with Britain and Germany. Committed to a role in the Pacific by the destruction of Spanish influence, the U.S. was neither prepared to accept the responsibilities nor to take the consequences of the liberated Philippines.

In 1904 the Army and Navy began their first formal efforts to draft joint war plans with at least an attempt to relate planning to political commitments overseas. The receptivity of the President, the Secretary of State, or the War and Navy Secretaries, however, exhibited a remarkable lack of enthusiasm for either the product or the process of planning. Determined to prevent militarism or military values from infecting civilian policy, the military voice in policy formation was resisted "to keep the

military subordinate."

In 1915 President Wilson, learning that the Army General Staff was making contingency plans for use in case of a war with Germany, "trembled and turned white with passion." The President threatened to relieve every staff officer on duty in Washington—even though the General Staff had been created by statute in 1903 precisely for the purpose of making war plans for possible conflict with many countries, including Germany. A classic example of the cleavage of war and diplomacy, Wilson rigidly excluded the military from any "interference" in policy. Nor would he allow policy makers to meddle in military actions against Mexico in 1914 and 1916 nor even in World War I, delegating as much of his power as possible to General Pershing.

The institutions necessary for a sustaining and evolving civil-military relationship prior to World War II simply failed to develop. Army and Navy officers frequently had a voice in foreign policy decisions, were frequently used by State as an alternate source of information on conditions abroad, but there was always resistance, always a desire to keep the military in the subordinate place assigned in Anglo-Saxon society since the time of Cromwell. The military officer did not want to exercise a "political" role, did not want to share in the actual policy-making process. He preferred to be furnished with firm guide-lines and directives on policy needs. The officers of the army and navy were insufficiently educated in political affairs, were isolated

from the mainstream of civilian thought as well as policymaking, and were often compelled to rely upon their own insufficient sources of information. In consequence, they were victims of a world outlook which made them interpret international events almost exclusively in terms of strife and conflict, competition and war. Under the circumstances, such interpretations sometimes bordered on fantasy. The Black Plan, for example, rested on the dubious assumption that Kaiser Wilhelm II would launch his fleet across the Atlantic and engage the U.S. Navy in a great Caribbean battle for mastery of the hemisphere. Reflecting no awareness of either European politics or the European alliance system, it was at best a "worst contingency" approach which failed to consider even the options available to Germany.

No U.S. War plan before 1939 recognized that the United States would fight alongside allies. The unified and combined commands of World War II and Korea were neither fully unified nor directly responsive to their designated commander. Forces were normally assigned for tactical operations only; for other functions the parent services were in a controlling position. The role of diplomacy was rarely considered, less rarely considered to be relevant.

Yet the so-called military mind existed almost as frequently in civilian as in military circles. If the military leaders were not well able to plan the closely integrated use of force in politics, the diplomatic service was even less so. In the rare

case where outstanding diplomats may have had a clear perception of the skilled use of force, the weakness of the State organization and extreme reluctance toward coordinated planning with the military in any form frustrated execution. Through World War II there was, in short, no effective reconciliation of force with diplomacy in the U.S. policy process. American leaders from the turn of the century, civilian as well as military, accepted the interventionist ethic as a national duty of the stronger nations. No thought was given to the political and social consequences of policy in the host country. Policy makers had no conception that courses of action which they generally viewed as altruistic often succeeded in building in the long term only resentment.

II

The primacy of the State Department in the practice of diplomacy underwent a change after World War II with the establishment in 1947 of a formal "national security" organization. The National Security Act sought primarily a new and unified organizational structure for security policy—for the coordination of the military arms, of intelligence, domestic resources and other elements of security at the national level. The primary goal was unification of the services, but of necessity the integration of national political, military and economic resources under a common structure operated to modify the traditional role of the State Department. Processes of international diplomacy, long a sacred

preserve of the diplomat, passed into the realm of an interagency council. A great many issues heretofore negotiated in direct bilateral discussions came within the function of the National Security Council.

The 1947 national security organization, at best a transition document, underwent a decade of legislative change culminating in 1958 in a reasonably sophisticated formal structure for national security planning and decision making. The 1958 amendments reflected President Eisenhower's career experience as Army Chief of Staff, World War II Supreme Commander in Europe, and Commander in Chief in the White House. The law recognizes that separate sea, land and air warfare are gone forever and that planning for the conduct of future wars would be on a national basis, exercising military control through functional unified commands utilizing elements of any or all of the services as appropriate. Seeking a more effective exercise of power, combat forces are mission oriented; the services retain their ground, sea and air roles for little more than to "provide, train and equip" forces for the unified combatant commands. In Eisenhower's words

. . . complete unity in our strategic planning and operational direction [is vital]. It is therefore mandatory that the initiative for this planning and direction rest not with the separate services but directly with the Secretary of Defense and his operational advisers, the JCS . . .

No military task is of greater importance than the development of strategic plans . . . Genuine unity is indispensible at this starting point. No amount of subsequent coordination can eliminate duplication or doctrinal

conflicts which are intruded into the first shaping of military programs.

Nevertheless, the responsibility for "the first shaping" of strategic planning and doctrinal development by the JCS--repeated three times in the Eisenhower message--was delegated by the JCS to the services where large and prestigious staffs dominate strategic planning.

As a consequence, implementation produced interesting comparisons. The Chief of Naval Operations on 11 April 1960 outlined basic Navy doctrine as originating in the Constitution, the various laws, declarations, resolutions and treaties which govern foreign policy, and similar mandates relating to sea supremacy and freedom of the seas. Nothing in the CNO guidance refers to a joint function, to operations other than of the U.S. fleet, or to roles other than in strictly naval warfare.

None of the pertinent Army, Navy and Air Force manuals shows coordination or consistency; they underplay joint roles and propagandize service values in parochially oriented missions. The United States Air Force Basic Doctrine (1971) uses the term "aerospace" 38 times—down from 108 in the 1959 edition. The "US Air Force" or "USAF" appears 24 times, the JCS and DOD only once.

No reference is made to the US Army, the US Navy, or the US Marine Corps. National objectives are referred to only casually and in broad general, philosophical terms. Where Army and Navy doctrines are defensive and retaliatory, Air Force doctrines are offensive

and punitive. Where the Air Force visualizes a short war of extreme violence, the Army and Navy plan longer wars of attrition. If such doctrinal guidelines are considered adequate for individual service needs, without question they are far from adequate for joint, multi-service, or national needs. The strategy they define emerges via a prism seen by one service from the bedrock or terrain, by another through peripheral mobility, by the third through the punitive threat of annihilation.

The effect on joint planning and national decision making is predictable. Joint doctrine for multi-service operations is primitive. The outsider cannot conceive, for example, that despite seven years of costly war in Vietnam involving the loss of thousands of combat and support aircraft, pilots and crews, no common approved doctrine for tactical air support nor for control and employment of other types of fixed and rotary-wing aircraft has yet appeared.

The far-sighted organizational efforts of the Eisenhower era were hardly matched by the implementation. The question is the sincerity of the attempt at honest compliance with the spirit of the law. Sophisticated planning failed to appear because of the hiatus between military and political problems; the relation of power and values, war and diplomacy, has not been bridged. The military staffs develop plans for total victory, for unconditional surrender, for apocalyptic goals, partly because, in Henry Kissinger's words, in such plan all factors are under control of

the military. Lacking a sound doctrinal base, the most powerful nation in the world finds itself paralyzed by the enormity of its own weapons technology. In the military strategic planning void, it was the political leadership which took the initiative in major postwar strategic revisions of 1950, 1953, 1961 and 1967. The irrelevance of doctrines such as massive retaliation, however, indicates a void in political and military thinking and in the proper role of military force in diplomatic, economic and other policies which it presumably serves.

The weaknesses in joint strategic planning and doctrinal development became evident under Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. His limited confidence in the military and particularly in the Joint Chiefs of Staff was ill-concealed. But the McNamara revolution affected primarily the managerial function of Defense. He made no attempt, and in fact it was hardly in his interest, to further unify the military services in their operational role. Systems analysis made the services more competitive in weapons procurement but, lacking either a doctrinal base or true joint service goals, it further intensified parochial differences. When managerial efficiency and doctrinal deficiency combined in Vietnam it proved to the world only that the ability to manage a war is not the same as the ability to fight one. In sum, Defense reorganization in 1958 contributed significantly to a sound formal organizational structure for Defense but the informal oeganization substituted interservice rivalry for military-civilian bargaining.

ENGRETH PERMENT

III

Formal or informal change to improve the efficiency of the JCS-Joint Staff and the national planning organization perenially raises the fear -- more vilified than verified -- of creating a so-called Prussian general staff. The Joint Staff is prohibited by law to function as an overall Armed Forces General Staff; it is merely an advisory body to the JCS. Nor is the JCS technically in the line of command except by delegation of such authority by the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense is neither obligated to use the Joint Staff nor to follow JCS advice when given.

-

Tears of Prussianization are hardly justified by the record.

In recent crises, the military view was subordinate in Korea (1950), Guatemala (1954), Lebanon (1958), Bay of Pigs (1961),

Laos (1961), Cuba (1962), and in the ABM decision (1968). The military view predominated in the Dominican crisis (1965) and was mixed in Indochina (1954), Berlin (1961), and in the SALT negotiations (1971). The Vietnam strategy (1965-1974) is unique.

Politically ill-conceived, strategically unsound and tactically disjointed, it represents a failure of political and strategic decision making and of unified operational control. On the record the Secretary of Defense has rarely considered the Joint Staff as his planning body; it has functioned only marginally as an advisory body in national decision making. In its foreign policy role, therefore, the Defense-JCS structure could hardly be classed as

adequate, the defects being conceptual and administrative as well as organizational.

The rejection, implicit or explicit, of the premise that war is an instrument of policy is in large part the key to overreaction and overmilitarization. The diplomat, hopelessly outclassed in his own contingency planning weakness, defers to the military leadership. The JCS deference on political issues as being the responsibility of the State Department and White House, produces military advice largely devoid of political content. 8 However satisfying this must normally be to the civilian superiors, the "good soldier" philosophy, in a world in which no problem is strictly military nor strictly political, has limitations on both sides. Every recent President has found it necessary to ask the JCS to base their advice not on narrow military considerations but on broad-gauged political and economic factors as well. Military problems cannot be looked at as self-contained technical issues to be treated (as in the classic example of Herman Kahn's On Thermonuclear War) without regard to their political context, nor can they be transformed into something approaching an exact science endowed with exactly defined concepts, rigorous analysis and quantitatively distinguishable models.

Under a cloak of subordination to political authority,

American military leaders voluntarily and traditionally avoid full

and normal participation in the policy process to which their

professional training and experience fully entitles them. The

natural consequence of a national security structure formally involving the Pentagon in the policy making, therefore, has been the rationalization of many foreign policies in military terms. Political problems, when considered in military terms, emphasize military options; superior Pentagon staffing soon makes them military problems.

The national strategic planning deficiencies can be classed as a lack of positive, general, near-term goals, a lack of unity of purpose in joint aims, and a lack of a body of basic doctrine in current unified operations. These deficiencies have kept the military chiefs prisoners of the separate services which they head. The anachronism of strategic planning as a service function rather than as a unified function grossly limits the conceptual grasp. The doctrinal void handicaps the quality of advice to the civilian leadership in national planning and frequently places a strait-jacket on operational performance in the field. Despite the emerging unity among the services developing from closer interrelation of functions, further significant role changes are needed to capitalize upon both operational necessity and the growing harmony of function.

Conceptual deficiencies are aggravated by organizational flaws. A key change in 1958 was the provision for a JCS responsibility in military operations. Nevertheless, vast and prestigious operational planning staffs in the Army, Navy and Air staffs retain major roles at the expense of the JCS-unified command structure.

Retention of significant planning and operational responsibilities by the services monopolizes assignment of top quality officers on service staffs at the expense of the Joint Staff and contributes to overemphasis of service views in combined operations. Interservice operations would both require and stimulate development of strategic and tactical doctrine, but progress toward unity can be realized only by full and complete communication. Without common knowledge and understanding, no discussion leading to militarily sound concepts can flourish. With voluntary acceptance of true joint operations, progress in the development of joint doctrine is inevitable.

Department must inevitably follow from a lessened role for the separate services. With little question the JCS organization has been derelict in developing joint strategic and tactical doctrine adequate for current needs. These tasks are critical to discharge effectively the operational responsibilities currently provided by law. The Vice Chiefs of the services and the Operations Deputies in their primary role fail to use the Joint Staff as their planning staff, favoring duplication of service functions. The overriding aim is to provide and develop plausible alternatives on major policy issues, those alternatives emerging not as cases of special pleading for service interests. Alternatives do emerge in the untidy turmoil of legislative give and take, but the focus should be on the national interest rather than on oblique special

interests of the services. Effective policy planning is too much at the mercy of competitive internal forces which favor "status" rather than "interest" politics. "Status politics" revolve around individual service values and folkways, subcultures and intangibles which, without finding explicit embodiment in political issues, nevertheless determine political consequences. Where external policy is dominated by domestic interests, "interest politics," per Richard Hofstadter, revolve around conflicts of policy: whether we should or should not build an ABM system or a B-1 bomber. Status politics and not public policy or foreign interests in large part dominate JCS deliberations today.

The increasing involvement of Defense in the policy process needs to be recognized and encouraged, not for the purpose of dominating policy issues where responsibility lies elsewhere, but to diminish the tendency to rationalize foreign policies in military terms. Guidelines toward broadened planning perspectives, toward national rather than parochial interests, depend essentially upon two and only two conceptual principles or tests of a policy process.

The first such test of long range planning and the rule to which all others are subordinate flows from the principle that the purpose of military power is to achieve a political objective.

The most complete statement by Clausewitz is

^{. . .} war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse with an admixture of other means . . . This political intercourse does not cease through the war itself, is not

changed into something quite different, but, in its essence, continues to exist, whatever the means it uses, and the main lines along which the events of the war proceed and to which they are bound are only the general features of policy which run all through the war until peace takes place. And how can we conceive it to be otherwise? Does the cessation of diplomatic notes stop the political relations between different nations and governments? Is not war merely another kind of writing and language for their thought? It has, to be sure, its own grammar, but not its own logic.

Accordingly, war can never be separated from political intercourse, and if . . . this occurs anywhere, all of the threads of the different relations are, in a certain sense, broken and we have before us a senseless thing without an object. 10

This is the <u>Principle of the Objective</u>, the first principle of strategy, decision and policy making. The rise and fall of world powers has been more significantly influenced by faulty objectives or faulty strategies toward achievement than by failure to accomplish assigned tasks. Any theory of strategy and decision making requires a clear appreciation of purpose, objective, or effect desired in order to assess its validity.

The second and remaining principle is the <u>Principle of Control</u>, the essentiality of preserving or maintaining influence in order to achieve the objective. Control can be both internal and external. Internal control applies to broad non-military considerations, political, economic, social, cultural and psychological. It applies to military elements, geography, weaponry, morale, technological change, environment, organization, communications, intelligence, and, perhaps most of all, time. External control relates to the same components in the vicinity of the objective,

sense the achievement of the aim in strategy and policy making is the retention of control through pressure, coercion, persuasion, propaganda, bargaining, fear or praise. Control—or center of gravity, to use the Clausewitz term—is the fundamental key to a theory of modern intervention. The task facing the strategist in an adversary situation is to establish and exploit control of the pattern of activities by manipulation of the center of gravity to keep it where the strategist, and not the opponent, desires. The center of influence should be moved by the strategist toward those points within the opponent's structure that are most critical to the opponent and at the same time most vulnerable. Control is gained through manipulation of factors such as geography, technology, resources, intelligence, friction or "fog of war" such as chance or accident, and timing.

Control of strategic time has traditionally meant, offensively, the momentum to gain the objective before the opponent can
mobilize his resources; defensively, a delaying action to buy time
with space to prevent loss of the objective. Strategic time was
brilliantly controlled by the Israeli forces in the Six Day War in
1967, capitalizing on the political error by Nasser which precipitated a war for which he was not ready. Israeli forces carried
out a skillful, aggressive campaign against Egyptian, Jordanian
and Syrian armies in the face of a one to four inferiority in
forces, crushing the first two opponents in simultaneous offensives

while holding off the third, then quickly redeploying forces from the Jordanian campaign for the direct frontal assault, surprising Syrian forces in strongly prepared defensive positions on Golan Heights. Achieving the objectives in each area and in the face of apparent total enemy collapse, the Israeli forces avoided the mistake of MacArthur in Korea of overextension beyond the objective. As a consequence, Israel gained strategic position through defensible desert or water barriers and much foreshortened frontiers.

In a Maoist strategy of guerrilla war, control of strategic time is critically important; the loss of control by the U.S. in Vietnam—although rarely expressed as such—resulted from strategic differences between the American military and civilian leaders in the U.S. and in Vietnam. Military strategists believed in exerting maximum pressure, both psychological and destructive, so as to defeat the enemy in a short, decisive conventional campaign; the strategic failure followed loss of sight of the objective in a guerrilla war: to convert the enemy, not to destroy him.

President Kennedy lost control of the momentum of the war to civilian and military officials in Saigon primarily over issues of napalm, defoliants, free-fire zones and the introduction of jet aircraft. Although there was no significant policy difference between Washington and Saigon, the question of maximum power vs gradualism blurred and soon undermined the strategic effort. The strategic weakness was a clear failure of the objective and

subsequent loss of control of the war. The objective, the establishment of a viable and stable South Vietnamese government and state, required creation of an acceptable alternative political solution to reunification with North Vietnam under a communist government. Control passed to the enemy who skillfully manipulated forces and maintained control of the population despite severe weakness in the field. By the end of 1968, all Hanoi needed to do was to continue to fight unremittingly, state her terms for victory, and sit out the negotiations without making any concessions. The principles of the objective and control are vital to planning and execution; they are the litmus test of a decision structure.

The JCS organization and the national security structure acutely requires as well, guidelines for assessing performance. A planning organization must be responsive, concentrated, able to identify authority, effective (in both resources and manpower) and accountable. Little need be added in further amplification or explanation. A seasoned, mature process should foster the close strategic and diplomatic elements of policy. At each step in the decision process, politics—or to use Clausewitz's phrase, the intelligence of the state—must remain in full charge to insure that the threat or use of force is subordinate to political goals, under political authority, and as freely determined in due political process.

...

From the foregoing, one may well infer that the search for a JCS/NSC organizational structure able to provide truly professional advice to the national leadership on political-military problems must necessarily be strong and authoritarian. If ideal in theory, however, such a goal may be neither possible, practical nor desirable. The enormous political power inherent in the multibillion dollar annual cost of defense guarantees that policy decisions, whatever the framework for decision-making, will be reached not by an idealized, efficient and highly centralized structure but by traditional American legislative style give and take—by avoiding or muting controversial issues, by delay or deferment, by compromise, trade-offs, and log-rolling, by expressing policies in vague generalities to which all parties can acquiesce, and similar techniques common to decision-making bodies.

Assuming that the need is not for an authoritarian national security decision structure, certain models suggest themselves for consideration. One is the case for multiple advocacy. Alexander George maintains that instead of utilizing centralized management practices to discourage or neutralize internal disagreements over policy, an executive can use a multiple advocacy model to harness diversity of views and interests in the process of national policy making. Such a mixed system combines elements of a centralized management model with certain features of pluralistic and participatory systems. 12

A primary problem for the President is the need to find alternate sources of advice on military issues -- including honest dissent. Morton Halperin points out that the military has a virtual monopoly on providing information about readiness and capabilities of US or even allied forces, and the effectiveness of American combat operations. The prestige and influence of the military leaders, particularly in their relations with Congress (and the right to inform Congressional committees directly of their differences with administration policy) highlights the difficulty. On a diplomatic move, the President can turn to career foreign service officers, businessmen, academics, intelligence specialists, and others for legitimate advice. Such alternative sources are rare in the military. The need, therefore is clearly for alternative courses of action over a wide range of possible circumstances. Rather than centralized practices to discourage or neutralize internal disagreements over policy, the executive seeks multiple advocacy to provide diversity of views in the interest of rational policymaking.

The organizational structure for policy decision-making,

Vincent Davis states, can be a flat or tall pyramid. The flat

structure facilitates horizontal communication between individuals

and units at the same level, but it also facilitates communication

up and down the chain of command. The tall pyramid makes horizon
tal communication more difficult because of the emphasis on the

vertical dimension. It stresses the importance of vertical

communication, but precisely because the vertical line is long, it is also frequently congested. The flat pyramid facilitates communication in both directions, hence contributes to high morale and is the ideal structure for stimulating innovative ideas and proposals. The tall pyramid, however, is more effective for certain limited purposes, for tightly controlling and managing important short-range projects (such as the Special Projects Office in the Navy for the Polaris submarine development). The tall pyramid is therefore psychologically satisfying to the top leadership because it gives the feeling of more effective control. Top leaders are more effectively in control, but the difficulty is the temptation to over-control, over-manage or over-administer. An organization should combine both flat and tall organizational modes, retaining the flat when new ideas and morale are primary priorities and utilizing the tall for special urgent tasks where precise management is overriding.

The centralized Department of Defense, NSC and OMB structure emerging since 1961 is a taller and taller pyramid over the structure of the security establishment. This arrangement has stifled initiatives and innovative steps at lower levels, but it has given the Secretary of Defense and his mushrooming staff a psychological satisfaction in the appearance of more effective control. Yet the psychological sense of satisfaction is largely self-delusion.

Control is indicated because the mechanisms are operative, but the send result is frequently disappointing if not disastrous. Limita-

tions on any tight and narrowly controlled group of men running a large and complex organization allow no less.

Last for consideration is the question of a vertical structure typical of the Army organization as opposed to a bilinear structure traditionally favored in the Navy-and toward which McNamara reorganized the Department in 1966. In his words, "the Department of Defense has been given a bilinear organizational structure.

The operational control and direction of the combat forces extends down through one chain of command, and the direction and control of supporting activities down through the other."

The dual roles of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in both executive and support functions violates the principles of dualism just as the Army vertical organization had previously. To the extent that the Chiefs exercise authority in both operations and management, the organization is bilinear only in a technical sense; it ties management and command and blurs the responsibilities on both. Technically, separation is obtained by giving the Vice Chiefs management responsibility, and essentially disassociating the Chiefs from the services. For a great many practical reasons, however, the Chiefs cannot allow the Vice Chiefs a'free hand. The Chief has responsibility despite delegation. The record shows that the Vice Chief handles only about five percent of the duties and the question immediately rises as to whether the separation of the Joint Chiefs from their services was a proper path to follow from the beginning. There are problems both ways. The vertical

structure typified by the Army required major reorganization in every war in which it has been employed; the bilinear structure has a record of smooth transition from peace to war. On the other hand, the Fitzhugh Blue Ribbon Commission concluded that the JCS violated the sense of the law in that its "advisory responsibilities to the President and Secretary of Defense could not properly include operational responsibilities, nor could the members free themselves from their understandable service loyalties." 14

From the foregoing, a reasonably realistic organizational form suggests itself. The law presupposes a bilinear structure with two channels of authority under the Secretary of Defense, one for management/procurement, the other for command/operations. The line authority on the procurement side normally flows from the Secretary of Defense (acting on the advice of the JCS) through the Service Secretaries to the Army, Navy and Air Force. The chain of command for the operations side flows from the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, JCS (Joint Staff) and the unified commanders. (Legally, the line authority is from the Secretary of Defense directly to the unified commands, but in practice is exercised by the Secretary of Defense through the JCS.) In the external organization, major managerial/budget decisions are reviewed at national level, most recently in the Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC) of the NCS. On the command or operations side, the Washington Staff Actions Group (WSAG) coordinates tactical actions. (A sketch of such an organization is attached as Figure 1.) Force




Figure 1

levels on major weapons systems such as bombers or aircraft carriers have profound political and economic implications, and, within rather broad and variable limits, the President in recent years has been too little in control of such major programs. The question is partly the ubiquity of Defense interests throughout the national economy, partly the weakness of <u>influence</u> by other agencies and <u>control</u> by the President over defense programs. The need is clearly to strengthen both lines of influence and control over Defense.

Granted that the question of personal styles of office holders is paramount in the national security organization, the structure should allow the President and his senior advisors an opportunity for a serious look at Defense programs from other than a Defense viewpoint at preselected critical or turning points in such programs. The importance of such a review has been well stated by a qualified student of national security organization:

When individuals in the U.S. Government consider a proposed policy change, they see quite different things. A proposal to withdraw American troops from Europe, for example, is to the Army a threat to its value, a threat to its command organization, its budget and size; to OMB a way to save money; to Treasury a balance-of-payments gain; to State a threat to good relations with NATO; to the president's Congressional Advisor an opportunity to remove a major irritant in the President's relations with the Congress. The differences come from the differing currencies in which they define the issue as well as the stake — whether they see a threat or an opportunity. 15

Each participant sees the issue within the extremes of threat and opportunity. Within each agency, vested interests present

divergent views which cloud agency positions. The heart of the American system of policymaking is a resolution of competing interests. The military establishment must take political, military and other factors increasingly into account, and its executive group must blend the wisdom of civilian and military personnel. In order for a military establishment to function, and recognizing that military force has no intrinsic worth aside from its utility in achieving political ends, it must have purpose, policy, objective and scope. These are determined by the political authority with due regard to the role of other agencies in national security planning, primarily through a much clearer mandate and responsibility for subordinate actions, including a wide choice of alternative and dissenting actions prior to choice.

V

The Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy on 30 June 1975 completed a thorough study of the foreign policy process, including an extensive contract research programs in areas such as defense and arms control. The important findings of the Commission research are less in the substantive recommendations than in the conception of the problem of organizing for foreign affairs. Seeking to avoid either high level abstraction at one extreme or low level tactics at the other, the central issue in organizing for foreign affairs is seen as the vesting and weighting of perspectives and interests—not in

organization per se but which perspectives are introduced and what weights given in regular processes of decision and action.

In the Commission study on defense and arms control, the three general tasks seen as performed by a government organization are:

- * Structuring the permanent government. The national security organization represented initially the perspectives and interests set up in response to problems of the cold war of the late 1940's, vested and weighted in a permanent structure of fewer than a million people (military included). Is the present balance of perspectives and interests appropriate for achieving American purposes as shaped and weighted by a national security establishment of the 1980's of more than four million, 99 percent of whom are members of the Permanent Government, an executive establishment that does not change with Presidents or administrations?
- * Managing the Departments and Agencies. Given the basic structure and processes of the Permanent Government, the central issue is whether the balance between departments and their political managers is appropriate for the problems of the late 1970's and 1980's, and whether the skills of the department managers, given the instruments they control, are adequate for the job.
- Central Decision and Coordination. Often ill-defined and poorly recognized, the problem of central decision and coordination has dominated discussion of national security

organization for a decade and a half. Judgments must be made as to 1) whether the principal formal mechanism for central coordination, the NSC, is sufficiently broad in perspective for present and future problems; 2) whether the sharp line between domestic and foreign policy issues in both formal and informal coordinating mechanisms is appropriate for current problems; and 3) whether the search should continue for a single, dominant mechanism to perform the task of central decision and coordination.

Looking at the structure of the Permanent Government with respect to military intervention, a remarkable change has occurred. Before WW II, U.S. military and Government employees concerned with foreign affairs numbered fewer than 400,000. Today we maintain more than 300,000 active military officers and a national security establishment of over four million people, organized by function and agency to deal with the multiple facets of international affairs wherein each department has a partial, deliberately paro-- chial definition of "the problem" of foreign policy. All of these factors conspire to produce a Permanent Government of vested interests regardless of the administration in power. For example, Secretary of Defense McNamara made his fateful choice of the F-111 as the bi-service, limited war fighter of the 1960's from a choice of specific operational requirements defined by the Air Force Tactical Command alone, and which reflected TAC interests rather than those of the Secretary of Defense and the President. The fighter

BACKET ALL THE TANK MAN

which emerged did not have capabilities suited for the Kennedy Administration's limited war strategy but instead was designed for a nuclear mission McNamara meant to deemphasize.

During the period of the cold war after WW II, security defined in military terms became the overriding purpose abroad, both in concept and in organizational form. The concept has now changed; the organizational form remains. In contrast with earlier eras of American history, American foreign policy became substantially "militarized." The predominent feature of the post—
WW II quarter century was the global expansion of American military influence. At the height of this expansion, circa 1968, the U.S. had defense treaties with 42 nations, 3.5 million men under arms in "peacetime" with 1.1 million stationed abroad manning 2200 military bases in 33 countries. The twenty-five year Defense bill surpassed a trillion dollars and a foreign aid bill exceeded \$150 billion. 17

The military instrument sought neither control nor domination but merely to counter perceived Communist threats to Free World security and independence. Since the principal instrument of involvement was military force, the military and defense professionals played a primary role both abroad and in Washington. As suggested earlier, the National Security Act of 1947 gave form and structure to the fact that U.S. involvement in foreign affairs would no longer be a responsibility for representation and negotiation by State Department, but would involve many departments, primarily

the Department of Defense and the military departments as partners in providing for U.S. national security. The "Declaration of Policy" introducing the 1947 Act states as much. Thereafter, principal declarations of U.S. foreign policy objectives and directives became Basic National Security Policy, National Security Action Memoranda, and National Security Decision Memoranda.

Militarization of foreign policy resulted not from independent action by military leaders, not from organizational structure, but primarily from the conceptions and judgments of Presidents and largely civilian advisors about the importance of the military threat. This was powerfully reinforced by the ease of mobilizing support in Congress and the country for foreign policy objectives justified in military terms, and the ease of White House entry into tough bureaucratic issues of diplomacy or security when symbols of "national security" are involved. Conception, given organizational expression, reiterates and expands the initial concept.

The size, strength and character of the military service, the Department of Defense, and the network of troops and advisors abroad substantially affect 1) the recognition of foreign policy problems as "threats" requiring action, 2) the flow of information about problems recognized and unrecognized, 3) the alternative actions and their relative attractiveness, 4) the pressures in decision making, and 5) the character of actions taken. The expansion of the military establishment <u>followed</u> expansion of

American foreign policy objectives, not vice versa. Once established, this structure influences American foreign policy objectives. Impact abroad is not simply a function of people and money. But these indicators are suggestive. The ratio between Defense and State resources in budget is 150 to 1, in personnel 30 to 1, in employees abroad 100 to 1.

The Commission case studies document the heavy weight of security considerations defined in military terms rather than in foreign policy, economic and domestic terms. For example, Defense budgets are not formally reviewed by the State Department or other external viewers which the Office of Management and Budget requests on other department budgets. Weapons are acquired by a military defining process which in many critical choices are poorly matched to national strategic objectives (F-111, ABM, FDL); weapons for national purposes which do not reinforce a service need develop slowly or not at all (smart bombs, hard-site ABM); and weapons tend to oversophistication and "goldplating," threatening to price the country out of the war-fighting business (MBT-70, Trident). Future requirements for projecting American presence and power require a skillful balance between service conceptions of weapons needs and broader foreign policy objectives. Military strategy and doctrine is frequently deficient, more often leaving serious gaps between Presidential or Secretary of State conceptions and military practice, of which glaring divergencies appeared in Vietnam.

In structuring the bureaucracy, alas, the Permanent Government in national security affairs (as elsewhere) has every incentive to expand and few to contract. Bypass mechanisms are easier to create than to cancel; each administration leaves additional residue for its successors. The Permanent Government has reached elephantine proportions and the effect on the practice of foreign policy is pernicious. Size--sheer, unmanageable size--is the root problem in Washington and overseas today, in two distinct ways, numbers of people and multiplicity of chains of command. Of the two, the latter is by far the more serious.

The second general task performed by a governmental structure, managing the departments and agencies to achieve national objectives, is particularly important in the light of greatly increased complexity of possible military interventions which may be considered in future years. Can one expect that the military services will develop weapons the nation needs, such as a missile, when the military leader responsible for choice may have devoted a career to a manned aircraft or an aircraft carrier.

Despite Presidential or Secretary of Defense initiatives in weapons programs, most of the action most of the time is taken by departments and agencies comprising the Permanent Government (or not taken at all). Departments and agencies are created to pay special attention to particular aspects of a problem. Over time—and not much is required—these organizations develop their own conceptions of how they should fulfill the mission. Organizational

structure creates departmental parochialism reinforced by the environment; the manner in which departments interpret designated missions reflects organizational needs as well as the mission.

A central role of the President and his administration, therefore, is to appraise needs, judge priorities and conception of the national interest, and insure that departmental action effectively serves a broader conception of national needs. This is achieved by reorganization where necessary, by use of independent analysis and implementation analysis, by careful attention to personnel recruitment, placement and training, (none of the case studies, for example, found a Secretary of State making a real effort to manage the activities of the department) and by better understanding of the processes Secretaries are charged with managing.

The remaining task performed by a governmental structure is central decision and coordination. As a general rule, foreign relations cannot be separated sharply into "security," "foreign policy," and "economics." Each is intermingled and is part of a broader problem of domestic politics. Virtually no issue of importance in foreign relations falls exclusively within the domain and control of a single department or agency. Agencies are influenced by the perspective and task which are more narrowly its own, by the concerns of its particular clientele, by augmenting its particular influence in national decisions. In the NSC and elsewhere, participants represent agency views; it is extremely difficult to "negotiate" an agency position for the broader goal without

loss of prestige and influence within the agency and supporting staff. To a large degree the needs of a President and those of "his" officialdom are incompatible. The critical variable affecting which mechanisms are used is the President himself: his personal preferences and style and how confidence flows downward.

Efforts to legislate structure for high-level centralized management and decision, therefore, cannot succeed. The NSC exists only to serve the President; he alone can decide on how he wishes to use it. For centralized management and decision on issues in which the President is personally involved, any executive structure that he finds unuseful will go unused.

VI

Subject to the above, a number of alternative mechanisms can be suggested to assist the President in central decision and coordination at chief executive level.

1. A formal State-centered system: The State Department

SIG/TRG*. This is a State chaired committee system which identifies foreign policy issues requiring central management and brings
recommendations to the Secretary of State (President as necessary).

Established by President Johnson, the SIG and TRG tiers of committees has not worked but has not really been tried, largely because State was not given or failed to assume an adequate permanent role.

^{*}Senior Interdepartmental Group, SIG; Interdepartmental Regional Group, IRG.

- 2. <u>Bureaucratic concensus</u> as tried in the CBW and SALT cases, often did not bring important issues to the President, particularly where agreement could not be reached. Where agreement is reached it represents a lowest common bureaucratic denominator of compromise. Nor can the President be assured that issues reach him in a timely manner. Where bureaucratic agreement is reached, however, implementation follows more easily. Concensus decisions foster a sense of participation and often spares the President vocal conflict and hard choices among advisors.
- 3. An Informal White-House Centered System: Active Presidential Staff Managing Ad Hoc Task Forces. An Assistant for National Security Affairs with two or three deputies and a small 2 or 3 man (NSC) staff, identifies issues requiring strategic management largely through an interagency group chaired by a strong Deputy Secretary of State. When early warning of issues is received, the Special Assistant forms ad hoc task forces of Under or Senior Assistant Secretaries tailored to the problem. The President is exposed to sharply stated views of his own principal barons within the Executive Branch, Congress and elsewhere. The task force dissolves when the problem is resolved. The system assigns specific responsibility to the task for central decision, allows flexibility in membership, encourages serious discussion and hard choice, and produces weighted options and estimates of consequences of each choice. It allows both adequate Presidential and NSC staff control and timing with sufficient interaction among members

in fast moving issues. The system fosters understanding of longer term objectives and consequences and facilitates implementation by involving key individuals in the departments.

Balancing the advantages are clear disadvantages. It demands unusual talent and temperament in the White House and Under/Assistant Secretary staffs, and, given the press of business, may miss important issues for Presidential attention. It fosters resentment in the rest of government about a closed system and excessive secrecy. Actions tend to emerge late, as external deadlines loom, sometimes foreclosing opportunities thereby. It encourages attention to tactics rather than high-level decisions and is limited by the prevailing high-level understanding of the issue. In general, the system has worked quite well.

4. A Formal White House-Centered System: NSC 1969. This system, established by President Nixon on Inauguration Day 1969, evolved after six months experience by addition of fixed committees like the Verification Panel, then became a closed two man system between the President and Assistant for National Security (Dr. Kissinger). The NSC became the principal forum for consideration of policy issues for Presidential decision. A system of NSC support committees through National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM's) from the President or Kissinger directed an IRG (now called IG) to prepare a policy examination of a specific issue, seeking options and not recommendations—so that agency participants became analysts as well as advocates. After a discussion in the NSC,

often frank and heated, the President, privately, would decide and issue an appropriate Decision Memorandum (NSDM).

The system provided a regular, legitimized process for raising issues for Presidential review at very low cost to the President and Cabinet. Examination of the limits of a policy problem was facilitated; a broad gauge of options with rich argument came to NSC/Presidential level without foreclosing choice or preselecting certain options at bureau level. Control of timing and context in which issues arise was easy, as was the problem of Presidential overriding of Cabinet officers. All legitimate interests could be represented and interested parties had their day in court with Presidential adjudication of competing claims. Longer run planning was facilitated, broader overviews encouraged, and the decisions were communicated widely and clearly.

The major disadvantage is the nearly irresistible temptation for the manager of the process to take control. The system tended to bog down in the weight of formal meetings, and though study and decision were facilitated, implementation received little attention. It was over-formal for serious debate and, with information spread widely, leaks were inevitable. Given limits on time and energy, important tertiary areas of foreign policy issues—such as Latin America or Africa—were neglected.

5. Variant: The NSC With Verification Panel and Working
Group. The Verification Panel and special staff or Working Group
was added to the Nixon NSC to add a substantial capability for

interagency analysis of technical issues of SALT.

6. A Closed System: "Kissinger's One Man Band." The chief characteristic of decision and coordination here is not the privacy of the decision but that the shape of the issue is kept secret from the rest of government, Congress and the public. Outsiders, including those with responsibility, cannot even identify alternatives or the grounds on which choices are made. This "system" appeared in extreme form in the latter stages of the Kissinger NSC, he deciding which issues required central direction, the shape, alternatives and choices to be presented to the President. 18

The closed system has undeniable advantages in providing maximum speed and Presidential flexibility, permitting faits accompli which undermine potential opposition, avoids bureaucratic compromise and facilitates dramatic impact of disclosure for domestic political credit. The disadvantages, however, are so overwhelming as not to require systematic evaluation: limited span of control, poor understanding and use of available talent, demoralization, crisis orientation and inattention to longer run problems, poor implementation, suspicion within government and the country, and inattention to consensus building.

Evaluation of the above systems based upon detailed examination of case studies suggests that the closed system, obviously, is rarely appropriate; formal structures like the 1969 NSC system are useful in taking stock of a variety of issues at the beginning of an administration and thereafter in handling second order

issues. The fixed committee at sub-cabinet level is able to provide early warning of issues requiring coordinated management. The informal ad hoc task force is a useful option for selective use in augmentation of other systems in use.

Looking at the national policy process with respect to decisions possibly involving military intervention in future crises, several changes in existing structures appear desirable. Perspectives and interests vested and weighted in the Permanent Government, procedures for managing the departments and mechanisms for central coordination and change need be examined to lessen the militarization of policy options inherent in the present system.

Toward this end the Murphy Commission contract research program suggested a number of measures, including the following:

• Creation of a strong representative of broader security and foreign policy perspectives to identify problems, provide information, devise alternatives, make and implement routine decisions. Preferably this representative would be created within the Department of State at Under Secretary level with an appropriate staff of perhaps 100 professionals; alternately it would be a separate unit of a greatly enlarged NSC staff.

- Joint SecState/SecDefense preparation, presentation and defense of a Foreign and Defense Policy statement to supercede the current Defense Posture Statement. Assuming adequate competence in State, this statement would be presented

jointly to the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees.

- Development of a strong Foreign Service capability for "foreign assessment" in addition to routine political reporting.
- Creation of a Military Operations Analysis Office in OSD focused on military operations and capable of systems analysis and implementation analysis. (Rejected by the SecDef)
- Transfer of military staff responsibility for military operations under unified command to a single military officer with a separate staff for military operations.
- Addition of the Secretary of the Treasury and the President's scientific and economic advisers to NSC membership and redefinition of assignments of Presidential assistants to break down the sharp distinction between "foreign policy" and "domestic" issues. (Not supported by President Ford)

Notwithstanding, the overwhelming conclusion appearing throughout the study and research program is that the national security structure augmented by a strong and capable Defense staffing organization is capable, and usually does, overwhelm the presumably dominant State role in policy. Unless the Department of State can be strengthened root and branch throughout its structure in Washington and abroad, there is little hope that militarization of policy will not only continue but will continue to flourish.

VII

The Murphy Commission research program identified a number of satellite functions or sub-tasks related to foreign policy which merit attention. These are 1) implementation, 2) articulating foreign policy goals and guidelines, 3) attending to the longer run, 4) assessing foreign governments, 5) making ad hoc adjustments for personalities and operating styles. Not included in the Commission study but equally necessary is 6) the function of follow-up and evaluation of performance.

Implementation is at least half the problem in most important decisions and actions. Presidents and administrations dominate important decisions; bureaucracies dominate implementation. The predominant influence over choice among alternatives rests with the President and his associates. When a decision has been made the predominant influence over the character of the action shifts to the implementor, generally the Permanent Government. Perceptions, objectives and constraints differ one from the other. The broader the directive, the wider the latitude for interpretation and for slanting implementation toward organizational needs and interests of the implementor. The understanding by policy and program decisionmakers in both the executive and legislature of institutional factors affecting implementation has been poor. The important issue is to narrow the gap between decision and implementation.

Articulating Foreign Policy Goals and Guidelines is a

difficult and elusive problem. Effective procedures for central decision and coordination on the basis of a reasoned conception of foreign policy objectives will not guarantee an effective American foreign policy. Postwar goals and guidelines have broken down. No longer does the attentive public or other participants in American policymaking know what American policy is for and about. Basic assumptions and simplifications about international politics, how to define security, what constitutes threats to the US—earlier axioms have given way to widespread uncertainty. The chief recent inadequacy in articulating foreign policy goals is nothing more than inattention. Overriding concerns for secrecy, a penchant for puffery, and intolerance for argument or debate clouds both participation and understanding.

CONTRACTOR OF THE PROPERTY OF

Failure in Attending to the Longer Run usually follows overconcentration on the immediate at the expense of the important and
a Government tendency to react to problems rather than initiate.
Policy choices should be made on best projections of longer run
consequences, a difficult alternative frequently because of uncertainty about the future and possible sacrifice of immediate needs.
The circumstances of decisionmaking in the US Government—short
terms in office, domestic constituencies—tends to shorten the
time horizon. Improved long run perspectives require higher
quality forecasting, better long term judgment in regular processes
of governmental decision, a heightened awareness of importance of
long term consequences, better longer run planning staffs and

and longer term (five year) funding authorizations.

The task of Assessing Foreign Governments is a critical component of foreign policy choice: understanding why foreign governments take certain actions, predicting actions they are likely to take, predicting the effect of proposed U.S. initiatives (and redesigning U.S. actions to achieve the desired impact). The U.S. government has not been well served in foreign assessment. Presidents and other policy makers have not understood why foreign governments took certain actions, have acted on poor choices about actions of allies and opponents and have formulated U.S. actions which have been counterproductive. A major function of State (where it is called "political reporting and analysis") and the intelligence community and a function of increasing future importance, State performance has been poor overall, poor in comparison to CIA assessment, poor in comparison to reasonable expectations. Characterized by description rather than analysis, politics too narrowly defined, avoidance of inference or prediction, and argumentative, generalized or irrelevant briefs cloaked in obscure English, the defects illustrate weaknesses in the foreign service capabilities, goals, training, incentives and awards, ignorance of Washington concerns and arrogance of ambassadors. In Washington. the Department lacks the capability to either improve or fully understand field action, and does not raise sharp questions with embassies or require better assessment.

The task of Making Ad Hoc Adjustments for Personalities and Operating Styles is a problem of organizational structures, procedures, tradition, directives—and presidential intentions. The vacuum of the State Department in analysis, decision making and implementation was gradually filled by an expanded NSC staff. In some ways this led to distortion through competing preferences about policy, and competition for power and influence. Chief Executives should and should be expected to make explicit ad hoc adjustments in operating procedures—deliberately frustrating organization charts and the logic of organizational design—to fit the capabilities of key individuals to the Executive's personal needs.

Inherent in both the style and structure of decision making is the task of Follow-up and Evaluation of Performance. Chief Executives and agency heads should, routinely and ad hoc, perform independent study and evaluation of decisions, actions and operations, both failures and successes, relating actions to both near and long term goals, quality of implementation and analysis, accountability by commanders at all levels, performance of individuals, and cost in both resources and manpower.

But a Barrer of the best of th

VII

The Congressional role in foreign policy and Congressional-Executive relations with respect to military power and national policy is an important adjunct of national decision making which

has received too little attention from participants and scholars alike. Under the Constitution, the Congress and Executive share important responsibilities with regard to foreign policy--war power, treaty powers, and the appointive process. Congressional control of the purse strings is a powerful instrument of both foreign and domestic policy. Congress also has sole power to regulate foreign commerce, but in practice has delegated much of these powers to the Executive. The executive-legislative process in theory is reciprocal and consultative, with powers of Congress keyed to the phrase "advise and consent." To get the constitution off on the right foot, President George Washington dutifully visited the Hill to seek such advice. He found it so abusive that he strode from the Senate chamber swearing "never to return to this place"--a tradition unbroken until President Ford's visit a few days after his inauguration in August 1974. (Although warmly received by his former colleagues, he is not known to have returned.) During the interval the presidential potential in foreign affairs had grown to dramatic proportions due only in part to an essentially unpredictable attitude by Congress even in its moments of greatest influence.

The failure of President Wilson to consult Republican members of the Foreign Relations Committee in his deliberations on the Treaty of Versailles led to the destruction of the League of Nations. A generation later, Congress ratified the UN Charter with the provision that American troops would be committed to UN

action only after a Special Military Agreement had been negotiated with the UN Security Council and approved by Congress. The Agreement failed to be negotiated only because of the deepening cold war between the two most powerful members of the Security Council. 19

Yet the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) could hardly have happened without Senate Foreign Relations Committee leadership under Senator Vandenberg. The antiballistic missile (ABM) debate and the Vietnam War brought about new roles for the Congress in shaping and articulating public opinion on national security matters. The vast increase in international trade and investment problems in the 1970's contributed to important growth of the Congress in regulating commerce. The annual defense debate and Congressional decisions on the size of the armed forces, the ships, planes, missiles and other weapons of war, exert major influences on foreign policy and the military support of diplomacy worldwide. Yet these congressional pressures are essentially negative—they tend to hobble the free play of diplomacy by placing limits on resources rather than to extend the leverage of the resources themselves.

Perhaps no area of potential influence gives the legislators more difficulty than the power to initiate war, vested exclusively in Congress by the Constitution, but, prior to the recent War Powers Resolution, virtually under the exclusive control of the Executive. 20 The "dog of war" which Thomas Jefferson thought had been tightly leashed to the legislature somehow had shifted into

the executive kennel. Modern armaments tend to emphasize the executive role. It is often asserted that the initiation of nuclear war could not possibly await Congressional authorization; at the other extreme it is contended that limited wars are inappropriate for Congressional action. There being no wars available other than "limited" and "unlimited," Congressional power is essentially nullified, at least until the Congress can find a mediumsized war in which it can participate. Therein lay the origin of the War Powers legislation.

Attempts were made to restore the balance in the war-making process through ad hoc efforts. Such relatively mild measures as a "Sense of the Senate" resolution calling on the President not to undertake commitments to war without Congressional sanction, repeal of the Tonkin Gulf resolution, and resolutions barring use of American ground forces in Thailand, Laos and Cambodia, generally failed. President Nixon ignored these warnings by expansion of the war into Laos and widespread use of American air power in Cambodia, Laos and North Vietnam. Congress retaliated at last with additional restrictive legislative action culminating in the war powers act, passed over presidential veto, which prevents the President from sending American troops into combat overseas for more than 60 days without the expressed consent of Congress.

Although the Resolution was an expression of popular protest of an unpopular war, the unanticipated consequences may be farereaching. The President must resolve an overseas crisis in less

than sixty days or risk congressional failure to grant an extension. When American troops are committed, the inducement to use tactical nuclear weapons in order to reach an early decision, therefore, may be too strong to overcome. Note that Defense Secretary Schlesinger on several occasions deliberately drew attention to the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea, pointedly adding that American troops will not get drawn into another prolonged Vietnam style war. President Ford has refused on several occasions to rule out first strike use of American nuclear weapons and stated, in reply to a press conference question, that "we had a change of some degree about a year and a half ago, when I took office . . . to maximize our flexibility." Defense Secretary Rumsfeld in the FY-77 posture statement echoed that "we do not preclude . . . first use of nuclear weapons in the defense of our interests." Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General George Brown, discussing tactical nuclear weapons in the current military posture statement, added that "a theory of controlled and limited escalation is inherent in the possibility of this employment." The Resolution was never intended to increase Presidential reliance on nuclear weapons, and the linkage to the War Powers Act is not clear. The conclusion is strong, however, that by reducing the President's other options, the effect will be to increase the likelihood of nuclear war.

Other consequences may be equally adverse to Congressional intent. As a practical matter it is difficult to recall a sizable

intervention which was not popularly supported for at least sixty days. If this be true then the effect is a delegation of short term war-making power to the President. Senator Javits, cosponsor of the Senate version, stated that his bill would give "the President more authority to do what is necessary and proper in an emergency than he now possesses." Congress would appear to have little choice in most cases than to ratify Executive initiatives.

The War Powers Resolution was clearly a protest to the closed, one man policy process of the late Nixon administration. Other less publicized Congressional actions seem better oriented to favorable long term consequences in both concept and potential—but these actions again show a high element of indecision and paradox. Recent increases in staff competency are long overdue. The AEM action, the movement toward a functional, mission oriented congressional budget analysis, offer promise. Yet close observers of congressional-executive relations with respect to foreign policy see little beyond continued subservience of the legislature to the executive. The Murphy Commission report offers valuable indicators on these trends. 21

An interview survey of 105 congressmen chosen in a statistically random selection found widespread and strong dissatistaction with the role they perceive the congress is playing in foreign policy. Yet congressmen are generally satisfied with the executive role and differ widely on what the congressional role

should be, on its nature, extent and limits. They express strong support for organizational changes yet do not see such changes as significant. Most dissatisfaction focusses on inadequate information from the executive and inadequate consultation—the weakest link—so as to be able to reach their own conclusions on policy matters, and hence to fulfill an adequate "review and oversight" role. Desiring to participate in shaping and modifying policies, and when necessary, to check, reverse or initiate policy in cooperation with the executive, they nevertheless do not see direct participation by legislators in the conduct of foreign policy as appropriate.

The significant procedural change toward a unified budget of functional, mission oriented programs found strong support but an undercurrent of pessimism toward adoption. The measure, one of sixteen suggested reform proposals in the foreign policy field, received 76.8 percent support (17.2 opposed); the likelihood of adoption--estimated in the Pentagon as inevitable for the next (FY-78) budget--is only 57.1 percent (42.9 seeing it as unlikely). A tabulation of the sixteen reform proposals, a summary of congressional attitudes and an analysis of legislators' support are attached as Tables 1, 2 and 3. Indeed, one can readily conclude that the Congress continues to satisfy itself with the rhetoric of legislation leaving the hard work of implementation, from policy making to evaluation, as executive responsibilities. Actions to restore the power of the Congress, taken, pending or proposed, are

largely tactical and cosmetic. A revitalized role of Congress in policy making is less a problem of organizational change than of the will and energy of the members. Lacking either in sufficient degree, the executive role will continue to dominate except during those rare historic periods when executive weakness can be misinterpreted as legislative strength. (Perhaps Congressional action in Angola is in this latter category.) Congress, in short, has a marvelous if unfulfilled capacity for oversight, for advice, for constraint, for chastening the presidency and informing the people. But it is inherently incapable of conducting government and providing national leadership in foreign affairs or elsewhere.²²

Careful reading of the Murphy Commission report with respect to Congressional-Executive relations fails to disclose any pattern of recommended initiatives sufficient for sophisticated analysis, perhaps sufficient even to justify the effort of convening a Commission in the first place. 23 With a knowledgeable and well advised Vice President on one side of the Commission discussions and generally less informed and less persuasive members of Congress on the other, it is understandable that the heart of the problem of separate or shared executive-congressional powers was never reached. The congressional members in some instances, in fact, appeared far too willing to interpret events with respect to the War Powers Resolution with a strong bias of self interest.

The Statement of Purpose of the Joint Resolution claims that

it "will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances. "24 The Commission study asserts that reports "by the President to the Congress concerning military evacuations at Danang, Phnom Penh and Saigon, and the recovery of the merchant ship Mayaguez and its crew, " tested the constitutionality of the consultation and reporting sections of the Resolution. In fact, however, the military evacuations indicated far less the imminence than the collapse of all hostilities in Southeast Asia; the recovery of the merchant ship Mayaguez, even though casualties were suffered. involved no remote "imminent involvement" in hostilities as contemplated in the Resolution. In both instances President Ford simply carried out his oft-repeated promise to keep Congress informed. He stated as much to Congressional members at the Mayaguez briefings; this information was repeated to the Commission by the Vice President.

IX

It is neither necessary nor desirable—nor even possible,

perhaps—to offer in crisp summary form an ideal structure for

national security decision making. Some order can be sought from

the wide variety of determinants discussed herein without being

overly prescriptive. Numerous models for national decision making

are adequate to serve the ends of policy oriented toward possible

need for military intervention in future years. Structural, conceptual and empirical variants both formal and informal, successful and unsuccessful, have been reviewed. But what is ideal for one era may be inappropriate for another. Above all, what is ideal for the personal style of one president may be inappropriate for his successor, and if inappropriate it will be unused. As President Kennedy expressed it "There will always be the dark and tangled stretches in the decision making process--mysterious even to those who may be most intimately involved. . . "

Within the Defense department, greater unity of the services is desired by the President, the Congress and the American people. Such unity is embodied in the cognizant legislation and is probably desired by most occupants of the Pentagon as well. It becomes increasingly necessary therefore to re-examine the conditions which stimulate parochialism so as to reduce the harmful effects of rivalry and to increase the sophistication and reduce the prominence of the Defense role in national security policy. The most persistent criticism is the militarization of foreign policy. Lacking sound doctrinal guidelines for interservice operations, strategy remains captive of technology and policy is driven by weaponry. Technology and modern weaponry without sound doctrinal guidelines leads only to militarism.

The President and national policy makers have few sources of military advice other than the Pentagon; that advice is reinforced by the influence and credibility of the JCS in the

Congress, the public and the not wholly disinterested defense industry. Sheer size of the military bureaucracy generates vested interests in programs of its foreign clients which in turn generate pressure for military aid and intervention. The proliferation of foreign policy oriented staffs in Defense (ISA, JCS, the intelligence agencies and service staffs) dominates the policy process with military oriented views, dilutes State authority and further weakens political-military control.

Policy making is also overbalanced by a national security structure performing many tasks of negotiation and diplomacy traditional to the State Department. The NSC, necessary in some form as an institution of major power policy making, also frequently tends to isolate the President from the operational agencies by the addition of another layer to the process. Excessive centralization of control of foreign policy in the White House in turn contributes to further weakening the State Department role and locates the decision process under circumstances where dissenting views are least likely to be expressed. These problems are hardly new. They were noted in a far less complex security structure by the first Hoover Commission, which cautioned against presidential overinvolvement in foreign affairs without proper executive branch consultation.

Elements such as the above weaken the full play of diplomacy and contribute to undue military influence on decision making.

Of major concern to students of administration, these difficulties

violate what should be a permanent non-partisan and inconspicuous institution occupying a key but subordinate role in the foreign policy process. As long as the policy process is dominated by the national security structure, however, the military role will be preeminent. It is vital that control be retained firmly in the civilian executive. The challenge is to make the structure fully responsive to national goals and not merely to the military perspective of those goals.

For all its flaws, the performance of the national security structure in recent years has been generally sound and increasingly effective. The same can hardly be said of the role of the Congress in national security policy. The Murphy Commission, created under the impetus of Senator Fulbright and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, sought to counter the Nixon concentration of power and a plebiscitory president. Given the diverse constituencies of the Congress--uncentralized, undisciplined and uncontrolled yet influenced by disciplined and controlled power blocs--forward looking yet with both eyes firmly on the constituencies -- it is extremely difficult to organize congressional support, easy to mobilize opposition, and impossible to predict either continuity or a specific direction. Given the dominance of interest politics in the congressional morays, the role of the Congress may never be coequal with the executive in foreign policy. Lacking the capacity to exert legislative influence other than a subordinate and generally negative role, well meaning

efforts such as the War Powers Resolution may likely be counterproductive in achieving the desired effect.

Looking to the future with the framework of the immediate past in mind, one is inclined to support the claim of an aspiring Presidential candidate that the soundest element of our governance is the American people themselves, and that popular sanction on national policy, for all the inherent pain and frustration, has been in the end the counsel of wisdom.

Table 1

LEGISLATORS' APPRAISALS OF SIXTEEN FOREIGN POLICY PROPOSALS

		Support			3	Likelihood		
Subject of Question	Support	Оррове	Neutral	п	Likely	likely	Unsure	
More GAO monitoring of overseas programs	84.1%	11.9%	4.0X	(101)	74.0%	22.9%	3.1%	(96)
Executive "unify" budget categories into single authorization for foreign affairs activities	76.8	17.2	0.9	(66)	57.1	42.9	1	(16)
Define Executive Branch consultation obligations	73.0	17.0	10.0	(100)	70.4	29.6	1	(88)
More joint committee hearings, action Senate & House foreign affairs committees	70.0	20.0	10.0	(100)	39.8	58.1	2.1	(63)
Submit Executive Agreements to Congress	62.5	22.2	15.3	(104)	44.3	54.6	1.1	(61)
Executive-Legislative liaison committee to	57.4	27.8	14.8	(101)	0.44	53.6	2.4	(84)
Create Foreign Affairs Research Institute for	56.4	34.7	8.9	(101)	53.8	45.1	1.1	(91)
Change CIA statutory mandate to report equally to	55.6	35.2	9.2	(94)	39.1	58.7	2.2	(9%)
Increase Congressional oversight of CIA by direct	54.7	79.97	18.9	(53)	62.5	35.4	2.1	(84)
The Exec. funds in foreign affairs to full information and access to documents	53.0	36.0	11.0	(100)	37.6	62.4	1	(85)
Strengthen foreign policy committees	46.5	40.4	13.1	(66)	34.4	61.3	4.3	(63)
Question period for Secretary of State on floors of Congress	45.6	9.24	8.9	(103)	19.5	80.8	1	(66)
Establish Congressional General Counsel's Office	39.2	0.64	11.8	(102)	34.8	63.0	2.2	(65)
Form Committee on National Security from combined Armed Services and Foreign Relations/Foreign	28.4	59.8	11.8	(102)	13.7	84:2	2.1	(66)
Foreign affairs listson offices staffed by Congress	27.4	8.09	11.8	(102)	13.2	81.3	5.5	(16)
Create "Department of Peace" Cabinet with primary responsibility in formulation & conduct of foreign policy	23.5	70.4	6.1	(96)	12.1	87.9	:1	(16)

Table 2

CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD SIXTEEN PROPOSALS:

A SUMMARY

MAJORITY Support and Favorable Assessment* in BOTH HOUSES:

Require Executive to "unify" budget categories Give GAO more authority to monitor overseas programs More precisely define Executive consultation responsibilities

MAJORITY Support in HOUSE; MAJORITY Favorable Assessment, BOTH HOUSES:

Increase Congressional oversight of CIA

MAJORITY Support and NEAR MAJORITY Favorable Assessment, BOTH HOUSES:

Require Executive Branch to submit all Executive Agreements Establish Executive-Legislative liaison committee

MAJORITY Support in BOTH HOUSES but LESS THAN MAJORITY Favorable Assessment:

Encourage more joint hearings, legislative activity Tie Executive spending to information, documents

MAJORITY Support and Favorable Assessment in HOUSE BUT NOT SENATE:

Create Congressional Foreign Affairs Research Institute

MAJORITY Support, HOUSE ONLY:

Bring more foreign policy legislative under jurisdiction of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Relations Committees
Revise statutory mandate of CIA

NEAR MAJORITY Support and Favorable Assessment, SENATE CNLY:

Establish Office of General Counsel to Congress

NEAR MAJORITY Support, HOUSE ONLY:

Provide for Secretary of State questioning on floor

NO MAJORITY Support or Assessment in EITHER HOUSE:

Create Foreign Affairs liaison offices staffed by Congress Create Cabinet "Department of Peace" Combine Armed Services and Foreign Affairs/Foreign Relations Committees to form Committee on National Security

^{*} Favorable Assessment = "50-50 or better" chances.

Table 3

LEGISLATORS' SUPPORT OF PROPOSALS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPOSALS' LIKELIHOOD

Proposal (Question Number) Support Likely Unlikely n			Likelih		
Depose 16.7 83.3 (12)	Proposal (Question Number)	Support*	Likely	Unlikely	n
Depose 16.7 83.3 (12)	More GAO monitoring of overseas programs	Support	85.27	15.87	(85)
Oppose 26.7 73.3 (17)					
Oppose 26.7 73.3 (17)	Proposition World Solf builded assessing				(34)
Define Executive Branch consultation	executive unity budget categories				
Oppose 23.1 76.9 (17)		oppose	20.7	73.3	(1/)
More joint committee hearings, action Support 53.1 46.9 (70) Oppose 5.3 94.7 (20) Submit Executive Agreements to Congress Support 56.4 43.5 (65) Oppose 10.0 90.0 (23) Executive-Legislative liaison committee Support 65.3 34.7 (58) Oppose 4.8 95.2 (28) Foreign Affairs Research Institute Support 82.4 17.6 (57) Oppose 9.7 90.3 (35) Change CTA statutory mandate Support 59.2 40.7 (30) Oppose 6.7 93.3 (19) Increase Congressional oversight of CTA Support 78.6 21.4 (29) Oppose 9.1 90.9 (36) Strengthen foreign policy committees Support 56.8 43.2 (65) Oppose 9.1 90.9 (36) Strengthen foreign policy committees Support 56.8 43.2 (65) Oppose 8.6 91.4 (40) Question period for Secretary of State Support 78.3 21.6 (40) Oppose 8.6 91.3 (49) Congressional General Counsel's Office Support 78.3 21.6 (40) Oppose 1.8 98.2 (61) Foreign Affairs liaison office Support 43.5 56.5 (28) Oppose — 100.0 (62) "Department of Peace" Support 30.4 69.6 (23)	Define Executive Branch consultation .				
Submit Executive Agreements to Congress Support 56.4 43.5 (65) (0ppose 10.0 90.0 (23) (65) (0ppose 10.0 90.0 (23) Executive-Legislative liaison committee Support 65.3 34.7 (58) (0ppose 4.8 95.2 (28) Foreign Affairs Research Institute Support 82.4 17.6 (57) (0ppose 9.7 90.3 (35) Change CIA statutory mandate Support 59.2 40.7 (30) (0ppose 6.7 93.3 (19) Increase Congressional oversight of CIA (0ppose 25.0 75.0 (13) Tie Exec. funds to information, documents Support 78.6 21.4 (29) (29) (29) (36) Strengthen foreign policy committees Support 61.3 38.6 (53) (29) (36) Strengthen foreign policy committees Support 56.8 43.2 (65) (29) (40) (40) Question period for Secretary of State Support 32.6 67.4 (47) (49) (49) Congressional General Counsel's Office Support 78.3 21.6 (40) (79) (50) (50) Committee on National Security Support 39.3 60.7 (29) (79) (79) (79) (79) (79) (79) (79) (7		Oppose	23.1	76.9	(17)
Submit Executive Agreements to Congress Support 56.4 43.5 (65) (0ppose 10.0 90.0 (23) (65) (0ppose 10.0 90.0 (23) Executive-Legislative liaison committee Support 65.3 34.7 (58) (0ppose 4.8 95.2 (28) Foreign Affairs Research Institute Support 82.4 17.6 (57) (0ppose 9.7 90.3 (35) Change CIA statutory mandate Support 59.2 40.7 (30) (0ppose 6.7 93.3 (19) Increase Congressional oversight of CIA (0ppose 25.0 75.0 (13) Tie Exec. funds to information, documents Support 78.6 21.4 (29) (29) (29) (36) Strengthen foreign policy committees Support 61.3 38.6 (53) (29) (36) Strengthen foreign policy committees Support 56.8 43.2 (65) (29) (40) (40) Question period for Secretary of State Support 32.6 67.4 (47) (49) (49) Congressional General Counsel's Office Support 78.3 21.6 (40) (79) (50) (50) Committee on National Security Support 39.3 60.7 (29) (79) (79) (79) (79) (79) (79) (79) (7	More joint committee hearings, action	Support	53.1	46.9	(70)
Submit Executive Agreements to Congress Support Oppose 10.0 90.0 (23) (65) Oppose 10.0 90.0 (23) Executive-Legislative liaison committee Support 65.3 34.7 (58) Oppose 4.8 95.2 (28) Foreign Affairs Research Institute Support 82.4 17.6 (57) Oppose 9.7 90.3 (35) Change CIA statutory mandate Support 59.2 40.7 (30) Oppose 6.7 93.3 (19) Increase Congressional oversight of CIA Support 78.6 21.4 (29) Oppose 25.0 75.0 (13) Tie Exec. funds to information, documents Support 61.3 38.6 (53) Oppose 9.1 90.9 (36) Strengthen foreign policy committees Support 56.8 43.2 (65) Oppose 8.6 91.4 (40) Question period for Secretary of State Support 32.6 67.4 (47) Oppose 8.6 91.3 (49) Congressional General Counsel's Office Support 78.3 21.6 (40) (40) (50) Committee on National Security Support 39.3 60.7 (29) Oppose 1.8 98.2 (61) Foreign Affairs liaison office Support 43.5 56.5 (28) Oppose — 100.0 (62) "Department of Peace" Support 30.4 69.6 (23)					
Coppose 10.0 90.0 (23)					
Executive-Legislative liaison committee Support 65.3 34.7 (58) Oppose 4.8 95.2 (28) Foreign Affairs Research Institute Support 82.4 17.6 (57) Oppose 9.7 90.3 (35) Change CIA statutory mandate Support 59.2 40.7 (30) Oppose 6.7 93.3 (19) Increase Congressional oversight of CIA Support 78.6 21.4 (29) Oppose 25.0 75.0 (13) Tie Exec. funds to information, documents Support 61.3 38.6 (53) Oppose 9.1 90.9 (36) Strengthen foreign policy committees Support 56.8 43.2 (65) Oppose 8.6 91.4 (40) Question period for Secretary of State Support 32.6 67.4 (47) Oppose 8.6 91.3 (49) Congressional General Counsel's Office Support 78.3 21.6 (40) Oppose ' 100.0 (50) Committee on National Security Support 39.3 60.7 (29) Oppose 1.8 98.2 (61) Foreign Affairs liaison office Support 43.5 56.5 (28) Oppose 100.0 (62) "Department of Peace" Support 30.4 69.6 (23)	Submit Executive Agreements to Congress				
Oppose 4.8 95.2 (28) Foreign Affairs Research Institute Support 82.4 17.6 (57)		Oppose	10.0	90.0	(23)
Oppose 4.8 95.2 (28) Foreign Affairs Research Institute Support 82.4 17.6 (57)	Executive-Legislative liaison committee	Support	65.3	34.7	(58)
Oppose 9.7 90.3 (33) Change CIA statutory mandate Support 59.2 40.7 (30)		Oppose	4.8	95.2	(28)
Oppose 9.7 90.3 (33) Change CIA statutory mandate Support 59.2 40.7 (30)	Poreign Affaire Research Institute	Support	92 %	17 6	(57)
Change CTA statutory mandate Support 59.2 40.7 (30) Oppose 6.7 93.3 (19) Increase Congressional oversight of CTA Support 78.6 21.4 (29) Oppose 25.0 75.0 (13) Tie Exec. funds to information, documents Support 61.3 38.6 (53) Oppose 9.1 90.9 (36) Strengthen foreign policy committees Support 56.8 43.2 (65) Oppose 8.6 91.4 (40) Question period for Secretary of State Support 32.6 67.4 (47) Oppose 8.6 91.3 (49) Congressional General Counsel's Office Support 78.3 21.6 (40) Oppose 78.3 21.6 (40) Oppose 78.3 (49) Committee on National Security Support 39.3 60.7 (29) Oppose 1.8 98.2 (61) Foreign Affairs liaison office Support 43.5 56.5 (28) Oppose — 100.0 (62) "Department of Peace" Support 30.4 69.6 (23)	roteign arialis Research Institute				
Oppose 6.7 93.3 (19) Increase Congressional oversight of CIA Support 78.6 21.4 (29)					
Increase Congressional oversight of CIA Support 78.6 21.4 (29) Oppose 25.0 75.0 (13) Tie Exec. funds to information, documents Support 61.3 38.6 (53) Oppose 9.1 90.9 (36) Strengthen foreign policy committees Support 56.8 43.2 (65) Oppose 8.6 91.4 (40) Question period for Secretary of State Support 32.6 67.4 (47) Oppose 8.6 91.3 (49) Congressional General Counsel's Office Support 78.3 21.6 (40) Oppose 7.00.0 (50) Committee on National Security Support 39.3 60.7 (29) Oppose 1.8 98.2 (61) Foreign Affairs liaison office Support 43.5 56.5 (28) Oppose 7.00.0 (62) "Department of Peace" Support 30.4 69.6 (23)	Change CIA statutory mandate				
Oppose 25.0 75.0 (13) Tie Exec. funds to information, documents Support 61.3 38.6 (53) Oppose 9.1 90.9 (36) Strengthen foreign policy committees Support 56.8 43.2 (65) Oppose 8.6 91.4 (40) Question period for Secretary of State Support 32.6 67.4 (47) Oppose 8.6 91.3 (49) Congressional General Counsel's Office Support 78.3 21.6 (40) Oppose - 100.0 (50) Committee on National Security Support 39.3 60.7 (29) Oppose 1.8 98.2 (61) Foreign Affairs liaison office Support 43.5 56.5 (28) Oppose - 100.0 (62) "Department of Peace" Support 30.4 69.6 (23)		Oppose	6.7	93.3	(19)
Oppose 25.0 75.0 (13) Tie Exec. funds to information, documents Support 61.3 38.6 (53) Oppose 9.1 90.9 (36) Strengthen foreign policy committees Support 56.8 43.2 (65) Oppose 8.6 91.4 (40) Question period for Secretary of State Support 32.6 67.4 (47) Oppose 8.6 91.3 (49) Congressional General Counsel's Office Support 78.3 21.6 (40) Oppose - 100.0 (50) Committee on National Security Support 39.3 60.7 (29) Oppose 1.8 98.2 (61) Foreign Affairs liaison office Support 43.5 56.5 (28) Oppose - 100.0 (62) "Department of Peace" Support 30.4 69.6 (23)	Increase Congressional oversight of CIA	Support	78.6	21.4	(29)
Oppose 9.1 90.9 (36) Strengthen foreign policy committees Support 56.8 43.2 (65) Oppose 8.6 91.4 (40) Question period for Secretary of State Support 32.6 67.4 (47) Oppose 8.6 91.3 (49) Congressional General Counsel's Office Support 78.3 21.6 (40) Oppose - 100.0 (50) Committee on National Security Support 39.3 60.7 (29) Oppose 1.8 98.2 (61) Foreign Affairs liaison office Support 43.5 56.5 (28) Oppose - 100.0 (62) "Department of Peace" Support 30.4 69.6 (23)			25.0	75.0	
Oppose 9.1 90.9 (36) Strengthen foreign policy committees Support 56.8 43.2 (65) Oppose 8.6 91.4 (40) Question period for Secretary of State Support 32.6 67.4 (47) Oppose 8.6 91.3 (49) Congressional General Counsel's Office Support 78.3 21.6 (40) Oppose - 100.0 (50) Committee on National Security Support 39.3 60.7 (29) Oppose 1.8 98.2 (61) Foreign Affairs liaison office Support 43.5 56.5 (28) Oppose - 100.0 (62) "Department of Peace" Support 30.4 69.6 (23)	Tie Evec funds to information documents	S	61 2	20 6	(52)
Strengthen foreign policy committees Support 56.8 43.2 (65) Oppose 8.6 91.4 (40) Question period for Secretary of State Support 32.6 67.4 (47) Oppose 8.6 91.3 (49) Congressional General Counsel's Office Support 78.3 21.6 (40) Oppose - 100.0 (50) Committee on National Security Support 39.3 60.7 (29) Oppose 1.8 98.2 (61) Foreign Affairs liaison office Support 43.5 56.5 (28) Oppose - 100.0 (62) "Department of Peace" Support 30.4 69.6 (23)	The Exect funds to information, documents				
Oppose 8.6 91.4 (40) Question period for Secretary of State Support 32.6 67.4 (47) Oppose 8.6 91.3 (49) Congressional General Counsel's Office Support 78.3 21.6 (40) Oppose — 100.0 (50) Committee on National Security Support 39.3 60.7 (29) Oppose 1.8 98.2 (61) Foreign Affairs liaison office Support 43.5 56.5 (28) Oppose — 100.0 (62) "Department of Peace" Support 30.4 69.6 (23)		oppose	,	,,,,	(30)
Question period for Secretary of State Support 32.6 67.4 (47) (49) Congressional General Counsel's Office Support 78.3 21.6 (40) (50) Committee on National Security Support 39.3 60.7 (29) (50) Committee on National Security Support 39.3 60.7 (29) (61) Foreign Affairs liaison office Support 43.5 56.5 (28) (62) "Department of Peace" Support 30.4 69.6 (23)	Strengthen foreign policy committees				
Oppose 8.6 91.3 (49) Congressional General Counsel's Office Support 78.3 21.6 (40) Oppose — 100.0 (50) Committee on National Security Support 39.3 60.7 (29) Oppose 1.8 98.2 (61) Foreign Affairs liaison office Support 43.5 56.5 (28) Oppose — 100.0 (62) "Department of Peace" Support 30.4 69.6 (23)		Oppose	8.6	91.4	(40)
Oppose 8.6 91.3 (49) Congressional General Counsel's Office Support 78.3 21.6 (40) Oppose — 100.0 (50) Committee on National Security Support 39.3 60.7 (29) Oppose 1.8 98.2 (61) Foreign Affairs liaison office Support 43.5 56.5 (28) Oppose — 100.0 (62) "Department of Peace" Support 30.4 69.6 (23)	Question period for Secretary of State	Support	32.6	67.4	(47)
Oppose					
Oppose - 100.0 (50) Committee on National Security Support 39.3 60.7 (29) Oppose 1.8 98.2 (61) Foreign Affairs liaison office Support 43.5 56.5 (28) Oppose - 100.0 (62) "Department of Peace" Support 30.4 69.6 (23)					***
Support 39.3 60.7 (29) Oppose 1.8 98.2 (61)	Congressional General Counsel's Utilice	Support	78.3		
Oppose 1.8 98.2 (61) Foreign Affairs liaison office Support 43.5 56.5 (28) Oppose — 100.0 (62) "Department of Peace" Support 30.4 69.6 (23)		oppose		100.0	(30)
Foreign Affairs liaison office Support 43.5 56.5 (28) Oppose — 100.0 (62) "Department of Peace" Support 30.4 69.6 (23)	Committee on National Security	Support			
"Department of Peace" Support 30.4 69.6 (23)		Oppose	1.8	98.2	(61)
"Department of Peace" Support 30.4 69.6 (23)	Foreign Affairs liaison office	Support	43.5	56.5	(28)
"Department of Peace" Support 30.4 69.6 (23)					
Oppose 4.9 95.1 (69)	"Department of Peace"				
		Oppose	4.9	95.1	(69)

^{*}Excludes "Pro/Con" and "don't-know" responses.
**"Likely" includes "50-50 or better" responses.

Footnotes

- l. Laurence J. Legere, jr. Unification of the Armed Forces, Office of the Unief of Military History, Department of the Army, "ashington, D.C., 1950, p. 2. For the following incidents see also John D. Hayes, ed. Damuel Francis Dupont:

 A Selection From His Civil Jar Letters, N.Y.: Cornell University Press 1909 v. m; Fletcher Fratt, Compact History of the U.S. Navy, N.Y.: Hawthorn 1967; Alfred Thayer Mahan

 Sea Fower in its relation to the Mar of 1812, London 1905

 n; Malter Millis The Martial Opirit N.Y.: Houghton Mifflin 1931; Charles L. Dufour The Night the Mar das Lost NY:

 Doubleday 1960
 - 2. Legere, p. 67.
 - 3. Richard D. Challener. Admirals, Generals and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1914, Frinceton U. 1973, p. 364.
 - 4. Challener, p. 405.
 - 5. Ibid.
 - 6. "Special Message to the Compress in Reorganization of the Defense Establishment, Apr. 3, 1958, "Public Papers of the President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958, pp. 278-279.
 - 7. denry Kissinger, "Force and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age," Foreign Affairs, vol 34, Apr. 1956, p. 354.
 - 8. Some maintain that the cleavage is pre-World "ar II or pre-missile era rather than a continuing phenomenon, others that it is post world War II. Yet it cannot be discovered that a Secretary of State has ever appeared before a military appropriations committee to discuss policy implications of a military budget. General George C. Marshall, a great military leader with unique qualifications in relating policy to war, as Secretary of State declined to testify before Congress on the budget because it might be "misinterpreted as an effort by him to introduce a military factor into his work." See Warner Schilling, Strategy, Policy and Defense Budgets, pp. 257-258; Walter Millis, Forrestal Diaries, pp. 230-239.
 - 9. A compilation was made by the author for the Commission on Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. A wide selection of studies on the Defense structure was examined with respect to national security decision—making: by official commissions, pinels, study groups; unofficial(government-supported) analyses; unofficial works

by former bureaucrats; and books by outside organizations and scholars. In a cross-section of approximately 90 such studies, 125 specific defects were found with respect to the role of the Defense Department in the foreign policy process. More than one-half of the recommendations (67) involve inadequate planning and strategic or doctrinal deficiencies; over one-quarter of the remainder allege military domination of policy. Only 10 percent of the recommendations refer to inadequate civilian guidance; another 10 percent refer to over-organization, too many layers, awkward staffing, or options compromised at low level.

- 10. Karl von Clausewitz, Cn War, O.J. Matthys. Jollestrans, N.Y.: Modern Library VIII, p. 596.
- 11. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics, NY: Columbia U., 1961, pp. 162-166.
- 12. See Alexander L. George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," APSR, Sept. 1972.
- 13. Robert S. McNamara. The Essence of Security, NY: Harpers, 1967, pp. 96-97.
- 14. Fitzhugh Blue Ribbon Panel, Report to the President and Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., 1 July 1970, App. A.
- 15. Morton H. Halperin, "The Decision to Deploy the ABM: Bureaucratic Policies in the Pentagon and White House in the Johnson Administration," APSA meeting, Los Angeles, 11 Sept. 1970.
- 16. Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, vol. IV, Appendix K, Defense and Arms Control Mashington, D.C., June 1975, on which the following is largely based.
- 17. There were 380 major installations abroad in 1965; today there are 283, 232 of which are in three countries, 181 in Germany, 27 in Japan and 24 in Gorea.
- 18. A resemblance exists in this practice and what Kissinger preached as a professor, insisting that "the spirit of policy and that of bureaucracy are diametrically opposed."
- 19. Senator Jacob Javits, Who Makes War, 1973, p. 156.

- 20. Public Law 93-148 of 7 Nov. 1973.
- 21. See Murphy Commission Report, Vol V, Appendix M, Congressional Survey, Washington, June 1975. Twenty Senators and 85 Representatives participated in the Survey.
- 22. Arthur F. Schlesinger, "The Runaway Presidency," Atlantic Monthly, Nov. 1973, p. 51.
- 23. The Murphy Commission, a joint Congressional and Executive task, was an initiative of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
- 24. Cited in Murphy Commission Report, p. 198.

Changes in American Public Attitudes Toward International Involvement

John E. Mueller

This paper is an effort to assess historical changes in popular American attitudes toward the cold war and particularly toward its various ancillary concerns: international tensions, the fear of war, isolationism, the willingness to confront (and combat) international communism, the support for military intervention, support for defense spending.

Data will be drawn from a wide assortment of public opinion polls conducted since World War II in which relevant questions have been posed. Of particular interest are the results obtained in a nationwide poll carried out in December 1974 by Louis Harris and Associates and commissioned by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. In this poll a wide variety of pertinent questions were asked and it will be the particular burden of this paper to put some of the results obtained in that poll into somewhat broader historical perspective. Specifically: Do the results of this poll suggest the American public has substantially changed in its attitudes toward aspects of the cold war and international involvement or are the results generally in line with those obtained by polls in earlier years?

The problem of question wording

I must begin, I'm afraid, on a rather tedious methodological note, one developing ideas and a point of view that will recur repeatedly in this analysis. This is my preoccupation with the precise wording of the poll question under consideration.

In my view, the public opinion polling process can be seen as a rather primitive stimulus-response situation. In a rather odd social context the

respondent is peppered with a series of questions delivered by an interviewer who is a perfect stranger. The questions range over all sorts of issues, many of which—most of which?—the respondent has spent almost no time thinking about. And, if the respondent has thought about the issue before, it is often the case that no determined opinion has been reached.

Nevertheless, there the interviewer is, pencil poised, ready to record for all posterity the respondent's reaction to each question, many of which are of necessity rather simplistic or banal. For the respondent the situation often is at once confounding and embarrassing as well as flattering—few people, after all, are used to having their every word taken down as some sort of holy writ (or at least as valued ephemera).

Accordingly most respondents do their best to oblige and are willing, with all the instant profundity they can muster, to react on the spot to the series of questions.

That is what the public opinion polls measure.

The data so gathered can be, I think, a valuable aid in understanding popular attitudes but they must be handled with great care. In particular I have found that one must pay close attention to the precise nature of the question-stimulus to which the respondent fashions a hasty reply. This is the case because on many issues seemingly minor changes in the wording of the question can profundly alter the shape of the response. Respondents often seem to react as much to the tone or context of the question, or to key words in it, as they do to its objective content.

In the present situation, for example, if poll questions asking about US military intervention have the word, "Communist", in them, they simply are not the same questions as ones without that key word no matter how similar they may be on other grounds. Similarly "help defend" is not the same as "send American

troops" nor is "did we make a mistake in Vietnam" the same as "is the Vietnam War worth fighting".

A splendid example of this is furnished in the Chicago Council poll. On two different pages of the questionnaire the respondents were asked if they wanted to expand or cut back defense spending or to leave it at its present level (Table 1). The questions were very similar. As the Council's report observes, however, the context of one question (A in Table 1) was such that trade-offs with other government expenditures were implied. The result was that this formulation of the question found the public 10 percentage points more willing to cut defense expenditures.

It should be stressed that neither version of the question is in any sense "loaded" or "biased". Both are perfectly sensible formulations to get at the issue at hand. But the results should certainly suggest that to conclude 32% (or 42%) of the American public "thinks" that defense spending should be cut is purest nonsense. Public opinion polls are entirely incapable, with any degree of precision, of answering questions like "What percentage of the American public thinks defense spending should be cut?" That question simply has no answer.

In my view, the kinds of public opinion analyses that have the most merit involve comparisons. One can compare subgroups on a single poll on how they react to the same question; one can compare responses to the same question asked at different points in time to assess trends; and one can compare different formulations of a question to see what kinds of words or contexts alter the response patterns. Such analyses are not necessarily sure to be successful but at least they are not fundamentally flawed at the outset.

It is this perspective that will be applied in the observations that follow.

The decline of international tensions

Having declared my methodological purity, I would like to begin by making an observation for which I have very little data.

It seems to me that, internationally, things are a whole lot less tense than they used to be. In particular, concerns that another world war may be around the corner are much lower than they often were in the past--particularly in the chilliest periods of the cold war which began to thaw, I think, in 1963. This says nothing about the reality of the situation of course--it may be that we are in fact closer to World War III now than we were in, say, 1948 or 1951 or 1962. But it seems that public (and official, I think) expectations about such a calamity are much mellower than they have been. We are, in short, more relaxed, more sanguine about a major conflagration. Realistic or not, this perspective informs other attitudes I suspect, including those about defense spending and perhaps about some forms of military intervention.

Let me array what data I have on this point. In national opinion surveys conducted between 1943 and the 1960s, the American public was asked some two hundred times about its expectations of major war. The questions, in various permutations, were of the form, "Do you expect the United States to fight in another world war within the next _____ years?" The results obtained are sketched in Figure 1.6

As can be seen, the issue was often asked about in the 1940s and 1950s and the polls generally discovered a rather considerable popular concern about the dangers of a nuclear war with the Soviet Union—a concern largely neglected by purveyors of fifties nostalgia. The question has appeared only infrequently on polls conducted after 1963, however. This, I would submit, is something of an indication of relaxed tensions since poll questionnaires tend to be filled with items of current topical interest and something that is no longer being

discussed simply doesn't get asked about. The newspapers, which are the chief customers of the polling organizations for these kinds of questions, want topicality, not history.

To a degree the change in the concern about an imminent world war can be seen in the few data points available for the period after 1962. In April 1963, a bare six months after the tumultuous Cuban missile crisis, expectations about a world war in five years had reached a very low level historically, while fewer people expected a world war within one year than in any earlier poll. However, tensions as measured by these two questions had risen by the time they were last asked—in mid-1965 and early 1966 as the United States was moving directly into the Vietnam War. Although the public was probably thinking more of major war with China than with the Soviet Union, the data suggest war expectation questions might well have generated interesting newspaper copy. By that time, however, the polling agencies had lost the habit.

The decline of tensions in the 1960s over a war with the Soviet Union can also be seen in two other comparisons. Twice Gallup has asked the American public to look twenty years into the future and decide which of a list of things "will have happened by then"—one item on the list is "Atomic war between Russia and America."

The question was first posed in December 1959 at one of the mellowest points in the Cold War period. Khrushchev had recently visited the United States and the "Spirit of Camp David" was abroad in the land. The question about war in five years had been asked two months earlier, and it had reached its lowest recorded level. In that atmosphere Gallup found seventeen percent selecting atomic war with Russia as being one of the things that "will have happened" in twenty years. When the question was again posed ten years later, in October 1969, the expectation level had dropped from this rather low score to an almost unmeasurably small eight percent.

Another set of polls asked "Under present circumstances, how worried or concerned are you about the danger of a major world war breaking out in the near future?" In 1964 it was found that 90% expressed a "great deal" or a "fair amount" of concern on this issue. This slid to 83% in 1968 and to 66% in 1972.

It would be helpful to have some really extensive data to demonstrate this relaxation of tensions, but the limited data available (as well as common sense, I think) argue that in this important area there has been a decidedly non-trivial change in international perceptions. The American public still has plenty of things to worry about, but a concern about an imminent nuclear war seems to be much less prevalent than it was in the 1950s and early 1960s. 9

The effect of Vietnam

If the comparative thawing of the cold war and a consequent reduction in tensions and war expectancy is one of the major international events of the last 12 or 13 years, another one has surely been the war in Vietnam. The war, it is often observed, was a "trauma" for the American public—it came close to "tearing the country apart."

An evaluation of the war is partially tapped in one set of questions on the Chicago Council survey—which was conducted after direct American military involvement had ended with the "Peace with Honor" settlement of January 1973 but before the final Communist victories there in spring 1975. Respondents were handed a list of international events and asked to designate which were "proud moments" in American history and which were "dark moments." The results, tabulated in Table 2, show Vietnam (before the final collapse, remember) to be seen as a comparatively dark moment (though it would have been helpful to have more potential dark moments up for comparison—such as the Bay of Pigs, the "fall" of China or

Cuba, the U-2 crisis, etc.). It would be interesting to have this question repeated now to see if the debacle has made the Vietnam "moment" seem even darker. 10

One of the more impressive events of recent years was how casually the American public accepted the Communist victories there in the extraordinary debacle of spring 1975. During the course of the war, many observers warned that a Communist victory in Vietnam might have addre impact on American politics. A rise of a new McCarthism (in simplistic analogy with the "fall" of China) was often predicted.

Actually, Vietnam may have been written off as a bad debt quite a bit earlier. Table 3 details data on a central poll question posed during the war: was Vietnam a "mistake". As can be seen support for the war had already reached low levels as early as 1968 or 1969 with residual support presumably coming only from the most tenacious of hawks.

With this perspective on the war and with American troops no longer engaged there, Americans seem to have been quite willing to forget the whole thing. The Chicago Council survey in 1974 found the public giving about as much attention to "what's happening in Vietnam these days" as it was to "the war in Cyprus". Il So boring had Vietnam become for Gallup that, after the "Peace with Honor" settlement, he never even bothered to ask the American public again whether it felt the war was a mistake—in fact, he largely gave up on the issue as early as 1971.

Support for military intervention abroad

It has been argued that rather imperfect poll data seem to be suggesting two things. First, international tensions with respect to World War III seem much lower than they were 10 or 15 years ago. This presumably would induce the public to be less supportive of US military intervention abroad since it is less afraid of the threat such interventions are supposedly designed to counter—although, of course, it may also see such ventures as less risky than before.

Second, it has written off the Vietnam experience as a big mistake. This presumably means it is likely to be wary of repeating this "dark moment" in its history—although many may see the war simply as a mismanaged fluke without relevance to other affairs or events.

By the mid-1970s has popular support for US military intervention abroad gone down then? It would be great to have data to answer this question with some degree of precision. Unfortunately the poll material that exists on this distinctly non-trivial issue is diffuse and muddled. But the data do suggest some tentative conclusions I think. It seems useful to divide the issue into two areas: 1) support for intervention to aid an attacked friendly power; and 2) support for intervention to prevent the spread of Communism.

1. Military intervention to aid an attacked friendly power. Over the course of the last 30 years various polls have been conducted which included questions asking about US military intervention to aid friendly countries that have become the victims of a foreign invasion. The wording of these questions varies considerably and, insofar as can be determined, the response is affected in major ways if a) the word "Communist" or "Soviet" appears in the question and b) the questions asks about sending US troops, as opposed simply to "helping defend" or "come to the aid or defense" of an attacked power.

The data in Table 4 have been used in one paper 12 to suggest a "substantial drop" by 1974 in support for military intervention. But as can be seen, the 1974 question (from the Chicago Council survey) differs from the earlier two in important ways: it specifically asks about sending US troops and it does not specifically ask about turning back a Communist or Soviet attack. Because of these differences, one would expect the last question to show less support for military intervention. And it does.

One might well argue that the difference of a mere 10 or 12 percentage points between the surveys suggests support for military intervention did not

drop, since that much difference is probably attributable to differences in question wording. ¹³ In fact, as far as I can see from shuffling through all kinds of poll results (a very tedious business), public support for military intervention to defend against an invasion of a friendly power was much the same in 1975 as it was in earlier years in the cold war going back at least to 1950.

I have three chunks of data to support this: a) a comparison of one question asked in the Chicago survey with a question asked in 1951; b) a comparison of questions asked during the Korean War with ones asked during the first half of the Vietnam War; and c) some Gallup results that allow a fairly systematic comparison of attitudes from 1971 with those of 1975.

- a. Table 5 shows a comparison between 1951 and 1975. Both ask about supplying troops to help defend Yugoslavia against an attack by Soviet or Communist armies. Both find about the same (small) percentage in favor. Other countries were asked about by NORC in the early 1950s and by the Chicago Council poll in 1974 but, alas, Yugoslavia is the only country they both asked about.
- b. Table 6 supplies data from polls in which Americans were asked about the advisability of getting involved in other Koreas and other Vietnams. The Korean War polls have an extra response category, "It depends." If one crudely allocates these people into the other three categories (or even if one doesn't), one finds the comparable 1967 Vietnam results (Questions B and C) to be rather similar to those found for the equivalent period in the Korean War, 1952 or 1953.

Questions D and E are included in Table 6 to show what happens when the question tosses the "US troops" issue into the question and tosses the "Communist" issue out: "support" for military intervention drops considerably.

c. Finally, it happens there are data available to allow a comparison

of a poll from 1971 with one conducted in mid-April 1975 at the time of the collapse of the US-supported governments in Indo-China. Opposition to US military interventions is generally higher in the later poll but not greatly so, particularly considering the circumstances under which it was conducted. Furthermore, the percentage in favor of intervening with troops is hardly changed at all.

There are five countries that show an increase of at least 8 percentage points in the "stay out" category between the 1971 and 1975 polls. Two of these, India and Turkey, received a lot of rather bad press during the interim while the drop in attachment to Nationalist China is probably attributable to the substantial relaxation of tensions between the United States and mainland China that occurred between 1971 and 1975. Since the 1975 poll was conducted during the collapse of the US position in Indo-China, it is hardly surprising to find an 8 point rise in the "stay out" santiment with respect to Thailand—indeed that change almost seems rather small under the circumstances.

The other major increase in the "stay out" category is more difficult to assess: West Germany. The 11 point increase is quite striking and can't be explained by any changes of policy or circumstances that I'm aware of. It's hard to put the change down to a generally increased isolationism, however, because the percentage favoring the use of US troops changed hardly at all and because a comparable increase in the "stay out" category is not found in questions about somewhat similar countries like England and Japan. 14

I include in Table 7 also some data from a Harris poll conducted in 1969, in part because their exclusion might suggest I was suppressing data that goes against my tentative argument that there has been no dramatic increase in popular opposition to military intervention abroad to counter invasions against friendly powers. In general one finds a considerable drop in support for military intervention between the Harris 1969 poll and the two Gallup polls of the 1970s.

I am inclined to discount this apparent change however. First, it seems odd that one would find precipitous decreases in support for military intervention between 1969 and 1971, but then find nothing comparable between 1971 and 1975. It is also troublesome that the "No opinion" percentage in the Harris poll is generally so much higher, suggesting less interviewer persistence (not necessarily a bad thing) which makes comparison more difficult.

But most importantly (here it comes again) the 1969 question is worded differently: it asks about support for the use of US armed forces, not US troops. For some, "armed forces" probably suggested air raids and artillery bombardment, a more palatable alternative than "troops" which suggests the foot soldier. That's enough, I suspect, to explain the difference.

2. Military intervention to prevent the spread of communism. All the questions above ask about American willingness to aid in the event of an armed attack against another country. Mostly, it seems, the public is about as willing to help as it ever has been. However there is another kind of military intervention—getting involved militarily simply to stop the spread of Communism, not to defend against an outright invasion. This would envision a situation less like Korea and more like the Dominican Republic in 1965 or Lebanon in 1958.

The minimal data on this score are presented in Table 8 and they suggest a considerable drop in enthusiasm (at least between 1968 and 1972) for these kinds of venture.

Although the word "Communism" still very much inspires opposition in the American public and, although opposition to Communist invasions of other lands may be as high as ever, there is probably a more relaxed feeling about the rather generalized and airy "threat" of Communism than there once was. One poll found that, while 86% of the population in 1964 said it was worried a "great deal" or a "fair amount" about "the threat of Communism at home and abroad," this figure had dropped to 79% in 1968 and to 69% in 1972. 15

In the summer of 1951 NORC asked "If you had to choose, which would you say is more important—to keep Communism from spreading, or staying out of another war?" Faced with this unpleasant set of alternatives, 63% favored stopping Communism, 29% wanted to say out of war. 16 It would be interesting to have this question repeated now. 17 It would also be interesting to have earlier polls to compare with one result in the Chicago Council poll. The respondents were presented with a list of 18 "possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have." Each was to be rated on its importance. "Containing communism" was first on the list. Fully 13% of the public (and 16% of the leaders sampled) found this to be "not important at all" as a goal and 27% (49% of the leaders) found it to be only "somewhat important". 18

With respect to opinion about military intervention abroad, then, the data seem to be suggesting one constancy and one change from the days of the cold war. Americans seem to be about as willing as ever to aid friendly countries if they suffer foreign invasion; but Americans also seem to be less devotedly anti-Communist than they once were and less willing to agree to military intervention aimed merely at stopping the spread of Communism. It would seem that public support for another Korea might be as high as it ever was, but that support for other Lebanons or Dominican Republics would be lower. The public's apparent ability to contain its enthusiasm for Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's recent gambol in Angola is entirely consistent with these findings.

Trends in isolationism

Table 9 supplies poll data gathered over the last 25 years on several isolationist questions—ones which ask respondents if they would rather have the United States be an active participant in world affairs or have it be aloof and independent.

Isolationism so measured grew during the Vietnam War as it did, at least in the responses to question B, during the Korean War. Some of this perceived growth during

the 1960s may be artifact, however. Isolationism as measured by the A, C, and D questions was at a historic low in the 1963-65 period as the Vietnam War was beginning—an effect perhaps of American success at the Cuban missile crisis and of the improving relations with the Soviet Union. To a degree, then, Vietnam may have caused isolationism to increase to more historical levels.

Nevertheless the figures for the mid-1970s in the A and D columns are generally quite high. The question is, will they remain so? Tracing the A question, one sees an unprecendentedly high isolationism reading in spring 1973 in the aftermath of the "peace with honor" settlement in Vietnam. In the Chicago Council survey of December 1974, however, isolationist sentiment had again slumped to its general historical average—normalcy, perhaps. But the spring 1975 reading, in the midst of the Indo-China collapse, is again quite high, a particularly remarkable change because this rather bland question has proven to be, generally, rather imperturbable as poll questions go.

The A question was asked again on a national poll in the spring of 1976 but the results are not yet available. This datum should be a fairly valuable indication of whether the Vietnam-spurred isolationism will be lasting or not.

Support for defense spending

Historical poll data demonstrate rather clearly that popular support for cutbacks in defense expenditures is far higher in the 1970s and late 1960s than it was during the cold war period. Russett has presented data on this ¹⁹ and Table 10 gives samples from his data from the 1950s and updates his data for the period since 1969. (See also Table 1.)

In the 1950s, support for reductions in defense expenditures was comparatively low—in the 1957 question in Table 10, for example, only 9 percent supported reduction even though the question contained the reminder that "the biggest part of government spending goes for defense." The C and D questions allow a comparison

between 1960 and the late 1960s (unfortunately no good data for the time in between seem to exist). A rather dramatic change is evident. The D and E series indicate that the change was not a fleeting one—it persisted (with perhaps a little mellowing) into the mid-1970s. Finally the F and G questions, which are of substantially different form than the others and can only be compared to each other, suggest a possible additional mellowing in 1976—though still not to the levels of the 1950s (similar questions from that time cited by Russett generate much lower support for reductions). A yet—unpublished spring 1976 tapping of question E should help to assess this last finding.

Not only is there far more support today for cut-backs in military spending, but, unlike the situation in the 1950s, the sentiment for such reduction is coming disproportionately from the attentive public. The Chicago Council survey found its sample of national leaders to be substantially more in favor of defense reductions than the general public (Rielly 1975:16-17). And the Gallup breakdowns by education for question D in Table 10 show the college-educated to be 10 or more percentage points more likely to support cut-backs in defense than the grade school educated. By contrast NORC breakdown for question A in the 1950s either show the college-educated to be 15 percentage points more in favor of spending increases (April 1951) or else they find little difference by education (December 1952 and October 1955). 21

I think there are probably two major reasons for this shift in mass opinion and the even greater shift in elite opinion. One of these, of course, relates to the war in Vietnam, a disillusioning experience with military force if there ever was one. For many the war, with the light ever at the end of a receding tunnel, pointed up the emptiness of the military's assurances and increased skepticism about its recommendations. Confidence in the military dropped enormously between 1960 and 1971 as Table 11 shows and hasn't managed to recover very much since. 22

The other major reason for the increased support for defense cut-backs relates to the decline of international tensions discussed earlier. If military expenditures are in part a preparation for war and if war--at least thermonuclear war--seems less likely to happen, it makes sense to some (though it might seem folly to others) to relax this preparedness somewhat and to use the money for something else. Arguments about military spending are much more likely to convince someone who fears a major war within the next 2 years than they are to convince someone who sees no such imminent calamity. And, as the data presented above suggest, while lots of people at various points in the cold war saw a big war as imminent fewer nowadays seem so concerned.

Related to this as cause or effect (or, more probably, both) is the reduced concern about the "threat" of Communism discussed above.

There may also be something of a relaxation in the need to be number 1, if one comes to believe that being number 2 does not particularly portend disaster. One question posed over the last decade (but not, alas, earlier) asked "The United States should maintain its dominant position as the world's most powerful nation at all costs, even going to the brink of war if necessary." In 1964 56% agreed with this rather extreme statement. That figure dropped to 50% in 1968 and further to 39% in 1972, to rise slightly to 42% in 1974. 23

While support for cutting back defense spending is probably higher than it was in earlier years, Rielly's analysis of the Chicago data suggests that this support is by no means firm and unyielding. He finds that around half of those who favor defense reductions can be dissuaded if they are convinced that reduced spending either would increase unemployment or would cause the United States to fall behind the Soviet Union in military strength. Accordingly any politician inclined to see reduced defense spending as a rather popular issue must bear in mind the fact that it would become far less popular if his opponent is able successfully to raise the spectre of potential Communist superiority or of unemployment.

Summary

This paper is an effort to assess historical changes in American popular attitudes toward the cold war and toward various of its ancillary concerns, particularly international involvement. Using post-World War II poll data gathered from various sources and paying particular attention to the precise wording of the questions posed in the surveys' various questionnaires, it is possible to arrive at some conclusions. The conclusions, however, must be rather tentative because there are so frequently major gaps between repeated askings of questions and because there is a tendency on the part of the polling agencies to alter the wording of questions in a manner that greatly reduces their historical comparability.

Among these tentative conclusions are the following:

- 1. International tensions, as measured by the fear of major war, are far lower than they used to be.
- 2. The public reacted with so much composure to the final debacle in Indo-China in part because it had largely written the issue off as a mistake years before.
- 3. In general it appears that public support for military intervention to defend a friendly power against an outside invasion is not dramatically lower than it used to be.
- 4. The public seems to be less devotedly anti-Communist and there probably has been a decline in support for military intervention intended simply to stop the spread of Communism.
- 5. General isolationism was unusually low in the early 1960s and rose considerably from that level during the Vietnam War. It is not clear, however, that this increase will be lasting.
- 6. Support for cut-backs in defense spending is far higher than it was in the cold war period. This is probably due to several related factors: the

experience of Vietnam, reduced confidence in the military, the reduced fear of nuclear war, the reduced fear about the "threat" of Communism, and a relaxation in the psychological need to be number one.

7. The support for defense reducation is by no means firm and unyielding.

Notes

- 1. A number of abbreviations are used to cite these data sources: AIPO (American Institute of Public Opinion—the Gallup Poll); GOI (Gallup Opinion Index);
 NORC (National Opinion Research Center); NPPSS (National Data Program for the Social Sciences—General Social Survey); SRC (Survey Research Center).
- See John E. Rielly, <u>American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy</u> (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1975).
- 3. Another concern is sampling variability, particularly if one uses data going back to the 1940s. See John E. Mueller, <u>War, Presidents and Public Opinion</u> (New York: Wiley, 1973), ch. 1; and Norval D. Glenn, "Problems of Comparability in Trend Studies with Opinion Poll Data," <u>Public Opinion Quarterly</u>, 34 (Spring, 1970), 82-94.
- 4. Rielly, op. cit., p. 16.
- 5. One can also compare them with one's expectations about how the poll should come out—for what that's worth. The precise numbers on a poll do have concrete meaning sometimes if they are measuring a simple, specific behavioral act (like voting) rather than attitudes or opinion. See Mueller, loc.cit.
- 6. For more detail, see John E. Mueller, "Public Expectations of War," American Political Science Association Convention paper, September 1975.
- 7. Data from Roper Public Opinion Research Center, Williamstown, Mass.
- 8. William Watts and Lloyd A. Free, State of the Nation (New York: Universe Books, 1973), 39, 280.
- 9. See also Rielly, op. cit., p. 10. While tensions over a major war may have relaxed, the Vietnam experience still suggests to the public that other kinds of war are possible. One question "Do you expect the United States to fight in another war [not a world or major or nuclear war] within the next 10 years?" found 56% answering affirmatively in Spring 1973 in the wake of the Vietnam

- "Peace with honor" settlement. In Spring 1975, in the context of the Indo-China collapse, this figure rose (temporarily?) to 70%. (Source: NDPSS Codebooks).
- 10. The Korean War is also seen as an especially "dark moment" and it may be that the agonies of Vietnam have helped to reduce the retrospective popularity of the earlier war. For some evidence on this point, see Mueller, op. cit. (1973), 171-72. Intuitively, the popularity of the Cuban missile crisis on this list seems rather low—particularly since President Kennedy's name is specifically associated with it.
- 11. Rielly, op. cit., p. 9.
- 12. Bruce Russett and Miroslav Nincic, "American Opinion on the Use of Military
 Force Abroad," Yale University, no date.
- 13. One question on the Chicago Council survey generated a fantastically <u>low</u>
 percentage in favor of doing nothing: Now let me hand you this card with
 four statements on it. Please read these four statements and tell me which
 one comes closest to describing your own view of what the United States
 should do <u>if friendly countries</u> are attacked.
 - 23% The United States should send military aid, economic aid and, if necessary, send American troops and manpower.
 - 37 We might send some military aid as well as economic aid, but we should not involve any American troops or manpower.
 - We might send some economic aid, but we should not send military aid and should not involve any American troops or manpower.
 - 9 The United States should <u>not</u> send any military aid or economic aid, and should not send any American troops or manpower.
 - 9 Not sure

This question generates only 9 percent in favor of doing nothing, the lowest percentage favoring complete non-intervention on any poll I've seen dealing

with this general issue. The reason for this, of course, is not that total isolationism fell into severe disfavor in December 1974, but rather that the third alternative, proposing a very modest kind of aid, is unique in the questions used on this topic and proves to be very seductive to many of those who would otherwise opt for the fourth alternative (and perhaps to others as well). Accordingly the question cannot be used for making historical comparisons. (Data source: Chicago Council Codebooks.)

14. Data reported by Lloyd A. Free ("International Attitudes of Americans," in Donald R. Lesh (ed.), <u>A Nation Observed</u> (Washington: Potomac Associates, 1974), pp. 143-44) finds something of a drop in support for defense of the European allies between 1972 and 1974: "The United States should come to the defense of its major European allies with military force if any of them are attacked by Soviet Russia."

	1972	1974
Agree	52%	48%
Disagree	32	34
Don't know	16	18

And, unlike the Gallup survey, Free finds a drop in support for the defense of Japan: "The United States should come to the defense of Japan with military force if it is attacked by Soviet Russia or Communist China."


	1972	1974
Agree	43%	37%
Disagree	40	42
Don't know	17	21

Other related data: the percentage who professed to worry a "great deal" or a "fair amount" about "maintaining close relations with our allies and keeping our military alliances strong" stood at 68% in a 1964 poll and rose to 75% in 1968 and remained the same in 1972 (Watts and Free, op. cit., p. 39).

- 15. Watts and Free, op. cit., p. 39.
- 16. NORC Codebooks.
- 17. One might compare these numbers with those in Table 8 from 1968 and 1972—but being careful to consider that getting in "another war" is not simply the same as the "usesof armed force."
- 18. Rielly, op. cit., p. 13 and Chicago Council codebooks.
- 19. Bruce M. Russett, "The Revolt of the Masses: Public Opinion on Military

 Expenditures," in John P. Lovell and Philip S. Kronenberg (eds.), New

 Civil-Military Relations (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1974), pp. 57-88.
- 20. See <u>Gallup Opinion Index</u> 50, 71, 101, and 112. However there is no difference by education on question F in Table 10 (<u>GOI</u> 113).
- 21. NORC Codebooks. See also Russett, op. cit. and Bruce Russett, "The Americans' Retreat from World Power," Political Science Quarterly, 90 (Spring 1975), 1-22. Incidentally, it should not be assumed in assessing these questions that the public has any confident quantitative feel for the level of defense spending. In July 1969 Gallup asked, "Offhand, do you happen to recall about much of every dollar is now spent for military and defense purposes. Fully 71 percent refused to guess and most of those who did were pretty far off (GOI 50, p. 10). See also Mueller op. cit. (1973), pp. 62-63.
- 22. The table also shows that, in general, the last decade hasn't been particularly good for any major institution even medicine or education. This is undoubtedly a multiple effect not only of Vietnam, but also of the recession and of Watergate. (A special effect of the latter can be seen in the "executive branch" row: a drop due to Vietnam, then a gradual rise through 1973 with a precipitous fall afterwards—still unrecouped in 1975.)
- 23. Free, op. cit., p. 141.
- 24. Op. cit., pp. 16-17.






Table 1
Question Wording--Defense Spending

- A. (Hand respondent card "A"). Here is a list of present federal government programs. For each, I'd like you to tell me whether you feel it should be expanded, cut back or kept about the same. (Read list and record below for each item.) 1. Aid to education. 2. Defense spending
- B. Do you think that we should expand our spending on national defense, keep it about the same as it is now, or cut back our defense spending?

	. A	В
Cut back	42	32
Kept some	38	47
Expand	14	13
Not sure	6	8

Source: Rielly, p. 16.

Table 2
"Dark" and "Proud" Moments in Recent US History

Here's a list of international events that the United States has been involved in in recent history. For each, please tell me whether you think it was a proud moment in American history, a dark moment, or neither a proud moment nor a dark moment.

		Proud Moment	Dark Moment	Neither	Not Sure
1.	US role in the founding of the United Nations	82	4	9	5
2.	US role in the Korean War	22	41	27	10
3.	Nixon's trip to Communist China	60	9	24	7
4.	US role in the Vietnam war	8	72	15	5
5.	The Berlin airlift	53	7	15	26
6.	CIA involvement in Chile	7	41	19	34
7.	Kennedy's handling of the Cuban Missile crisis	53	18	14	15
8.	US involvement in the Dominican Republic	10	20	27	43
9.	US role in World War II	69	12	11	8
10.	The founding of the Peace Corps	81	2	10	7
11.	The Marshall Plan of aid to Europe	56	6	15	23
12.	US sending emergency aid to Bangladesh	76	3	11	11
13.	American support of Israel during the October 1973 war	43	11	29	17

Source: Chicago Council poll codebooks.

Table 3
Support and Opposition in the Vietnamese War

- A: "In view of the developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam?" (AIPO)
- B: "Some people think we should not have become involved with our military forces in Southeast Asia, while others think we should have. What is your opinion?" (AIPO)
- C: "Do you think we did the right thing in getting into the fighting in Vietnam or should we have stayed out?" In 1964 and 1966 asked only of those who said they had been paying attention to what was going on in Vietnam (80 percent of the sample in 1964, 93 percent in 1966). (SRC)

For each question the numbers represent, in order, the percentages in support of the war (Pro), in opposition (Con), and with no opinion (DK).

		A			В			С	
	Pro	Con	DK	Pro	Con	DK	Pro	Con	DK
November 1964							47	30	23
January 1965				50	28	22			
May 1965				52	26	22			
August 1965	61	24	15						
November 1965				64	21	15			
March 1966	59	25	16						
May 1966	49	36	15						
Bomb oil dumps									
September 1966	48	35	17						
November 1966	51	31	18				47	31	22
Early February 1967	52	32	16						
May 1967	50	37	13						
July 1967	48	41	11						
October 1967	44	46	10						
bunker, Westmoreland, vi	sit								
December 1967	46	45	9						
Tet offensive									
Early February 1968	42	46	12						
March 1968	41	49	10						
April 1968	40	48	12						
GOP Convention									
August 1968	35	53	12						
Dem. Convention									
Early October 1968	37	54	9				30	52	18
Nixon elected									
February 1969	39	52	9						
September 1969	32	58	10						

Table 3 (cont.)

January 1970	33	57	10			
March 1970	32	58	10			
April 1970	34	51	15			
Cambodia invaded						
May 1970	36	56	8			
November 1970				30	49	20
January 1971	31	59	10	50	49	20
May 1971	28	61	11			
November 1972				29	57	14
January 1973	29	60	11	23	37	14
Settlement						

Sources: Mueller, pp. 54-55, GOI 92, SRC Codebooks.

Table 4

Question Wording: Military Intervention

Sept. 1970: There has been a lot of discussion about what circumstances might justify the United States going to war in the future. Do you feel if each of the following happened it would be worth going to war again or not? Western Europe were invaded by the Communists.

Go in 51% Stay out 32 No opinion 17

June 1972: (Agree or disagree): The United States should come to the defense of its major European allies with military force if any of them are attacked by Soviet Russia.

Go in 52% Stay out 32 No opinion 16

Dec. 1974: There has been a lot of discussion about what circumstances might justify U.S. military involvement, including the use of U.S. troops. Do you feel if ... Western Europe were invaded, you would favor or oppose U.S. military involvement?

Go in 39% Stay out 41 No opinion 20

Sources: Harris Survey Yearbook of Public Opinion (New York: Harris, 1971), 86-87; Watts and Free, p. 281; Rielly, p. 18.

Table 5

Military Intervention to Help Yugoslavia, 1951 and 1974

Aug. 1951: If Communist armies were to attack Yugoslavia, do you think the United States should stay out of it, or should we help defend them? (if "help defend":) Should we send American troops to help them or just send military supplies? (NORC codebooks).

15% Send troops

Dec. 1974: There has been a lot of discussion about what circumstances might justify U.S. military involvement, including the use of U.S. troops. Do you feel if ... the Soviet Union attacked Yugoslavia after Tito's death, you would favor or oppose U.S. military involvement? (Rielly, p. 18).

11% Help Yugoslavia (send troops)

65 Stay out

24 Not sure

Table 6 .

Getting Involved in Other Koreas, Vietnam

A. If Communist armies attack any other countries in the world, do you think the United States should stay out of it, or should we help defend the countries, like we did in Korea? (NORC)

		Stay Out	Help Defend	It Depends	No Opinion
1950	September	14	66	15	5
	December	28	48	15	9
1951	August	28	53	13	6
	December	30	52	13	5
1952	June	33	45	15	6
	October	31	45	18	6
1953	August	36	45	13	6
	November	26	52	17	5
1955	October	28	52	14	6
1956	November	24	52	20	4

Source: NORC Codebooks.

B. Dec. 1967 "In the future, do you feel the United States has an obligation to defend other Vietnams if they are threatened by Communism?"

39 44 17

C. Dec. 1967 (Roughly): Should US go to the defense of Thailand if that country were threatened by Communism?

36 42 22

D. Oct. 1967 "If a situation like Vietnam were to develop in another part of the world, do you think the U.S. should or should not send troops?"

57 29 14 E. Jan. 1969 (same) 62 25 13

Source: Mueller, 1973, pp. 111-12.

Table 7

Military Intervention to Help Various Countries, 1969, 1971, 1975

April 1969: "If ... were invaded by outside Communist forces" would you favor American action with "US armed forces", "military and economic aid", or "stay out". (Harris)

April 1971, April 1975: "In the event a nation is attacked by Communist-backed forces, there are several things the U.S. can do about it—send American troops OR send military supplies but not send American troops OR refuse to get involved. What action would you want to see us take if ... is attacked?" (Gallup)

		Armed forces/ Troops	Aid/ Supplies	Stay Out	No Opinion
West Germany	1969	38	21	28	13
	1971	28	41	22	9
	1975	27	32	33	8
Israel	1969 1971	9	35 44	39 33	17 12
	1975	12	42	37	9
Japan	1969	27	15	21	37
	1971	17	34	38	11
	1975	16	35	40	9
England	1971 1975	37 37	33 30	19 24	11 9
India	1969 1971	22 7 7	15 40	40 39	23 14
Mexico	1975 1969	52	34 24	47 13	12
	1971	45	26	19	10
	1975	42	25	23	10
Thailand	1969	25	15	37	23
	1971	11	36	38	15
	1975	10	32	46	12
Brazil	1969	34	18	28	20
	1971	16	36	33	15
	1975	15	33	39	13
Nationalist China (Taiwan)	1969	26	15	36	23
	1971	11	30	45	14
	1975	8	27	54	11

Table 7 (cont.)

Canada	1969	57	22	11	10
	1971				
	1975	57	19	14	10
Saudia Arabia	1975	7	27	54	12
Philippines	1969	30	17	19	34
	1971				
	1975	29	34	26	11
Turkey	1971	10	36	37	17
	1975	9	29	49	13

Sources: Time, May 2, 1969; Russett and Nincic; GOI 121, July 1975.

Table 8

Military Intervention to Prevent the Spread of Communism

The U.S. should take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to prevent the spread of communism to any other parts of the free world.

	1968	1972
Agree	57%	46%
Disagree	29	43
Don't know	1.4	11

Source: Watts and Free, p. 217.

Table 9

Questions on Isolationism

- Do you think it will be best for the future of this country if we take an active part in world affairs, or if we stay out of world affairs? (NORC, AIPO) A.
- Do you feel that since the war this country has gone too far in concerning itself with problems in other parts of the world, or not? (NORC, SRC) В.
- Would it be better for the United States to keep independent in world affairs--or would it be better for the United States to work closely with other nations? (AIPO) :
- The United States should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along as best they can on their own. Do you agree or disagree? D.

For each question the numbers represent, in order, the percentages responding with an isolationist response, an interventionalist response, and no opinion.

		۷			м			υ			O	
	Stay	Active	No	Too		No	Keep Inde-	Work	N ON	Mind Busi-		No
	Out	Part	Opinion	Far	Not	Opinion	pendent	Closely	Opinion	ness	No	Opini
October 1945	19	02	11				•					
1947	25	89	7									
April 1949				41	20	6						
September 1949	25	29	80					1				
October 1949				48	41	11						
January 1950	24	29	6									
June 1950				36	24	10			þ			
November 1950	25	99	11									
December 1950	25	99	6	36	48	13						
October 1952	23	89	6	55a	32	12						
February 1953	22	73	2									
August 1953							15	78 7				
September 1953	21	71	8									
Apr11 1954	25	69	9									
October 1954				41a	917	12						
March 1955	21	72	7									:
November 1956	25	71	4									32
April 1963							10	82	8			

33

Table 9 (cont.)

16	79	\$			18	70	12
				2			
	,				27	99	7
			22 72	9	ì	3	•
					35	98	0
32	65	4			3	2	•
					17	7.7	13
24		10			!	:	1
35	09	4					

Sources: Mueller (1973), p. 110; Rfelly, p. 12; Free, p. 144; Current Opinion, Apr. 1975; NDPSS Codebooks.

^aSome people think that since the end of the last world war this country has gone too far in concerning itself with problems in other parts of the world. How do you feel about this? (SRC) Qualified isolationist and internationalist responses are included in the figures given. They total 9 and 7 percent for the 1952 survey, respectively, and 6 and 6 percent for the 1954 survey.

Table 10

Attitudes on Defense Spending

A. During the coming year, do you think we should cut down the amount we are spending on our rearmament program, keep it about the same, or spend even more on our armed forces? (NORC 302) (NORC 334)

April 1951	8%	Cut	down	39	Keep	same	44	Spend	more	9	DK
Dec. 1952	117	Cut	down	52	Keep	same	31	Spend	more	6	DK

Oct. 1955 Same, except "arms program" instead of "rearmament program" (NORC 378)
87 Cut down 60 Keep same 26 Spend more 6 DK

B. Feb. 1957 The biggest part of government spending goes for defense. Do you think this sum should be increased, decreased or kept about the same as it was last year? (AIPO 579)

9% Decreased

C. Spring 1960 There is much discussion as to the amount this country should spend for national defense. How do you feel about this—do you think we are spending too little, too much, or about the right amount?

18% Too much 45 About right 21 Too little 16 DK

D. Same, except "the government in Washington should spend for national defense and military purposes" instead of "the country should spend for national defense".

July 1969	52% Too much	31 About right	8 Too little	9 DK
Nov. 1969	46%	or inducting	0 100 110011	, 5.0
Mar. 1971	49%	31	11	9
Feb. 1973	42%	40	. 8	10
Sept. 1973	46%	30	13	11
Sept. 1974	44%	32	12	12

E. We are faced with many problems in the country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I would like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money or about the right amount ... (9) the military, armaments and defense.

Apr.	1973	38% Too much	45	About right	11	Too little	6	DK
Apr.	1974	31%	45		17		7	
Apr.	1975	31%	46		17		7	

F. Oct. 1974 Choose between "The Federal government should reduce spending for military and defense purposes" and "The Federal government should not reduce spending for military and defense purposes."

55% Reduce spending

45 Not reduce spending

Table 10 (cont.)

G. Feb. 1976 Government spending for military defense should be reduced.

37% Agree 52 Disagree 11 No opinion

Sources: Russett; NORC Codebooks; GOI 112, Oct. 1974; NDPSS Codebooks; GOI 113, Nov. 1974; New York Times, Feb. 13, 1976.

Table 11

Public Confidence in Various US Institutions

As far as the people running these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them?

% with a great deal of confidence in:

	1966	1971	1972	Spring 1973	Spring 1974	Spring 1975
Banks and financial institutions	67	36	39		-	32
Major companies	55	27	27	29	31	19
Organized religion	41	27	30	35	44	24
Education	61	37	33	37	49	31
Executive branch of the federal gov't	41	23	27	29	14	13
Organized labor	22	14	15	15	18	10
Press	29	18	18	23	26	24
Medicine	72	61	48	54	60	50
TV	25	22	17	18	23	18
U.S. Supreme Court	51	23	28	31	26	31
Scientific community	56	32	37	37	45	38
Congress	42	19	21	23	17	13
Military	62	27	35	32	40	35

Sources: Current Opinion, Nov. 1972; NDPSS codebooks.

THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND MILITARY INTERVENTION

Intelligence and policy-making: U.S. Doctrine

The truism that Intelligence is the first line of defense derives from the fact that foreign policy decisions are made by the President with the advice of his Secretary of State based in theory on the best information available to experts throughout the government. The same applies to the Secretary of Defense and the U.S. military forces of which the President is also the Commander-in-Chief. The collection, evaluation and dissemination of the information on which these decisions are based is the primary function of Intelligence. The information sought and needed concerns the operational environment in which foreign policy decisions are made, i.e. the "set of potentially relevant factors and conditions which may affect a state's external behavior." For this reason Intelligence also seeks to provide sound estimates of the present and future status, capabilities, vulnerabilities and probable intentions of foreign powers. Recent research on foreign policy behavior stresses that although the operational environment sets the parameters or boundaries within which decisionmakers act, it "influences the choice among policy options, that is, the decisions themselves, only as it is filtered through the images of decision-makers...To the extent that decision-makers perceive the operational environment accurately their foreign policy acts may be said to be rooted in reality and are thus likely to be 'successful.'

To the extent that their images are inaccurate policy choices will be 'unsuccessful,' that is, there will be a gap between elite-defined objectives and policy outcomes."

There are two main schools of thought on the relationship of intelligence to policy-making. The traditional view holds that intelligence should be strictly separated from policy-making and operations in order to retain its objectivity. The argument is that if the policymaker is supplied with complete and accurate information with respect to a problem calling for a decision, the options or responses will suggest themselves. At the very least, carefully evaluated information from an objective, unbiased source will increase the decision-maker's chances of making a "correct" decision. The role of the analyst, like that of the intellectual, is to seek the truth, i.e., to find and present the facts, however critical of policy their implications may be. In order to do so, the analyst must stand aside and not be committed to any set of policy preferences which if held would affect his ability to perceive and present facts objectively. The late Allen Dulles stated that the Central Intelligence Agency was founded on the principle of "centralizing the main responsibility for the preparation and coordination of our intelligence analyses in an agency of government which has no responsibility for policy. Policymakers tend quite naturally to become wedded to the policies which they have been responsible for making. Prejudice is the most serious occupational hazard we have in intelligence work."2

A second view holds that intelligence is in fact, and should be,

"policy-oriented." Sherman Kent argues that:

Certainly intelligence must not be the apologist for policy, but this does not mean that intelligence has no role in policy formulation. Intelligence's role is definite and simple. Its job might be described in two stages: (1) the exhaustive examination of the situation for which a policy is required, and (2) the objective and impartial exploration of all the alternative solutions which the policy problem offers. ³

Since this is so, the consumer, i.e., the policy-maker and operator, must supply guidance, not only in setting collection requirements but also for research and analysis in order that the product may be pertinent or "relevant" to consumer needs and problems. However, as Kent warms, the closer the links between policy-makers and analysts, the greater the danger that "intelligence will find itself right in the middle of policy, and that upon occasions it will be the unabashed apologist for a given policy rather than its impartial and objective analyst."

Beginning in 1971-72 a confidential survey on "Intelligence and Covert Operations: Changing Doctrine and Practice" found considerable ambivalence among the thirty respondents polled on the relation of policy-making to intelligence. While there was wide acceptance of the traditional view that intelligence should be separated from policy-making in order to retain its objectivity, nevertheless, two-thirds of the respondents believe that the policy-maker must supply guidance to the analyst or producer in order that the product of the latter may be "policy-oriented" or relevant.

Based on forty years of experience, the former head of the British Joint Intelligence Bureau (Defense), Major General Sir Kenneth Strong makes a number of observations which effectively bridge this paradox:

The relationship between Intelligence officers and policy-makers is of course difficult and complex. The generally accepted view that it is the duty of the Intelligence officer to 'give just the facts, please' has little relevance in a modern governmental structure. In the first place, the facts are often such that the policy-makers are unable to interpret them without expert advice. Secondly, and obviously, the choice of facts is critical, and the Intelligence officer's decision as to which facts are relevant and which should be presented to the policy-maker is often the major initial step in the decision process...

On the other hand, there is a frequent temptation for policy-makers to use Intelligence data selectively to suit their own preconceived judgments or political requirements.

Strong notes that intelligence is frequently blamed for operational or policy errors and suggests that the remedy lies in greater participation of Intelligence officers in policy-planning and operations:

> My experience is that operational and policy errors are often wrongly attributed to inaccurate or insufficient Intelligence. The tactical success of the Gérmans in the socalled Battle of the Bulge in the Ardennes in the closing stages of World War II was vociferously attributed to the failure of Intelligence staffs to provide warning of German intentions. An inquiry by General Bedell Smith immediately after the war absolved Intelligence of any failure on this occasion; such blame as could be attached to anyone was said to rest with the operational staffs. I think that this discussion of the attribution of blame for failures is a fruitless, though continuing, argument. The remedy lies in bringing Intelligence and operational staff more closely in contact, and I am convinced that Intelligence officers should participate directly in any important planning, policy or operational decision-making, both in war and peace

In a sense, the objectives of Intelligence work are to have accurate forecasts of events or stages of development on the desks of decision-makers sufficiently early for them to take action, or, failing this, to have accurate and imaginative estimates of situations on the decision-makers' desks at the same time as the news to which they refer is appearing on the press agency teletype. Obviously, sensible anticipation demands the cooperation of the policy-makers and planners, who must play their part by informing Intelligence staffs of the kinds of matters on which decisions are likely to be made, and the kinds of policies that are being developed.

Divided policy-making and operational responsibilities combined with career-conditioned and institutionalized rivalry have created considerable tension between civilian and military elements within the American and other intelligence establishments, a relationship which sociologists such as Morris Janowitz have called the problem of civilian-military relations. A similar tension exists between policy-makers and intelligence experts, each accusing the other of "intellectual arrogance". After noting such tension, General Strong suggests that the solution to this problem lies in better understanding and closer cooperation between the two elements in the decision-making process:

No Intelligence officer or agency can be right every time, just as no doctor can be infallible in his diagnoses and no lawyer can be certain of the adequacy of his advice on a complex problem. Not even the existence of a first-class Intelligence organization with access to all sources, staffed and trained by the most competent personnel, will guarantee that the right options will be chosen and the right policies pursued. It must, however, be added that there is often an element of intellectual arrogance in the posture of some policy-makers...I have often found myself viewing with appalling mistrust many of the generalizations on foreign affairs and foreign countries aired by those responsible for the development of policy.

In practice, of course, a finely balanced cooperative

system is vital if Intelligence and policy-making are to be sensibly related. In the first place, the Intelligence input must aim at being of such a consistently high quality as to acquire for itself a reputation for indispensability. Secondly, the policy-maker must ensure that the Intelligence staffs receive as much help as is possible in establishing their priorities, so that the bulk of their work will be relevant.9

Ray S. Cline, former Director of Intelligence and Research in the Department of State from 1969 to 1973, has written a trenchant critique of national decision-making as controlled by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, under the explicitly descriptive title, "Policy Without Intelligence". Using the U.S. military alert of midnight October 24, 1973 as a case-study, Cline writes that "shortcomings in the handling of intelligence" were the result of (1), Kissinger's "failure to pass on evidence contained in Soviet statements on the situation" (in American-Soviet diplomatic exchanges); (2), "isolation of intelligence officers from thinking and key questions in the minds of policy officers"; and (3), "policy officers acting as their own intelligence analysts when they have neither technical knowledge nor time to weigh all the evidence objectively." 10 Drawing on his experience as Deputy Director for Intelligence in CIA during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, Cline draws the following doctrinal precepts to which few other experts would take exception:

[&]quot;1. Sharing of intelligence data and diplomatic correspondence at suitable levels is essential to careful decision-making.

^{2.} Sharing of ideas and estimates among senior intelligence analysts and policy-planners is conducive to sound policy.

^{3.} Basing key decisions on careful intelligence analyses is prudent and facilitates the public explanation that breeds confidence."

Covert Operations and Intervention (Doctrine)

Covert operations are a part of the broad spectrum of foreign policy instruments ranging from friendly persuasion through normal diplomatic channels to the direct use of military force in open warfare. Political actions which would prove embarassing if publicly exposed, such as the subsidizing, bribing, and/or blackmailing of politicians and parties are conducted below the covert threshold, along with such other clandestine activities as political assassination and acts of terror, and the use of spies, mercenaries and guerrillas to carry on subversive revolutionary or counterrevolutionary movements. Although states traditionally deny such interference in principle, most of these activities constitute aggressive intervention by one state in the internal affairs of another, and are frequently called political warfare. The common denominator underlying the aggressive use of nonmilitary instruments of foreign policy is their purpose: to extend the influence of one state over another. Influence tends to merge with control, and its ultimate extension is direct military intervention and conquest, in which case clandestine intervention escalates beyond the covert threshold into the open use of force. Political operations, both open and covert, have been called "competitive interference" or "informal penetration" by their advocates, and heralded as a "revolution in statecraft" in scholarly works which attempt to provide a theoretical basis for the analysis of foreign intervention. 12 The first critical examination of the complex

problems involved in the management and control of covert operations was my book, The Strategy of Subversion (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1964). Since the Watergate affair covert operations have come under increasingly sharp criticism culminating in extended Congressional investigations in the mid-1970's.

Like other foreign policy actions, political warfare operations both open and covert depend on intelligence agency support to provide the information and estimates on which in theory they are based. Historically, however, they have often been controlled by special divisions of the foreign office, such as the so-called "Asiatic Department" of the Tsarist Russian foreign office. This changed during World War II when the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and its American counterpart, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) were set up to carry out the political warfare missions of their respective governments, although both agencies also had intelligence collection missions.

Britain's wartime leader, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, created the Special Operations Executive not only in order to collect intelligence but also "to set Europe ablaze." The SOE and the OSS supported resistance movements in Nazi-occupied Europe which conducted widespread sabotage using guerrilla tactics. These later became known as "strategic services." Since all political warfare and sabotage operations are hostile by definition, they can only be conducted secretly by clandestine agencies using traditional espionage and counter-

espionage techniques. Secret political actions (including bribery, sabotage and even assassination) have a dangerously high explosive potential and in the long run may do more harm than good especially in times of peace. When operations of this kind, which are hard to keep secret, are exposed or "blown" (to use the technical term), an international scandal such as the Bay of Pigs results, since no government officially admits that it aggressively intervenes in the internal affairs of other nations using such methods. The same principle applies to domestic political sabotage operations, such as those connected with the Watergate affair. 14

So far as the United States is concerned, in addition to intelligence collection and distribution, the National Security Act of 1947 gave the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) a purposely broad charter to perform "such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council (NSC) determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally" plus "such other functions and duties" as the NSC "may from time to time direct."

Under this broad formula, in addition to being an Intelligence arm of the President, CIA has in practice performed a wide range of covert operations for political warfare purposes. Like its predecessor in this area, the wartime OSS, the CIA has secretly intervened in a number of trouble spots or crises to extend U.S. influence and control and to neutralize Communist seizures of power in the Cold War which followed World War II. A former CIA director, the late Allen Dulles,

regarded such operations as part of the "Cold War Mission" of the agency.

On the highest level, political warfare is rationalized by both the United States and the Soviet Union as "cooperating with our friends abroad" or "giving them moral and ideological support."

In December 1975 when clandestine U.S. support of non-Communist guerrilla forces and factions fighting in the newly independent African state of Angola escalated beyond the covert threshold, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger defended such intervention as necessary in order to demonstrate that the United States still has the national will to behave as a great power. This argument seemed "to revive the postulate that the United States must oppose any Soviet adventure outside the Soviet bloc or lose credibility as a great nation and ally...."

For their part Soviet sources defended Russian support of Communist-led forces as legitimate aid extended to "wars of national liberation."

On the operational level, such intervention has meant air-lifting military advisers and equipment and setting up the intelligence networks on which they rely for vital information. On the lowest level, in the rice paddies of Southeast Asia or in the African bush, it means struggle without quarter between counter-insurgency forces and "national liberation movements" both of which employ all the techniques of guerrilla warfare including espionage, terror and assassination.

American intervention in Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia began with secret CIA-controlled missions and later escalated above the

covert threshold into open military intervention and warfare.

It is this covert operational role of CIA which is the most politically explosive, and which has given rise to much sharp criticism, both at home and abroad. Moreover, the pattern of using clandestine techniques of political warfare and sabotage later spread to the domestic scene, giving rise to the Watergate affair and similar politically oriented illegal operations, conducted for the most part by agents who had had CIA training.

Egan Colby had been head of CIA's Directorate of Operations (formerly called Plans), the agency's single largest division, responsible for all clandestine collection and covert operations and for CIA's eighty-five overseas stations. Employing an estimated 6-7,000 people, the Directorate has had a budget of about \$350 million, nearly half the CIA total.

Since the beginning of the Cold War almost one half of clandestine personnel have been diverted from the primary task of collecting
and processing information, as envisaged by those who established the
CIA in 1947, to warfare, paramilitary or even covert military operations
as in Laos and Vietnam. Following withdrawal of the United States
from hostilities in Southeast Asia, many of CIA's local assets have
been assigned to such tasks as reporting on the international drug
traffic in the area, a traffic linked politically to Meo tribesmen
and other elements formerly supported by the CIA. During his brief

tenure as Director of Central Intelligence Schlesinger indicated interest in the intelligence aspects of the international drug traffic (handled by a new centralized intelligence division of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in the Department of Justice) and international terrorism illustrated by spectacular airplane hijackings, kidnaping and other acts of terror. Colby has kept a much lower profile with respect to both these international problems.

The basic assumptions underlying American political and military intervention in the so-called "Third World," which has been the major target of our covert operations during the Cold War decades, have been false. They reflect a grossly-oversimplified, black and white view of international relations, exemplified by the so-called "domino theory", which since Vietnam has been thoroughly discredited. One of the many ironies connected with U.S. intervention in Angola is that the domino idea was revived by a Secretary of State who prided himself on his political sophistication. Rigorously pursued, the domino theory would reduce American policy until it consisted "largely of reactions to Soviet maneuvers whether or not American interests are directly challenged." 17

In the developing areas of the world, nationalism and the drive for modernization have produced a series of recurrent political and social revolutions which have displaced traditional elites and various colonial and postcolonial ruling groups. As new ruling elites in the Third World consolidate their power and extend their privileges, the

nepotism and corruption associated with traditional societies will almost certainly create burning political, economic, and social grievances. These in turn will lead to new revolutions. In spite of heroic if belated U.S. efforts to arrest the process, this is clearly what happened to the Diem regime in South Vietnam, and the pattern will repeat itself elsewhere. Naturally Soviet or Chinese Communist parties, or both, will seek to exploit such indigenous revolutionary movements, employing their separate strategies of subversion or political warfare. However, the traditional cold war assumption that Communists will automatically succeed in capturing and controlling such movements unless vigorously opposed by U.S. covert operations and counterinsurgency programs is patently false. The cycle of revolution in the developing areas is as open-ended as the process of modernization itself, from which it is inseparable. It bears little or no relationship to the fears and frustrations of political warriors on either side of the Bamboo and Iron Curtains, and even less relationship to their propaganda slogans about the struggle between the so-called forces of freedom (or "national liberation") and forces of slavery (or "neo-colonialism").

Based on a study of the meager historical evidence of covert operations available in the early 1950's and 1960's I arrived at a number of conclusions to The Strategy of Subversion which have since been reinforced by the record of such operations in Southeast Asia, Africa and elsewhere into the mid-1970's. The most important of these conclusions may be summarized as follows.

One: The effectiveness of covert operations as a means of influence, control or conquest has been overrated and their employment oversold--- mainly by self-serving advocates during periods of intense international tension and ideological crusades such as the Cold War or "the lost crusade" in Vietnam.

Two: The potential usefulness of covert operations tends in practice to be lost in a power struggle between the competing bureaucracies most directly involved, namely: (a) a Foreign Office or other top-level foreign policy agency, (b) a military establishment which provides logistic support, i.e., the arms or men or both required for armed insurrection, revolutionary or "wars of national liberation" movements, and (c) a quasi-independent secret intelligence or security police organization which provides the intelligence support, or actively engages itself in covert operation or combines both functions. Such divided policy-making and operational responsibilities (which are inevitable even under totalitarian regimes) tend to institutionalize bureaucratic rivalries and to create serious problems of management and control, as dramatically illustrated during the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in April, 1961.

Three: Divided policy-making and operational responsibilities also militate against the production of reliable intelligence estimates on which covert operations are based, on three distinct levels:

(a) strategic intelligence estimates which are likely to be hadly

(a) strategic intelligence estimates which are likely to be badly distorted during times of mounting international tension or in a militant ideological or crusading atmosphere as evidenced by repeated

"intelligence failures" in Vietnam; (b) built-in distortion factors present in even the most rationally organized intelligence systems such as the feed-back effect when information is collected and evaluated by operational personnel who stand to gain in personal reputation from the successful completion of projected covert undertakings; and (c) counterintelligence measures taken by the adversary to penetrate, expose, neutralize or abort projected operations.

Four: Covert operational agencies repeatedly disavow any policymaking function and are often excluded from a policy role by executive
decree, national legislative regulation, or both. Nevertheless, such
agencies are capable of pre-empting a policy-making role by operations which may predetermine or shape historical events, creating
situations of fact to which foreign policy must then be readjusted,
frequently under adverse or crisis conditions.

Five: Under a blanket of "operational security" clandestine agencies can effectively sabotage foreign policy by bureaucratic deception and delay, or by operating in crisis situations on assumptions diametrically opposed to executive decisions. In such crisis situations the chief executive is a captive of his own staff "for the duration", like the commander-in-chief of allied armies in the field after a crucial battle is joined. For example, the late President Kennedy was clearly unable to obtain compliance from CIA with a direct order to purge known Batista elements from the invasion force which landed at the Bay of Pigs. More recently in spite of an order from President Nixon to destroy them, a subordinate, or better insubordinate CIA official continued to stockpile certain toxic substances. Such incidents have

dramatized what is now openly recognized as the difficult problem of securing effective command and control within clandestine agencies as well as control from above by the chief executive of the State.

Six: Once a covert agency has acquired the international reputation of controlling an effective "fifth column" abroad, this image can be exploited by other powers for their own political warfare or propaganda purposes, and the country becomes vulnerable to all sorts of irresponsible charges which complicate conduct of its relations with the rest of the world.

Seven: No matter how effectively managed or controlled, some covert operations are certain to be compromised and exposed, making the responsible government vulnerable to the charge of lying, i.e., of saying one thing in public (and often in its confidential assurances to other powers) while its agents abroad act directly contrary to such declarations. This has often resulted in serious embarrassment to the Foreign Office or State Department concerned and to its representatives abroad. Eight: The Great Powers have extended "friendly technical assistance" to emerging and client states, helping them build combined intelligence, security police and covert operational agencies, which have done much to increase political turbulence in the Third World with their provocations, plots, counter-plots and assassinations. Some of these provocations have precipitated international crises (such as the extended Congo crisis of 1960-1962 or the imbroglio in Angola in 1975-1976 which has threatened detente between the United States and the Soviet Union). The record of indigenous covert operational agencies in

Sub-Saharan Africa has been a shabby one indeed, and the conclusion is inescapable that by training and supporting such agencies the Great Powers have in fact done a strategic disservice to the peace. 18

To these earlier conclusions should be added at least two others. which for the sake of convenience are here numbered nine and ten. Nine: Covert operations with limited objectives, once a program has started, have a momentum of their own that carries them to a point where they may have unforeseen and disastrous political consequences which were unforeseeable at the time of their initiation. Two examples from recent American and Soviet experience illustrate this principle: (a) the much publicized U-2 incident in which, even on the eve of a planned U.S.-Soviet summit conference, surveillance flights over the USSR were continued, with the unexpected result that Khrushchev was able to exploit them for propaganda purposes and to abort the conference itself; and (b) the Soviet KGB deception or disinformation campaign which contributed to former President Nixon's decision to visit to the People's Republic of China and to seek rapprochement with the United States. According to Arthur Cox, in August and September of 1969 the KGB mounted a major deception campaign which was orchestrated in several world capitals over a period of six months. In connection with armed Soviet-Chinese border incidents along the Ussuri River boundary between the U.S.S.R. and China, KGB agents in Washington and London made explicit threats that the U.S.S.R. was contemplating a pre-emptive strike and that "the use of nuclear weapons is not being excluded." For several months there was a flurry of inspired news

items about aggressive Soviet intentions. "The KGB operation succeeded in pressuring the Chinese to resume the talks, but it also so alarmed the Chinese leaders that they put out feelers for secret negotiations with the United States...which led to President Nixon's visit to China and the ensuing breakthrough toward more friendly U.S.-Chinese relations....Surely no development has provided a greater setback to Soviet foreign policy, and to the extent to which the KGB contributed to this must be considered part of an incredible blunder." 19

Ten: Whenever an adversary relationship exists between two powers the covert action agencies of each justifies its existence and operations on the grounds that the adversary is conducting them. This tends to produce a stimulous-reprisal pattern, especially when clandestine intervention is involved, which escalates the level of reciprocating intervention and creates a "mirror-image" situation in which each power condemns the other for such intervention. This kind of pattern clearly developed in the case of reciprocal U.S.-Soviet intervention in Angola in late 1975 and early 1976. However, in regard to the much broader spectrum of U.S.-Soviet relations in general Arthur Cox writes that: "...both CIA and KGB have been rationalizing the continuing existence of certain operations on grounds that the other is conducting such operations....Both organizations are flawed, both are dated, and both are still conducting political and psychological operations which tend to run counter to the objectives of their governments' foreign policies. Yet, the continuing existence of these organizations is used as a sort of litmus paper, by both sides, to test the true motivation and relative hostility of the other. 20

Couched in general terms, one of the strongest statements on reciprocating intervention was made by Senator Frank Church in a speach on "Covert Action: Swampland of American Foreign Policy," to the Pacem in Terris Convocation held in New York City on December 2, 1975: "Ever since the end of World War II, we have justified our mindless meddling in the affairs of others on the ground that since the Russians do it, we must do it too. The time is at hand to re-examine this thesis."

A confidential survey, previously mentioned, showed considerable ambivalence toward covert operations even among professional clandestime operators. Most of the thirty respondents (two-thirds of whom had served at the Directorate level of various intelligence agencies for an average of twenty-four years) regarded covert operations as an essential arm of diplomacy, but at the same time subscribed to the criterion that they should be used only as a last resort before the direct use of military force in a pre-war situation. There was also general agreement with the proposition that "clandestine operational agencies are capable of pre-empting a policy-making role through operations which create situations of fact to which national policy must later be readjusted, thus creating serious problems of management and control"-not to mention the acute national embarrassment which results when, as frequently happens, such operations are "blown" and become public knowledge. A heavy majority of the respondents also agreed that "covert operations have been oversold and overused as instruments of policy to such an extent that on balance they have become counterproductive." For the most part professional analysts with long careers

in collection, production, estimates and dissemination took the view that these purely intelligence functions should be separated organizationally from politically oriented covert operations. On the other hand, clandestine operators with mainly civilian backgrounds favor the status quo, with covert operations housed under CIA. This is to be expected, given the strong institutional loyalties which develop in all clandestine organizations. Almost all respondents, however, agree that effective control at the policy-making level has been inadequate in the past and wherever they may be housed will present problems in the future. With few exceptions, Congressional monitoring and control was regarded as inadequate and ineffective.

Although most of his professional experience had been spent in clandestine operations, including the Phoenix program in Vietnam, former Director of Central Intelligence William Colby himself publicly indicated a certain disenchantment with them in testimony before the Armed Services Committee on July 2, 1973, when he stated that it was "very unlikely" that the agency would again mount such wide-scale, covert military operations as its support of the Meo tribesmen in Laos.

INTELLIGENCE UNDER THE NIXON AND FORD ADMINISTRATIONS

After this summary of changing U.S. doctrine on strategic intelligence and covert operations, let us turn to a brief overview of organizational changes affecting the Intelligence Community during the Nixon and more recently Ford Administrations. The CIA reached its highest level of power and influence under the Eisenhower Administration when Allen Dulles was its director and his brother, John Foster Dulles, was Secretary of State. These were the Cold War years when the agency was used as an instrument of clandestine paramilitary intervention for the purpose of either supporting or overthrowing various target regimes abroad. The operations were later discreetly publicized by the agency itself as outstanding successes in its Cold War mission. Typical examples were CIA assistance in putting down the Hukbalahap rebellion in the Philippines in the early 1950's; the coup which overthrew the government of Mossadegh and reinstalled the Shah in Iran in 1953; the overthrow by a CIA-directed invasion force of President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in Guatemala in 1954; and finally the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April, 1961.²²

Although after the Bay of Pigs President John F. Kennedy replaced Allen Dulles with John Alex McCone as Director of Central Intelligence, he soon approved a clandestine paramilitary intervention program in Vietnam and Laos, and defended the agency publicly following the assassination in November 1963 of Ngo Dinh Diem in which CIA was implicated. From 1962 to 1973 in Laos the CIA organized and directed a secret army which employed 35,000 Meo tribesmen and 17,000 Thai mercenaries.

President Lyndon Johnson was much too preoccupied with the war in Vietnam to pay much attention to the intelligence community.

Although his relationship with McCone was a friendly one, he regarded

him as simply another source of information, and there is no indication in his memoirs, The Vantage Point, that Johnson ever read a national intelligence estimate.

The war in Vietnam strained civil-military relations throughout the government and within the intelligence community, where problems of divided policy-making and operational responsibilities have always been abrasive, especially in regard to the management and control of covert operations. Moreover, unexpected revelations such as the Pentagon Papers called attention to the fact that, rather than serving as a basis for policy-making, CTA estimates and warnings were frequently ignored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the White House staff. It was against this background that, after his re-election, President Nixon decided to overhaul the two top level agencies most concerned with decision-making in the national security and foreign policy areas.

The Nixon reorganization of the NSC and Intelligence Community was proclaimed with much fanfare as a major reform on November 5, 1971. In addition to the announcement that Richard Helms, the Director of Central Intelligence, had been assigned a broader supervisory role over the entire community, other changes included: (1) establishment of a NSC Intelligence Committee (NSCIC); (2) establishment of an Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC); and (3) reconstitution of the U.S. Intelligence Board. Roughly a year later, in December 1972, the White House announced that James R. Schlessinger, at that time head of the Atomic Energy Commission, would replace

Richard Helms as the Director of Central Intelligence. Apparently the President had been dissatisfied with the way Helms had carried out the planned Nixon reorganization and had given the new Director of Central Intelligence a clear "mandate for change," with a reported deadline of roughly eighteen months to do the job or get swept out of office himself.

The Nixon reorganization was long overdue for a number of reasons. First, there had been pressure from the Executive branch for several years to force the intelligence community to become more responsive to the needs of decision-makers in the national security and foreign policy areas.

Second, Congressional spokesmen had for years been critical of alledged intelligence failures in which the Community had been caught by surprise. The Tet offensive in Vietnam was a classic failure of intelligence gathering and estimating. The highly publicized loss of the spy ship <u>Pueblo</u> and the shooting down of an FC 121 Reconnaissance plane (successor to the U2) were more operational than intelligence failures. But the same could not be said of failure to provide warning of the Libyan coup d'etat of September 1, 1969, in which a military junta of army officers overthrew and replaced King Idris. At that time no one in the entire intelligence community knew who the twelve officers making up the new Revolutionary Command Council were. The Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee was

especially vocal in regard to military intelligence failures.

The third and most important factor behind the Nixon reorganization was an imperative need to reduce and control intelligence spending, which, because of the high cost of satellite surveillance and related technical sensor systems, had reached about \$3 billion annually. The Department of Defense owned and operated many of these systems which provide information of crucial interest to both CIA and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). Defense also funds and exercises some staff supervision over the National Security Agency (NSA), which intercepts and monitors foreign communications, breaks foreign codes and ciphers, and provides for U.S. communications security. These various collection systems and agencies had grown over the years into competing and often overlapping interests with bureaucratic preferences, commitments and momentum of their own. It was widely recognized that the time had come to cut down on intelligence spending by eliminating duplication and overlap.

The Clash of Budgetary Interest

As is frequently the case in bureaucratic politics at the federal level, the allocation of resources through the national budget is a major source of conflict. In the case of the intelligence community, budgetary influences and interactions are extremely complex. They are both direct and indirect.

The main clash of budgetary interests within the intelligence community comes with the preparation of the annual consolidated

Foreign Intelligence Program Budget. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) prepares the consolidated budget, which in turn includes three separate budgets, one for the CIA and one each for the Departments of Defense and State. This is where the crunch comes, since most of the appropriations come from Defense, but little from the Department of State. By law the Secretaries of Defense and State are responsible for the money appropriated to their respective departments. The Secretary of Defense is not likely to permit an outside agency (in this case the office and person of the DCI) to dictate how it spends its own funds, although in practice, "for the good of the cause," large funds are in fact allocated to keep the community functioning.

A number of heavy clashes over resource allocation were expected if Schlesinger pushed his budgetary requirements for the intelligence community in such a way as to clash with the vested interests of the Department of Defense. The expected conflict was postponed by the sudden personnel changes resulting from the Watergate investigation in the spring and summer of 1973, when President Nixon replaced Schlesinger as DCI with William E. Colby and moved the former to the position of Secretary of Defense.

Schlesinger's astringent personnel policies and his determination to carry out budgetary and structural reforms created a great deal of ill-will, not to say bitterness, in the intelligence community, especially in CTA, the agency which was hardest hit and for a time partially paralyzed as even key aids feared the loss of their jobs. Under these conditions during his brief tenure as Director, Schlesinger could hardly be expected to achieve his goal of making intelligence more responsible to national needs as interpreted by the President and his National Security Affairs Advisor, Henry Kissinger.

The Intelligence Community Under Colby

For several months after William Egan Colby succeeded James Schlesinger as DCI, there was some question as to whether the changes made or planned by Schlesinger would be shelved, since Colby came from the clandestine "operations" side of CIA as did two of his predecessors, Allen Dulles (1953-61) and Richard Helms (1965-73). By the spring of 1974 the picture had clarified: the main thrust of the Schlesinger reforms would continue, and Colby was described as "the executor of Schlesinger's will."

The Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (known as the Murphy Commission from the name of its Chairman) in its Report to the President dated June, 1975 gives a carefully "sanitized" description of the Intelligence Community and its functions.

The DCI's Intelligence Community (IC) Staff has attacked management problems of the community by focusing collection and production on key intelligence questions or issue-areas, such as Arms Control

and the Middle East. The IC Staff is subdivided into four sections:

(1) analysis, which includes computer support, automatic data processing and information handling; (2) management, plans and budgetary resources; (3) fiscal; and (4) products, a section which reviews and assesses the products of the community, a function designed to support the activities of the NSC Intelligence Committee, the top-level forum for intelligence production requirements of the nation.

Mr. Colby has followed Schlesinger's example in acting more like a true Director of Central Intelligence than simply like a CIA chief interested principally in operations and covert political action. This enhanced role is illustrated by the sweeping changes Colby has effected in the organizational structure designed to produce national estimates, and by less radical changes in the working-level committees of the U.S. Intelligence Board.

Turning first to national estimates, there were indications that the old Office and Board of National Estimates were being dismantled under Schlesinger. In the midst of considerable controversy, the process continued steadily until they were in fact abolished by Colby. General Danial Graham (formerly head of the IC Staff and Director of DIA) had a major hand in reshaping the national estimative structure along the lines suggested in his article, "Estimating the Threat:

A Soldier's Job." In this article (published in Army magazine, April 1973), Graham frankly acknowledged that the military estimates produced in the Department of Defense during the Vietnam war were so far

off base that they lacked credibility. Policy-makers turned to CIA for such estimates, and the agency responded, producing them in a section of its Intelligence Directorate called "The Office of Strategic Research" (OSR). But Graham argues that, while he was head of DIA's Directorate of Estimates, he restored the Defense Department's capability to produce credible and useful estimates tailored to the real needs of the decision makers. Accordingly, OSR in CIA was phased out of the strategic estimates business, although it still produces current intelligence from a restricted data base.

This working-level reform has had its broad parallel in the replacement of the Office of National Estimates by what, for lack of a better label, may be called a high-level "Staff," of about twelve National Intelligence Officers (NIOs). Each NIO is either a geographic or functional expert and is allotted one staff assistant. "Flexibility" was a high-frequency word in the CIA under Colby, who has recruited an NIO for Economic problems from the RAND Corporation, another for Arms Control ("Mr. Salt Talks"), and others for key geographic areas such as the Soviet Union, China, and the Middle East. Reportedly the NIOs are to be recruited from all agencies within the intelligence community (with a sprinkling of functional experts from the outside), and the military NIOs are to have general officer rank in order to add prestige or "clout" to the position.

A former ONE aide believes that the National Intelligence Officers will be linked much more closely with the NSC staff. Much will depend on how much independence the NIOs will be able to achieve in practice as well as theory and how much outside expertise they can draw upon.

The new system was designed to reduce the pressure for consensus which has frequently resulted in the vague wording of estimates in order to reach agreement on a text or formulation "which divides us least." In the past individual agency dissents to such formulations have been reduced to footnotes to the text of the estimate. In a bulletin to CIA employees Colby stated that "the independence and objectivity" of national estimates would be preserved. A former member of the old national estimates office who opposed the change argues that: "They're selling out to the Pentagon and Defense Intelligence Agency. If the CIA made any contribution to the intelligence community it was that its intelligence analysts had no axes to grind, no military hardware programs and no policies to defend."

On the other hand, military spokesmen point out that CIA has always defended its own policy preferences vigorously, and has been as mission-oriented as any of the agencies in the community.

Most students of the problem, including the late Allen Dulles, argue that one of the greatest hazards of the intelligence business is the tendency to tell the policy-maker what he wants to hear and to slant intelligence in support of policy. A case can be made that although, as demonstrated by the Pentagon Papers, national intelligence estimates were repeatedly ignored during the Johnson Administration,

nevertheless a certain amount of "cognitive dissonance" was involved. In other words, USIB approved and Community produced National Intelligence Estimates were ignored or rejected whenever they failed to lend support to preplanned policy decisions, but not without some sort of intellectual bad conscience or lingering doubts on the part of many decision-makers.

According to some observers the Nixon reorganization enabled Kissinger to disregard CIA-produced estimates with a good conscience and few if any second thoughts since he chairs the NSC Intelligence Committee, and the review panels, which can make their own re-assessments of any estimates which fail to support current or planned courses of action.

Until 1975 Kissinger, as the Fresident's Advisor on National Security Affairs, in effect controlled not only the flow of intelligence but also of final or net estimates to the President.

Many experienced intelligence analysts, both within and outside the government argue with conviction that there has been a serious retrogression in the national intelligence estimating process under the Nixon and Ford Administrations. For example, Arthur Cox writes that such retrogression is due to "a series of actions largely controlled and inspired by Henry Kissinger. The Board of National Estimates has been abolished. The National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) who replaced it are enmeshed in the machinery of the NSC; Kissinger as

Secretary of State dominates the NSC. With his other hat as National Security Adviser and chief of the NSC staff he controls not only the agenda of the NSC, but also the intelligence briefings. Most of the briefings of the President are handled by Kissinger, rather than by Colby."

In order to restore the independence, objectivity and prestige of the intelligence-estimating process, Mr. Cox recommends that a new Office of National Intelligence Estimates (CNE) be created as part of the office of the President, but entirely separate from both CIA and the NSC: "The ONE would be established by statute at the apex of the intelligence community. Its function would be limited exclusively to the preparation of intelligence estimates to assist the President and the members of the NSC in making U.S. foreign and defense policy decisions." He argues that such a reform "would make the national estimates the most important part of our vast intelligence apparatus, with the kind of prestige and authority needed to ensure maximum attention from the policy makers.... a completely independent, highly prestigious body such as this would be able to report the facts about Soviet strategic weapons or Soviet military intentions without any pressure from the Pentagon or others who have time and time again exaggerated the dangers we were facing."24

A second agency in the central or national intelligence complex which has been heavily affected by the Colby reforms is the U.S.

Intelligence Board (USIB) which has been called the "Board of Directors"

or the Supreme Court of the intelligence community. It is chaired by the DCI in his role as leader of the intelligence community. CIA is represented by the Deputy DCI, Lt. General Vernon A. Walters.

Other regular members are the Directors of INR, DIA, and NSA. The Departments of Treasury, Justice (FBI) and the Energy Research and Development Administration are also represented. This is the national or executive level of the USIB.

But there is a second, working level of the USIB, which is the real heart of the intelligence community, where it functions as a community rather than as a collection of vested interests each seeking a share of the national budget. There are the fifteen USIB interagency committees, whose members are drawn from the working level of the various intelligence agencies. These committees concern themselves with daily matters of substance and requirements. Their members are engaged in the continuing process of collection and evaluating information and know what is needed, in the way of hardware, for example, to get the job done. Hence their needs, their requirements, are filtered up through the USI3 executive level. Since the committee secretariats were usually housed in CIA and often charged by CIA personnel, the more important ones tended to become independent empires with vested bureaucratic interests. These have been shaken up, reduced in size and number by personnel cuts, and are now more service-oriented than formerly. The "big four" of the old group will probably continue to exist. Their functions are indicated by their titles: (1) the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee; (2) the Committee

on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation; (3) the Critical Collection Problems Committee; and (4) the SIGINT Committee, which deals with substantive requirements problems in the broad Signal Intelligence field. To these has been added a new committee on Human Intelligence (recently renamed "Human Resources") reflecting re-recognition of the importance of the classical espionage agent, if properly placed, in filling critical gaps in the flood of information collected by overhead reconnaissance and other advanced technological means.

In the past the USIB Committees have generated intelligence requirements with little or no attention to costs and cost-efficiency. Under Colby they have been directed to consolidate and "prioritize" requirements throughout the intelligence community in such a way as to eliminate collection overlap and reduce overall costs. Of the estimated total intelligence community budget of something less than \$4 billion a year, the Defense Department, which finances the reconnaissance and communications intelligence programs, accounts for about \$2 billion, while the CIA proper's share of the remaining \$2 billion has been held to roughly \$700 million. Colby has promised Congress to manage the entire community and save money without letting the intelligence product suffer. Already a series of DCI Directives have been issued and have reached the working levels of all agencies with endorsements requesting compliance.

These directives indicate that a strong effort is being made to rationalize intelligence production in terms of answering such questions

as (a) what do we know? (present data base), (b) what do we need to know? and (c) which agency can fill the gaps at what cost? to be followed by periodic (as opposed to haphazard) evaluation of progress toward stated goals. Among the latter are "surprise avoidance" (i.e., no intelligence failures), no duplication, and reduced costs and staffs.

Meanwhile, within the Intelligence Community under both Schlesinger and Colby there has been a revival of interest in classical espionage, now classed as the covert side of human intelligence (HUMINT). Espionage has often been held in low esteem as producing "uncertain information from questionable people," the comment of Admiral Wemyss, the British First Sea Lord at the end of World War I. With the advent of advanced technological means of surveillance, such as the U2 and SR71 reconnaissance planes, traditional espionage sources have been reduced to where they provide only an estimated five percent of information collected. However, the very success of technical sensors has indicated critical gaps in the information they can supply. For example, overhead photography can show a missile on a launcher. Radar intelligence can track it when fired, and telemetry intelligence (Telint) can provide data on performance of the warhead. But only a well-placed espionage agent (read defector in place) can tell you what is in the warhead of an operational missile and what targets it is to attack. These now recognized shortcomings of technical sensors have revived interest in human espionage to such an extent that, as previously noted, an interagency Human Sources Committee of the U.S. Intelligence Board has recently been created to study the problem. It is

also recognized that "agents in place" such as Stig Wennerstrom or Oleg Penkovsky result from "Acts of God" (or the devil depending on whose ox is being gored). This being the case, the standard response of the clandestine services to additional intelligence requirements is to talk about developing new sources and the need to conserve existing, largely imaginary, assets.

Since 1947 the clandestine service division of CIA has directed both espionage (the illegal collection through secret agents of information to which access is legally denied) and covert political operations, frequently using the same agents for both purposes. This practice has resulted inevitably in degrading the collection function since the "action" (and the rewards) have been largely in the covert operations sector. The careers of both Helms and Colby are illustrative in this regard.

For at least the last two decades, the CIA stations abroad have been interested primarily in political warfare operations and have sought to recruit agents or sources who can be used for such purposes, primarily dissidents, or others willing to engage in the overthrow of existing governments or to provide information needed for more subtle forms of intervention. Then, after a given covert operation has been approved, the emphasis shifts to developing additional sources who can provide information which will insure its success. The main thrust of the station's efforts is directed toward what in military terms is called tactical intelligence, and has something, but actually

very little to do with classical espionage, which has been aimed mainly at collecting information of strategic importance.

The collection requirements for espionage can be satisfied only by a radically different approach and by the recruitment of entirely different sources than the disaffected political activists who gravitate toward covert operations. What is needed are well placed people who have access to plans, strategic dialogue, staff papers, decision-making, etc., sources who can provide information on strategic intentions rather than details with respect to hardware and capabilities. The latter kind of information can be provided by technical sensors.

In addition, espionage must become responsive to Washington-based requirements rather than merely reporting general news based on hearsay evidence. The emphasis on covert operations has produced an essential mismatch between what is collected and what is needed to fill the gaps in the information provided by technical sensors. Moreover, the sources recruited for political warfare purposes rarely if ever have access to such information.

Clearly, current clandestine collection practices and recruiting practices will have to be radically altered if there is to be any substantial improvement in U.S. espionage capabilities. But such a reversal is unlikely given the bureaucratic clout of vested interests in the clandestine services with their stake in the preservation of the status quo. The need to separate the clandestine collection effort from covert political operations has been recognized by such non-establishment scholars as Harry Howe Ransom, as well as by dedicated professionals

serving on the USIB Human Sources Committee. However, unless the need for such separation can be impressed on policy-making and executive levels within both the intelligence community and the government at large, the weight of vested interests will almost certainly perpetuate the present organizational structure. Probably only the President, working through the NSC channel, has enough clout to insure that this basic reform is carried out.

Criticism and Investigation of Intelligence Activities

Serious criticism of covert operations began with the publication in 1964 of the author's Strategy of Subversion and The Invisible Government by David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, both works, but especially the latter, calling for closer scrutiny and control over the entire intelligence community. However, it was not until roughly a decade later, after the Watergate affair, that investigative journalists such as Seymour Hersh of the New York Times touched off sensational Congressional investigations into CIA's domestic activities. Covert operations then became matters of both public and especially Congressional concern. Meanwhile the groundwork for that concern had been laid by personal memoirs such as Patrick McGarvey's C.I.A., The Myth and the Madness (New York, 1972), and Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks' CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (New York, 1975), an important, responsible critique which received wide publicity as the first book in American history to have been censored (by CIA) prior to publication. Most damaging from the CIA point of view were Philip

Agee's CIA Diary, published abroad (England, 1975) and The Abuses of the Intelligence Agencies, edited by Jerry J. Berman and Morton H. Halperin (Wahsington, The Center for National Security Studies, 1975). Adding fuel to the fire coming from the private sector, Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller's commission on illicit CIA activities published with Report to the President in June 1975 in which it found the agency guilty of nearly every serious allegation made privately against it. By way of contrast the so-called Murphy Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy in its Report of June, 1975 devoted only a little more than one of its fifteen pages on Intelligence to what it called "covert action" defined somewhat disingenuously as "activity abroad intended not to gather information but to influence events, an activity midway between diplomacy and war."

According to Leslie H. Gelb, this "spate of Congressional and press investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency has cast that organization, for many Americans, in a new and sinister light....Past concerns over allegations of irresponsibility and zealotry within the C.I.A. have been heightened by a cumulative impression, at times, of a monster run amok." The figure of a rogue elephant has also been used at times. Both agency spokesmen and serious critics realize that such pejorative metaphors are false and misleading. However, there can be no question that the CIA image, both at home and abroad, has been seriously damaged. The dramatic murder on December 23, 1975 of Richard Skeffington Welch, CIA Station Chief in Athens, Greece by

unknown terrorists, illustrates both the low esteem to which the agency has fallen abroad and anti-Americanism stemming from CIA association with conservative regimes frequently controlled by military juntas.

Damage Assessment: The Effect on CIA and the Intelligence Community

Sometime in November, 1975, in an unpublished interview, an official who has had considerable experience at the Directorate level of CIA but who prides himself on his objectivity, since he has no personal institutional axe to grind and no publicly stated positions to defend, made a number of observations with respect to the Intelligence Community the substance of which are summarized below.

First. Ever since Watergate, the Intelligence Community, especially CIA, has been caught in a power play between Congress and the Chief Executive over Intelligence, especially the problems involved in the management and control of covert operations including Congressional oversight.

Second. There have been real abuses and malpractices with the CIA which need to be corrected. Ironically, many of these lapses have been brought out by Colby himself, whose unprecedented candor in this regard has aroused much bitter opposition from old hands in the clandestine services who argue that he should have "stonewalled" any attempt to disclose them.

Third. In a sense Congressional and other investigations have had a positive effect in that they have dramatized the need for a much

tighter executive command, control and accountability within CIA itself. As a result, in addition to other internal reforms, the role, functions and clout of the Inspector General have been upgraded and secure channels established through which abuses may be reported at any level without fear of reprisal.

Fourth. HUMINT, i.e., information collected either open of from knowledgeable persons or clandestinely from covert sources, is indispensable. Coloy's position in this regard is unexceptionable: "In a world which can destroy itself through misunderstanding or miscalculation, it is important that our leaders have a clear perception of the motives, intention, and strategies of other powers so that they can be deterred, negotiated about, or countered in the interest of peace or, if necessary, the ultimate security of our country. These kinds of insights cannot be obtained by means of technical sensors or analysis alone. They can only be obtained from closed societies by clandestine means of collection, i.e. espionage."27 However. the most valuable human intelligence usually comes from open sources. For example, the most important inputs in the national intelligence estimating process have come from reports of sophisticated and highly knowledgeable Foreign Service Officers whose area expertise can never be replaced by technical sources. Ironically, because of the brush with which the whole intelligence business has been tarred, most Foreign Service Officers would bristle at the idea of being thought of as sources. Moreover, because of the cloud over the agency, many overt sources outside the government have dried up to some extent.

Fifth. Morale in the clandestine services is very low, since many aides who have devoted the better part of their lives to what they regard as a necessary service believe that their role and functions have not only been publicly tarred but seriously downgraded by management within the agency itself. As far as clandestine collection is concerned, many valuable sources that have been active have requested permission to lay low for a while until the storm of investigations blows over. This kind of thing is harmful, it hurts, but the damage is not irreparable.

Sixth. So far as military capabilities are concerned, since they rest mainly on intelligence collected from open and technical sources, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger to the contrary notwithstanding, they have not been appreciably affected by past and current investigations. DIA and the other Service agencies will probably bear the brunt of future investigations, but in these agencies the vulnerable spots are due to inefficiency rather than sins of commission. Seventh. In regard to Congressional investigations of Intelligence, although no one has hit an artery yet, so to speak, the potential of doing great harm if they continue on and on can not be overlooked. One of their worst effects is that top level officials such as Colby have to spend 60 - 80% of their time and energy on them, when simply minding the store is a full-time job in itself. Under these conditions there is always the potential danger that an incipient crisis threatening national security-a small cloud on the horizon---will be either overlooked or its threat minimized. One of the most sensitive

spots which needs better understanding and protection comes under the label of "sources and methods." Two categories here: First, HUMINT sources both open and covert must be protected, otherwise the open ones will soon dry up, and the clandestine ones may be compromised or even eliminated. Second, there are certain technical capabilities and sources which are truly secret, i.e. no other country really knows that we have them, and it is important that they not know. A familiar example is code-breaking, but there are also new advances in the state of the art in collection and processing which must be protected. Eighth. The CIA Charter needs to be revised in order to set limits which will reduce the temptation to extra-legal free-wheeling and violation of the first and fourth amendments. However, overly restrictive legislation could so hamstring the agency that it could not function effectively. Perhaps by the spring of 1976 such legislation can be worked out in collaboration with responsible intelligence and passed by next fall.

<u>Minth</u>. Ray Cline's thesis that the head of the NSC should be separated from any other government task is correct. The present dual role of Kissinger as Secretary of State and Head of the NSC is both abnormal and unfortunate. The formal intelligence structure of the NSC has functioned only fitfully and spasmodically, with only two meetings of the NSC Intelligence Committee in the last several months.

As indicated by the last point, this interview took place before the abrupt dismissal by President Ford of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and William E. Colby himself on November 2, while in the same move, widely heralded as "the Sunday Massacre," Kissinger was replaced as head of the NSC by his deputy, General Brent Scowcroft. Shortly thereafter Lietenant General Daniel O. Graham resigned as chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency because he felt deeply associated with Schlesinger and was also concerned over the dismissal of Colby. Donald Rumsfeld of the White House staff, and George Bush, Ambassador to China, two old Congressional associates of Ford, were named to the Defense and CIA posts, although Colby was later asked to remain at his post during a transitional period and continued to represent the agency at top-level meetings with the President and his advisers through a period extending into the first two months of 1976.

Ironically, the timing, and above all the abrupt manner in which Ford chose to dismiss Colby, aroused both anger and resentment among law enforcement and intelligence professionals, and came as a devastating blow to agency morale, "already reeling under the unaccustomed spotlight of Congressional investigations and press exposure."

Although after much dispute over the propriety of appointing a politician to such an important post, the nomination of Bush was finally approved on December 18, 1975 by the Senate Armed Services Committee but only after it received a letter from the President stating that he would no longer consider Bush as a vice-presidential running mate in the 1976 elections. Bush himself stated publicly that he hoped to return to private life after his tour

of duty in the CIA post, and it was considered unlikely that a President taking office in January 1977, if he were not Mr. Ford, would retain Bush as the Director of Central Intelligence. 29

Dr. Bruce M. Lancaster, a former Foreign Service Officer and Colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserves writes that Congressional investigations and press exposure of intelligence activities will have mixed effects in both the short and long term.

Short Term. "Some losses, as U.S. ability, integrity and judgment are questioned. In regard to agent losses, much of the cover now being blown by Congress and in the press is so light that our most dangerous enemies have long since known who the exposed agents were. Some sources, however, will dry up as they wait and see how we re-organize."

Long Term. "The long term effects should be largely beneficial.

(a) The military attache's role has been well defined for a century and the rules of the game generally accepted. At issue are civilian-directed operations, especially the clandestine. The goal should be better guidance and control by the White House. Despite public concern at the powers of an 'imperial presidency,' the ability of the White House to provide anything beyond general guidance to the intelligence community, plus specific instructions in a restricted number of cases, is limited by its small staff and by preoccupation with other urgent national business. Even before he moved many of them with him to the State Department, Dr. Kissinger's NSC staff seldom numbered more than forty professional level employees. The limits on the span

of control which small Presidential and Congressional staffs can exercise were evident to Senator Howard Baker, who remarked that he 'came away from the Watergate inquiry pretty well convinced that nobody in the Congress knows what's happening in the Intelligence Community and with the disquieting suspicion that maybe nobody in the White House knows.' (b) Hopefully, there will be less temptation in foreign affairs to use the 'cheap shot' covert operation rather than traditional measures of diplomacy, with more consideration of the effects of covert operations on broad foreign policy goals. Thomas Yancy, an army colonel who was so good at his craft that he was accepted as G-2 of the Fifth Marine Amphibicus Corps taught me over thirty years ago that you should never begin an intelligence operation without assuming eventual discovery and assessing the probable costs of such discovery."

Prospects for Reform and Intervention

Ever since the clandestine Gulf of Tonkin incidents opened the door to large scale military intervention in Vietnam, Congress has been painfully aware that covert operations can lead the nation unwittingly down the garden path to war. The decision to wage war, many Senators contend, should properly rest with Congress. As a result of the war in Vietnam and the Watergate affair, the CIA has come under heavier and more determined Congressional scrutiny than at any time in its history. No less than five committees, four in the Senate and one in the House, were stirred by the Watergate disclosures to

inquire into various aspects of CIA's operations, and Chairman John C. Stennis of the Armed Services Subcommittee on intelligence stated that hearings would eventually be held on revising the agency's charter, the National Security Act of 1947.

Ironically, although Congress was aware of the need for closer surveillance over CIA well before the Vietnam conflict, it failed to act decisively in this regard time and again. Since the National Security Act of 1947 and the 1949 Central Intelligence Act previously noted, nearly 200 bills calling for closer surveillance of intelligence agencies have been introduced. Most of them attempted to establish a Congressional Committee to oversee the activities of CIA. Only two of them ever reached the floor of Congress, where both were decisively defeated by more than two-thirds majorities.

In spite of all the investigations and publicity, whether the Congress will in practice pass legislation which will provide for effective supervision over covert operations remains to be seen. The record for the period 1974-75 is mixed. According to Leslie Gelb, the 1974 amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, which passed in the wake of disclosures of CIA involvement in the coup against the Allende regime in Chile improved supervision only marginally:

"The law made the President personally responsible for covert operations, but did not define such operations. It was riddled with loopholes. For example, it said the operations had to be reported to Congress, 'in a timely fashion'; in practice this has meant after

the fact, when little can be done about it. The main contribution of the law was to enlarge Congressional knowledge of covert actions.

Until that time, only the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees were privy. These four committees had formed themselves into subcommittees with ties of friendship to the agency; even some of their members described their 'oversight' as perfunctory. To this cozy situation the amendment added the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee....

The fact is that many liberals stay away from all the intelligence subcommittees because they do not want to be tagged in the future with having tacitly approved an operation, even if they agreed with it, or because they want to be free to criticize if anything goes wrong." 31

As to Administration plans:

"The White House, the CIA and its many friends in town, who have long constituted a potent, informal society for prevention of tampering with the agency, are trying to turn aside whatever movement for reform may be developing. Ford's own reorganization plan, according to those in the know, appears to feature a Joint Committee of Congress with little power, a more independent Inspector General of the C.I.A., a strengthening of his Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and perhaps a new Presidential special assistant for intelligence. If that runs into resistance on Capital Hill, the White House is apparently prepared to send its proposed new C.I.A. director, Ambassador George Bush, to Congress to plead against new legislation that would tie his hands before he has had time to study the problem.

"Normally, Congress would be responsive to such a plea; time would pass, and the momentum toward reform would dissipate. How well delaying tactics of this sort would work in this case depends on whether the House and Senate are ready, at long last, to assume responsibility in the field of foreign intelligence. The question is whether Congress is disposed to treat the future of the C.I.A. as a transitory problem, rolling a few heads, altering institutional facades, and warning against violations of the law, or whether it sees it as part of the Vietnam-Watergate experience, requiring some fundamental checks on the covert exercise of power."

In sum, unless the historic confrontation triggered by Watergate between the Executive branch of the government and Congress is resolved clearly in favor of Congress, no fundamental change in the role and functions of CIA is likely. This applies to the Presidential use of covert political and military operations as an instrument of foreign policy no matter how much "dirty tricks" may be publicly deplored when used to influence the electoral process at home. In this regard Nixon's secret bombing of Laos and Cambodia set a precedent which future presidents may be tempted to follow in similar circumstances.

Ever since Machiavelli, Western statesmen and politicians have been fascinated with the idea of combining the wiles of the fox with the strength of the lion. In the crusading atmosphere of the Cold War and in Vietnam, it was hoped that covert operations might provide such a winning combination. That hope was based on ignorance, which has always been a poor counselor. Nevertheless, as long as the clandestine services of the CIA remain intact and ready to serve again "as the President's loyal tool", the temptation to use them may prove as irresistible in the future as it has in the past. Certainly during 1975, a year when Congressional investigations and press exposures reached their climax, the lure of covert political action proved irresistible to both Secretary of State Kissinger and to President Ford, since during this period the Administration poured millions of dollars through CIA clandestine channels into the hands of non-Communist parties in Fortugal and, in a second such operation, funnelled money and arms through President Mobuto of Zaire to support liberation movements in Angola, thus precipitating a confrontation on this issue with Congress that continued on into 1976.

FOOTNOTES

- 1. Michael Brecher, Blema Steinberg, and Janice Stein, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 13 (March 1969), pp. 80-81. See also the series of articles on national and international images by Karl W. Deutsch and Richard L. Merritt, Ralph K. White, and Milton J. Rosenberg in Herbert C. Kelman, ed., International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New York, 1965), pp. 130-337.
- Allen Dulles in the essay condensation of his <u>The Craft of Intelligence</u>, which appeared in <u>Harper's Magazine</u> (April, 1963), p. 132.
- 3. Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Hamden, Connecticut, 1965), p. 201.
- 4. ibid., p. 200.
- 5. Paul W. Blackstock, "Intelligence and Covert Operations: Changing Doctrine and Practice" (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina, Department of Government and International Studies, 1973), p. 32.
- 6. Kenneth Strong, Men of Intelligence: A study of the roles and decisions of Chiefs of Intelligence from World War I to the present day (New York, 1971), p. 140.
- 7. ibid., p. 132.
- 8. Paul W. Blackstock, The Strategy of Subversion: Manipulating the Politics of Other Nations (Chicago, 1964), Chs. 4, "Divided Policy-making and Operational Responsibilities", and 5, "The Problem of Reliable Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence", pp. 95-142.
- 9. Strong, op. cit., p. 156.
- 10. Ray S. Cline, "Policy Without Intelligence," Foreign Policy 17 (Winter 1974-75), p. 132.
- 11. ibid., pp. 130-131.
- 12. See especially Richard Cottam, Competitive Interference and Twentieth-Century Diplomacy (Pittsburgh, 1907) and Andrew M. Scott, The Revolution in Statecraft: Informal Penetration (New York, 1965).

- 13. On SOE operations see Michael Ford, SOE in France (London, 1966), based on official archives. Historians and political scientists have been denied access to comparable U.S. archives, and the only serious study in the field, based on secondary sources and extensive interviews is Richard Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkely, 1972).
- 14. See J. Anthony Lukas, "Watergate: The Story So Far," The New York Times Magazine, July 22, 1973, reprinted as a Warner Modular Publication No. 971 (Andover, 1973), pp. 1-40.
- 15. Graham Hovey, "Fog and Worse on Angola," The New York Times, December 30, 1975, p. 25. See also the official report of Kissinger's press conference on Angola and Detente, December 23, 1975 (Washington, Department of State, PR 627/81).
- 16. Christopher S. Wren, "Africa: An Inviting Arena for Moscow,"

 The New York Times, December 28, 1975, Section 4, p. 1, in which
 "a well-placed Soviet insider" in Moscow is quoted as saying:
 "We've been supporting our firends in Angola for more than a
 decade. Why should we stop now just to satisfy Mr. Kissinger?"
- 17. Graham Hovey, loc. cit.
- 18. Blackstock, op. cit., pp. 304-320.
- 19. Albert Cox, The Myths of National Security (Boston, 1975), pp. 110-111.
- 20. <u>ibid.</u>, p. 202.

. .. ,

- 21. Frank Church, as quoted in <u>Intelligence Report</u>, Vol. 1, No. 1, published by The Center for National Security Studies, Washington, D.C. (December 1975), p. 8.
- 22. "Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States," Recort to the President, June 1975 (Washington, D.C., 1975) known and hereafter cited as the Rockefeller Report, pp. 210-212.
- 23. The Rockefeller Report, p. 244.
- 24. Cox, op. cit., pp. 205-207.
- 25. "Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, Report to the President (Washington, D.C., 1975), p. 100, hereafter cited as the Murphy Report.
- 26. Leslie H. Gelb, "Should We Play Dirty Tricks in the World?" The New York Times Magazine, December 21, 1975, Section 6, p. 10.

- 27. This is a close paraphrase of the position stated by Colby at a conference on CIA sponsored by the Center for National Security Studies, held in Washington in the Senate Hearing Room, September 12-13, 1974, later published in The Center Magazine, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (Washington, March/April 1975), p. 73.
- 28. Laurence Stern, "CIA Shaken by Timing of Firing," The Washington Post, November 4, 1975.
- 29. Walter Pincus, "Bush Nomination Cleared by Panel," The Washington Post, December 19, 1975.
- 30. Bruce M. Lancaster, letter to the author dated January 1, 1976 with a draft article entitled "Ts Anybody in Charge of U.S. Intelligence Activities Abroad? (Why Congress Alone Can Never Control CIA)," which will be published in John Forshee (ed.), Readings in American Politics and Government (New York, 1976).
- 31. Gelb, op. cit., pp. 18-19.
- 32. ibid., p. 20.

.

33. William Safire, "Cold War II", The New York Times, December 29, 1975, p. C25. The column begins: "As 1975 draws to an end, detente is mead. The Second Cold War is under way."